
Pro Rege

Volume 42 | Number 1

Article 4

September 2013

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
Sewell, Keith C. (2013) "Remembrance and Research: Some Reflections on a Pending Centenary -- Conclusion," *Pro Rege*: Vol. 42: No. 1, 22 - 30.
Available at: http://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege/vol42/iss1/4

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A quarterly faculty publication of
Dordt College, Sioux Center, Iowa

Remembrance and Research: Some Reflections on a Pending Centenary—Conclusion



by Keith C. Sewell

The initial part of this discussion concluded that the many responses to the publications of Fritz Fischer broadened the debate on the origins of the war of 1914. Another example of this creative widening of the discussion is the highly perceptive exchange in 1971/72 between Joachim Remak and Paul Schroeder.¹ A decade later, the analysis of Germany offered by David E. Kaiser drew further attention to the deficiencies in British policy.² In England, A. J. A. Morris drew attention, in considerable detail, to matters half-forgotten: "radical" concerns about the direction of British foreign

policy after 1901, and the growth of an increasingly strident anti-German lobby within the British commercial and political elites.³ The latter was expressed at the highest level in the famous "Crowe Memorandum" of August 1, 1907.⁴

Arguably an early turning point in the functioning of the European states system took place with the collapse in the late 1880s of the diplomatic alignment known as the "three emperors' league." It was developed by the then Chancellor of Germany, Otto von Bismarck (1815-98). This *Dreikaiserbund* brought together Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. After Bismarck's triumph over France in 1870-71, Bismarck's policy was one of peace and security. The *Dreikaiserbund* ensured that an isolated France was unable to cause serious trouble for the new German Empire, founded in 1871. In spite of strains, the *Dreikaiserbund* was effective for much of the 1870s and 1880s. For the time being, it ensured the diplomatic and military isolation of France. However, it came to grief, especially after the forced retirement of Bismarck in 1890, because of German inability to reconcile Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans. Forced by circumstances to choose between Austria and Russia, Germany chose Austria for both geo-political and cultural reasons.

The somewhat incongruous consequence of Russia's alienation from Germany's pro-Austrian orientation was the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance by 1894.⁵ Henceforth Germany

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and Austria, the “central powers” (later forming a “Triple Alliance” with Italy) were confronted by a Franco-Russian combination to the west and east respectively. The “militarism” of Germany—largely inherited from Prussia—may be at least partly explained by her central position in Europe. Germany was the only great power in Europe that

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had a common frontier with three other great powers.⁶ Strengthened by their alliance with Russia, successive French governments now sought to detach Italy from her association with the “central powers” and harbored the ambition of re-acquiring the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine (lost in 1871)—an objective impossible to contemplate without a general war.

The emergent Franco-Russian alliance was of deep concern to Great Britain. Acting in concert, these two powers could challenge the position of Great Britain in Africa and Asia respectively. At the same time, any prospect of an Anglo-German alignment came to nothing—notwithstanding royal, spiritual, and cultural ties. Great Britain could not provide Germany with aid in the military protection of her land frontiers, while Germany could not support Great Britain in Asia or Africa. The initial development of the German high-seas fleet can be viewed as an attempt to gain greater leverage in her relations with Great Britain. Germany was never in a position to challenge British maritime supremacy in this period.

In the 1980s, Paul Kennedy, in two densely argued studies, discerned that British entry into the 1914 conflict was, in truth, driven by her Franco-Russian commitments and fear of German industrial strength and success, rather than by honorable concerns for Belgian neutrality.⁷ In practice,

once attention was properly widened beyond the German violation of Belgian neutrality, the question of Russian policy objectives (and British perceptions thereof) in the pre-August 1914 situation could never be excluded from any adequate discussion on the outbreak of the war.⁸ For Great Britain, her relations with Russia in central Asia, where the security of India was of paramount consideration, were both fraught and delicate.⁹

As the generation of Fischer enthusiasts passed from the English scene, a much more nuanced analysis of the period 1904-14 was offered by Keith Wilson in a series of studies marked by considerable depth and perception. In recent decades, Wilson has done more than any other English historian to open up discussion on these issues.¹⁰ And the context changed. In 1989 the Berlin Wall came down, and in 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed. Access to Russian archives is still not easy but is not impossible. Certainly, our view of what Butterfield called “the Russian connection” is now more detailed than in his lifetime. A steady flow of studies more than confirms his mid-century assertions and vindicates Gooch’s 1929 pointed cross-questioning of Grey.¹¹ The sometimes flamboyantly outspoken Niall Ferguson has offered an account that is deliberately counter-Fischer and critical of the policy of Edward Grey.¹²

