

---

# Pro Rege

---

---

Volume 2 | Number 2

Article 3

---

December 1973

## Dooyeweerd's "History" and the Historian

Nick Van Til

*Dordt College*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro\\_rege](https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege)



Part of the [Christianity Commons](#), [Higher Education Commons](#), and the [Philosophy Commons](#)

---

### Recommended Citation

Van Til, Nick (1973) "Dooyeweerd's "History" and the Historian," *Pro Rege*:

Vol. 2: No. 2, 7 - 15.

Available at: [https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro\\_rege/vol2/iss2/3](https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege/vol2/iss2/3)

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Publications at Dordt Digital Collections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pro Rege by an authorized administrator of Dordt Digital Collections. For more information, please contact [ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu](mailto:ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu).

# DOOYEWEERD'S "HISTORY" AND THE HISTORIAN

---

by Nick Van Til  
Professor of Philosophy



*Mr. Van Til received his A.B. from Calvin College. Subsequent to military service in World War II he spent a semester at Westminster Theological Seminary in the study of Apologetics. Thereafter he received M.A. degrees from the University of Michigan in both history and philosophy and followed further graduate studies in philosophy at Michigan State University.*

*Mr. Van Til is a charter member of the Dordt College faculty. He teaches in the departments of philosophy and history; holds the rank of Professor of Philosophy; and serves as the chairman of the Theology-Philosophy department.*

It has been my observation that many who are busy with history as their academic profession seem opposed to Dooyeweerd's approach to history. This may be due in part to the fact that they have not sufficiently sought to understand Dooyeweerd. However, it seems to me that it is more particularly because what Dooyeweerd discusses as history is not the same as what the historians are discussing as history. This is true quite specifically when both begin to speak about "law" in history, or when they begin to ask, Can one posit some specific laws for history?

When an historian attempts to locate some laws for history, he generally looks to the past to see if any pattern has emerged which he can expect to repeat itself in the future with such regularity that he can depend on it and can use it to make predictions. This is the basis for law in the so-called "exact" sciences such as physics

and chemistry. Noting that there is not that kind of regularity of pattern in history and concluding that history does not repeat itself, many students of history conclude that we have to abandon the idea of law in history and that we have to therefore abandon the idea that history is a science, at least in the narrower sense which is required by the demands of prediction expected and obtained in the "exact" or positive sciences.

Failing to find any predictive basis for the future in the study of past events, at least for exact prediction, the Christian historian turns to the Scriptures and makes some statements which he believes are valid on the basis of the credibility of the Scriptures themselves. He knows that God is a covenant-keeping God. He knows and expects some kinds of conclusions on the basis of sacred history. God will not go back on his promises to his people. Christ will return

in due time and there will be a judgment and a subsequent separation of the "City of God" and the "City of the World." There is an antithesis which runs through history, though it is not man's business to sort out the sheep from the goats in the process of time. Beyond some of these broad outlines, the historian in the Reformed and Amilenial position does not attempt to delineate the future with a fine-pointed pen. He is satisfied with a Biblical eschatology broadly construed.

For Dooyeweerd (if I understand him correctly) laws for history along with every other law in creation are imbedded in the total scheme of Cosmonomic Law, which is the touchstone of Dooyeweerd's philosophy. Dooyeweerd insists that the Bible does not provide us with philosophical ideas, anymore than it gives us natural scientific knowledge or economic or legal theory. But the "states of affairs" presenting themselves within the temporal order of our experience are of a dynamic meaning-character, that is, they refer outside and above themselves to the universal meaning-context in time, to the creaturely unity of root and to the absolute Origin of all meaning.<sup>1</sup> (Origin here refers to God as Creator.)

"Dooyeweerd insists that the Bible does not provide us with philosophical ideas, anymore than it gives us natural scientific knowledge or economic or legal theory."

Dooyeweerd cautions us against coming to hasty conclusions in our theoretic explanation of the "states of affairs" as we experience them and try to explain them. He suggests, "I consider it a critical requirement to suspend our philosophical interpretation of the 'states of affairs' at issue until we have so many of them at our disposal, relating to all the modal aspects of our temporal experiential world which until now we have learned to distinguish, that we can try to conceive them in a philosophical total view."<sup>2</sup>

In elaborating his position Dooyeweerd enumerates a variety of modes or aspects of experience. Each of these exhibits its own laws and is sovereign in its own sphere. These aspects or modalities include number, space, energy, motion, life, feeling, analysis, history, language, the social, economics, aesthetics, law (jurisprudence), ethics, and pistics (faith). Each modality anticipates the one above it in the scale, and each above has a reciprocal relation to the ones which precede it. Created entities also participate in these aspects as acting subjects according to their complexity. Man is an acting subject in all aspects from the numerical to the pistical (faith) aspect.

