Re-Constituting Phenomenology: Continuity in Levinas’ Accounts of Time and Ethics

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Abstract
At the heart of Levinas’ work is an account of subjectivity that is premised on his account of temporality. In this regard, Levinas is like many other phenomenologists. However, in order to understand Levinas in this manner, we must first reconceive what Levinas means by ‘ethics’, so we can see the fundamental continuity in his accounts of subjectivity and temporality. By understanding the continuities, not just within but also between, Levinas’ ethical subject and his futural temporality, we are able to reconceive of the scope and method of phenomenology, so as to adequately assess Levinas’ influence in that discipline.

Keywords
phenomenology, Levinas, time, ethics, phenomenological, theology

Disciplines
Philosophy | Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion

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Re-Constituting Phenomenology: Continuity in Levinas’s Account of Time and Ethics

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ABSTRACT: At the heart of Levinas’s work is an account of subjectivity that is premised on his account of temporality. In this regard, Levinas is like many other phenomenologists. However, in order to understand Levinas in this manner, we must first re-conceive what Levinas means by ‘ethics’, so we can see the fundamental continuity in his accounts of subjectivity and temporality. By understanding the continuities, not just within but also between, Levinas’ ethical subject and his futural temporality, we are able to reconceive the scope and method of phenomenology, so as to adequately assess Levinas’ influence in that discipline.

RÉSUMÉ : Au sein de l’œuvre de Levinas, se trouve un exposé sur la subjectivité fondé sur son compte de temporalité. À cet égard, Levinas est comme de nombreux phénoménologues. Cependant, pour mieux le comprendre de cette façon, nous devons d’abord re-concevoir ce que Levinas veut dire par “l’ethique”, pour voir la continuité essentiel de ses comptes de subjectivité et temporalité. En comprenant les continuités, entre et à l’intérieur de son sujet moral et sa temporalité futurelée, nous sommes capables de redéfinir l’envergure et le moyen de la phénoménologie, afin de suffisamment juger l’influence de Levinas dans cette discipline.

An account of temporality is central to any phenomenologist’s understanding of subjectivity, and also of phenomenology itself. What I would like to argue here is that this statement is true also for Levinas. For this to be true, however, it must be shown that Levinas provides us an account of subjectivity, that temporality somehow plays a central role in that account, and that Levinas ought

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doi:10.1017/S0012217310000259
to be considered as a phenomenologist. All three of these claims are controversial, and require proof.

The need to prove these claims can be seen most clearly in the (perhaps common) assumption that Levinas’s philosophy is ethical to the extent that it is concerned more with a theory of absolute Alterity than with a theory of subjectivity. Arising from this assumption is the understanding that Levinas undergoes a significant shift in his account of the “ethical relation,” from his early description of it in the “face-to-face” encounter (in Totality and Infinity) to his later analysis of this relation as the subject’s being substituted for the Other (most notably in Otherwise Than Being). These two assumptions arise from a common misconception about Levinas’s “ethical” philosophy: that his account of the ethical relation is such that the relation takes place between two “existents,” two beings, creatures, or persons in the world. This misconception must be remedied if we are to properly account for the importance of Levinas to the discipline of phenomenology.

Understanding the change in Levinas’s account of ethics as a radical shift, then, threatens a serious misunderstanding of his ethical and philosophical project. To discover the continuity in Levinas’s account of ethics, this paper will show that those ethics cannot be understood apart from his account of time, and this because his ethics present a “defense of subjectivity” (TI, 26) that changes not only how we understand Levinas, but also how we understand phenomenology.

The paper begins by briefly outlining Levinas’s account of time as the ethical relation to the Other (section 1). It then focuses on the specifics of his account of time, especially on two distinct analyses that are often overlooked in scholarship on Levinas’s notion of temporality: first, his analysis of enjoyment and sensibility in Totality and Infinity, which roots the subject’s relation to the future in two distinct “moments” that lie outside the subject — the il y a and the Other; and second, his invocations of eschatology in Totality and Infinity and “The Trace of the Other,” which place the notion of the trace at the heart of subjectivity (section 2). Building on these two analyses, the paper then shows that Levinas’s ethical concerns regarding the subject’s relation to the Other, even in the face-to-face ethical encounter, are primarily with a relationship within the life of the subject itself, rather than a relationship between distinct existents; this is to say that Levinasian ethics are concerned more with an understanding of subjectivity than with an account of ethics, traditionally speaking (section 3). I will end by showing that Levinas’s “ethical” project, so conceived, necessitates a re-evaluation of phenomenology’s method, scope, and self-understanding (section 4).

1. Time, Futurity, and Ethics

The argument begins with the suggestion that there is an essential connection between Levinas’s account of temporality and his account of ethics. This suggestion comes directly from Levinas himself: time, he says, “is the very relationship of the subject with the Other” (TO, 39). This relationship to the Other, to alterity, is constitutive of Levinas’s notion of ethics.
Time can be equated with the relationship to the Other by Levinas because time, for him, is not primarily about chronology, about the passage of time that leads in a direct line from the past, through the present, to the future: t + 1, t + 2, ... t + n. Rather, time is about the functioning of subjectivity: the present is the very existing of the subject as a subject distinct from other things and from the anonymous existence of what is just there (the il y a; cf., TO, 43). The present, then, is the fact that I exist as myself, and that everything else exists, as it were, “already as if it came from me” (TO, 64). The world is therefore reduced to my projects and projections, and the present comes to stand for this situation in which I, as Ego, am the centre and master of everything (TO, 72).

This mastery is challenged, for Levinas, by death, understood as that which places the subject “in relationship with what does not come from itself” (TO, 70). Contrary to Heidegger’s analysis of death as that which is most my own,1 for Levinas death is the “situation where something absolutely unknowable appears” (TO, 71), and so it “indicates that we are in relation with something that is absolutely other ... something whose very existence is made of alterity” (TO, 74). It is only when we are confronted by something that is radically separate from ourselves and cannot be reduced to me and my projects that we discover the possibility of something radically Other.

