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A Catholic Perspective on Marriage and the Gift of Children—With Special Attention to Herman Dooyeweerd’s Social Ontology of Marriage

Marriage is grounded in God’s purpose for creation. It is the two-in-one-flesh union of a man and a woman, with conjugal love being the integrating principle of the whole communion of marriage and family life. *Gaudium et spes* stated it this way: “Marriage and conjugal love are by their nature ordained toward the begetting and educating of children. Children are really the supreme gift of marriage” (no. 50). In this short paper, I discuss the question of how the good of marriage is related to the gift of children, according to the Catholic tradition. The answer to this question presupposes an understanding of the nature of marriage and the corresponding reasons for getting married. In the twentieth century, particularly in the fundamental theological accounts, for example, of Dietrich von Hildebrand (1929), Pius XI in *Casti Connubii* (1930), and Karol Wojtyła (1960), but also of Reformed philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd (1936 [1957]), who appreciably engages the thought of Pius and Hildebrand, leading up to Vatican II’s *Gaudium et spes* 47-53, the focus of these accounts had to do with the question whether marriage is a good in itself, an intrinsic good, that is to be sought for its own sake; or it is an instrumental good, necessary for something else, particularly for having children. In the development of the Church’s teaching on marriage, some theologians gave a strong personalist tone to marriage as a community of love, but did so by opposing love to procreation; others continued to insist that procreation takes precedence over love. Either way of framing the relationship between the good of marriage and the gift of children

by Eduardo J. Echeverria

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was rejected in *Gaudium et spe*}, which formulated this relationship as the natural ordering of marriage and conjugal love to procreation. This paper gives a short treatment of how Catholicism reached that formulation. I conclude with some reference to Pope Francis’s view in his 2016 post-synodal Apostolic Exhortation, *Amoris Laetitia*.

**Augustine and Aquinas**

To begin with, St. Augustine’s thinking on this question of the relationship of marriage and children is complex. On the one hand, he defends the goodness of marriage against the charge that Catholics favored the Manicheans because of the pride of place they ascribed to holy virginity in contrast to marriage. In defending the goodness of marriage as an intrinsic good, Augustine affirms the marriage of persons known to be infertile: “[T]here is good ground to inquire for what reason it [marriage] be a good. And this seems not to me to be merely on account of the begetting of children, but also on account of the natural society itself in a difference of sex. Otherwise it would not any longer be called marriage in the case of old persons, especially if either they had lost sons, or had given birth to none. But now in good, although aged, marriage, albeit there has withered away the glow of full age between male and female, yet there lives in full vigor the order of charity between husband and wife.”

On the other hand, he holds that marriage is an instrumental good. Augustine says, “Truly we must consider, that God gives us some goods, which are to be sought for their own sake, such as wisdom, health, friendship: but others, which are necessary for the sake of others, such as learning, meat, drink, sleep, marriage, sexual intercourse. For of these certain are necessary for the sake of wisdom, as learning: certain for the sake of health, as meat and drink and sleep: certain for the sake of friendship, as marriage or sexual intercourse: for hence subsists the propagation of the human kind, wherein friendly fellowship is a great good.” In short, he concludes, “it is good to marry, because it is good to beget children, to be a mother of a family.” But this is not the only reason why marriage is good.

The good of friendship is realized in procreation, as well as the fidelity of chastity by properly ordering our sexual desires (hence providing a “remedy for concupiscence”); finally, for Christians the goodness of marriage is found also in its sacramental character, by making marriage indissoluble: “Therefore the good of marriage in every nation and for all mankind lies in the purpose of procreation and in chaste fidelity; but for the people of God, it lies also in the holiness of the sacrament, by reason of which it is forbidden for a woman, for so long as her husband lives, to marry another, even if she has been put away by her husband, and not even in order to have children....These, therefore, are the goods that make marriage good—offspring, fidelity, sacrament.”

Another thinker illustrating the complexity of the answer to this question is St. Thomas Aquinas. He distinguishes between marriage’s primary and secondary ends. The former end is the good of children, and the latter is the mutual help that husband and wife give each other in marital life. Leading Catholic moral theologian, the late Germain Grisez, explains why, in Aquinas’s view, these two ends are natural: “Marriage is natural in respect to its primary end, since nature intends that children be not only born but brought up, and this requires the lasting tie between the parents in which marriage consists. Marriage also is natural in respect to its second end: ‘For, just as natural reason dictates that people dwell together, since individuals are not self-sufficient for everything that pertains to life—which is why human beings are said to be political by nature—so, of those activities which are required for human life, some are better suited to men and others to women, so that nature inclines toward a certain association of man with woman, which is matrimony’.” For Aquinas, the sacrament of marriage also has the purpose of properly ordering concupiscence to marriage’s ends, by virtue of the sacrament’s healing grace. Therefore, Aquinas confirms Augustine’s view that “marriage is not good in itself but only as instrumental to the procreation and raising of children.” Nevertheless, Grisez argues that Aquinas’s thought, too, exhibits a certain complexity.