Those who are acquainted with Kant's "forms of intuition" and "categories of thought" will recognize some similarities between what Kant was trying to do and what Dooyeweerd has done. There is, however, this basic distinction: Kant suggested that man created "reality" for himself by the use of the forms of intuition and the categories of thought, while Dooyeweerd insists that these modalities are inherent in the order of creation and have norms which are not amenable to subjective manipulation. In fact, it is this inherent objectivity which makes it possible for the Christian and the non-Christian to say similar things about shared "states of affairs." While granting the non-manipulatory nature of the various modal aspects, one might argue against Dooyeweerd by suggesting that everyone approaches the common "states of affairs" with a particular religious bias which will distort the conclusions reached concerning the "states of affairs."<sup>3</sup>

Students of Kant will also have noticed that time is missing in the above listing of the modal aspects of reality. Where does it fit in? For Dooyeweerd, "cosmic time overarches the different aspects as order, and streams through their boundaries as duration."<sup>4</sup> The continuity of time is not exhausted by any single specific aspect of meaning. Therefore, this continuity cannot be comprehended in any concept but can only be approximately apprehended in a transcendental idea. Here Dooyeweerd apparently takes his cue from Henri Bergson who argued that concepts artificially cut up time like a series of photographic slides that do not give us the feeling of duration or action which is pos-


sible with the movie camera. This approach to time by Dooyeweerd not only approximates Bergson's Intuitionism but also forms part of Dooyeweerd's objections to conceptualization of revelation when he argues that to think of Biblical revelation in conceptual terms is to lapse into rationalism.

For Dooyeweerd, nothing created is self-sufficient. Everything points beyond itself to the other aspects of reality. God alone gives meaning to the parts and to the whole. Dooyeweerd so emphasizes this concept that he refuses to give the status of being to any created entities. They stand only as "meaning" in relation to God as Being. God is the Transcendent, the source of all creation. He is the transcendent a priori of all philosophical or scientific activity. But forming a counterpart of this view is the strategic assumption that God operates through cosmic time and that the fulness of meaning of creation is refracted by time's limitations in much the same way that white light is refracted by a prism into a spectrum of color.<sup>5</sup>

Those who are critical of Dooyeweerd at various points, including myself, feel that in his notion of time Dooyeweerd is assigning to

up time into discernable and separately experienced entities of duration. Dooyeweerd seems to have a feeling for this cutting up of time when he says, "If I hasten to my work and look at my watch, then time has for me not only an abstract aspect of movement, but I experience it in the continuous coherence of its aspects of number, space and movement, with the stream of organic life, duration of feeling and the normative social aspects."<sup>6</sup>

From the last four paragraphs we should be ready to conclude that time is not of the essence when it comes to Dooyeweerd's view of the laws of history. To be sure, what goes on "historically" will happen under the overarching canopy of cosmic time; but history will not be a record of past events in time, but will fit into the modality structure as indicated above. It stands between the analytic and the lingual aspects of man's experience of those modes of the created order. To get at the idea of history, we must now move on to discover the nuclear moment or the identifying characteristic of the historical modality. Each modality has such a nuclear moment or identifying characteristic, according to Dooye-



"Those who are critical of Dooyeweerd at various points, including myself, feel that in his notion of time Dooyeweerd is assigning to it a function which it does not perform. In fact, it is my opinion that he has the process reversed."

it a function which it does not perform. In fact, it is my opinion that he has the process reversed. Instead of time refracting the ordered creation into distinguishable entities, it is the various experiences of the various aspects that break up the duration of time which otherwise would be like an indistinguishable flow.

Van Riessen, also a professor at the Free University, feels that the experience of the physical breaks up time. Stoker of the University of Potchefstroom, South Africa, suggests that it is the succession of events that breaks

weerd. This distinguishes it from every other sphere, gives it its sovereign rights, and places it in its order amongst the modalities or aspects.