Into the 1890s, British policy concerning alliances was characterized as “splendid isolation.” In the new century, however, Great Britain changed her posture dramatically. On January 30, 1902 she signed an alliance with the Empire of Japan.¹³ On April 4, 1904 she entered into a series of “friendly understandings,” known as the *Entente Cordiale*, with France; these addressed a wide range of outstanding issues. As if this were not dramatic enough, she signed a Convention with Russia on August 31, 1907. In other words, by 1907 Great Britain had come to close “understandings” with her old enemies in Europe and Asia respectively.¹⁴

These considerations present us with a fundamental question: *Why did Great Britain, after the turn of the century, abandon its policy of “splendid isolation” and become involved in the rival alliance systems of the continental great powers, adherence to which were to draw her seemingly inexorably into war in 1914?*

Before answering this question, we need to emphasize three points. *First*, as we have noted, France and Russia had already developed a full and close military alliance. Great Britain did not join this alliance formally, wishing to enjoy some continued freedom of action. The result was that she was always in some measure an outsider, France and Russia down to 1914 having a much closer relationship with each other than with Great Britain. A further consequence was that the British found themselves enduring the disadvantages of an alliance without the full advantages of alliance membership. *Second*, with British friendship assured, France might become more emboldened towards Germany, and Russia towards Austria Hungary. *Third*, a growing sense of “encirclement,” coupled with statistics that suggested an increasing relative military inferiority, might serve to drive Germany and / or Austria Hungary towards desperate measures.

If these were the ramifications of the British change in policy, they were not its cause and motivation. It was the empire-minded governing Conservative Party, with Lord Lansdowne (1845-1927) as Foreign Secretary, that initiated immense changes in British foreign policy commencing in 1902. The *same policy* was continued, after 1905, by their archrivals, the Liberal Party, led initially by Henry Campbell-Bannerman (1836-1908) and after 1908 by H.H. Asquith (1852-1928). A key to this apparent contradiction is that the Liberal Party was a coalition of groupings and opinions, and that the Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, and Asquith, his Prime Minister for most of the relevant period, were members of the group within the party known as the “Liberal Imperialists.”¹⁵ Their views on domestic policy differed substantially from that of their Conservative predecessors, but their general outlook on foreign and imperial policy did not.

Historians can fall victims to the categories that they use to organize the vast amounts of information that they have to address. Sometimes the categories reflect the organization of government departments. In this case, it is important not to organize our understanding of the formulation and implementation of high policy in this period into separate domestic, foreign, and imperial policy categories. We might call this “the fallacy of separate

mental boxes.” To answer the fundamental question posed above, the too often unstated truth is that Great Britain’s turn towards an alliance (with Japan) and “understandings” (with France and Russia) *arose from her experience of the dangers of international diplomatic isolation at the time of the South African War of 1899-1902.*

This reality can be missed, thanks to the “separate mental boxes” fallacy. For example, in the 1960s, the scholar G.W. Monger rightly focused on 1900-07 as the crucial period of policy change, but without sufficiently considering the significance of the South African conflict for the momentous changes in British foreign policy that he explored.¹⁶ This oversight was as understandable as it was problematic. The South African conflict could be classified as “imperial-colonial” rather than “foreign.” Certainly, the supremacy of the Royal Navy prevented other powers from intervening, in spite of the widespread international disapproval of the British action. In addition, not only has the “Great War” of 1914 overshadowed its predecessor, but crucial documents concerning the fomenting of the 1899 conflict were also long to surface.¹⁷

In the United Kingdom the *Public Records Act* (1958) as now applied provides for the release of all but the most sensitive government documents after thirty years—the “thirty years rule.” Prior to its full operation, public access to documents could take very much longer. It should not be too great a surprise that documents relating to the British high-level decision-making that led up to the outbreak of the (second) South African War (the “Boer War”) in 1899 were for a long time unavailable. It was only in the early 1950s that Ethel Drus published a series of pieces traversing the period from the Jameson Raid of 1895/6 to the outbreak of war in 1899. These pointed to the complicity of Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914), Secretary of State for the Colonies in the crucial period 1895-1903),¹⁸ along with Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902)¹⁹ and later Alfred Milner (1854-1925),²⁰ in provoking military conflict with the Afrikaner republics.²¹ In her wake came important work by J.S. Marais, G.H.L. Le May, and more recently A.N. Porter and Iain R. Smith.²²