Aquinas coordinates marriage’s ends with the goods of marriage: “[T]he principal end pertains to the human couple according to their generic nature, which they share with other animals, and thus *having and raising children* is a good marriage. The secondary end of marriage, which pertains to
the human couple precisely as human, is cooperation in the activities necessary for life; thus, the spouses owe each other fidelity, which is another of the goods of marriage. Beyond these natural ends, marriage among Christians has the end of signifying the union of Christ and the Church, and so the sacrament is a good of marriage.” Furthermore, by coordinating the good of fidelity with cooperation, the question arises whether this good is intrinsic to marriage itself. Although Aquinas himself never raises this question, Grisez argues that an affirmative answer to it is implicit in Aquinas’ thought: “Marriage has its first perfection from its own form—the intrinsic principle which makes it what it specifically is—and he describes this form as the ‘indivisible joining of souls, by which each spouse is bound to maintain unbreakable fidelity with the other (Summa theologiae 3, q. 29, a. 2).’” Moreover, adds Grisez, in Aquinas’ view friendship is not listed among the ends or goods of marriage, but by virtue of marriage’s indissolubility Aquinas argues for “maximum friendship between husband and wife, since they share not only marital intercourse but the whole of domestic life (see Summa Contra Gentiles, 3, 123).”

The Catechism of the Council of Trent

First published under the authority of St. Pius V in 1566, the Catechism of the Council of Trent answers the question regarding the reasons that man and a woman should be joined in marriage.

I noted earlier that St. Augustine had recognized “the natural companionship [societas] between the two sexes” as a good of marriage. It didn’t find its integral place in his understanding of the reasons for marrying. But in the Catechism’s teaching it finally does: “nature itself by an instinct implanted in both sexes impels them to such companionship [societas].” Furthermore, the order is reversed of primary and secondary ends. What was primary in Aquinas’ thought, namely, offspring, becomes secondary, and what was secondary, the mutual help that spouses give each other, is now seen as a subordinate aspect of the first reason. Still, the Catechism advances and hence brings a certain addition to bear upon the reasons for marrying by prioritizing the companionship of man and woman to which nature inclines. Thus, this companionship—and not just the mutual help that spouses give each other—is marriage itself rather than being extrinsic to marriage’s nature. Significantly, then, the Catechism teaches that marriage itself is a reason to marry, an intrinsic good—pace St. Augustine—that should be sought after for its own sake.

Moreover, as in the traditional view, marriage serves to order properly sexual desires. There, marriage is considered as a sacrament signifying the
union of Christ and the Church and, hence, the indissolubility of marriage.

Development of Magisterial Teaching on Marriage

The segue to magisterial teaching of Pius XI and Pius XII is well described by Germain Grisez as the dominance of a legalistic mentality of a canonical definition of marriage regarding “all issues about the meaning and value of marriage.” In the 1917 Code of Canon Law, the code defines marriage in terms of primary and secondary ends: “The primary end of matrimony is the procreation and raising of offspring; the secondary, mutual help and the remedy for concupiscence.” In this canonical light, the view that marriage is an instrumental good for having and raising children overshadowed the catechetical gains that had been expressed in the Catechism of the Council of Trent. Grisez explains: “However, that view’s very dominance provoked the emergence of an antithesis: Even if the primary end of marriage and marital intercourse is the procreation and raising of children, still marriage has an intrinsic value and meaning, the spouses’ union in mutual love, and since chaste marital intercourse expresses this value and meaning, it too has an inherent significance. The two views’ incompatibility and the plausibility of the second led to a development in Catholic teaching on marriage.”8

The development alluded to here by Grisez found its expression in Pius XI’s 1930 encyclical Casti connubii.9 Pius integrates the canonical definition of marriage into his account but does not organize his teaching around the notions of primary and secondary ends. Yes, he holds on to the notion that the having and raising of children holds pride of place in marriage. Still, Pius’ synthesis will be unique by ordering the goods of children, mutual help, chaste marital intercourse, etc., in regards to conjugal faith, the good of fidelity, which implicitly includes the “fostering of conjugal love,” according to Grisez, “among the secondary ends of both marriage and the marital act.”10 Says Pius, “This conjugal faith, however, which is most aptly called by St. Augustine the ‘faith of chastity’ blooms more freely, more beautifully and more nobly, when it is rooted in that more excellent soil, the love of husband and wife which pervades all the duties of married life and possesses a certain primacy of nobility in Christian marriage” (no. 23). He explains, “The love, then, of which We are speaking is not that based on the passing lust of the moment nor does it consist in pleasing words only, but in the deep attachment of the heart which is expressed in action, since love is proved by deeds. This outward expression of love in the home demands not only mutual help but must go further; must have as its primary purpose that man and wife help each other day by day in forming and perfecting themselves in the interior life, so that through their partnership in life they may advance ever more and more in virtue” (no. 23).

Pius concludes by referring us back to the Catechism of the Council of Trent: “This mutual molding of husband and wife, this determined effort to perfect each other, can in a very real sense, as the Roman Catechism teaches, be said to be the chief reason and purpose [causa et ratio] of matrimony, provided matrimony be looked at not in the restricted sense as instituted for the proper conception and education of the child, but more widely as the blending of life as a whole [communion] and the mutual interchange and sharing thereof [companionship and association]” (no. 24). Thus, conjugal love is the integrating principle of marital communion, bringing about its intrinsic perfection, by “pervading all the duties of married life and possesses a certain primacy of nobility in Christian marriage.” Such love is expressed by action and includes mutual help, with its primary purpose being that of the spouses helping each other to grow in virtue and holiness. Grisez rightly summarizes Pius’ teaching: “In this way, Pius not only recalls the catechism’s teaching but implies that Christian marriage is in itself a vocation and way of holiness. Thus, he supplies another ground for questioning the view that marriage is good only as instrumental to offspring.”11

Still, in reaction against the canonical definition of marriage and the corresponding legalistic mentality, some theologians (e.g., Herbert Doms) ascribed primacy to Pius’ teaching that marriage should be viewed “more widely as a communion, companionship, and association of life as a whole,” and took his point about not restricting marriage to the having and raising of children, by regard-
ing the latter as extrinsic to the good of marriage, and thus children are seen as accidental (“optional extra”) to marriage’s intrinsic meaning. This reaction evoked a reply in 1944 from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, with the confirmation of Pius XII, declaring inadmissible the opinion of those who “either deny that the primary end of marriage is the generation and education of children, or teach that the secondary ends are not essentially subordinate to the primary end, but are equally principal and independent.”  