We are now at the point where the basic confusion arises between Dooyeweerd's idea of history and the more generally accepted ideas of history, both secular and Christian. The confusion arises because, to my mind, Dooyeweerd at this point plays semantic tricks on us that he should have anticipated and avoided. The nuclear moment or basic characteristic of the historical modality is distin-

guished from other kinds of forming as, for example, the spider making a web which it does by instinct. Because man has analytical abilities, he alone has cultural abilities. Dooyeweerd suggests that the cultural mode of formation reveals itself in two directions which are closely connected with each other. On the one hand, it is a formative power over persons unfolding itself by giving cultural form to their social existence; on the other, it appears as a controlling manner of shaping natural things or materials to cultural ends.<sup>7</sup>

beyond history for the meaning of events, but it is not true that anyone who does not limit the concept of history to the confines of Dooyeweerd's historical modality by so much denies that there is a transcendent context for history, which context can be the Creator God of the Scriptures. In other words, history does not have to be fitted into the Cosmonomic Law scheme in a modality structure in order finally or perhaps more immediately to relate for meaning to its Origin, to use Dooyeweerd's term for Creator.

The difference in viewpoints between Dooy-

"In other words, history does not have to be fitted into the Cosmonomic Law scheme in a modality structure in order finally or perhaps more immediately to relate for meaning to its Origin, to use Dooyeweerd's term for Creator."

The historical aspect is only one of these fundamental modes of experience, and, like the others, it does not refer to a concrete "what," that is, to concrete events of temporal reality, but it refers to the modal "how," the manner in which they are experienced in their different aspects. The aspects are theoretic abstractions. It seems to me that the historical modality is an abstraction twice removed from the concrete, so much so that it almost turns out to be a vacuous concept. When one considers the act of controlled forming, one is tempted to ask, What is the forming concerned with? Then it turns out that one has to turn to the other modalities to find the answer. One can be busy with forming in the political sphere as indicated above in the reference which mentions giving cultural form to social existence.

Dooyeweerd's narrower concept of the "historical" becomes particularly apparent when he labels as "historicists" those historians who want to include all human activity as it happened in the province of history. These men, according to Dooyeweerd, are elevating the historical to a position which gives it precedence over the other modalities and would determine their meaning merely on the basis of history itself. It is true, of course, that the "historicist" does not look

eweerd and others comes out perhaps most strikingly when we begin to consider laws for history. As was suggested, most historians look for laws in terms of patterns emerging from the happenings of the past. For Dooyeweerd, laws for history are "oughts" which should control the direction of our cultural-formative activity. This obligation has been inherent in creation but was specifically fortified by the cultural mandate as found in Genesis 1:28, "Be fruitful and multiply, and subdue the earth..." Dooyeweerd's abstract limitation of the formative aspect would almost limit the reading to "subdue" without indicating anything to subdue. Be that as it may, the laws for the historical modality read more like ethical directives than conclusions extracted from an empirical and critical study of the past.

The norms which Dooyeweerd would impose for the use of man's formative power are as follows:

1. Continuity

This can be presumed to be a law for all constructive activity; but when giving an illustration, Dooyeweerd refers to man's political activity. It is impossible, for example, in the interest of wiping out the evils of past regimes to begin with a new calendar, as the French presumed to do after destroying

the monarchy.

We may note here that in illustration Dooyeweerd uses an example from the area of the juridical aspect of his scheme, indicating that forming as such needs a reference beyond itself. Further, we should also note that continuity is not in any way a norm that is peculiar to the historical in Dooyeweerd's limited sense. Continuity, applies, for example, to the aesthetic as well, or to any other aspect, for that matter, as it is a law of all existence. In the aesthetic, by way of illustration, we can suggest that the artist violates the law of continuity when he tries to be so innovative that no one understands what he is doing.

## 2 Differentiation

This norm points in the direction of specialization and division of tasks in society. Dooyeweerd often uses the idea of "opening-up process," whereby the simple and unified become more complex and differentiated. Differentiation brings about the kind of development which presently separates out such institutions as home, school, church, and state. In a "closed" society, these were often under one head.

Abraham's cultural stage of development could be used as an illustration of an undifferentiated one. To his household, Abraham was prophet, priest, and king, even though he had no family over which he would hold that position as father. He had the church in his household and he was its political head. He ruled over a small nation-state, as is evident by the fact that he was able to muster a small but effective fighting force in pursuit of Chedorlaomer when Abraham rescued Lot.

According to the norm for the formative "historical" modality, Abraham's situation was non-normative. It needed "opening up." The various cultural potentialities had to be more fully developed. As society develops, it should become more differentiated, so that prophet, priest, and king have their

separate provinces of activity, and the one does not encroach on the other.