The truth is that the driving principle of British policy in South Africa was not the civil rights of the

uitlanders (non-citizens working in and under the jurisdiction of the Transvaal) as such. It was actually about possession and control of the Great Reef, with its immense bounty of gold and diamonds.²³ This was a war of imperial aggression, in which the British Empire waged war on two small and remote republics. The plight of small nations was as nothing when imperial objectives were in view. Arguably, the British acted the part of Ahab, who, although he already had much wealth, coveted and seized Naboth's vineyard (I Kings 21.1-28).

The policy of aggression in South Africa pursued by the ruling Conservatives provoked considerable opposition within Great Britain. The summer of 1899 was one of high tension, with families and communities deeply divided over what was happening. Radicals, Free Churchmen, and Free Presbyterians opposed their government's policies and were labeled "Pro-Boers" for their stand. Campbell-Bannerman, the future Prime Minister, was to accuse the British government in parliament of employing "methods of barbarism" in South Africa.²⁴ In his latter years Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), sometime Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1901-6), was no friend of Great Britain and ever cautious as to her intentions. Accordingly, he inclined towards Imperial Germany. The basis of his caution was British aggression against the Transvaal. He sympathized with the predicament of the South African republics for both ethnic and confessional reasons.²⁵

To recap, by 1914 Great Britain had aligned itself with France and Russia, essentially for reasons of imperial security. This alignment was not about Belgium. That was why maintaining a policy acceptable to Russia was so important, as Butterfield rightly discerned. What Butterfield did *not* explore in any depth was why this change in high policy became so necessary after 1902. The answer is the strong international reaction against British action in South Africa. Arguably, fear of being overtaken in many key areas by Germany and or the United States spurred the British down the path of yet more expansion in order to try to compensate, but her actions brought about a level of isolation that was not "splendid" but dangerous. Therefore, Great Britain formed her alliance with Japan and "understandings" with France and Russia. The latter were al-

ways problematic at best and dangerous at worst. In 1912 Winston S. Churchill (1874-1965), then First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote to his Prime Minister, Asquith, rightly complaining that "Everyone must feel, who knows the facts, that we have all the obligations of an alliance, without its advantages and above all without its precise definitions."²⁶

On May 26, 1911 Grey advised the Prime Ministers of the British Dominions,²⁷ "we are not committed by entanglements which tie our hands. Our hands are free."²⁸ This was not strictly true. Grey may have been being disingenuous, or may have deceived others, having first in some measure been self-deceived. The truth is that a close alignment with France, and especially with Russia, would not have been acceptable to many in the ruling Liberal Party, including many members of Asquith's cabinet. The "Liberal Imperialist" faction within the Liberal Party controlled the actual conduct of foreign policy because it included the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. When the

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great crisis arose in July 1914, with Grey having to address the House of Commons under conditions of high tension, Great Britain would have found it extraordinarily difficult to discharge its actual and largely secret obligations to France and Russia if Germany had *not* invaded Belgium.

In effect, Great Britain *had* to go to war in Europe in 1914 because of the alignments that she had formed arising from her aggression in South Africa and in order to protect her over-extended empire.²⁹ It was Ahab's successors who endured the judgmental consequences of his crime. There was a strong connection between British aggressions in

Southern Africa and the fearful bloodletting that the British endured on the western front in 1914-18. God is not mocked—we reap what we sow, although perhaps with mitigation if we repent quickly. If in 1918-19 Great Britain and France emerged victorious, theirs was only a pyrrhic victory. They were both severely weakened. Great Britain lost its preeminent position. The true beneficiaries were the United States and the Empire of Japan. Even without a Great War, it is most likely that Great Britain would have experienced a relative decline in the twentieth century as other leading nations closed the gap in the immense lead Great Britain had opened up in the earlier nineteenth century.