Although this statement does not give an account of the whole communion of marriage and family life, it does make clear that it is inadmissible to displace parenthood from its central place in the intrinsic good of marriage. In sum, says Grisez, “There remained only one alternative: to treat parenthood as part of the communion of married life.” And leading up to Vatican II, that is precisely what some thinkers did. I turn now to Dietrich von Hildebrand, Herman Dooyeweerd (who, although not Catholic but Reformed, engages the thought of Hildebrand and Pius XI), and Karol Wojtyla (the future Pope John Paul II).

Prior to Vatican II

Significant thinkers in this tradition, such as Dietrich von Hildebrand, affirm the primacy of love in marital communion: “[Marriage] exists in the first place for its own sake and not exclusively for the sake of any result that it produces.” Hildebrand adds, “No other earthly community is constituted so exclusively in its very substance by mutual love.” He advances the thesis that the meaning of the sexual act in marriage, given that marriage is in itself, principally, a communion of love, may not be restricted to being a mere means to procreation. So, the meaning of marriage, conjugal love, in its interpersonal and unitive aspect is a good in itself: “Its meaning is primarily the realization of the sublime communion of love in which, according to the words of our Savior, ‘They shall be two in one flesh’ (Matt 19:5).”

Briefly, how does Scripture frame its understanding of marriage? In Mt 19:3-8, the words of Jesus Christ refer back to the Genesis texts of 1:27 and 2:24. “Back-to-creation” is the leitmotif in Jesus’ teaching. In his own teaching regarding marital monogamy and indissolubility (Mark 10:6-9; Matt 19:4-6), creation texts in Genesis 1-2 have foundational importance, in particular Gen 1:27 and 2:24: “Male and female he created them” and “for this reason... a man will be joined to his wife and the two will become one flesh.” These texts are absolutely normative for marriage, indeed, for sexual ethics. Jesus unites into an inextricable nexus the concepts of permanence, twoness, and sexual complementarity.

Yes, Genesis 2:24 is about the permanence of marriage; it is also about the exclusivity of the relationship: “twoness”; but it also is about the fundamental prerequisite of complementary sexual differentiation for effecting the “two-in-one-flesh” union of man and woman: “So then they are no longer two but one flesh” (Mark 10:8). Indeed, as Pruss rightly notes, “the text [Genesis 2:24] is a seminal scriptural text on the nature of human sexuality.” In short, marriage is a comprehensive, multi-dimensional (e.g., fiducial, rational, emotional, volitional, and bodily-sexual) unity founded on (and not only given expression in but also internally constituted by) a singular act of physical unity that is a sign and seal of two becoming one flesh. Yes, marriage is about more than sex, but it is also about nothing less than sex. In other words, bodily union (sexual intercourse and not just fleshly contact, rubbing bodies together) between a man and a woman, uniting biologically or organically in the bodily dimension of their being, is uniquely fitting for creating a bodily communion of persons that is generative. Thus, “only a unitive act can be generative, and only a generative act can be unitive—in that only it makes two ‘one flesh’.” In short, the form of love that is marriage is founded through a bodily sexual union of man and woman as one flesh. One flesh unity is the body’s language for one-life unity. This bodily-sexual union is not extrinsic to the mutual self-giving love that it signifies or symbolizes. Of course it is a sign or symbol of that.
mutual love, but that is precisely what it is in reality because the human body is part of the personal reality of the human being—a one-flesh union—and not an extrinsic instrument of the self. The body is intrinsic to one’s own self, not surprisingly, since the “human body shares in the dignity of the image of God.” But since the body is intrinsic to personhood, the nature of marriage is such that it requires sexual difference, the bodily-sexual act, as a foundational prerequisite, indeed, as also intrinsic to a one-flesh union. In short, only a sexual union of male and female persons makes bodies in any real sense “one flesh” (Gen. 2:24), with the latter organic bodily union being a necessary condition for the existence of conjugal marriage.

Returning to Hildebrand, we find that he has no intention of detaching the bodily union of married love from the essential unfolding of this act in the primary end of procreation. Indeed, the “general connection between procreation and the communion of love must always be maintained even subjectively, at least as a general possibility of this act.” He adds, “Love is the primary meaning of marriage according to the creation [Schöpfungssinn der Ehe], just as its primary end according to the creation [Schöpfungszweck] is the begetting of new human beings.” Although Hildebrand leaves unexplained here the relation between “meaning” and “end,” it is clear throughout his book that the relationship is such that this end and others are to be realized on the basis of marital love as its integrating principle. Put differently, marital love is the integrating principle of the intimate interpersonal two-in-one-flesh union in which husband and wife reciprocally complement one another in their mutual self-donation, bringing to fulfillment the meaning of marriage in and through these ends—offspring, fidelity, mutual help, sacrament.