If one follows this line of thinking, then an interesting anomaly is presented in the case of the Hebrews' choosing a king at the time that Samuel was serving the ostensibly triple role of prophet, priest, and king. The Israelites wanted to "differentiate" out the office of king after the manner of the Canaanites. In so doing, they were showing signs of apostasy as they were accused of rejecting not Samuel, but God as their King. Historical "development" is here disobedience and rebellion against God.

"The Israelites wanted to 'differentiate' out the office of king after the manner of the Canaanites.... Historical 'development' is here disobedience and rebellion against God."

## 3 Integration

This suggests the need of organization of the individual specializations in such a way that large-scale cultural operations can be carried on efficiently. The coordination needed to bring about a moonshot or a skylab experiment would be a modern example. When one, in a reactionary way, wants to prevent this kind of integrative activity, he is (according to Dooyeweerd) acting un-historically. Again, we call attention to the fact that the integration always goes on in some area covered by the other modalities. It always occurs in the areas of technical, economic, social, and political activity. Reactionary forces are also directed against this kind of integration (Cf. John Van Dyk, "Cultural Integration," Medieval His-

tory, Part I, p. 13, Dordt College printing).

It is interesting to notice that the laws of differentiation and integration were already suggested by Herbert Spencer, the English evolutionist. This need not bother us, for we can readily admit that it does not take the Christian perspective to understand that highly complex developments require highly complex organizations or "integrations." The question of direction is another matter, however. It took a good bit of organization to build the tower of Babel, but the intention of the work was manifestly apostate. Many have argued that ethically there are priorities which take precedence over such integrative activities as our moonshots. Dooyeweerd, of course, would not insist that the law of integration stands in dissociation from the Scriptural mandate of love.

#### 4. Individualization

This norm applies both to groups and to individuals. Since the time of the Renaissance, the individual has received a great deal of attention. Individualism ran out into apostasy as it reacted to the communal impositions which had been part of the earlier church-dominated Christendom. In America it ran out into a "rugged individualism," which is equally apostate. In the context of the Scriptures and the Christian life, the idea suggests that the individual should be able to make his own decisions in the areas of personal freedom on the basis of his own conscience as he stands before God and His law.

Dooyeweerd suggests that as an impediment to individualization modern totalitarian political systems attempt to annihilate the process of differentiation and individualization by a methodical process of mental equalizing of all the cultural spheres, thereby implying a fundamental denial of the value of the individual personality in the opening-up process of history.<sup>8</sup>

## Some General Criticisms

### The Method of Transcendental Critique

By looking at the common "states of affairs" and finding a place for some common dialogue with the non-Christian without first insisting that all recognize the Origin of all meaning, it would seem that Dooyeweerd is giving away more in his method at the outset than he should. He may insist that no one can say anything "subjectively" about the common "states of affairs," because all stand in the creation order and must be assumed to have meaning for that reason. But surely one must admit that the non-Christian does not recognize that context of meaning, so he can only make statements that assume his non-Christian apostasy. I would prefer to start with the Origin (God) and then begin to talk about the common "states of affairs." It is only on that condition that one should be allowed to claim meaningful statements. As Dooyeweerd himself would have to admit, the only alternative is to start a dialogue on the assumption that some immanent principle or aspect of creation such as man's reason could be used as a common point of reference.

### View of the Kingdom

If we take Dooyeweerd's transcendental method and add to that his cultural norms, in and by themselves there is really no mark by which to distinguish his approach from the patterns set by those who limit themselves to the "social gospel" view of the kingdom and/or those who with Spencer would proceed on the basis of evolutionary naturalism and its assumptions. Dooyeweerd would not take the historical norms out of the religious ground motive which he established for them by assuming a transcendent a priori (Creator) as the basis for the whole of cosmonomic law. There is, however, the danger that the Origin is obscured. As has been illustrated earlier, we cannot think about any norm per se, for they are always religiously qualified.

We face another danger with Dooyeweerd's norms. We may be tempted to make the working out of these norms to be a kind of preconceived end as the necessary precondition to the coming of God's Kingdom or as that part of the Kingdom

which must arrive before Christ can return. It appears that John Olthuis is on the verge of that kind of thinking with his visions of 1980 as he delineates them in Out of Concern for the Church.<sup>9</sup> There he envisions a Christian daily newspaper available on the stands and theater marquees aglow, spelling out the titles of the latest Christian films. That and more. It seems to me that this hope closely approximates a kind of neo-postmillennialism which is foreign to the Reformed tradition and is without Biblical warrant.

