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Unity and Diversity Among States

A Critique of Assumptions in the Study of International Relations 

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Introduction

Within the contemporary and very broad discipline known as political science there has emerged in the past thirty years a relatively new sub-discipline known as "international relations" — the study of international politics. This is not to say that the relations among states were not studied at all prior to World War II but rather that until World War II international affairs were examined largely from the standpoint of the diplomatic purposes and accomplishments of separate sovereign states, including their mutual

positivization of a considerable body of international law. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., describe the period before World War I this way:

The period of European history from 1648 to 1914 was the golden age of diplomacy, the balance of power and international law. Nearly all political thought focused upon the sovereign nation-state — the origins, functions and limitations of governmental powers, the rights of individuals within the state, the

requirements of order, the imperatives of national self-determination and independence. . . . Until 1914, international theorists almost uniformly assumed that the structure of international society was unalterable, and that the division of the world into sovereign states was necessary and natural. The study of international relations consisted almost entirely of diplomatic history, international law and political theory. . . .¹

It took the shocks of World War I, the world depression, and World War II, as well as the post-war decolonialization movement and the entrance of the United States into its global entanglements before new approaches were taken to the study of inter-state relations in general. And according to Stanley Hoffmann it also took the "democratization" of foreign policy, starting in the United States, to open up this new field of study. Through the nineteenth century "international politics remained the sport of kings, or the preserve of cabinets — the last refuge of secrecy, the last domain of largely hereditary castes of diplomats."² In the United States, however, "foreign policy was put under domestic checks and balances, knew no career caste, and paid little respect to the rules and rituals of the initiated European happy few. . . ."³

Between World War I and the end of World War II, several new streams of thought about international affairs were converging at the very time when the U.S. was putting isolationism aside and the new "global village" was emerging. The influence of several Marxist and Socialist thinkers who had begun to theorize about "imperialism" was

spreading, and the impact of "realist" arguments began to be felt, especially in the wealthy and powerful states. The realists were taking a hard critical look at the utopian optimism of the older Liberalism which had dreamed of eventual world peace through the development of world law.⁴

Thus, what emerged as the discipline of international relations after World War II resulted from certain historical and political changes that forced political scientists to adopt some new perspectives on, and approaches to, the study of politics. If, however, one asks what characterizes the discipline as an intellectual endeavor today, one will soon discover that there is no coherent, intergrated body of doctrine, no uniform method, and no agreed upon organization of subject matter. Of the work that has been done in the last thirty years, Stanley Hoffmann remarks that he is "more struck by the dead ends than by the breakthroughs; by the particular, often brilliant, occasionally elegant, but generally nonadditive contributions to specific parts of the field, than by its overall development; by the contradictions that have rent its community of scholars, than by its harmony."⁵ Martin Wight's question of almost twenty years ago, "Why is there no international theory?"⁶ might be answered more fully today with an explanation of *why not*, but it cannot yet be answered with the rejoinder that there *is now* an international theory! Apparently the best that can be done to "get at" the discipline of international relations is to summarize the "contending theories" as Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff have done, or to edit texts of a broad and eclectic character as Rosenau, Thompson, and Boyd have done.⁷

These brief, introductory remarks should be sufficient to allow us to explain that our attempt here to present "a

critique of assumptions in the study of international relations" will not mean "a general critique of the discipline of international relations" as if the discipline were a homogeneous unity. Yet at the same time we can argue that the international political realities which are being examined today from a variety of viewpoints with a vast array of methods and tools are nevertheless realities that force any scientist or theorist to make certain fundamental assumptions about the meaning of the "unity and diversity" among states. Whether one accepts or rejects the legitimacy of the state; whether one glamorizes or denounces war; whether one argues for or against greater interdependence among states; whether one attempts a "value free" or a "value laden" analysis of international politics, one will have to assume something about the unity that does or does not, that ought or ought not to, characterize the relations among diverse states in the world today. By attempting to uncover the assumptions that are made about this issue, we will be able to gain a very substantial insight into the contemporary science(s) of international politics.

What strikes one almost immediately in looking at the variety of approaches to the study of international relations is that all of the different methodological and ideological influences in the general field of political science are operative in international relations studies. Liberal and socialist, elitist and democratic, nationalist and transnationalist perspectives can all be found. Behaviorists, systems analysts, historical realists, functionalists, legalists, and others are all presenting explanations and accounts of what is (and in some cases, what ought to be) taking place internationally. What is equally striking is the continuing critical tension that is

manifest between those who are desirous of obtaining "hard" results from a methodologically rigorous scientific study of international relations and those who believe that history, philosophy, ethics, and even futurology⁸ must play an important part in the study of international politics. On the one hand, Karl W. Deutsch⁹ repeatedly reaches for the physical or mathematical analogy and explanation in analyzing international relations while neglecting almost entirely the historical, philosophical, ethical judgments that a Hans Morgenthau or Eric Voegelin or John H. Herz would concentrate upon.¹⁰ On the other hand, Kenneth Waltz takes as his point of departure the interpretation of classical and modern philosophers,¹¹ and F. Parkinson goes so far as to warn against the danger of scientism in the field: "The greatest potential danger to the field of study of international relations comes from the uncritical rejection of traditional philosophy and history, resulting in the growing separation of the social sciences from the mainstream of the humanities."¹²

The question of the unity and diversity among states is an especially important one in the context of this disciplinary tension, because the problem of political unity and diversity is an ancient one that antedates both the rise of the modern state and the emergence of contemporary social science research methods. In the main body of this paper we will examine closely three contemporary perspectives and approaches in the field of international relations — those of Hans J. Morgenthau, Karl W. Deutsch, and the joint effort of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. But we will lead into this examination by taking a brief glance at a few of the ancient traditions that continue to influence contemporary life and scholarship.

