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## Revisiting the Zahavi–Brough/Sokolowski Debate

Neal DeRoo

*Dordt College*, [neal.deroo@dordt.edu](mailto:neal.deroo@dordt.edu)

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# Revisiting the Zahavi–Brough/Sokolowski Debate

## **Abstract**

In 1999, Dan Zahavi's *Self Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation* initiated a critique of the standard interpretation of the distinction between the second and third levels of Husserl's analysis of time-constituting consciousness. At stake was the possibility of a coherent account of self-awareness (Zahavi's concern), but also the possibility of prereflectively distinguishing the acts of consciousness (Brough and Sokolowski's rebuttal of Zahavi's critique). Using insights gained from Husserl's *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* rather than the work on time-consciousness, this paper provides a new, more precise vocabulary in which to carry on the debate, in the hopes of bringing it to a mutually satisfactory resolution. After briefly laying out the terms of the Zahavi–Brough/Sokolowski debate (Sect. 2), I then elaborate a three-fold distinction in consciousness from the *Analyses* (Sect. 3) and relate that back to the issue of objectivity in the debate (Sect. 4). I end by suggesting how this three-fold model from the *Analyses* helps us preserve the essentially tripartite structure (as Brough and Sokolowski insist we do) while not making one of these levels the object of another (in keeping with Zahavi's critique) (Sect. 5).

## **Keywords**

Zahavi, Husserl, Brough, Sokolowski, phenomenology, Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis

## **Disciplines**

Philosophy | Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion

## Revisiting the Zahavi-Brough/Sokolowski Debate

There has been much debate in recent Husserlian scholarship on the nature of the difference between the three levels of consciousness identified in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (Hua X). One of the leading voices in this debate, Dan Zahavi, seems to suggest that there are actually only two levels of consciousness, and that two of the levels that Husserl distinguishes are actually one and the same level viewed from different angles. This is contrasted to the work of other leading Husserlian commentators, most notably John B. Brough and Robert Sokolowski who maintain the significance of three distinct levels of consciousness. The “Zahavi v. Brough/Sokolowski” debate touches on issues of extreme importance to anyone trying to get an accurate picture of Husserl’s theories of time-consciousness, the transcendental ego, and constitution, which is to say, to anyone trying to get an accurate picture of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.<sup>1</sup>

A quick glance at Husserl’s *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic* (Hua XI) would seem to bolster Zahavi’s claim. In this work, Husserl discusses the “fundamental stratification” of the life of the ego (Hua XI, 64) into the passive and the active “levels” of consciousness. As such, this work seems to suggest that there are only two layers of consciousness at work, and hence that Zahavi must be correct in the debate with Brough and Sokolowski. However, I intend to show that a more careful examination of the *Analyses* will show that there are, in fact, three levels of consciousness at work even in this text. Their grouping into two levels—passive and active—helps explain an ambiguity that gives rise to the Zahavi v.

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<sup>1</sup> Indeed, it could be argued that the debate concerning the relationship between the second and third levels of consciousness mirrors the debate concerning the relationship between transcendental and empirical subjectivity, and hence is central to any understanding of transcendental in Husserl.

Brough/Sokolowski debate, and the analysis provided of the passive sphere and its relationship to the active sphere in fact helps us better understand the nature of the difference between all three levels of consciousness discussed in Hua X. As such, I hope to be able to use the *Analyses* to mediate the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski.

I will begin by summarizing the core issues of the debate and suggesting that what is at stake in this discussion is a particular issue of objectivity (Section I). Then, I will suggest a way to map the three levels of consciousness discussed in Hua X onto the two levels discussed in Hua XI, and vice versa, by suggesting a new three-fold distinction between active synthesis, passive association, and internal time-consciousness (Section II). Next, I will discuss the issue of objectivity as it pertains to passive association (Section III). I will then end by explaining how passive association and internal time-consciousness can help us make sense of the two levels of constituting consciousness that are at the heart of the Zahavi v. Brough/Sokolowski debate (Section IV). In doing so, I hope to help establish a common ground that could help provide a solution to the problem raised by this debate.