We should add at this point that the spinoff of ideas which the disciples are able to "centrifuge" from the ideas of the master are not always in keeping with the intention of the original. Dooyeweerd tells us not to expect too much by way of perfecting the Kingdom here and now because of the continued countervailing effects of sin which are ever present and potent.<sup>10</sup>

### The Ambiguity of Continuity

Continuity would seem to be so obvious a law of history that it cannot be denied in either

"For the Christian, continuity would have to include such naturally discontinuous events as the virgin birth, the resurrection, and the ascension of Christ."

a common sense or scientific view of history. But in the secular mind, continuity is based on the idea of positive laws that allow for some measure of prediction. With a uniformitarian approach to the past, the secular scientist assumes that what is now, must always have been. Thus, events which do not now happen could not have happened in earlier history. The secular historian uses this test to throw out as impossible or unreliable any events which do not fit his prescription for valid events at present. This kind of thinking will control the secular view of continuity.

So it turns out that if we want to use the norm of continuity as one of the laws of history, we cannot use it in the same sense that the secular historian uses it and cannot limit it by his limitations. For the Christian, continuity can only be posited as a law of history within the context of sacred history and its emphasis on God's Covenant of Grace. This makes it necessary for our concept of "continuity" to be stipulated in such a way that the secular historian would not be willing to accept it. Our idea of continuity would have to allow for events which were not continuous with the cause-and-effect relationships which the secular historian posits on the basis of his ideas of natural law. For the Christian, continuity would have to include such naturally discontinuous events as the virgin birth, the resurrection, and the ascension of Christ. These events would also fall outside of any "common states of affairs" that the non-Christian might be willing to share with us.

We could use an example which might not come quite so readily within the classification of the miraculous as the above-mentioned events associated with the Incarnation. Take the case of Noah. By all the known norms of continuity, Noah would have had no reason to expect a flood. His countrymen surely must have doubted his sanity when they judged him by their norm of continuity. But Noah went ahead because he had had an intervening word from his covenant-keeping God. He went ahead in spite of all lack of historical-critical evidence. No wonder that Noah is listed as a hero of faith. He went ahead in spite of the scholars of his day who would make the word which Noah had received subject to the scrutiny of the historical-critical method in order to validate its authority. Noah accepted the once-spoken, in-itself-authority of his covenant God and staked his life on it. We might add that modern Bible-believing Christians can well follow Noah's example. It might eliminate some of the complexities we insert into our hermeneutics.

### History and Natural Law

Those who take the law side of the Dooyeweerdian modality scheme and make it the paradigm for their view of creation often do so out of the conviction that this scheme is God's Word for Creation. They often speak of the process in terms of three divisions: Creator, Law for crea-



tion, and the resulting creation.' They do this in order to get away from the natural law idea which grew out of Greek philosophy and which remained in Scholastic philosophy and theology to cut up reality and meaning into the categories of Nature and Grace. Nature, in the Scholastic scheme, has its own laws, which are the common ground for non-Christian and Christian activity without any presuppositions of basic difference.

Those who work out of this Dooyeweerdian structure also want to eliminate such distinctions as "natural" and "supernatural" as doing violence to Biblical concepts of providence. All events happen according to God's Law for creation, so all is miracle or nothing is miracle, and there is no point in speaking about "special providence" over against general providence.

While one can say that in a sense the above arguments are cogent, we again run into problems of communication and meaning. It does no good to try to argue someone out of the term miracle when somehow or other it is common practice to

of a Nature-Grace dichotomy wherein the work of Christ is relegated to the realm of grace. His work does not sufficiently touch the whole of creation. It also then fails to permeate the natural in such a way as to fulfill the cultural mandate and allow for the building of the Kingdom here and now. It is too reminiscent of a pie-in-the-sky theology.

While I would agree that we should not limit Christ's saving work to "soul saving" and in that respect make history His Story, nevertheless, we must be open to the Divine Plan of salvation as informing and dominating the whole course of history. By refusing to renovate their notion of continuity to make room for a Divine Plan in and for history, the Neo-Orthodox have had to make room for two kinds of events, those which can happen according to the ordinary laws of continuity and then the myths of religion which do not occur in ordinary history but need a new designation, namely, "Geschichte."