Death, though, does not confront us in or as the present (which is characterized by self-mastery, the very opposite of what is introduced by death). Rather, the time of death — the time that challenges the self-possession and mastery of the present — is the future (TO, 71). It is the future that “is not grasped” (TO, 76, 77), not controlled by the self, because the future strikes us, not as the continuation of our projects, but as “absolutely surprising” (TO, 76). This is in line with our common-sense understanding of time: while the past has already happened, and the present is what is happening (and can, therefore, be traced back to the already-happened of the past), the future alone is what has not (yet) happened. The essence of the future, the “futuration of the future” (DR, 115), is not the extension of the present (as time t + n) but is, rather, essentially distinct from the present.

In Levinas, this distinction is marked by the distinction between the self-possession of the present and the non-possession of the future. The future not only does not belong to me, it belongs to no one: it is “nobody’s,” and cannot be assumed by a human being (TO, 79). As such, our relation to the future is a relation with what we cannot know, with Mystery — and, ultimately, therefore, with something other, something entirely distinct from me: “[T]he very relationship with the other is the relationship with the future” (TO, 77).

But what is the nature of this relationship? After all, if the present and the future are essentially distinct, then it would seem impossible for them to come easily into relation. The only way they can come into relation is, precisely, by way of a relation between distinct entities. If they meet solely in the subject, then the future/Other will be reduced to the self-mastery constitutive of the present; if they meet only in the future, then the present/self is lost in the
“absolute surprise,” and no meeting can take place. Levinas’s solution is that the present and future come together not in the present/self, but in the intersubjective relation: “[T]he encroachment of the present on the future is not the feat of the subject alone, but the intersubjective relationship. The condition of time lies in the relationship between humans” (TO, 79).

Time, and more specifically the future, is clearly central to Levinas’s ethical project of the relation between self and Other. However, his response to the problem of how the present and the future can meet is effective only to the extent that it is unclear, and hence is not persuasive. That is, it answers the problem only by moving it up one level, and at this more basic level of interpersonal relations, the solution is ambiguous. It is simple to say that ethics is, for Levinas, the relation of the self to the Other. This statement undoubtedly is true — but it can be misleading. After all, the ethical relation of the face-to-face encounter, as described in Totality and Infinity, does not seem to look much like the ethical relation of the self’s being substituted for, and hostage of, the Other, as described in Otherwise Than Being. In the face-to-face, we seem to have a relatively straightforward account of the meeting between two existents (that is, two existing things): a self and an Other. In substitution, however, there is no such meeting, as the self arrives always too late on the scene: by the end of his career, Levinas is adamant that the ethical relation is not, strictly speaking, a relation at all, but an encounter, or rather, a non-encounter, that occurs before the self is around to be part of the encounter (OB, 11).

Returning to the problematic of time, then, the later Levinas continues to state that time is the relation with the Other (cf., e.g., GDT, 17, 19, 110); however, he now believes this relation happens in the “pre-history of the I” (GDT, 175) rather than, it would seem, in the future. This apparent change in temporality mirrors the shift in his account of ethics, from the face-to-face encounter to the subject’s substitution for the Other.

The close relationship between time and ethics has, so far, served only to render Levinas’s understanding of both ambiguous. But it does contain one promising feature: if the ambiguity can be cleared up in one of these categories, it should serve to illuminate the other, so as to help clear up the ambiguity there as well. With this promise in mind, we now turn to Levinas’s account of time to reveal that, even in his talk of the “pre-history of the I,” he still privileges futurity as the temporality of the relation to the Other. By tracing the way in which his language about time changes while his main thesis remains consistent, we will show a continuity and consistency within Levinas’s account of time, a consistency that will then, if the above analyses are correct, apply also to his main concern: ethics.

2. Continuity in Levinas’ Account of Time

We must now show, then, that Levinas remains consistent in relating the ethical relation to futurity, even when he describes this relation as having already
happened in the pre-history of the I. This will occur in two steps: first, by showing that the early account of futurity contains an ambiguity in regard to the relation between the subject and alterity; and second, that this ambiguity enables us to understand futurity as having always already occurred before the constitution of the subject.

2.1. The Ambiguity of Futurity in Totality and Infinity

The seeds of the apparent shift in temporal terminology are present already in Totality and Infinity. Levinas’s accounts of the future and of ethics in Time and the Other seem to be premised on certain sharp dichotomies: self-Other, present-future, etc. These dichotomies remain active in much of Totality and Infinity, most notably, it would seem, in the face-to-face encounter. But section 2.B of Totality and Infinity, entitled “Enjoyment and Representation,” begins to undermine these dichotomies via its re-conception of enjoyment. There, Levinas introduces the elemental as the “background from which [the things that are enjoyed] emerge and to which they return in the enjoyment we have of them” (TI, 130). As seeking things, as seeking to represent things to the self as things for the self, enjoyment is a return to solitude, to the self-mastery of the present subject; but, in opening us onto the elemental as the milieu in which we take hold of things, enjoyment also opens us onto another aspect of our condition: “One does not approach [the elemental] ... one is steeped in it; I am always within the element” (TI, 131). As “steeped” within the elemental, the subject find itself always already inserted into a particular condition that exists prior to its own constitution; the subject finds itself always already contacted by alterity in the very movement (enjoyment) that returns the subject to itself.