Arguably, one of the worst things that may be said of the Lansdowne-Grey policy is that it emboldened the Franco-Russian Alliance to the point where Germany and Austria felt driven into a corner and overly inclined to risk preemptive conflict. Under such circumstances, Austria—confronted with the assassinations in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914—would naturally adopt a stridently severe “anti-terrorist” stance against Serbia, viewing it as necessary for the retention of her status as a great power. Serbia, whose hands were far from clean, appealed successfully to Russia, the first Great Power to mobilize its forces against other great powers in 1914. And so it was that all domestic efforts to keep Great Britain out of the conflict failed. Great Britain was committed because of “entanglements” previously incurred for essentially imperial reasons. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that without such “entanglements,” she may have been able to act as a credible “honest broker” and play the part of an effective mediator and peacemaker.

These entanglements and their implications prompt further questions: *Was the great wave of British imperial assertiveness in the late nineteenth century inevitable? Was there another path open to Great Britain at that time?* Such questions inevitably direct our attention to the great public policy debate, conducted in parliament and beyond, between Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81)³⁰ and William Ewart Gladstone (1809-98).³¹ Disraeli, later Earl Beaconsfield (Conservative), stood for crown and empire and was Prime Minister from 1874 to 1880. It was he who gave Queen Victoria the title “Empress of India.” Gladstone (Liberal) stood for

liberty and commerce and was Prime Minister from 1868-74, 1880-86, and finally 1892-4. Intellectually, Gladstone combined classical scholarship with Christian conviction. He was a High Church Anglican with a strong Augustinian orientation. The confrontation between the two leaders attained a high intensity in the late 1870s, reaching its peak in Gladstone’s “Midlothian campaign” speeches of 1879.³² The issue seemed to come to this: was an Ottoman Empire that repeatedly treated the Christian peoples of the Balkans with calculated cruelty to be upheld for the sake of protecting British imperial interests against Russia? This issue could be construed as a confrontation of *Rechtsstaat* against *Machtstaat*, right against might, or liberty against empire.³³

Gladstone encouraged the rise of responsible self-government in Great Britain’s colonies of settlement.³⁴ He presciently anticipated the pre-eminence of the United States in the twentieth century.³⁵ Following his return to office in 1880, he vexed the empire-minded Conservatives by the readiness with which he accepted the return of the Transvaal to Afrikaner rule.³⁶ Gladstone was more accepting of openness and diversity than the imperialists of his day. He was deeply sensible of the distinctive and non-English national cultures and spiritual complexion of Scotland, Wales, and Ireland. Across the North Sea, “Kuyper,” according to James Bratt, “admired no one in politics more than Gladstone.”³⁷

Opposition within his own party to his advocacy of “home rule” for Ireland eventually split the Liberal Party in 1886 and thereby denied it office.³⁸ It was the Conservatives—the party of empire—who dominated British politics thereafter for almost all of the time down to 1905/6 and who went to war in 1899. The “Liberal Imperialist” faction, within the Liberal party, was amongst those who were not in accord with the Gladstone-like approach to Ireland. In retrospect, it is hard not to reflect on how much happier Anglo-Irish relations might have been if Gladstone’s proposals, or something like them, had carried the day in the nineteenth century. Arguably Britain’s greatest Prime Minister in the nineteenth century, Gladstone showed his fellow countrymen an alternative way to imperialism, but his wisdom was rejected. The

tragic consequences remain beyond human calculation.

Winston S. Churchill had seen action in the South African conflict and was not without admiration for Great Britain's Afrikaner enemies. In his maiden speech to the House of Commons on February 18, 1901 he startled members by declaring, "if I were a Boer I hope I should be fighting in the field."³⁹ Of the Afrikaners he wrote, "I do sympathize with their love of freedom."⁴⁰ There are suggestions that Churchill—who certainly did not get everything right, but whom his fellow countrymen rightly revere for his early warnings of the Nazi threat

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and effective leadership at the crucial juncture—was haunted by a sense of the long-term consequences of Great Britain's aggression in South Africa. Even in the critical years of 1940-41, his mind could turn to the roots of Great Britain's dire situation as they lay in earlier policies. After June 1940, with France prostrate and Germany triumphant over much of the European continent, and with Russia not yet in the war, it was more than obvious that Great Britain's lifeline was the United States.