Dooyeweerd has come close to falling into

"While I would agree that we should not limit Christ's saving work to 'soul saving' and in that respect make history His Story, nevertheless, we must be open to the Divine Plan of salvation as informing and dominating the whole course of history."

distinguish such happenings as floating axeheads from sinking ones, a distinction which the Scriptures also recognize. It seems to me that the Christian can perfectly well continue to use such distinctions without being under suspicion of taking a kind of deistic approach to natural law which would remove God from the ongoing existence of His Creation.

### History and Divine Plan

Those who follow the Dooyeweerdian notion of historical norms, are uncomfortable with the idea that history is His story. The latter emphasis seems to work against the idea that man is the history maker and that the process is a process of fulfilling the norms for cultural forming. Again, for the follower of Dooyeweerd, "His story" smacks

the Neo-Orthodox trap by denying that his modal structure can be used to comprehend the eternal. He denies that one can conceptualize the meanings of the Word-revelation. He maintains that the human ego is also of a super-modal nature, so that it cannot be comprehended in theoretic thought. The human ego is caught up in the supra-temporal. This super-temporal experience is found at the religious center of our existence.

Now it turns out that because of a route laid out by his own system, Dooyeweerd is confronted with the same stumbling block which faced the Neo-Orthodox. He must allow to events of the Scriptural account historical status in ordinary time along with ordinary day-to-day events, or he must find a different category for some events. Dooyeweerd chooses the latter course. By having man participate in the tem-

poral and the supra-temporal, he must make some kind of distinction which resembles Kant's noumenal (spirit) world as separated from the phenomenal (scientific, thing) world. Kant found in man an empirical ego to deal with the latter and a transcendental ego to deal with the former. Dooyeweerd does this, at least in part, by creating too great a gap between man's naive experience and his scientific activity, that is, his theoretic thought.

As to sacred history, Dooyeweerd makes a forthright choice. He states, "In this eschatological aspect of time, faith groups (places) the 'eschaton' and, in general, that which is or happens beyond the limits of cosmic time. In this special sense are to be understood the 'days of creation', the initial words in the book of Genesis, the order in which regeneration precedes conversion, etc.... I cannot agree with the tendency of some modern Christian theologians who identify the eschatological aspect of time with the historical and reject the supra-temporal central sphere of human existence and of divine revelation."<sup>11</sup>

In summary, I would draw the following conclusions: (1) When Dooyeweerd uses the word history and refers to laws of history, he is not referring to the same ideas that are ordinarily understood by the terms. (2) Dooyeweerd's law of continuity cannot be taken in a univocal sense along with any secular definition of the term. If we don't give it Christian meanings, it will cut out the history of salvation as given by the Scriptures. (3) While breathing anathemas on all past dualisms, Dooyeweerd has created a new dualism of his own by placing man both in the temporal and the supra-temporal order. This dualism has all the weaknesses of Kant's dualism between the noumenal (thought and spirit) world and the phenomenal (science and thing) world. (4) Dooyeweerd's overly neat Cosmonomic encyclopedia (arrangement of modalities, etc.), along with his distinctions concerning time, compromises and

complicates without warrant the Biblical teachings concerning the relationship between the world and the Word.

So, while we hailed Dooyeweerd as a knight in shining armor as he did battle with immanentistic philosophies, armed as he was with a belief in the Creation, the Fall, and Redemption, we find his own philosophic forays sometimes somewhat quixotic. Having said that, we should also say to his credit that Dooyeweerd ventured out beyond the safety of the old traditions on "search-and-destroy" missions. Most of us have sat safely behind the redoubts of the old castle of traditionalism sharpening lance points with bits of rationalism, hoping in that way to make our weapons sharper than those of the enemy though cast from the same metal.

1. Cf. "Herman Dooyeweerd," Jerusalem and Athens, E.R. Geehan, Editor, Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, Nutley, N.J., 1971, pp. 74-89.

2. Op. cit., p. 80.

3. Cf. C. Van Til, Jerusalem and Athens, pp. 89ff.

4. The New Critique of Theoretic Thought, Philadelphia, Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953, Vol. II, p. 3. (Hereinafter to be referred to by the initials N.C.).

5. N.C., Vol. I, p. 102.

6. N.C., Vol. I, p. 33.

7. "The Criteria of Progressive and Reactionary Tendencies in History." Speech given to the Dutch Royal Academy of Sciences and the Humanities. Available from the Reformational Dugout, Sioux Center, Iowa.

8. "The Criteria of Progressive and Reactionary Tendencies in History." Op. cit., p. 12.

9. Cf. pp. 19 and 20.

10. N.C., Vol. II, p. 262.

11. N.C., Vol I, p. 33.