Dooyeweerd’s Social Ontology of Marriage

Because he, too, affirms the primacy of love in marital communion, the Dutch Reformed philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd also values Pius XI’s, Casti Connubii. As we noted above, Pius writes, “This mutual molding of husband and wife, this determined effort to perfect each other, can in a very real sense, as the Roman Catechism teaches, be said to be the chief reason and purpose of matrimony, provided matrimony be looked at not in the restricted sense as instituted for the proper conception and education of the child, but more widely as the blending of life as a whole and the mutual interchange and sharing thereof” (no. 24). Although Pius explained the blessings of marriage in terms of the three goods of marriage, namely, offspring, conjugal faith, and the sacrament, it is clear from this passage that husband and wife should seek to realize these goods according to its integrating principle, which is conjugal love. Dooyeweerd remarks, “This encyclical frankly assigned ‘primary of honor’ (principatus nobilitatis) to married love in a Christian marriage. All this was in striking contrast with what happened in Protestant circles two years later, when the moral theologian Emil Brunner published his book Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, in which love, if viewed as the basis of marriage, was called a ‘sandy ground’ and marital love was identified with erotic inclination!”

Dooyeweerd raises a similar objection to what he calls the “rationalistic conception of married love as essentially a ‘blind passion’….When this individualistic rationalism found its way in Protestant ethics there was of course no longer any possibility of a really Christian notion of married love as the most intense moral bi-unity. Symptomatic is the utterance recorded by P. Kluckhohn of the Methodist preacher William Whitefield (1714-1770), who boasted that in his proposal of marriage there had been no question of love: ‘God be praised, if I know my own heart a little I am free of that foolish passion which the world calls love’. This shows how far the rationalistic utilitarian spirit of the Enlightenment had penetrated under the guise of Puritan piety.” Hildebrand follows up his citation of the Methodist Whitefield with an old Catholic prayer that speaks of marriage as “the mystery of love”: “O God, at the creation of mankind, making woman from man Thou hast already ordained that there should be a union of the flesh and of sweet love….Lord our God, Thou has created man pure and immaculate and still Thou wishest that in procreation of the generations one be made from the other by the mystery of love.”

Dooyeweerd gratefully acknowledges that “[Hildebrand] voices the Biblical-Christian conception of the conjugal bond as a typical and in-
comparable institutional love-union between husband and wife, [and] as the expression of the eternal love of Christ towards the Church as His Bride.”

Not entirely taken with Hildebrand’s book, however, Dooyeweerd also claims that Hildebrand “detaches the inner meaning-structure of married love from its temporal biotic foundation in the organic difference between the sexes.” But this is simply not the case. Hildebrand explicitly asserts the contrary: “The special character of conjugal love is, furthermore, marked by the fact that this love can only come into being, between men and women and not between persons of the same sex, as is the case with friendship, parental love, or filial love.”

Still, Dooyeweerd rightly holds that “Marriage is … intrinsically qualified as a moral community of love for the duration of the common life-span of two persons of different sex.” The moral aspect of this love relationship (its qualifying or leading function), shows an individuality type that “refers back to … the organic life-aspect of the conjugal relation, namely, the lasting sexual biotic bond between husband and wife.” Strictly speaking, “The moral individuality-type of the conjugal love-community is typically [emphasis added] founded in the sexual-biotic function of marriage.” As he argues elsewhere, the internal structural principle of the marital love-communion, the ethical aspect of this love-community being its qualifying function, may not be detached from, in Dooyeweerd’s words, “its biotic foundation in the organic difference between the sexes.” Again, he says, “According to its two radical functions (the moral and biotic functions) the marriage community can be described as a community of moral life-long love between husband and wife based on a relatively durable organic sexual bond.”

It would take us too far afield here to discuss the nature of the unity in becoming “one flesh.” Along with many contemporary Catholic thinkers, such as the late Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Robert George, Patrick Lee, John Paul II, et al., Dooyeweerd argues that the internal structural principle of the marital love-communion, the ethical aspect of this love-community being its qualifying function, may not be detached from, in Dooyeweerd’s words, “its biotic foundation in the organic difference between the sexes.” In other words, Dooyeweerd upholds the conjugal view of marriage in which two people—a man and a woman—who unite in marriage, must, in addition to other things, unite organically, meaning thereby in the bodily-sexual dimension of their being—marriage’s founding function (in Dooyeweerd’s terms). Suffice it to say, therefore, that essential to a Christian understanding of marriage is the normative significance of sexual differentiation: the male-female prerequisite is the foundational structural dimension of the God-ordained conjugal view of marriage, essential for nuptial intimacy and openness to the gift of life. Complementary sexual differentiation is divinely intended in the order of creation; hence bodily-sexual union is a necessary condition for marriage, in order for its unitive and procreative ends to be realized. Thus, “only a unitive act can be generative, and only a generative act can be unitive—in that only it makes two ‘one flesh’.” As Dooyeweerd explains,

The marriage bond, as such, is typically founded in the institutional (and not in an incidental) sexual union of husband and wife, which is undoubtedly made serviceable for the propagation of the human race. It is according to the order of the creation that normally marriage leads to the formation of a family. In other words, the typical foundational relation between the family and the conjugal bond implies the natural disposition of the latter to procreation. In this sense marriage may be called the “germ-cell” of the family-relationship. Both communities remain most intensely interwoven during the time of their actual existence. Yet marriage, as a love-communion, maintains its own
structure notwithstanding its interwovenness with the family.