At this critical point, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) appointed Harry Hopkins (1890-1946) as his personal intermediary with Churchill. Hopkins was born in Sioux City and raised in Grinnell, Iowa. On January 25, 1941, Churchill was discoursing late into the night with Harry Hopkins, who was visiting him in England. In the course of a wide-ranging and reflective conversation, as recorded by the ever meticulous Jack

Colville (1915-87), then Assistant Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, Churchill ruminated ruefully that "Joseph Chamberlain had pushed us into the Boer War and, by setting Europe against us, had stimulated the Germans into building a fleet."⁴¹ If we take these words at face value, and ponder with care their weighty implications, they should serve to drive us to a profound reassessment of British policy for the two decades commencing in 1895.

From 1945 onwards, Churchill was once again out of office—but now the Red Army was in the heart of Europe. If we exchange "Red" for "Tsarist," we need to acknowledge that *this* was precisely the kind of outcome only to be expected if the policies pursued by Grey and desired by his entente partners in 1914 had been wholly successful. In 1947 Churchill reported to those closest to him that he had dreamt of having a conversation with his much-revered father, Lord Randolph Churchill (1849-95). So vivid was the experience that Churchill recorded it in detail.⁴² In the course of his account of the wide-ranging conversation, which had much to say about Russia, occurs the following exchange, concerning the policy of Joseph Chamberlain in South Africa in 1899: [son:] "We conquered the Transvaal and the Orange Free State"; [father:] "England should never have done that. To strike down two independent republics must have lowered our whole position in the world. It must have stirred up all sorts of things. I am sure the Boers made a good fight."⁴³ Arguably, these words reflected Churchill's deeper sense that the consequences of British imperial aggression in South Africa had been highly detrimental also to Great Britain herself.

As we approach the 2014 centenary of the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, there is already a rising tide of literature on its origins. As succeeding generations have taken a longer view of these things, it has become easier to see how many evils have flowed from the Great War, the manner in which it was waged, and the dictated peace settlement. These included the collapse, rather than constitutional development, of Austria-Hungary, the association of democracy with defeat in Germany, the triumph of communism in Russia, the great depression, the rise of Fascist and Nazi totalitarianism, the Second World War, and the ideological and

military division of Europe down to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. God is not mocked (Galatians 6.7); the consequences of some actions can be expected to play themselves out even unto the third and fourth generations (Deuteronomy 5.9).

It is to be expected that some of the new writing on the subject will follow the old line of Headlam-Morley and the allied powers in 1919. Yet we have learned too much for the old over-simple “save little Belgium” standpoint to be accepted without a willful ignorance of other features of the overall international situation. We should now be prepared for new research to take us away from the old assumptions.

As to Edward Elgar, the “Great War” broke his heart. He had great affection for Germany. There his musical achievements were acclaimed long before his fellow countrymen recognized them. In later years he came to hate the way in which the arrogant words of A.C. Benson, “Land of Hope and Glory,” set to his “Pomp and Circumstance March Number One” (1901), were used during the conflict to boost morale in the face of mounting horrors. Those who would gauge his frame of mind on the morrow of “victory” must absorb the meaning of his aching and poignant *Cello Concerto in E minor*, first performed in 1919.⁴⁴

How we remember and memorialize is highly formative. This is why it is necessary to consider how our commemorative traditions can be highly deceptive. What nations, including their governments, say in commemorative events and monuments can hide at least as much as they reveal. They can overlay what has been partly or even completely forgotten. Especially as the nations of Europe grieve their millions of war dead, their governments may continue to resist the probing and sifting of historians. In the case of responsibility for the causes and consequences of the war of 1914, the more assiduously historians pursue their calling, the closer they come to confirming the profound but awful truth stated centuries ago by the Apostle Paul: “All have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God” (Romans 3.23).

As to my grandfather, he most probably went to his grave thinking that Great Britain had gone to war “to save little Belgium.” With all that has happened in the twentieth century, we in the twenty-first century ought not to be misled so easily. We

need to be wisely aware that commemorative events and monuments can mask as well as represent, and can entrench misunderstandings from which we need to be delivered.

