Document Type

Article

Publication Date

5-14-2024

Department

Engineering

Keywords

safety, resilience, actuators, cyber-physical systems, detectors, watermarking, probabilistic logic, fault detection, fault-tolerant systems, robust control

Abstract

This article provides a tool for analyzing mechanisms that aim to achieve resilience against stealthy, or undetectable, attacks on cyber-physical systems. We consider attackers who are able to corrupt all of the inputs and outputs of the system. To counter such attackers, a response scheme must be implemented that keeps the attacker from corrupting the inputs and outputs of the system for certain periods of time. To aid in the design of such a response scheme, our tool provides sufficient lengths for these periods of time in order to ensure safety with a particular probability. We provide an upper bound on how long the system can remain under stealthy attack before the safety constraints are violated. Furthermore, we show how a detector limits the set of biases an attacker can exert on the system while still remaining stealthy, aiding a system operator in the design of the detector. Our contributions are demonstrated with an illustrative example.

Comments

© 2024 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.

Source Publication Title

IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control

Publisher

IEEE

Volume

69

Issue

12

First Page

8234

DOI

10.1109/TAC.2024.3401013

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