Such a simultaneous ability to establish the solitude of the self and contact with alterity is impossible according to the stark dichotomies of Time and the Other. It is the invocation of the future, within the present (or presence) of solitude, that enables this seemingly impossible move, but it can do so only by re-evaluating the relationship between futurity and the present. Enjoyment is able to be in touch with something other than the self only because “a future is announced within the element and menaces it with insecurity” (TI, 137). This futurity “opens up an abyss within enjoyment itself” (TI, 141): enjoyment and sensibility are “separated from thought” and are “not of the order of experience” (TI, 137), which is to say, not of the order of the present, because in enjoyment I do not represent the world (I, precisely, enjoy it). Though I cannot yet encounter the Other (person) in enjoyment, I can escape totalizing thought there. In this way, enjoyment and sensibility serve as kinds of precursors to the face-to-face, but are distinct from it:

[En]joyment does not refer to an infinity beyond what nourishes it, but to the virtual vanishing of what presents itself. ... This ambivalence of nourishment, which on the one hand offers itself and contents, but which already withdraws ... is to be distinguished
from the presence of the infinite in the finite [in the face-to-face encounter] and from the structure of the thing. (TI, 141)

What this futurity of the elemental reveals is not, then, the Other of *Time and the Other*. Rather, this concept of futurity “is lived concretely as the mythical divinity of the element” (TI, 142). This “mythical divinity” manifests itself in a certain “nothingness that bounds the egoism of enjoyment,” and through this nothingness “enjoyment accomplishes separation” (TI, 142); that is, the distinctiveness of the subject. But what is separated from me in this mythical, elemental “night” of nothingness “is not a ‘something’ susceptible of being revealed, but an ever-new depth of absence, an existence without existent, the impersonal par excellence” (TI, 142). This is to say that the “element extends into the *il y a*” (TI, 142; translation modified).

Surprisingly, the analysis of sensibility and enjoyment in *Totality and Infinity* returns us to that ultimate horizon out of which the existent must continually raise itself in its subjectivity (cf. TO, 52 ff). What is perhaps most surprising in this is that the very thing that put us in contact with the Other (i.e., futurity) here puts us in the realm of the impersonal *il y a*, yet the accounts of futurity given in the two analyses are remarkably similar: the always still to come, the indeterminacy of the future that comes from nowhere and is nobody’s — these remain consistent through the two discussions of futurity (cf. TO, 79 and TI, 141). How can “the very relationship with the other [be] the relationship with the future” (TO, 77) if that future puts us in contact, not with the “infinite in the finite” that is the face-to-face, but rather with the anonymous existence of the *il y a*?

Here we see the futurity of the relation to the Other being installed into that out of which the subject raises itself in its existing. That is, we begin to see that the self becomes a self only by raising itself out of a milieu that is always already steeped in alterity, an alterity that is characterized by the “absolute surprise” of the future, though not yet by the height of the Infinite that characterizes the face of the Other (person).

2.2. The Trace and Eschatology

For Levinas’s understanding of time, then, it seems that the relationship with the future exists already in the past. To understand how this can be the case, we must turn to his essay “A Trace of the Other” (1963), in which Levinas makes explicit that the relationship to the future occurs in the past.

In that essay, as elsewhere, Levinas speaks of the need for an experience or encounter that would not reduce the Other to the same. To accomplish this, he claims, we would need a “movement of the same unto the other which never returns to the same” (TA, 348), but which is not, for all that, pure loss (TA 349). This would constitute “a relationship with the other who is reached without showing himself touched”: it is a “being-for-beyond-my-death” (TA, 349). To be-for-beyond-my-death is to be for “a future beyond the celebrated ‘being-for-death’”
(TA, 349); that is, a future beyond the projections of my own projects. To do this is not to stretch out the time of the present subject forward, which would reduce the alterity of the future to the sameness of the present; rather, to be-for-beyond-my-death is to “let the future and the most far-off things be the rule for all the present days” (TA, 349). The truly futural relationship, then, rules everything that I do in the present.

For this reason, Levinas calls this being-for-beyond-my-death “eschatology” (TA, 349). But this eschatological movement of futurity is truly achieved only in the trace of “an utterly bygone past ... which cannot be discovered in the self by an introspection,” a past, therefore, that cannot be remembered, “an immemorial past” (TA, 355), because only in the trace is the alterity of the Other with whom I am in relation preserved. It is preserved there because the trace “occurs by overprinting. ... He who left traces in wiping out his traces did not mean to say or do anything by the traces he left” (TA, 357), which is to say that we encounter the Other only by the traces of what he has left behind after he has left the scene. Existing always in the present, the subject discovers that the encounter with the Other always has already occurred, and is therefore always in the past, though in a past that is not merely a past-present.

The notion of an “immemorial past” in which the pre-primordial encounter with the Other leaves its mark as a trace becomes Levinas’s focus in Otherwise Than Being. At stake in that work is the “irreducible diachrony whose sense [Otherwise Than Being] aims to bring to light” (OB, 34). This notion of diachrony is the key development in Levinas’s understanding of time, but it has always been at work there: in contrast to the present time of subjectivity that exists as “the promise of the graspable” (DR, 98), the “time” of the encounter with the other that leaves its mark only as a trace within the present of the subject must be such that it cannot be synthesized, that is, united or made synchronous with the intentions and knowledge of the subject, existing always in the present. To avoid this synchronization, it is not enough to place this encounter in the past or the future, chronologically conceived, as both of these can be reduced to the constituted time of the Ego, and hence reduced to the presence of the present (in the past-present or the future-present). What is needed is a notion of time that defies all recourse to synchronization, all attempts to be unified in the project of the Ego. This radically non-synchronous time is diachrony, “the di-a-chrony of a past that does not gather into re-presentation” (DR, 112), “a lapse of time that does not return ... [that is] refractory to all synchronization,” which is “a past more ancient than every representable origin, a pre-original and anarchical passed” (OB, 9), “a past that is on the hither side of every present” (OB, 10). But is this not also the time of “absolute surprise” as opposed to the self-mastery of the present? If the diachrony of the past is defined by its inability to be gathered into re-presentation, this is because the diachrony of the past is constituted by the radical surprise that defined futurity already in Time and the Other and in the analysis of enjoyment in Totality and Infinity. That Levinas now places this account of the absolute surprise of
that-which-does-not-come-from-me in the past does not entail that he has abandoned his early account of temporality, which privileged the future. Instead, absolute surprise remains essentially futural but the future is now placed in the past. This is possible because Levinas’s account of time is concerned not with chronological time but rather with a non-chronological understanding of time, understood as “the relationship between humans” (TO, 79), “absolute future, or infinite time” (TI, 268), or the eschatological time of being-for-beyond-my-death (TA, 349). It is in this non-chronological account of time that Levinas’s notion of diachronic time takes its place, and hence his notion of diachronic time is consistent with the understanding of time he had developed in his earlier works.