Thus, Dooyeweerd holds that “marriage, as a love-communion, maintains its own structure notwithstanding its interwovenness with the family.” It would take us too far afield to elaborate Dooyeweerd’s conceptual articulation of that interwovenness in light of his notion of enkaptic interlacement. For now, let us consider his brief elaboration of that interwovenness. He writes,

After having gained a sufficient insight into the inner structure of the marriage bond [as a bi-unitary love-communion founded on the organic unity of biotic complementarity] we shall now try to deepen our insight into its inner coherence with the family. According to the divine order of creation marriage is intentionally adapted to the family relationship. This means that marriage is enriched and deepened by its natural interweaving with the family relationship, and conjugal love is deepened and enriched in parental love….When the marriage bond has expanded into a family relationship the former is enriched and deepened in its meaning by its close interweaving with the latter, because its bi-unity in conjugal love has produced a unity in plurality. In the conjugal union, as such, the expression of the personality in the temporal existence of each of the married persons is enriched, enlarged and completed by that of the other. A woman becomes “wife” in the full sense of the word only in the conjugal union with her husband, and vice versa. And the expression of the personality in the bi-unitary bond assumes a wider and deeper perspective in the multi-unitary bond of the family.

Dooyeweerd wishes to affirm marriage’s intrinsic value, an interpersonal union that is in itself good, rather than to see marriage as a mere instrumental good for the extrinsic purposes of having and raising children. He correctly understands that the internal meaning-structure of married love may not be detached from “its biotic foundation in the organic difference between the sexes.” Dooyeweerd also holds that the marriage bond, as a love-communion, is typically founded in sexual difference: the organic unity of male and female in conjugal sex is the foundational function of the structural whole that is marital union.

In the above passage, on the one hand, he makes it clear that that this union is naturally fulfilled by bearing and raising children. Thus, he does not displace parenthood as an integral part of the communion of married life. Still, Dooyeweerd insists, on the other hand, “[I]t is not possible to deduce the essential internal structure of the marriage-bond from the ‘cosmic purpose of propagation,’ as was [allegedly] done by Thomas Aquinas.” “This traditional universalistic construction,” adds Dooyeweerd, “necessarily results in an eradication of the boundaries between the marriage union and the family relationship.” The eradication of the boundaries between marriage and family is, he argues, implied by Aquinas’ attempt to deduce the essential internal structure of the marriage-bond from the “cosmic purpose of propagation.” He writes,

This is evident from Thomas’ statement that posterity is essential to the marital bond [4 Sent. Dist. 31, q. 1, a. 3, c]. Such a construction must naturally restrict itself to a deduction of the general institution of marriage from the purpose of procreation….[But] in its application to the factual relationships [of marriage] Thomas’ view leads to constructions of a very artificial and internally contradictory character. We need only mention his explanations of the relation between the individual act of sexual uniting and the “objective procreative purpose.” Thomas concedes that sexual intercourse in a barren marriage, or in general such which is not carried on with a concrete procreative intention, is morally permissible. But then it will not do to seek the inner essence of the conjugal institution in the aim of propagation. Then the internal structure of the marriage bond, in its difference from the family relationship, irresistibly forces itself upon us….The marriage bond… normally embraces husband and wife for life, independent of the natural procreative end. No “rational procreative purpose” can justify the sexual consummation of marriage in an ethical sense, but only married love sanctified in Christ. This love (and not a utilitarian kind of thought) is the true regulator and educator of married life towards temperance and chastity. In the divine order of creation, marriage is the only ordered way to form a family; marriage and family are mutually adapted to each other. But they retain
their own peculiar internal structure and value. If this is ignored or misinterpreted, our marital morality will result in a labyrinth of contradictions of our own creating, and the lucid simplicity of the divine ordinance [of marriage] will be obscured.\textsuperscript{45}

Doooyeweerd’s main point is right: marriage isn’t merely for having children, as if to say that it is merely a means to the procreative end. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that, in 1936, as I noted above, Doooyeweerd already expressed his appreciation for the work of Catholic philosopher Dietrich von Hildebrand on marriage, \textit{Die Ehe} (1929).

\textbf{Wojtyla’s Reflection on Marriage}

Karol Wojtyla, too, rejects the idea that marriage is a means to an end, and hence he agrees with Doooyeweerd’s point as well as Hildebrand’s. In his 1960 work, \textit{Love and Responsibility}, Wojtyla rejects what he calls the “rigorist and puritan interpretation” of the conjugal life and sexual intercourse, which sees the latter as instrumental goods serving the purpose of procreation.\textsuperscript{46} Wojtyla carefully distinguishes this interpretation from the Manichean tradition because “this view does not reject marriage as something evil that in itself is evil and unclean due to being ‘bodily’ as was maintained by the Manicheans.” Rather, it “contents itself with stating the permissibility of marriage for the sake of the good of the species.”\textsuperscript{47} Against this view, Wojtyla argues, “By joining in sexual intercourse, a man and a woman join themselves as rational and free persons, and their union has a morel value when it is justified by true conjugal love. Hence, if we can say that the Creator ‘uses’ the sexual union of persons to realize the order of existence intended by him within the species \textit{Homo sapiens}, it definitely may not be held that the Creator uses persons merely as means to an end intended by himself.” In response to the question why is this so, Wojtyla then adds,

\begin{quote}
He correctly understands that the internal meaning-structure of married love may not be detached from "its biotic foundation in the organic difference between the sexes."
\end{quote}