Ancient Perspectives on the Unity and Diversity Among States

Three main cultural streams lie at the root of modern western political life — the Biblical, the classical Greek, and the Roman Stoic. These three were joined together in various ways in the European Middle Ages. There are different emphases in each of these streams, and there is also something unique in the medieval period which is more than merely the sum of the earlier three parts. In each tradition, however, and in the Middle Ages, there was a very definite conception of the *unity* that should pervade or control the earthly *diversity* of “political” realms.

The Hebraic-Christian tradition presents us with the normative proclamation that the only God, the Creator of all things, is the Ruler of the ends of the earth. The earth is a unity because it belongs, as creation, to the only God. All kings and kingdoms, therefore, exist as servants of God, subject to His ultimate will and purposes.¹³ Psalm 2 is a concentrated example of this:

Why do the nations conspire,
and the peoples plot in vain?
The kings of the earth set
themselves, and the rulers
take counsel together, against
the Lord and his anointed,
saying,
“Let us burst their bonds
asunder, and cast their cords
from us.”
He who sits in the heavens
laughs; the Lord has them in
derision.
Then he will speak to them in
his wrath, and terrify them in
his fury, saying,
“I have set my king on Zion,
my holy hill.”
I will tell of the decree of the

Lord: He said to me, “You are
my son, today I have begotten
you.

Ask of me, and I will make the
nations your heritage, and the
ends of the earth your
possession.

You shall break them with a
rod of iron, and dash them in
pieces like a potter’s vessel.”

Now therefore, O kings, be
wise; be warned, O rulers of
the earth.

Serve the Lord with fear, with
trembling kiss his feet, lest he
be angry, and you perish in the
way; for his wrath is quickly
kindled.

Blessed are all who take
refuge in him.

(Revised Standard Version)

For the prophet Isaiah this could only mean that the diverse kings and kingdoms had their existence in order to reveal the glory of God’s *one* Kingdom, God’s unified rule over the whole earth. They were literally at God’s disposal. “All nations are as nothing before him, they are accounted by him as less than nothing and emptiness” (Isaiah 40:17, RSV).

Have you not known? Have
you not heard? Has it not been
told you from the beginning?
Have you not understood from
the foundations of the earth?

It is he who sits above the circle
of the earth, and its inhabitants
are like grasshoppers; who
stretches out the heavens like
a curtain, and spreads them
like a tent to dwell in; who
brings princes to nought, and
makes the rulers of the earth
as nothing.

(Isaiah 40:21-23, RSV)

With the coming of Jesus, the Old Testament revelation about God's universal Kingdom was attached to the historical person and work of Jesus, God's Son, the Christ. Jesus claimed that "All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me" (Matthew 28:18, RSV). The New Testament letter to the Hebrews picks up Psalm 2 and other passages and argues that the Son, begotten by the Father, is the Lord and King over all. Other New Testament passages elaborate this further.

Not only did the Biblical tradition insist on the rule of God behind and above all earthly dominions, but it pointed ahead, through history, to the eschatological and visible fulfillment of God's reign over all. Kings and rulers, therefore, hold stewardly offices beneath God's rule, and they should use those offices for the sake of divine justice, lest God depose them now and bring them to judgment in the end.

In classical Greek thought, particularly that of Plato and Aristotle, the unity of all earthly political orders is to be found in the universal cosmic rhythms that control their birth, growth, and decay, on the one hand, and in the universal rational form or principle in which each participates (or which informs each particular city-state), on the other hand.¹⁴ The attempts at federation among historical Greek city-states came later,¹⁵ and Plato and Aristotle never considered that option seriously. Consequently, the main contribution of classical Greek thought arises from its polis-centered movement in two directions: on the one hand it sought to give an adequate account of the recurring patterns of change to which every particular city-state seemed to be subject; and on the other hand, especially in Plato, it sought, by philosophical assent, to discover the universal, changeless form of true political order that would serve as the paradigmatic

norm for all particular and changing city-states. While Plato lacked the vision of a personal, transcendent God Who revealed His sovereign will and historical purpose through kings, prophets, and eventually His own Son, he nevertheless believed that the philosophic (noetic) quest could lead to the discovery of the normative, transcendent "city-state of health and goodness" that was not itself of human origin. According to Eric Voegelin, the great theme of Plato's late work, the *Laws*,

is the question, whether paradigmatic order will be created by 'God or some man' (624a). Plato answers: 'God is the measure of all things' rather than man (716c); paradigmatic order can be created only by 'the God who is the true ruler of the men who have *nous*' (713a); the order created by men who anthropomorphically conceive themselves as the measure of all things will be a *stasioteia* rather than a *politeia*, a state of feuding rather than a state of order (715b).¹⁶

The closest that Plato comes to an apocalyptic, eschatological vision, according to Voegelin, is in his reinterpretation of the historical ages of Cronos and Zeus. During the age of Cronos people lived "under the direct guidance of the gods," and later, in the age of Zeus, they lived in man-made city-states (*poleis*). A new age must now appear.