### **I. The Zahavi v. Brough/Sokolowski Debate**

From the outset, it must be noticed that this “debate” consists mainly of Zahavi’s critiques of Brough and Sokolowski, followed by his elaboration of what he takes to be a more accurate account of Husserl’s theory of consciousness.<sup>2</sup> At stake is a proper understanding of what Husserl means by the following passage:

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<sup>2</sup>Zahavi’s most in-depth discussion of this issue occurs in Dan Zahavi, *Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999); hereafter cited in-text as SA. He also discusses it in other works, including: Zahavi (ed.), *Self-Awareness, Temporality and Alterity: Central Topics in Phenomenology* (Dordrecht/Boston/ London: Kluwer Academic, 1998); Zahavi, “Self

Now that we have studied time-consciousness . . . it would be good to establish and run through systematically for once the different levels of constitution in their essential structure. We found:

1. the things of empirical experience in objective time (in connection with which we would have to distinguish still different levels of empirical being, which up to this point have not been taken into consideration: the experienced physical thing belonging to the individual subject, the intersubjectively identical thing, the thing of physics);
2. the constituting multiplicities of appearance belonging to different levels, the immanent unities in pre-empirical time;
3. the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness. (Hua X, 73).

Zahavi's interest in this passage is primarily with Husserl's theory of self-awareness. He claims that Brough and Sokolowski hold acts to be immediately given, even prior to reflection, as full blown inner objects distinct from the absolute flow of consciousness, which is also given to itself (SA, 70). On such an interpretation, Zahavi claims, the primary givenness of acts of consciousness is an object manifestation,<sup>3</sup> which yields too easily to a "reflection theory" which he is at great pains to disprove.<sup>4</sup> The problem with the Brough-Sokolowski position as Zahavi sees it is that it suggests that the act is not self-given, but is brought to givenness by something else (i.e., inner time-consciousness). Hence, it merely "defers" the problem of self-awareness to the level of inner time-consciousness, which leads, Zahavi contends, either to an infinite regress problem or is forced to posit "an implicit or intrinsic self-awareness" that can be posited as easily of the act itself as of some deeper level of consciousness deemed inner time-consciousness (SA, 70). Hence, this interpretation of the different levels of consciousness

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and Consciousness" in Zahavi (ed.), *Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience* (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2000): 55-74; and Zahavi, "Phenomenology of Self" in Tilo Kircher and Anthony S. David, (eds.), *The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 56-75.

<sup>3</sup> Using the grammar of vocabulary, Drummond will say that it puts awareness in the case of the accusative, rather than the genitive case that properly characterizes self-awareness; cf. John J. Drummond, "The Case(s) of Self-Awareness," in Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (eds.), *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 199-220; 199-201.

<sup>4</sup> Zahavi lays out his problems with a "reflection theory" of self-awareness in SA, 14-37.

in Husserl cannot adequately explain the need for the deepest level of the “flow” of consciousness because it does not adequately explain the connection between this flow and the acts of consciousness.

Zahavi attempts to solve this problem by linking the absolute flow of consciousness and the temporally constituted act to Husserl’s notions of functioning and thematized subjectivity, respectively.<sup>5</sup> The main thrust of what Zahavi contends is novel in his approach is based on the assertion that “Husserl’s investigation of inner time-consciousness is nothing apart from an investigation into the temporality of prereflective self-awareness” (SA, 71) because “inner time-consciousness is simply the name for the prereflective self-awareness of our acts” (SA, 80). In other words, Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness is an account of the way in which the acts of consciousness show themselves to us even as they (also) give us something else (namely, the intentional object): acts are, therefore, both self- and hetero-manifesting (SA 71-72).<sup>6</sup> Hence, in Zahavi’s opinion, inner time-consciousness is not “a particular intentional act” but “a pervasive dimension of self-manifestation” that is a passive self-affection (SA, 72).<sup>7</sup>

Husserl’s account of double intentionality is an elaboration of this model: “Whereas the flow’s constitution of the duration of its object is called its *Querintentionalität*, the flow’s awareness (of) its own streaming unity is called its *Längsintentionalität*” (SA, 73). This second “intentionality” cannot be understood as an

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<sup>5</sup> This, in turn, can also be mapped on to the distinction between prereflective and reflective self-awareness; SA 71. Later on we will see in what ways the notions of functioning and thematized subjectivity can be mapped on to the distinction between passive and active strata of consciousness.