So, Wojtyla’s claim here is no different from Doooyeweerd’s point that the inner essence of marriage may not be sought in the purpose of having children; rather, absolutely peculiar about the meaning of the marital bond is the constant love-union between husband and wife. Furthermore, like Hildebrand, Wojtyla regards procreation to be the primary end of marriage because “procreation is objectively, ontologically, a more important purpose than that man and woman should live together, complement each other and support each other (mutuum adiutorium), just as this second purpose is in turn more important that the appeasement of natural desire.”\textsuperscript{48} Wojtyla clarifies here that each of the traditional reasons for marriage, namely, the having and raising of children, mutual help, and \textit{remedium concupiscientiae}, which is a legitimate orientation for desire, are all expressions of “love as a virtue.” He adds, “However, opposing love to procreation or indicating a primacy of procreation over love is out of the question.”\textsuperscript{49} Wojtyla elaborates:

Besides, the realization of these ends is a complex fact. A complete, positive exclusion of the possibility of procreation undoubtedly diminishes or even eliminates the possibility of durable, mutual co-
education of the spouses themselves. Procreation unaccompanied by this co-education and co-striving for the highest good would also be in a certain sense incomplete and incompatible with the love of the person. Indeed, the point here is not only and exclusively the material multiplication of the headcount within the human species, but also education—whose natural substratum is the family based on marriage—cemented by mutuum adiutorium. If an interior cooperation between a woman and a man exists in marriage, and if they know how to educate and complement…each other, then their love matures to become the basis of the family. However, marriage is not identified with family and always remains, above all, an intimate union of two people. 51

Thus, significantly, for Wojtyła, just as it is for Hildebrand and Dooyeweerd, love is not an end of marriage; rather, love is the single, that is, integral but complex meaning of marriage that is expressed and fulfilled in each of these ends, though most essentially and fully in procreation, which is the primary end of marriage. In the transition to Vatican II, I conclude with Hildebrand: “Marriage, as well as the marital act, has meaning not only because of procreation, but also as the expression and fulfillment of a deep union of love.” 52 This position, emphasizing the centrality of conjugal love in Christian marriage, but without opposing love to procreation nor yet of suggesting that procreation takes precedence over love, will receive an adequate treatment in Gaudium et spes. In the next section of this paper, I turn to give a brief account of that treatment.

Gaudium et spes

Although Vatican II’s Gaudium et spes 53 consciously avoids the language of primary and secondary ends, it nevertheless affirms the truth behind the traditional formulation by stating that the having and raising of children naturally belongs to the full unfolding of marriage, with conjugal love being the integrating principle: “By their very nature, the institution of matrimony itself and conjugal love are ordained for the procreation and education of children, and find in them their ultimate crown” (no. 48). On this view, conjugal love is the “vivifying source,” as Grisez puts it, “of the whole communion of marriage and family life.” Conjugal love is, in Gaudium et spes, the integrating principle in its reflections on marriage and the family. Grisez explains: “Marriage and the family are a ‘community of love’ (no. 47); marriage itself is an ‘intimate community of conjugal life and love’ (no. 48); conjugal love ‘is uniquely expressed and perfected through the marital act’ and such acts ‘signify and foster that mutual self-giving by which spouses enrich each other with joyful and grateful hearts’ (no. 49); the fruitfulness of marriage is treated as the fulfillment of conjugal love: ‘Marriage and conjugal love are by their nature ordained toward the begetting and educating of children. Children are really the supreme gift of marriage and contribute very substantially to the welfare of their parents’; and the problem of birth regulation [responsible parenthood] is seen as one of harmonizing conjugal love with respect for life (see no. 51).” 54 In short, adds Grisez, according to Gaudium et spes, “conjugal communion is designed to be, and normally is, an intrinsically good part of a larger, intrinsically good whole: the family. Thus, parenthood, is the intrinsic fulfillment of the intimate union of persons [of husband and wife] and actions.” 55 Avoiding the language of primary and secondary ends, but still affirming the truth that parenthood is essential to the meaning of marriage, he implies that children are not the end to which marriage is an instrumental good; nor are they a means, sometimes even seen as an optional extra, to the couple’s fulfillment. Rather, the having and raising of children are the realization and hence fulfillment of the good of the marital communion of conjugal love. This teaching was reconfirmed by John Paul II in Familiaris consortio (1981) 56:

In its most profound reality, love is essentially a gift; and conjugal love, while leading the spouses to the reciprocal “knowledge” which makes them “one flesh,” does not end with the couple, because it makes them capable of the greatest possible gift, the gift by which they become cooperators with God for giving life to a new human person. Thus the couple, while giving themselves to one another, give not just themselves but also the reality of children, who are a living reflection of their love, a permanent sign of conjugal unity and a living and
inseparable synthesis of their being a father and a mother (no. 14).