Endnotes

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2. David E. Kaiser, “Germany and the Origins of the First World War,” *Journal of Modern History* 55 (1983): 442-474.
3. A.J. Anthony Morris, *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy of Peace and Retrenchment* (London: Longman, 1972), and especially his parallel and complementary *The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Rearmament, 1896-1914* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984).
4. *BD* III, 397-420. Cf. Herbert Butterfield, “Crowe’s Memorandum of 1 January 1907,” in *The International Thought of Herbert Butterfield*, edited by Karl W. Schweizer and Paul Sharp, (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 69-81, and Keith M. Wilson, “Sir Eyre Crowe on the Origin of the Crowe Memorandum of 1 January 1907,” in *Historical Research* 56 (1983): 238-241.
5. Cf. George F. Kennan, *The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia and the Coming of the First World War* (New York: Pantheon / Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1984), esp. 249-257.
6. The literature rarely compares Prussian “militarism” with what might be termed British “navalism.” The steely resolve exhibited in the Prussian-German military ethic was more than matched historically by the streak of sheer ruthlessness repeatedly displayed by the Royal Navy on the high seas. See Peter Hore, *The Habit of Victory: The Story of the Royal Navy, 1545-1945* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 2005).
7. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980), esp. 456-462, and *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), noting 230-41 and 252-58.
8. The fourth chapter of Zara Steiner’s much used *Britain and the Origins of the First World War* underwent significant change from the first edition, there entitled “Britain and Russia: The Troubled Partnership,” to the second edition, where it appeared as “Britain and Russia: The Troubled Relationship” (Basingstoke:

- Macmillan / Palgrave Macmillan, 1977 and 2003), 79-93 and 84-99 respectively.
9. Donald McLean, *Britain and Her Buffer State: The Collapse of the Persian Empire, 1890-1914* (London: Royal Historical Society [*Studies in History*, 14], 1979). A decade earlier, Virginia Cowles had produced her *The Russian Dagger: Cold War in the Days of the Tsars* (London: Collins, 1969); see esp. 261-320.
 10. Mainly collected in Keith M. Wilson, *The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and *Empire and Continent: Studies in British Foreign Policy from the 1880s to the First World War* (London: Mansell, 1987).
 11. These studies include Jennifer Siegel, *Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia* (London: Taurus, 2002), Ronald P. Bobroff, *Roads to Glory: Late Imperial Russia and the Turkish Straits* (London: Taurus, 2006), and pre-eminently, Sean McMeekin, *The Russian Origins of the First World War* (Boston MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
 12. Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (London: Allen Lane / New York: Basic Books, 1998), esp. 39-104, 143-173, 442-48, and 457-61.
 13. See Ian Nish, *Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907* (London: The Athlone Press, 1966).
 14. See particularly C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, *The Mirage of Power. I: British Foreign Policy, 1902-14* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972).
 15. H.C.G. Matthew, *The Liberal Imperialists: The Ideas and Politics of a post-Gladstonian Elite* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), esp. 150-223.
 16. George W. Monger, *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900-1907* (London: Thomas Nelson, 1963). See also Monger's "The End of Isolation, Britain, Germany and Japan, 1900-1902" in the *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* Fifth Series 13 (1963), 103-121. Monger later joined the British civil service.
 17. The most widely accepted history in English is Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979).
 18. See Denis Judd, *Radical Joe: A Life of Joseph Chamberlain* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977), esp. 183-237.
 19. See Brian Roberts, *Cecil Rhodes: Flawed Colossus* (New York: Norton, 1997), Antony Thomas, *Rhodes: The Race for Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), and more recently, Apollon Davidson, *Cecil Rhodes and His Time* (Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2012).
 20. See John Evelyn Wrench, *Lord Alfred Milner: The Man of No Illusions, 1854-1925* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958) and J. Lee Thompson, *A Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire* (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2008).
 21. Ethel M. Drus, "A Report on the Papers of Joseph Chamberlain relating to the Jameson Raid and the Inquiry," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 25 (1952): 33-62; "The Question of Imperial Complicity in the Jameson Raid," *English Historical Review* 68 (1953): 582-593; "Select Documents from the Chamberlain Papers Concerning Anglo-Transvaal Relations, 1896-99," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 27 (1954): 156-189; and later "Chamberlain and the Boers," *Journal of African History* 4 (1963): 144-145.
 22. J.S. Marias, *The Fall of Kruger's Republic* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); G.H.L. Le May, *British Supremacy in Southern Africa, 1899-1907* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); A. N. Porter, *The Origins of the South African War: Joseph Chamberlain and the Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1895-1899* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980); and Iain R. Smith, *The Origins of the South African War, 1899-1902* (London: Longmans, 1996).
 23. See Geoffrey Wheatcroft, *The Randlords: The Men Who Made South Africa* (London: Weidenfeld, 1993), esp. 196-217; Martin Meredith, *Diamonds, Gold and War: The British, the Boers, and the Making of South Africa* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), esp. 365-461; and Hermann Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People* (Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press, revised 2009), 232-256.
 24. Stephen Koss, ed., *The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Antiwar Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), esp. at 216.
 25. Abraham Kuyper, "The South African Crisis," in *Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader*, edited by James D. Bratt (Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans), 325-360.
 26. Winston S. Churchill to H.H. Asquith (as Prime Minister), August 23, 1912, as printed in Randolph S. Churchill, *Winston S. Churchill, Volume III, Companion Volume III* (London: Heinemann, 1969, 1639).
 27. At this time the self-governing Dominions within the British Empire were The Dominions of Canada, Newfoundland and New Zealand; the Commonwealth of Australia; and the Union of South Africa. The Great War ended the diplomatic unity of the Empire: the Dominions (as well as India) signed the Treaty of Versailles (1919) on their own behalf. The *Statute of Westminster* (1931), an act of the United Kingdom parliament, recognized and legalized the road to full independence, along which the Dominions (with the