<sup>6</sup> We will see below that I want to claim that it is passive association, and not inner time-consciousness that is both self- and hetero-manifesting.

<sup>7</sup> Again, we will see below that I want to claim that this realm of passive affection cannot be equated solely with inner time-consciousness, but must be distinguished between ITC and passive association.

object-intentionality (Ibid.), but is rather an account of how the intentional objects constituted in the *Querintentionalität* show themselves to us primarily (SA, 75).

At the heart of the disagreement between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski lies the issue of objectivity: in what way can we speak of acts of consciousness as “objects,” since Zahavi himself concedes that Husserl does, at times, speak of our acts this way (SA, 75)?<sup>8</sup> To answer this, we must turn to the relationship between passive and active syntheses, and how they tie in to the related notions of prereflective and reflective awareness or prephenomenal and phenomenal being (cf. SA, 78 and Hua X, 129). For Zahavi, it is precisely, and only, the issue of pre-reflective v. reflective awareness that makes us able to distinguish between the second and third levels of constitution elaborated by Husserl (SA, 81). That is, for Zahavi, the two levels differentiated by Husserl are but two different ways of looking at one and the same thing (SA, 80), namely, the flow of acts and lived experiences.

## **II. Are There Two or Three Levels of Consciousness?**

But Zahavi’s understanding of the layering of consciousness is not solely binary. Rather, he seems to admit of a three-fold layering when he states that inner time-consciousness can make us aware of the following three levels of consciousness:

1. “the transcendent objects in objective time (intentional consciousness)”;
2. “the acts as demarcated temporal objects in subjective time (reflective self-

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<sup>8</sup> By positing objectivity as the fundamental aspect of the disagreement, I begin to move beyond the realm of self-awareness that concerns Zahavi primarily so as to highlight the importance for this debate to a wider Husserlian problematic. Zahavi, and others debating the issue of self-awareness, are not unfamiliar with the issue of objectivity, and especially the “objectivity” of self-awareness; cf., for example, Drummond, “The Case(s) of Self-Awareness.”

awareness)”,<sup>9</sup>

3. “the stream of consciousness (prereflective self-awareness)” (SA, 81).

However, given that the second and third levels of consciousness are but different modes of self-awareness, the heart of the matter for Zahavi seems to be a two-fold distinction between self-manifestation and hetero-manifestation.

Zahavi claims that his position is supported by Husserl’s distinction between functioning and thematized subjectivity. This distinction of Husserl’s plays out in his analyses of passive and active synthesis. In this work, Husserl claims that the “fundamental stratification” of consciousness is its split into passive and active levels (Hua XI, 64), which would seem to support Zahavi’s two-fold focus. However, a closer examination of Husserl’s analyses in Hua XI shows that there remain at least three levels of constitution, and hence three levels of consciousness, at work here. Further, the apparent similarity between Zahavi’s self- and hetero-manifestation and Husserl’s passive and active syntheses is not so readily apparent once one asks whether the distinction between functioning (passive) and thematized (active) subjectivity map onto Zahavi’s pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness (which are two different modes of self-manifestation) or on to his distinction between self- and hetero-manifestation? If the latter, then how can we distinguish between the two different modes of self-manifestation?

To begin to answer these questions, let us turn to Husserl’s account of the relationship between functioning and thematized subjectivity. Husserl is adamant that thematized subjectivity presupposes functioning subjectivity: it is only because of passive

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<sup>9</sup> John B. Brough questions whether acts can, in fact, be distinguished *only* via reflection, or whether we do not experience distinct acts prereflexively; cf. the panel on SA at the 2001 meeting of the Husserl Circle and Drummond’s summary of it in “Case(s) of Self-Awareness,” 216.

syntheses that the ego is able to actively direct its regard (Hua XI, 120). The essential elements of passive constitution are associative structure, affection, and attention.<sup>10</sup> Attention must be understood as a “tending of the ego toward an intentional object, toward a unity which ‘appears’ continually in the change of the modes of its givenness” (EU, 85). This tending occurs because of affecting [*Affektion*],<sup>11</sup> that is, the allure [*Reiz*], “the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego” (Hua XI, 148).<sup>12</sup> Without this affecting, Husserl is adamant that “there would be no objects at all and no present organized with objects” (Hua XI, 164).