3. Continuity in Ethics

Having shown that diachrony — the theory of temporality that enables Levinas’s discussion of ethics as substitution and hostage — is consistent with his early theory of temporality, it remains to be shown whether this continuity will also translate back into a continuity and consistency in his seemingly ambiguous account of the ethical relation, and, if it will do this, how this might affect our understanding of that relation.

3.1. The Ethical Relation as “Trace”

The first hints of continuity in this account of the ethical relation can be found already in Totality and Infinity, when Levinas describes the ethical relation as eschatological, stating that “eschatology institutes a relation with being beyond the totality or beyond history, and not with being beyond the past and the present” (TI, 22). To make sense of this statement, we would need to develop an account in which the futurity that challenges the self-mastery of the present and hence makes possible the relationship with the Other beyond being is also, and simultaneously, at work in the very functioning of the present. The analysis of eschatology in “A Trace of the Other” helps us develop this account by suggesting the possibility of a relationship with futurity (and, hence, a relationship with alterity) that has always already occurred in the past of the subject, yet remains operative in the present of the subject.

This account, of course, finds its ultimate elaboration in Levinas’s understanding of the subject as hostage to the Other, which enables him to claim that the subjectivity of the subject is its very responsibility for the Other (OB, 100). But to really make sense of this account, and how it is continuous with his early attempts at explaining the ethical relation, we must acknowledge not only the temporal nature of that relation (i.e., as eschatological), but also its phenomenological (cf. TI, 29) stature as intentional (OB, 183). To do this, we must revisit Levinas’s understanding of intentionality, “the essential teaching of Husserl,” which Levinas describes in Totality and Infinity as “the idea of the overflowing of objectifying thought by a forgotten experience from which it lives” (TI, 28).1
This “forgotten experience” is, for Levinas, the Other’s bestowal of sense (\textit{Sinngebung}) onto the subject.\textsuperscript{12} The subject is able to bestow sense on a world only because the subject is endowed with sense by something outside itself. This occurs first, in objects giving themselves to the subject for constitution in the manner of impression; and second, in the very bestowal of the ability to give sense onto the subject by something else. While the former exists in every (present) act of the subject, the latter occurs before the subject exists as a subject, because it is precisely what enables the subject to be a subject: because I have had sense bestowed on me (by the Other), I am able to bestow sense onto the world (i.e., I am able to become a subject). This is what will lead Levinas to say that the very functioning of subjectivity is its responsibility (or, better, response-ability, ability to respond) to and for the Other (OB, 100). The subject, as a sense-bestowing entity, is, in its very bestowing of sense, responding to an alterity that has first bestowed its sense onto the subject. The subject’s acts, then, can be understood as the trace of an Other who is no longer on the scene, but who has left its indelible mark (its trace) on the subject, as the subject, i.e., as the very ability of the subject to bestow sense. This is what is at stake in Levinas’s discussion of the self as substituted for, or hostage in place of, the Other: where the Other is the first to bestow sense (by bestowing it on the subject), the subject then becomes the one bestowing sense, taking over the task and function of the Other and, in fact, unable not so to take the place of the Other and remain a subject. The very subjectivity of the subject is its taking-the-place of the Other as bestower of sense.

This notion of subjectivity then constitutes a relationship to an Other that does not reduce the Other to the same, but rather is the process of the self always “spending down” the resources it has gained from the Other, without this equating into pure economic loss: the more the self bestows sense, the more it “spends,” the more it is both true to itself (as sense-bestowing subject) and yet in relation with an Other who first bestowed sense on it. Yet, its “expenditure” is not a pure loss, as it is nothing other than the essence of subjectivity itself (i.e., to bestow sense). This then lives up to Levinas’s call for a heteronomous experience that would be “a movement of the same unto the other which never returns to the same,” but which is also not pure loss (TA, 348–349).

Hence, Levinas’s description of the subjectivity of the subject being characterized by responsibility for, or as being hostage of, the Other is in fact an outgrowth of his earlier work. With this understanding of the ethical relationship in place, one can see numerous indications of it already early on: in the invocations of eschatology and phenomenology in \textit{Totality and Infinity} that we have discussed above and also, perhaps more notable for us, already in \textit{Time and the Other}, where the subject’s relation to alterity that is introduced by the future is not a plurality of existents (contra Heidegger’s \textit{Mitsein}, \textit{Mitda-sein} or \textit{Miteinandersein})\textsuperscript{13} but rather a plurality insinuated “into the very existing of the existent” in a relationship with an Other that is not a relationship of communion or sympathy, but of Mystery (TO, 75). Here already we see that the
relationship with the Other is something within the subjectivity of the subject itself, rather than an act or experience had by the subject.