In the final section of this paper, I turn to Pope Francis’ 2016 post-synodal Apostolic Exhortation, Amoris Laetitia.57

Pope Francis’s Amoris Laetitia

Vatican II’s teaching is heartily reconfirmed again in Amoris Laetitia (hereafter AL). Pope Francis writes (AL, no. 80),

Marriage is firstly an “intimate partnership of life and love” [Gaudium et spes 48] which is a good for the spouses themselves, while sexuality is “ordered to the conjugal love of man and woman” [Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 2360]. [Thus] the conjugal union is ordered to procreation “by its very nature” [Gaudium et spes 48].58

In this light we can understand that Francis, too, gives a strong personalist tone to marriage as a community of love, but does not do so by opposing love to procreation or by insisting that procreation takes precedence over love. He says, in short, “Love always gives life” (AL, no. 165):

The child who is born “does not come from outside as something added on to the mutual love of the spouses, but springs from the very heart of that mutual giving, as its fruit and fulfillment” [Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 2366]. He or she does not appear at the end of a process, but is present from the beginning of love as an essential feature, one that cannot be denied without disfiguring that love itself. From the outset, love refuses every impulse to close in on itself; it is open to a fruitfulness that draws it beyond itself. Hence no genital act of husband and wife can refuse this meaning [Humanae vitae, nos. 11-12], even when for various reasons it may not always in fact beget a new life. A child deserves to be born of that love, and not by any other means, for “he or she is not something owed to one, but is a gift” [Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 2378], which is “the fruit of the specific act of the conjugal love of the parents” [Donum vitae, II. 8]. This is the case because, “according to the order of creation, conjugal love between a man and a woman, and the transmission of life are ordered to each other (cf. Gen 1:27-28). Thus the Creator made man and woman share in the work of his creation and, at the same time, made them instruments of his love, entrusting to them the responsibility for the future of mankind, through the transmission of human life” [Relatio Finalis 2015, 63].

Furthermore, emphasizing that the child should be welcomed as a gift of God, as he does in the above passage, Francis also affirms that the “family is the setting in which new life is not only born but also welcomed” (AL, no. 166), with openness and affection, regardless of the circumstances. Indeed, he adds, “The gift of a new child, entrusted by the Lord to a father and a mother, begins with acceptance, continues with lifelong protection and has as its final goal the joy of eternal life. By serenely contemplating the ultimate fulfillment of each human person, parents will be even more aware of the precious gift entrusted to them” (Ibid). Moreover, the gift character of the child entails his immense worth, his uniqueness, irreplaceability, and hence may never be used for one’s own ends. Rather, children should be loved unconditionally. “This love,” Francis states, “is shown to them through the gift of their personal name, the sharing of language, looks of love and the brightness of a smile. In this way, then learn that the beauty of human relationships touches our soul, seeks our freedom, accepts the difference of others, recognizes and respects them as a partner in dialogue” (AL, no. 172).

In this context, Francis emphasizes the importance of children being raised by a married mother and father and, hence, of the complementarity of the sexes in parenting because mothers and fathers are not interchangeable (AL, nos. 172-76). This emphasis fits well his rejection of “an ideology of gender that ‘denies the difference and reciprocity in nature of a man and a woman and envisages a soci-
etry without sexual differences, thereby eliminating the anthropological basis of the family” (AL, no. 56; nos. 285-286).

One final point regarding Francis’ reflections on children pertains to their moral formation, as well as their education in the faith (AL, nos. 287-290), and sex education (AL, nos. 280-85). In short, Francis is persuaded that civilization depends on strong, stable marriages and hence families for integral human development (AL, nos. 274-278). Parents are the primary educators of their children, and hence of their moral formation as well, which includes their sex education. Indeed, he says, “the family is the first school of human values, where we learn the wise use of freedom” (AL, no. 274). He says, “A person’s affective and ethical development is ultimately grounded in a particular experience, namely, that his or her parents can be trusted. This means that parents, as educators, are responsible, by their affection and example, for instilling in their children trust and loving respect” (AL, no. 263). Included in this moral formation is the shaping of the will, the good of the intellect, by developing good habits with the aim of “interiorizing values into sound and steady ways of acting” (AL, no. 266). This interiorizing is about the formation of virtues, which is a steadfast inner principle of operation.” Francis adds, “The virtuous life thus builds, strengthens and shapes freedom, lest we become slaves of dehumanizing and antisocial inclinations” (AL, no. 267). In this connection, it is important to see that Francis opposes any theory of nurturing, of child-rearing, which transfers or replaces the uniquely indispensable responsibility of parents, of mother and father, to specialists and experts, rendering it a professional task outside the family, particularly by the state. To use a handy phrase coined by Peter and Brigitte Berger in their significant study on the family, Francis decidedly opposes the “professionalization of parenthood.”

Mindful that this was one of the brainstorming papers at the bi-annual meeting (December 2, 2017) of Evangelicals and Catholics Together, enough was said in this paper about marriage and family to begin a conversation on the nature and ends of marriage and family.

Endnotes

1. Brain-storming paper at the bi-annual meeting (December 2, 2017) of Evangelicals and Catholics Together.


3. Ibid., no. 9.

4. Ibid., no. 32.


6. Ibid., 560.


8. Ibid., 562.

9. Online: https://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19301231_casti-connu-bii.html


11. Ibid., 563.


15. Hildebrand, Marriage, 3.

16. Ibid., 24:

17. Ibid., 21.

18. Pruss, One Body. “They are seminal texts, ones that the biblical and postbiblical traditions take very seriously. They are, Christians should believe, true, and true in a deep way” (155).