Being affected can pass over into passive constitution, however, only because of the process of association, that is, only because what is currently affecting us “recalls”<sup>13</sup> something in the past. This process of passive association works on two levels: first, it enables us to reproduce things from our past in the present: seeing something now automatically calls to mind some previous experience. This calling-to-mind is most often

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. EU §§ 16-18. For more on these elements, cf. also William F. Ryan, S.J. “Passive and Active Elements in Husserl’s Notion of Intentionality,” *The Modern Schoolman* LV (November 1977), 37-55.

<sup>11</sup> It must be noted that affecting [*Affektion*] is a living quality belonging to the formal structure of association and constitution; it is not part of the content of what is being intended (cf. Hua XI, 167-168 and Ryan, “Passive and Active elements,” 43).

<sup>12</sup> Though it must be emphasized that, as with the “attention” under discussion here, this pull is different from, and in a sense prior to, the ego’s attentively turning toward an object: the pull or allure here is *Reiz* in German, which is often translated as “stimulus,” which though perhaps misleading in some contexts is helpful to us here in indicating the manner or the level on which this “pull” occurs: just as the heat of the fire is a stimulus that prompts us to remove our hand without the active involvement of the ego but automatically, reflexively, so the allure of the object stimulates the ego to constitute it (i.e., the object), but to do so automatically, like a reflex, before the active involvement of the ego.

<sup>13</sup> This recalling is purely phenomenological, happening within the epoche and hence distinct from the recollection of empirical and psychological notions of association; cf. Hua XI, 117-118. For those primarily familiar with the *Logical Investigations*, the use of “association” as a key term in Husserl may be surprising. In LI, Husserl is painstakingly detailed in his critique of empiricist and psychological uses of association. In this secondary sense, association belongs properly in the realm of “indication,” and hence is accidental, rather than necessary, to the ego (unlike, for example, the eidetic functioning of the ego at work in expression; cf. LI I.§§ 1-10). Derrida’s reading of Husserl in *La Voix et la Phénomène* seems to point in the same direction as the later Husserl: association is essential to the ego’s functioning. The point that remains to be clarified, however, is whether association, as it works in these later texts, still belongs in the realm of indication as it does when understood along the lines of the empiricists and psychologists. Husserl seems to suggest that it does (EU, 78), though this is not the time or place to pursue this question, or its relation to Derrida’s argument in *La Voix et la Phénomène*, further.

done on the basis of similarity: that which is reproduced from the past is in some way like that which is perceived in the present. This type of reproductive association is “an absolutely necessary lawful regularity . . . without which a subjectivity could not be” (Hua XI, 118-119; cf. also Hua XI, 124) because in it “the entire past-consciousness is co-awakened” (Hua XI, 122). Reproductive association enables our present consciousness to be united to our past-consciousness, and thus makes possible the historicity of the subject.

This historicity, in its turn, is shown to be necessary for the life of the subject through the second, “higher” level of association: expectations. Expectations are closely related to apperception, and hence to perception and the primary constitution of objects as what they are. My previous experiences are retained in a horizon “of actual and possible expectations” (Hua XI, 119) that enables me to experience any object as the object it is. For example, I perceive the chair as a chair, though I only perceive one side of the chair at this time. How can I do this? Because I have a horizon of expectations that enables me to expect, with varying degrees of certainty, how the other sides of the chair could be perceived if I were to make those other sides available to me in a primary presentation (i.e., by walking around so that I could see the back of the chair directly). Because of my past-consciousness, I am able to expect other, currently non-present sides of the chair, and this allows me to apperceive what I see as a chair, a thing like other chairs. Without this horizon of expectations, I would not be able to apperceive things in the world.