3.2. Clarifying the “Ethical” Relation

We have suggested in the previous section that the Other that is encountered by the subject is the trace of the Other left behind in the subjectivity of the subject. But how, then, can we relate this to the idea that the ethical relationship is encountered only in a distinctly existing Other person, as Levinas’s analysis of the face-to-face encounter in Totality and Infinity might seem to suggest?¹⁴

Here, one must, perhaps, distinguish between the order of analysis and the order of experience. As in most phenomenological analyses, that which is most readily experienced in this instance is not that which is phenomenologically prior. If I first experience the Other in the face-to-face encounter, this experience is so jarring to me only because it reveals to me that this alterity — which I now seem to be encountering for the first time — is, in fact, already within me. When Levinas describes the face-to-face encounter as absolutely surprising, the surprise is in the encounter with the face of the Other person that opens up the dimension of height, alterity, ethics, etc.; but what makes this surprise absolute is that the self discovers, in the face-to-face, that it has already been opened up; that alterity has already stricken it, riven it in two. The self can encounter an Other person or existent ethically only because the very essence of its own subjectivity has already been affected by “the antecedent and non-allergic presence of the Other,” which renders the violent impulses of the face-to-face encounter as secondary, as not representing “the first event of the encounter” (TI, 199). This is why Levinas is able to say that the event proper to the expression manifest in and by the face is a “bearing witness to oneself, and guaranteeing this witness” (TI, 201): I bear witness to myself in the face-to-face because, in bearing witness to myself, I bear witness also to the alterity that the face of the Other reveals within myself, to that stranger or Other who “is me,” and makes me “a stranger to myself” (TI, 267). The relation between two existents is, therefore, experimentally primary but phenomenologically secondary in the ethical relationship of the face-to-face.

But if Levinas’s ethical relation is not, in essence, an experienced relation between two people, then what, exactly, is the meaning of this relation, and what is its ethical weight? The first of these questions we have already begun to answer in our analysis of Levinas’s understanding of temporality. Just as his notion of time is not the linear time of chronology but rather the non-synchronous “diachronous” time of eschatology — concerned primarily with interrupting the self-presence and self-mastery of the subject in and as the present — so, too, is his understanding of the ethical relation concerned not with an experienced relationship between two people (which would easily be reduced to another movement in the self’s own projects and projections),¹⁵ but rather primarily with the condition or structure of subjectivity itself.
One can distinguish in Levinas at least four distinct “moments,” understandings, or functions of the self: the ego (self as constituting power); the subject (self as continuous);\(^{16}\) the oneself or ipseity (self as infinite depth/uniqueness); and the (empirical) person encountered in experience. Levinas’s ethical project is to show that the subjectivity of the self is based on its ipseity, not its egoity; that is, the self is continuous (and hence can be ethical in the traditional sense: can make promises, etc.) not because of its constituting power, but because it is constituted in responsibility. While this emerges especially clearly in Otherwise Than Being, it is at work already in Time and the Other, where Levinas claims that enjoyment opens “an interval between the ego and the self” (TO, 62). This early attempt at distancing the self from its constituting powers as ego is then expanded and deepened in the analysis of enjoyment offered in Totality and Infinity and discussed above, in which Levinas finds an openness to alterity even in enjoyment — the very height of phenomenological self-fulfillment\(^{17}\) — itself. This discovery of alterity within the constituting powers of the ego is lost in the traditional understanding of the face-to-face encounter as that between empirical persons encountered within experience. It is not merely the empirical person that is essentially shaped by alterity (as Husserl’s notion of impression already makes clear),\(^{18}\) but rather it is the Ego of the self that is constituted, in its essence, by otherness. This is then explained in the analyses of sense-bestowal and, ultimately, in the condition of the subject as responsible hostage, when Levinas shows that the ipseity of the self comes not from itself but is bestowed upon it by the Other, who demands that the self respond to its call by making sense of a world. In making sense of a world, the self always says, implicit with every other statement or thought, “I” — which is, for Levinas, a response to the Other’s call by saying, “Here I am.”

When I experience my subjectivity primarily as an ego, I replace the Other with myself without acknowledging the unpayable debt I have to the Other for constituting me as a subject. Levinas’s call to responsibility is to understand our subjectivity on the basis of our ability to respond to the Other — that is, our ability, given us by the sense-bestowing Other, to say “Here I am,” or, more generally, “I,” to the Other who announces itself already within our subjectivity. We are called, therefore, to see our egoity not as the principle of our subjectivity, but as an invitation to respond to the Other who bestowed on us that egoity. The subject is not primarily an I who creates (subject as Husserlian ego), but an I who responds (subject as Levinasian responsibility).

### 4. The Significance of Levinas’s “Ethical” Project for Phenomenology

Levinas’s so-called “ethical” project is, then, concerned with a proper understanding of the subject and not with an elaboration of rules or norms for actions in the world. As such, it does not seem to be “ethical” in the traditional sense of that term.\(^{19}\) It remains ethical in this more traditional sense only in a limited way — but a way that has important consequences for phenomenology’s moving forward.
Levinas believes that the encounter with the Other is ethical because it is premised on a sense-bestowal (Sinngebung) that is "essentially respectful of the Other" (RR, 121). This Sinngebung is respectful, in turn, because it is not premised solely on the constituting powers of the Ego, but instead takes into account the effect that the Other has on constituting that Ego. The notion of the Ego as constituted, in addition to its constituting powers, represents Levinas's major contribution to phenomenological theory, containing an implicit development of the Husserlian notion of intentionality in its emphasis on the Ego's passivity (being-constituted) rather than merely on its activity (constituting). His focus on passivity is meant to indicate precisely that the Ego is influenced or impressed upon by things outside itself in materiality, sensibility, etc.

On the surface, this does not seem to constitute a novel development in phenomenology, as even Husserl notes that the Ego is affected by things outside itself in the mode of impression:

The word 'impression' is appropriate only to original sensations; the word expresses well what is 'there' of itself, and indeed originally: namely what is pregiven [vorgegeben] to the Ego, presenting itself to the Ego in the manner of something affecting it as foreign. ... This non-derived impression ... breaks down into primal sensibility and into Ego-actions and Ego-affections. (Hua IV, 336)²⁰

But, as indicated here, this affection by the foreign does not for Husserl strike at the essence of the Ego itself, but only at its acts. Levinas develops this notion to suggest that the Ego can be affected by things outside itself only because it is, in and of itself, constituted by alterity. This is not to remove the constituting powers of the Ego, but only to say that the Ego is characterized not only by those powers — by its acts — but also by its being-affected, its passivity.