20. Edward Schillebeeckx, OP, Het Huwelijk, Aardse Werkelijkheid en Heilsmyterie, Eerste Deel (Bilthoven: H. Nelissen, 1963), 34. Translated by N.D. Smith as Marriage, Human Reality and Saving Mystery (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965); “What cannot be justified from the texts [Gen. 2:24; Eph. 5:31] is that Genesis as a whole refers merely to the creation of woman and
man, and not directly to marriage. The intention of the whole text was to restore the social fact of marriage to a divine institution. With a deliberately pointed reference to monogamous marriage, that is, to marriage between one man and one woman, the Samaritan Pentateuch and the Septuagint translated the Hebrew “and they become one flesh” interpretatively as “and these two become one flesh” (Gen. 2:24). This ideal of marriage, based on a belief in God’s creation, was not stated by the sacred writer without a certain element of conscious polemic against the ancient oriental views concerning marriage [namely, polygamy] which had tainted the Israelites…. Although polygamy was officially tolerated by the Law, it was in no sense an expression of the deepest experience of the Israelite ethic. The purest expression of this ethic of married life is to be found in Genesis and in the commentary of the Book of Sirach upon it” (20–21).

21. Matthew Levering, *Biblical Natural Law, A Theocentric and Teleological Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 59: “This instruction to be ‘fruitful and multiply’ [Gen 1:28] is not merely an extrinsic command, but an internal inclination toward the good [of union], as is manifest in Eve’s rejoicing, ‘I have gotten a man with the help of the Lord’ (Gen 4:1). God creates human beings with an inclination toward the good of living in society: ‘male and female he created them’ (Gen 1:27) and ‘It is not good that the man should be alone’ (Gen 2:18).” Levering adds: “In this regard recall, too, Adam’s wonderful statement, ‘This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of Man’ (Gen 2:23). Nor is this inclination, in human beings, merely animal: marital intercourse is a ‘knowing’ (Gen 4:1).”


24. This, too, is the view of Herman Dooyeweerd’s philosophical anthropology, *Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, Volume Three, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophical Anthropology*. General editor: D.F.M. Strauss. Translated by Magnus Verbrugge and D.F.M. Strauss (Ancaster, ON: Paideia Press, 2011), Part II, chapters 1-3, “[T]he human spirit cannot carry out any real acts outside its temporal corporal individuality-structure. For that reason, we said: it is the individual human being in the integral unity of ‘body’ and ‘soul’ who accomplishes the acts. The full person as a totality is the subject of the act…. In the acts, the ‘soul’ is actually operative in the entire enkaptic structure of the body, and only in the body does the soul have the capacity to do so, insofar as the acts are included in the temporal order of the body. In other words, we can take the ‘acts’ neither to be purely ‘corporal’ nor purely ‘spiritual’. They are both inseparably connected and precisely for that reason they bear a typically human character. Only the act-structure in its fundamental dependence upon the spirit stamps the body as human” (162-163).

This is also the teaching of John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Pope Francis. John Paul underscores the constitutive nature of this one-flesh unity in his magnum opus, *Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body*, by stressing that man, as male and female, is unable to express that communion and hence to achieve unity “without the body.” “He is constituted in such a way from the beginning [from the creation] that the deepest words of the spirit—words of love, gift, and faithfulness—call for an appropriate ‘language of the body’. And without this language, they cannot be fully expressed.” In other words, one-flesh unity is the language of the body for one-life unity. This emphasis on the body being intrinsic to one’s own self is rooted in the Church’s teaching on the soul/body unity of the human person. As John Paul says, “In fact, *body and soul are inseparable*: in the willing agent and in the deliberate act *they stand or fall together*” (*Veritatis Splendor* §49). Therefore, he adds, we can easily understand why separating “the moral act from the bodily dimensions of its exercise is contrary to the teaching of Scripture and Tradition” (Ibid). This teaching is explicitly embraced by Benedict XVI (e.g., Address to the Roman Curia, December 21, 2012) and Francis, in particular in *Amoris Laetitia* §§56 and *Laudato Si* §155.


27. I am citing here the original German: ‘Die Liebe ist der primäre Schöpfungszweck der Ehe, wie die Erstehung neuer Menschen ihr primärer Schöpfungszweck’ (*Die Ehe*, 7). The English translation leaves out, inexplicably, the emphasis on the creation.


29. For my argument calling for a retrieval of Dooyeweerd’s social ontology of marriage, see my article, “Key Themes in Mekkes’s Post-Critical Thought,” in *Philosophia Reformata* 82 (2017): 43-73, especially 63-69. Online: https://www.academia.edu/32941963/Key_Themes_in_Mekkes_Post-Critical_Thought_

31. Ibid., 316.

32. Ibid., 22.


41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., 322-323; italics added.

43. Ibid., 320.

44. Ibid., 323.

45. Ibid., 323-324; italics added. For an alternative, and I judge, more correct, interpretation of Aquinas than Dooyeweerd’s, see Finnis, “Law, Morality, and ‘Sexual Orientation’,” 14-21. For Finnis’ fuller treatment of Aquinas’ sexual ethics, see his *Aquinas*, chapter VII.2.


47. Ibid., 44.

48. Ibid., 44-45.

49. Ibid., 52; see also, 51.

50. Ibid., 52.


55. Ibid., 569.


58. Francis makes clear that marriage is an intrinsic good rather than an instrumental good for having children: “It follows that ‘spouses to whom God has not granted children can have a conjugal life full of meaning, in both human and Christian terms’” (AL, no. 80). Elsewhere he says, “Some couples are unable to have children. We know that this can be a cause of real suffering for them. At the same time, we know that ‘marriage was not instituted solely for the procreation of children…. . Even in cases where, despite the intense desire of the spouses, there are no children, marriage still retains its character of being a whole manner and communion of life, and preserves its value and indissolubility’ [Aparecida Document, no. 457]” (AL, no. 178).