This two-fold association must be kept distinct from internal time-consciousness. While internal time-consciousness is a necessary presupposition of associative syntheses (cf. Hua XI, § 27), the two are not the same. Association is needed to “awaken” the

associated objects, as retention and (especially) protention are empty. Without association, Husserl claims, internal time-consciousness would be “meaningless” (Hua XI, 125) because it abstracts from content, and hence cannot give us “any idea of the necessary synthetic structures of the streaming present and of the unitary stream of the presents” (Hua XI, 128). However, without internal time-consciousness and the temporalization of consciousness that it makes possible, the idea of association, either reproductive or expectative, would be impossible. Hence, association is founded upon, but distinct from, internal time-consciousness.

But association must also be kept distinct from the actively intentional acts of the ego. Association is a passive synthesis, as Husserl points out time and time again, and as such is distinct from active syntheses.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, the “specific intentions” of active consciousness arise from, and hence presuppose, passive syntheses (Hua XI, 118).

We are left, then, with three distinct levels of constitution:

1. active syntheses, i.e., specific, egoically-directed intentional acts;
2. passive associations;
3. internal time-consciousness.

The three distinct levels of constitution at work in the analyses of passive and active synthesis are reminiscent of the three levels of constitution in Husserl that we discussed earlier (from Hua X, 73). If the parallel between the two lists holds, a clarification of the distinction between internal time-consciousness and passive association would help to mediate the debate between Zahavi and Brough/ Sokolowski. In order to clarify this distinction, however, we must first examine it in light of the issue

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<sup>14</sup> Cf., for example, Hua XI, 120 where Husserl speaks of passivity as “the founding level of all the active-logical processes.”

of objectivity, which we have already stated is the key issue at stake in the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski. In turning to an analysis of objectivity and passive synthesis,<sup>15</sup> then, we will hopefully be able to see a bit more clearly how and why objectivity is a central problem in the debate.

### **III. Objects and Passive Synthesis**

#### *A. Objects and Objectlike Formations*

Association, in giving us things in the world, precisely does not yield for us objects. Rather, by bringing together similar hyletic data, association enables us to form “objectlike formations” [*Gegenständlichkeit*].<sup>16</sup> These objectlike formations must still be acted upon by the ego to become fully formed objects. Specifically, they must be judged, the similarities held before the thematizing gaze and understood in their essences. It is only by passing through the tribunal of judgment that beings can appear for me as objects (Hua XVII, 69).

Passing through the tribunal of judgment, then, marks the move from passive to active synthesis as a “quantam leap,” a qualitative and not merely a quantitative difference.<sup>17</sup> The difference is between the unthematized thing of experience and the object of thought characterized by judgment. It is only with this last step, that of (active) judgment, that we can speak properly of objects (EU, 81 n.1). Properly speaking, within the sphere of passive synthesis, we have only tendencies, habitualities,<sup>18</sup> horizons.

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<sup>15</sup> Throughout, I use passive synthesis as a wider umbrella term, including both time-consciousness and passive association. This is to mark the fundamental difference between these two levels and the level of active synthesis.

<sup>16</sup> I follow Steinbock in translating *Gegenständlichkeit* as “objectlike formations;” cf. translator’s introduction to *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, xlii.

<sup>17</sup> Ryan, “Passive and Active Elements,” 46.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Fink and Husserl, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method* translated by Ronald Bruzina (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); 10. For an exploration of this

## *B. Objectivity in Passive Association*

Returning to the question of objectivity in the passive sphere, then, we see that we can speak, if not of objects then at least of objectivity (including objectlike formations), in the passive sphere. In fact, one can distinguish at least three different dimensions of objectivity in Husserl's account of passive synthesis: individual, intersubjective, and cultural.<sup>19</sup> The first is a weaker dimension of objectivity, limited as it is to a "single perceiving Ego-subject" (Hua III, 316-317). This is the type of objectivity attained by a single stream of consciousness and its "ideal perceptual multiplicities" (Ibid.). Here we see the most rudimentary ability of the subject to see unity in multiplicity. This objectivity is moved to a higher level when the object can be intersubjectively verified: in discussion, I can come to see that my perception of the object is like or unlike others' perceptions of it. The more agreement we can come to about the object, the greater its level of objectivity. Because it has been tested in the fire of multiple subjects' experiences, this level of objectivity is higher (more accurate, more verified) than that which is held by one subject alone.