At stake in this critique is more than just a critique of Husserl's overly theoretical approach to phenomenology. Rather, at stake is the very self-understanding of phenomenology itself: by radically reconceiving intentionality as a two-way street (constituting/constituted), Levinas recasts — or at least extends — the definition of what phenomenology is. When the Ego is understood as fundamentally in control of itself, then phenomenology can be defined largely as a method, namely, the methodology for the proper utilization of egoic acts. Related to this, if the Ego is understood as the essence of the self, then subjective conditions are relevant only to the extent that they affect particular manifestations of egoic acts (i.e., that an Ego constitutes X rather than Y), but they can have no effect on the function of those acts themselves: since the Ego is self-present and self-mastered, nothing external to it can affect its essential functioning. To employ Kantian language, one could say that subjective conditions can affect only the content of egoic acts, and not the form that those acts themselves take. Instead, the essential functioning of the Ego must exist in
its purest form in abstraction from all such subjective concerns. This seems to
be the justification for Husserl’s talk of a “transcendental Ego,” and for his
invocation of the phenomenological reduction.

If, however, Levinas is correct in asserting that the Ego is not fundamen-
tially in control of itself but is, rather, constituted by something outside itself,
then phenomenology can no longer concern itself merely with the functioning
of the Ego if it wishes to be something other than a “regional ontology.”
Related to this, if the Ego is constituted by something outside itself, then it is
not primary, but secondary, and as such it is possible for it to be present
within the self without its being the primary essence of the self. And if the
Ego is not primary within the self — that is, if the Ego is not equivalent to the
subject within the self — then subjective conditions could, potentially, influ-
ence the very functioning of the Ego itself. This not only calls into question
the viability of a “Transcendental Ego,” but it also challenges the validity of
the transcendental itself, in its traditional understanding: if there is no “pure”
Ego that can be distinguished from its subjective conditions, then perhaps the
very idea of transcendental conditions distinct from empirical or subjective
conditions also disappears.21 That is, to return to somewhat Kantian language,
perhaps there is no logical possibility of a sharp distinction between form and
content.

Before outlining some of the major consequences of this Levinasian de-
velopment of Husserlian phenomenology, I must pause to forestall a possible cri-
tique. It could be protested that much of what I have attributed to Levinas here
can be ascribed already to Husserl, and as such does not constitute a critique of
phenomenology at all, but merely its application. The passivity of the sub-
ject,22 the critique of traditional notions of transcendence,23 and the two-way
connection between Ego and world24 are all taken account of in the Husserlian
corpus, and as such Levinas provides nothing new — and definitely nothing
critical — to phenomenology. But to state that these themes are present already
in Husserl is not to undercut Levinas, for he himself indicates as much (e.g., T1,
28). Indeed, much of what I am saying is innovative in Levinas was developed
precisely through Levinas’s “long frequenting of Husserlian labors” (RR, 113;
translation modified). To say that Husserl makes note of these themes is not the
same thing as to say that Husserl developed them at length, and therefore to say
that Levinas discusses something already discussed by Husserl does not entail
that Levinas contributes nothing novel to phenomenology. What is novel in
Levinas’s contribution to phenomenology is, perhaps, precisely that he de-
velops from within phenomenology the “forgotten” horizons that pheno-
menology introduced, but then neglected (OB, 183), and therefore develops
Husserl’s insights “beyond what Husserl himself said” (EI, 32). If Husserl him-
self also develops these themes in works to which Levinas had no access, this
does not denigrate Levinas’s achievements but rather elevates them all the
higher, showing that he did, in fact, accurately understand Husserl’s pheno-
menology, even to the point of predicting what Husserl himself would say.25
So if we can say, then, that Levinas's description of the reversal of Sinngebung and its subsequent effect on our understanding of the Ego as both constituted and constituting is a development of phenomenology, it remains to be shown what consequences this development might have for phenomenology. Here, I will be able to elucidate only some of the major consequences, without describing them in great detail, in the hopes that some of the lesser consequences will become apparent once the major themes are in place. Some of these consequences include:

1. If the Ego is primary, then studying its functioning would authentically characterize first philosophy. If, however, the Ego is not primary, then something else can take the place of first philosophy. For Levinas, of course, this is ethics, which we can now understand in its Levinasian sense as the claim that the Ego is constituted by alterity, and hence is not primary. This suggests not only the critique of ontology that Levinas himself undertakes (e.g., in IOF) but also a critique of the notion of epistemology as first philosophy operative in Cartesian philosophies, as well as a critique of the simple notion of givenness and the "principle of principles" that it supports, within phenomenology. If simple givenness can no longer be the mark of phenomenological evidence, then the idea of mediation must bear some essential importance to phenomenological accounts of the functioning of the Ego, and the traditional phenomenological epistemology of intuition and givenness cannot continue to be taken as the basis for adequate phenomenological evidence without further proof for its reliability.