- exception of Newfoundland) were already travelling.
28. Quoted by Keith M. Wilson, in "The Fiction of the Free Hand" in *The Policy of the Entente* (1985), 85-99.
 29. Imperial over-extension was already apparent. The classic discussion is Aaron L. Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), esp. in this context 232-240.
 30. The definitive biography remains Robert Blake, *Disraeli* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1966). In this context, see particularly C.C. Eldridge, *Disraeli and the Rise of a New Imperialism* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996).
 31. The literature on Gladstone is extensive. The *Life of W.E. Gladstone* (1903), by John Morley, in three volumes, is problematic in that its secularist outlook effectively masks the Christian inspiration of so much of Gladstone's political conduct. In significant respects, H.C.G. Matthews, *Gladstone, 1809-1874*, and *Gladstone, 1875-1898* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986 and 1995 respectively), tend to follow this pattern. A valuable corrective is provided by David Bebbington, *William Ewart Gladstone: Faith and Politics in Victorian Britain* (Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1993) and *The Mind of Gladstone: Religion, Homer and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
 32. William Ewart Gladstone, *Midlothian Speeches, 1879*, edited by M.D.R. Foot (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1971).
 33. See especially C.C. Eldridge, *England's Mission: The Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880* (London: Macmillan, 1973).
 34. The classic discussions are to be found in Paul Knaplund, *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1927), and *Gladstone's Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1935).
 35. W.E. Gladstone, "Kin Beyond the Sea," *North American Review*, number 264 (September-October 1878): 179-213.
 36. The best single account remains Deryck M. Schreuder, *Gladstone and Kruger: Liberal Government and Colonial 'Home Rule,' 1880-85* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).
 37. James D. Bratt, "Abraham Kuyper: Puritan, Victorian, Modern," in *Kuyper Reconsidered: Aspects of his Life and Work*, edited by Cornelis van der Kooi and Jan de Bruijn (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1999), 53-68, at 65. Kuyper and Gladstone are rarely compared, but see Henk te Velde, "Charismatic Leadership, c. 1870-1914: A Comparative European Perspective," in *Making Reputations: Power, Persuasion and the Individual in Modern British Politics*, edited by Richard Toye and Julie Gottlieb (London: I.B. Taurus, 2005), 42-55.
 38. See D. George Boyce, "Gladstone and Ireland," in *Gladstone*, edited by Peter J. Jagger (London: Hambledon Press, 1998), 105-122, and the papers edited by Boyce and Alan O'Day as *Gladstone and Ireland: Politics, Religion and Nationality in the Victorian Age* (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
 39. Robert Rhodes James, editor, *Churchill Speaks 1897-1963: Collected Speeches in War and Peace* (New York: Chelsea House, 1980), 30.
 40. Martin Gilbert, *In Search of Churchill: A Historian's Journey* (New York: John Wiley, 1994), 278.
 41. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, Volume VI, *1939-1941: Finest Hour* (London: Heinemann, 1983), 994.
 42. First published in the British newspaper *The Sunday Telegraph*, January 30, 1966.
 43. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*. Volume VIII, *1945-1965: Never Despair* (London: Heinemann, 1988), 365-372, at 369.
 44. Edward Elgar, *Cello Concerto in E minor*, Opus. 85. The definitive recording is by Jacqueline du Pré (1945-87), made in 1965, with Sir John Barbirolli conducting the London Symphony Orchestra.