But this model of intersubjective verification requires dialogue between different subjects, and therefore requires the involvement of active egos. It seems to be no longer passive, but active. But there is a non-active way for other subjects to be involved in the ego's constitution of objectlike formations: the cultural. Simply put, previous cultural achievements are "virtualized" (Hua VI, 372-3), and can then be sedimented in the

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idea, cf. Anthony Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995).

<sup>19</sup> For a more in-depth analysis of these dimensions, cf. Paul Gyllenhammer, "Three Dimensions of Objectivity in Husserl's Account of Passive Synthesis," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* Vol. 35 No. 2 (May 2004), 180-200.

subject's horizons.<sup>20</sup> That is, not just my own but also other people's cultural achievements (including achievements of knowledge and judgment) become part of my experience of the world, and so can be recalled in association and used in the passive constitution of objectlike formations (cf. Hua XV, 214, 234-5).<sup>21</sup> This is necessary, Husserl claims, to the constitution of ideal objects, which have a "*persisting existence . . .* even during periods in which the inventor and his fellow are no longer wakefully so related [to the object]" (Hua VI, 372). This is to say that ideal objects have a "continuing-to-be even when no one has . . . realized them in self-evidence" (Ibid.). Ideal objects, then, transcend mere historical occurrences or facts, even as they are based upon them: ideal objects are types of experience that are clearly recognized by individuals as a "guiding norm for future engagements with the world."<sup>22</sup> As guiding norms for future engagement, they become candidates for sedimentation into the horizons of expectation discussed above.

### C. The "Object" of Time-Consciousness

We have already shown above that time-consciousness and passive synthesis must be kept distinct: passive synthesis provides the content that gives time-consciousness meaning, while time-consciousness provides the temporalization of the subject that founds passive synthesis.<sup>23</sup> But can we mark this distinction beyond the seemingly Kantian language of form and content? I think we can, because the two levels of constitution seem to correspond to two distinct accounts of fulfillment: time-

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<sup>20</sup> Husserl's prime example here is writing, a point that Derrida will make much of in his Introduction to the French translation of Husserl's *Origin of Geometry* (cf. Edmund Husserl, *L'Origine de la géométrie* trans. with introduction by Jacques Derrida. Paris: PUF 1962).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. also Gyllenhammer, "Three Dimensions of Objectivity," 194, 199 n.37.

<sup>22</sup> Gyllenhammer, "Three Dimensions of Objectivity," 193.

<sup>23</sup> In Husserl's words, we could say that, as a "lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general" (Hua XI, 117), passive synthesis must conform to time-consciousness, the "universal, formal framework . . . in which all other possible syntheses must participate" (Hua XI, 125).

consciousness achieves the general fulfillment of retained protentions and protended retentions in non-intuitive differentiation (cf. Hua XXXIII, 21-27), while passive synthesis achieves the particular fulfillment of the domain of intuition (Hua XXXIII, 30-39; 227ff.).

The “objects” of the two levels of constitution then are distinct: time-consciousness is fulfilled by the retention of previous protentions,<sup>24</sup> that is, by elements seemingly within the realm of time-consciousness,<sup>25</sup> while passive synthesis is seemingly fulfilled by the intuition of the world, that is, of the *amalgam* of things in the world and my horizons of experience with them.<sup>26</sup> As such, the “objectlike formations” of passive synthesis are simultaneously directed at the world and within the self (its retentional horizons, etc.). As directed toward our horizons and partially constitutive of those horizons, passive synthesis achieves a small level of self-manifestation (the manifestation of the horizons of which they are themselves a part), while still maintaining, simultaneously, a measure of hetero-manifestation (the manifestation of the objectlike formations of the things in the environing world). This would seem to suggest that the second level of constitution marks, not a borderline between self- and hetero-manifestation (as Zahavi suggests), but rather a transition that is also a connection