2. If the self and the ego were equivalent, then subjective conditions would be philosophically irrelevant. If, however, something else constitutes the subjectivity of the self, then subjective conditions could be relevant to the functioning of the Ego (i.e., to knowledge and ontology). As such, Levinas seems to be an integral precursor to French "postmodernism,"26 and the phenomenological heritage of the movement must be understood if one is to accurately take note of the influence and consequences of this movement. For example, Lyotard's famous description of postmodernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives" builds precisely on Levinas's critiques of representational thinking, the primacy of ontology, and any system of thought that moves toward totalization, i.e., the reduction of alterity to the conditions of the same (or of the System, in Lyotard and Baudrillard).28 Similarly, the critique of objectivity in French postmodernism is carried out by undermining those things that make objectivity possible, including "the nature of consciousness as always identical to itself," which is, as I've tried to argue here, the Levinasian problem par excellence. Invoking Levinas here not only gives us more insights into academic questions of influence, but more importantly suggests a new level of philosophical depth that could be unveiled in postmodernism if
it were to be read also on this level of the constitution of the subject, and not merely on the level of political or institutional organization. Thinking that multiculturalism is the admirable goal of postmodern theory fails to appreciate the depth of its critique, in much the same way that treating Levinas's ethical project as a straightforward statement of ethical norms of self-sacrifice and immolation before the Other fails to appreciate the depth of his critique of traditional philosophical thinking.\textsuperscript{30}

3. If subjective concerns are philosophically relevant, and if, as mentioned earlier, phenomenology is not to be understood merely as a methodology, then new avenues of potential phenomenological inquiry are opened up. If intentionality is not merely a methodological issue or the act of noesis aiming at noema, but is rather a condition that constitutes the subject, then the application of a simple form of the reduction is no longer sufficiently rigorous.\textsuperscript{31} If the powers of the Ego are, even in part, constituted by its life-world or by culturally sedimented objectivities,\textsuperscript{32} then perhaps some received knowledge is not merely a matter of the "natural attitude" in need of reduction but is, rather, constitutive of the very functioning of the Ego itself. As such, hermeneutic concerns could, potentially, be reintroduced into the heart of phenomenological discourse.

4. If the Ego is not self-sufficient but is constituted by alterity, then it is not immediately objectionable to posit the existence of egoic acts that might not be controlled by the Ego. Indeed, if the passivity of the Ego as constituted is taken seriously and combined with the possible inclusion of hermeneutical concerns within phenomenological discourse, then perhaps the "theological turn" in French phenomenology is not immediately ruled out of the bounds of strictly phenomenological research.\textsuperscript{32} Indeed, it may turn out that it does not even constitute a "turn" at all, but is rather the development of strictly phenomenological concerns that have been present from the inception of phenomenology.

5. If the Ego were solely a constituting agent, then temporality could be properly understood on the model of something achieved by the Ego. If, however, the Ego is also a constituted patient, then temporality can be re-evaluated as something other than the achievement of the subject. In this light, the recent turn to eschatology by certain phenomenologists (e.g., Marion, Lacoste) not only might prove to be consistent with phenomenology rather than some abrupt turn from it, but indeed also may provide a helpful corrective toward establishing a proper phenomenological understanding of time. Given the importance of temporality to phenomenology, establishing a coherent and consistent account of time may prove essential to any attempt to reinvigorate phenomenological epistemology (as suggested in 1. above). The concept of eschatology may, then, prove essential to a more rigorous understanding of phenomenology (including a phenomenological "ontology," that would, via the
notion of intentionality, call into question the materialism that currently seems to hold sway in much of Western science).

The above list will suffice, for now, to illustrate the importance of Levinas’s ethical project for phenomenology. His project can be deemed “ethical,” in the traditional sense, only to the extent that we understand it as installing an appreciation of alterity into the very heart of subjectivity itself. It can do this, however, only if we properly account for its relation to Levinas’s re-evaluation of temporality, and understand the mutual implication of these two throughout his work. This, in turn, entails that the alterity discovered in the heart of the subject must also be discovered — and accounted for — in the heart of phenomenological temporality. Such a project calls into question much of the basis of “orthodox” phenomenology, while simultaneously grounding some other movements in Continental philosophy in the phenomenological discourse. As such, Levinas’s ethical project reconstitutes the bounds of phenomenology itself, opening the door for new research in phenomenology.

Notes

1 Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, §§ 46–53.

2 Indeed, this seems to be the crux of Derrida’s critique of Levinas in “Violence and Metaphysics”: If Levinas’ Other is in fact entirely and infinitely other, infinitely different, then it cannot be experienced by the self; and as such the self-Other “encounter” that forms the basis of Levinas’s ethical project could never occur. Cf. Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 79–153.

3 Levinas himself seems to vacillate throughout Totality and Infinity on the nature and significance of enjoyment: he will say, for example, that “In enjoyment I am absolutely for myself” (TI, 134) and that “sensibility is enjoyment” (TI, 136), but then say shortly thereafter that “sensibility enacts the very separation of being” (TI, 138) and that “enjoyment seems to be in touch with an ‘other’” (TI, 137). What is introduced in this section of Totality and Infinity becomes very significant as Levinas continues to pursue the question of the ethical relation to the Other, because this vacillation is rooted in precisely the type of subject that Levinas is intent on describing: one that is for-itself, and yet open to otherness in general. This re-emerges in Levinas’s discussion of eros and fecundity in section 4 of Totality and Infinity (cf., e.g., 4.A, “The Ambiguity of Eros”), which has interesting resonances with Levinas’s early work On Escape. I thank the anonymous referees for Dialogue for helping me see the significance of the apparent vacillation at work here.

4 Hence, the analysis of futurity causes us to pause before Adriaan Peperzak’s assessment that “The second chapter of Totality and Infinity describes the manner in which nature is made to submit by the ego through consumption, dwelling, manipulation, work, and technology, as well as through aesthetic contemplation.” a project that Peperzak admits is never fully completed (cf. Peperzak, To the Other: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas [West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1994], 42). Futurity helps us see that the second chapter of Totality and Infinity announces both the submission of nature to the ego and the openness that entails that this submission will never be completed; in this section of Totality and Infinity, then, are announced both the Husserlian project of sense-bestowal and its inversion in Levinas, as we will describe in more detail below.

5 The emergence of subjectivity from out of the anonymous existing of the *il y a* is described in Time and the Other, but finds its most thorough elaboration in Existence and Existent, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001). The translation of the title loses something of the vitality of the original French title: *De l’existence à l’existant*.