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. Ms. L I 15, 24a-b: “The earlier consciousness is protention (i.e., an intention “directed” at what comes later) and the following retention would then be retention of the earlier retention that is characterized at the same time as [its] protention. This newly arriving retention thus reproduces the earlier retention with its protentional tendency and at the same time fulfills it, but it fulfills it in such a way that going through this fulfillment is a protention of the next phase”; as translated in Lanei Rodemeyer, “Developments in the Theory of Time-Consciousness: An Analysis of Protention,” in Donn Welton (ed), *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003): 125-154; 131. This constitutes an advance, of sorts, on Husserl’s earlier claims that retentions retain retentions (Hua X, 81).

<sup>25</sup> In this way, time-consciousness achieves the “self-relatedness” (*Selbstbezogenheit*, Hua XXXIII, 207) necessary for the stream of absolute consciousness.

<sup>26</sup> There is also a distinction in intentionality that must be accounted for here, that between *Längsintentionalität* and *Querintentionalität*, between the more general “tending toward” of Drummond’s intentionalityD and the more specific “directedness to an object” of Drummond’s intentionalityO; cf. Drummond, “Case(s) of Self-Awareness,” 217; and SA, 73.

between them,<sup>27</sup> and hence not only a distinction between “levels,” but also the maintenance of a single—if complex—account of self-awareness.

#### **IV. Mediating the Debate**

We have so far been at pains to show: 1) a parallel between the three levels of constituting consciousness in Hua X and the three levels of consciousness discussed in Hua XI (i.e., active synthesis, passive synthesis, internal time-consciousness); and 2) that the second level of the latter list (i.e., passive synthesis) contains a certain level of objectivity that is distinct from the objectivity of the first or third levels. What remains is to relate this back to the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski on the levels of consciousness in Husserl.

John Drummond has said that “[a]ny resolution to the dispute between Brough and Zahavi would have to account for how we might have two ‘dimensions’ or a differentiation within consciousness while preserving a single, albeit perhaps complex, notion of self-awareness.”<sup>28</sup> The suggestion here is that perhaps the distinction between passive association and internal time-consciousness would enable such a differentiation without lapsing into the “reflection” theory which multiplies self-awarenesses.

We can maintain a single self-awareness only if we are able to avoid turning passive syntheses into an object of internal time-consciousness. I think that we have been able to do this without losing the ability to distinguish between distinct passive syntheses, and hence to distinguish between discrete experiences. In the first place, the “object” of

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<sup>27</sup> This would suggest the possibility of developing an explanation of the “parallel” between transcendental and empirical subjectivity, if the transcendental stakes of the debate were clearly elaborated in note 1 above.

<sup>28</sup> John J. Drummond, “The Case(s) of Self-Awareness,” in *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness*, edited by Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006): 199-220; 216.

the “acts” of time-consciousness is only time-consciousness itself, and therefore, as long as passive association is distinct from time-consciousness, it cannot be the “object” of time-consciousness.

Secondly, the “constituting multiplicities” of passive synthesis (i.e., the associations themselves, and not the products of those association) provide us a distinct account of objectivity, namely the *Gegenstandlichkeit* of the sensible, envioning world,<sup>29</sup> which distinguishes this type of objectivity from both the strong notion of the object that occurs in active synthesis and the more “formal” striving character of protentive time-consciousness (Hua XI, 73). Hence, there is a distinction between passive association and internal time-consciousness such that they cannot be the same thing (and hence, passive association cannot be the “object” of time-consciousness).

But this may not entirely solve the question of whether the passive syntheses are *themselves* objectivities, or whether they merely *yield* objectivities, even if it does seem to answer whether passive synthesis are the objects of time-consciousness.<sup>30</sup> This is a more vexing question; I would want to contend that passive syntheses are themselves objectivities (though certainly not objects) to the extent that they themselves, as distinct acts, are part of our sedimented horizons. The move from individual to intersubjective and cultural levels of objectivity would seem to entail an analysis of the effectiveness of our synthetic acts themselves: when presented with similar stimuli, do I consistently synthesize the world in the same way as do others? Even within individual objectivity

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<sup>29</sup> That is, the world of expectations that must be kept distinct from the “anticipations” characteristic of active synthesis, and from the protention of time-consciousness; for more on this distinction, cf. my dissertation, “Futurity in Phenomenology,” especially Part One, “Futurity in Constitution and Transcendental Subjectivity.”

<sup>30</sup> Here again, we take the discussion past the focus exclusively on a theory of self-awareness out to larger philosophical issues.

and association, there is the question of the reliability of the syntheses themselves: am I, to borrow language from Analytic epistemology, functioning properly?<sup>31</sup> That is, when tendencies are at work in passive association, at least one of these tendencies must also apply to the constituting acts themselves: not only does some stimulus recall to mind previous, similar stimuli, but it also recalls that previous occurrences of similar stimuli have tended to yield productive expectational capabilities. Even if the effectiveness of these acts can only be *judged* in the realm of active synthesis via reflection (and therefore, perhaps, by being objectified, strongly speaking), this would seem to presuppose an already-existent, that is to say, in the language of self-awareness, *prereflective*, objectlike-formation, as no object can exist (in active synthesis) without a prior objectlike-formation being constituted in passive synthesis. There must, it would seem, be a certain degree of objectivity to our acts, even if they are not, strictly speaking, objects (and especially not the objects of time-consciousness). It is my hope that this distinction in objectivity will enable us to preserve the distinction between “dimensions” of consciousness without resorting to a “reflection theory” that makes one dimension the object of the other, and hence multiplies self-awarenesses.

## **Conclusion**

I disagree, then, with Zahavi’s elaboration of the levels of consciousness that provides the justification for his reduction to two distinct levels of consciousness (self- and hetero-manifesting).<sup>32</sup> This manifests itself in a disagreement with some of Zahavi’s claims regarding inner time-consciousness, for example, that it is both self- and hetero-manifesting (SA 71-72), and that it is “simply the name for the prereflective self-

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant and Proper Function* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

<sup>32</sup> Though I concede that my position remains consistent with Zahavi’s on several important points.

awareness of our acts” (SA, 80) because it is equivalent to “a pervasive dimension of self-manifestation” that is a passive self-affection (SA, 72). In contrast to these claims, I have instead suggested a three-fold elaboration (active synthesis, passive synthesis, time-consciousness) that I hope clarifies the levels of constituting consciousness discussed by Husserl in Hua X. It is passive association, I contend, that is both self- and hetero-manifesting, and hence is an essential aspect of the passive dimension of self-manifestation that must be kept distinct from the “flow” of inner time-consciousness.<sup>33</sup>

While it is my hope that this suggestion will begin to resolve some core issues of the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski (i.e., concerning the “objectivity” of the second level and the need to distinguish it from time-consciousness), my more modest hope is simply that this new attempt at clarification will begin to mediate (rather than resolve) the debate by providing a neutral vocabulary within which proponents of each side can exchange their views.

Thank you.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> By trying to move beyond the issue of self-awareness through recourse to the *Analyses*, I have also tried to show, contra Zahavi’s claim on SA 81, that the issue of pre-reflective v. reflective awareness is not the only thing that can make us able to distinguish between the second and third levels of constitution elaborated by Husserl.

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## Abbreviations of Husserl's Works

*\*\*English translations cited where appropriate\*\**

- EU            *Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik.* Ed. L. Landgrebe. Hamburg: Meiner.
- Hua III        *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology.* Trans. F. Kersten. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic, 1982.
- Hua VI        *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.* Trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
- Hua X         *On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time* trans. John Barnett Brough Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic, 1991.
- Hua XI        *Analyses concerning Active and Passive Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic.* trans. Anthony J. Steinbock. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic, 2001.
- Hua XV        *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929-1935.* ed. Iso Kern. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
- Hua XVII     *Formal and Transcendental Logic.* Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.
- Hua XXXIII   *Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/1918)* Husserliana Band XXXIII. Eds. R. Bernet and D. Lohmar. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic, 2001.