6 This appears surprising only if one does not see the continuity in the accounts of time and ethics that I am arguing for in this paper, and which has already been foreshadowed in the analysis of enjoyment. Levinas tries to illustrate the importance of the ambiguity between alterity and the *il y a* in his account of the accomplishment of ethics “Beyond the Face” (section 4 of Totality and Infinity, already noted above), notably in his concept of fecundity. While a thorough analysis of fecundity and its relationship to ethics via the related notions of eros and profanation would prove too lengthy to be included here, I think such an analysis would further confirm the argumentation of this paper. In brief support of this claim, I can only here refer to the consistent recurrence of permutations of the idea of the future in section 4, most notably, perhaps, the claim that fecundity resembles the idea of infinity (and everything that notion does for Levinas, in Totality and Infinity and beyond) insofar as it “transforms the relation with the future into a power of the subject,” though a future that “does not enter into the logical essence of the possible” (T1, 267). This transformation of the future (beyond its Aristotelian and Heideggerian understandings) establishes the idea of a stranger who “is me,” indeed, who makes me “a stranger to myself” (ibid.; there are obvious parallels here to the trace of the other in me, to be discussed later in this paper). Fecundity, then, not only creates a situation in which I encounter the Other within, and as, myself, but also firmly links this relationship with the other to the relationship with time (cf. T1, 268). It is also interesting to note, in light of the conclusions I will draw in the last section of this paper—most notably that pertaining to the scope of phenomenology’s influence once we properly situate Levinas within that tradition—, Julia Kristeva’s *Strangers to Ourselves* (trans. Leon S. Roudiez [New York: Columbia University Press, 1991]), a book whose title has clear resonances with the passage from Levinas cited above.

7 The date of this article is important in that it shows that the “move” from the ethics of the face-to-face in Totality and Infinity to the ethics of substitution in Otherwise Than Being was begun before the publication of Derrida’s “Violence and Metaphysics,” and therefore the motivation for that “move” was internal to Levinas’s project, and is not the result of Derrida’s criticisms in that essay.

8 Levinas will take up the criticism of Heidegger’s being-toward-death, begun implicitly already in Time and the Other, more explicitly in God, Death and Time.

10 Such a past is of a different order than that of the past-present. In other words, it is not enough that this an-archic past occurs before the empirical "arche" of a particular subject. 1867, for example, can still be recuperated by me in my experience via the notion of history, in which we use language to present past experience as constitutive of our present experience by tracing a narrative arc from that past experience to the present. Though I was not alive in 1867, I do know that that was the year of Canadian confederation; I can trace an entire history from that moment of Confederation (or even before that) to my current situation as a Canadian citizen. As such, I am able, in some way, to incorporate 1867 as a moment in my experience, even though I never had a direct experience of it. For more on the distinction between history and the time of ethics, cf. Rudolf Bernet, "My Time and the Time of the Other," in Zahavi, ed., *Self-Awareness, Temporality and Alterity: Central Topics in Phenomenology* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic, 1998), 137–149.

11 One can already see structural connections to the ambiguity of futurity as the relation to alterity that will occur in the analysis of enjoyment in this work, as discussed above.

12 That the subject is a receiver of sense, and not exclusively a bestower of sense, constitutes Levinas's major re-working of the Husserlian notion of intentionality, as developed in several important articles in the 1950s and 1960s that characterize his re-evaluation of phenomenology. It is discussed at some length in Drabinski, *Sensibility and Singularity: The Problem of Phenomenology in Levinas* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001). Later, we will evaluate its importance to an understanding of phenomenology; for now, however, let us focus on its contribution to the encounter of the subject with alterity.

13 Cf. *Being and Time*, passim (see especially § 26). See also TO, 41, and Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 90.

14 The other prominent metaphor for this relation from *Totality and Infinity* that we have discussed in this paper—fecundity—is no more clear in this regard. The invocation of the "child" as that which is produced by fecundity heavily privileges the idea of the ethical relationship as one between distinct existents, though Levinas tries to mitigate this connotation by reminding us that the intentionality of eros (which produces fecundity) "aims beyond an existent however future, which, precisely as an existent, knocks already at the gates of being" (TI, 258).

15 This seems to be the heart of Levinas's critique of Husserl and Heidegger; cf. Bernet, "Levinas's Critique of Husserl," in *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas*,...
My claim is not that Levinas discusses the subject primarily via language of continuity, but rather that Levinas deals with the function of continuity within the self, a function that is necessary for any account of ethical and moral responsibility, traditionally speaking (for more on the necessity of continuity for traditional notions of responsibility, cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992]). Discussions focused on this idea of continuity might prove a fruitful point of departure for attempts to relate the "ethical" relation in Levinas to traditional accounts of ethics (e.g., in Analytic philosophy), e.g., by stating that the subject's continuity through time—and hence its ability to be an ethical agent—is rooted not in its autonomy, but in its responsibility before the Other.


As Levinas himself realizes: "The ethical situation of responsibility is not comprehensible on the basis of ethics" (OB, 120).


Cf. discussions of the life-world, passive synthesis, etc., in *The Crisis* and in *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis*. 
This is also to ignore the possibility that we understand Husserl’s works as evidencing these kinds of themes because we are post-Levinasian readers of Husserl. This might, in part, explain why the French readings of Husserl tend to differ from their German counterparts.

Though one should not ignore the profound influence of the work of Nietzsche in this movement as well, especially following the publication of Deleuze’s *Nietzsche et la philosophie* in 1962.


Not to mention that such a reading of Levinas misconstrues entirely not just his purpose, but also the kind of ethics that would grow out of his “ethical” project. The same, I would argue, would be true of postmodernism: a tolerance of multicultural others not only misses the purpose of postmodernism but also, in many ways, runs counter to the kind of politics or ethics it might be said to support. For a “postmodern” critique of multiculturalism, cf. Baudrillard, *The Spirit of Terrorism*.


**Levinas’s Works, Cited by Abbreviation**

**DR**


**EI**


**GDT**