After the unhappy experiences with human government in the age of Zeus, the time has now come to imitate by all means life as it was under Cronos;

and as we cannot return to the rule of daimons [gods], we must order our homes and poleis in obedience to the *diamonion*, to the immortal element within us. This something, 'what of immortality is in us,' is the *nous* [intelligent mind] and its ordering *nomos* [rational laws]. The new age, following the ages of Cronos and Zeus, will be the age of *Nous*.¹⁷

Whereas for Israel and then for Christians the political disorder and disunity of this age would be overcome by the fulfillment of God's Kingdom, for Plato the disorder would be overcome, if at all, by the full dawn of the age of *Nous*.

Beginning soon after Aristotle in Greece, but coming to a fuller development in the early Roman Republic and the later Roman Empire, was the ethical-juridical philosophy of Stoicism. "To the Stoics," as Parkinson reminds us, "the world was a unit, irrespective of the manifold particularisms which it displayed, and an object from which to extract a set of laws."¹⁸ Stoic thought was characterized by a rational quest for the unchanging order of the cosmos and thus it was clearly Greek. But it developed after the city-state declined and when the great empires of Alexander and of the later Romans were emerging. Thus it became increasingly oriented to the ecumenic universality of the world as a whole.

Chrysippus (280-207 B.C.), "who wrote a treatise *On Law* and was the greatest Athenian seminarist of his time," developed the idea of a meta-positive order of world law that reduced to relative insignificance the immanent social distinctions among various peoples. In fact, he believed that these

distinctions should be reduced to a minimum.

This applied to all states as much as to individuals. Harmony between states was a Stoic ideal and could conceivably be attained if all states were linked together in a system of universal values based on principles of equality. In the Stoic mind, customs varied, but the element of reason which underpinned natural justice was uniform.¹⁹

In Roman law the Stoic mode of thought came to have a tremendous influence, especially in the development of the *jus gentium*. The Stoic conception of a natural law, *jus naturale*, controlled the reinterpretation of Roman law in the process of applying it to the peoples who were being integrated into the Roman empire but whose own customs and legal traditions were not those of early Rome. The resulting body of legal interpretation was called *jus gentium* — "the law common to all people making up the Roman Empire."²⁰

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.) summarized the Stoic philosophy of law, reason, nature, and God in a way that became its classic statement:

There is in fact a true law — namely, right reason — which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions always influence good men, but are without effect upon the bad. To invalidate this law by human

legislation is never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict its operation, and to annul it wholly is impossible. . . . It will not lay down one rule at Rome and another at Athens, nor will it be one rule today and another tomorrow. But there will be one law, eternal and unchangeable, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will be, as it were, one common master and ruler of men, namely God, who is the author of this law, its interpreter, and its sponsor.²¹

As Eric Voegelin points out, the Ciceronian formulation has remained a constant in history "because it is the only elaborate doctrine of law produced by the ecumenic-imperial society."²² It became the formative force in Roman law, and the early Latin Christian Fathers adopted it instead of developing an independent philosophy of law from out of the Hebraic-Christian tradition. "The background of Roman Law in the formation of the European lawyers' guilds, and the new-Stoic movements since the Renaissance, have left us the heritage of a 'higher law' and of 'natural law.'"²³

Parkinson points to an important tension that gradually emerged in Rome between the legal universalism of Ciceronian Stoicism and the conquering particularism of the successive imperial foreign policies. Emperor Marcus Aurelius (121-180 A.D.) manifested this tension. On the one hand there is his famous Stoic dictum, "My city and country as Antonius is Rome — as a man it is the world." On the other hand, he believed in the autonomous voluntarism of individuals and states. Says Parkinson, "Here was the philosophical frame within which the tragic dilemma of international

relations was to pose itself time and again, with the freedom of individual states pitted against the ideal of a preordained universe."²⁴ The rational, moral, legal universalism of Stoic philosophy did not sufficiently come to grips with the reality of diverse, particular political powers. The idea of a cosmic legal unity that controlled Stoic thinking easily transcended the limits of the small Greek city-states, but it apparently did not get very far outside the particularity of the Roman Empire.

The Christian-Hebraic, Greek, and Roman cultural streams flowed together during the centuries after Christ. Parkinson summarizes this development quite compactly:

Once Christianity had been adopted as the state religion of the Roman Empire at the end of the fourth century A.D., Stoic notions of universality, reinforced by the powerful memory of the Roman imperial structure, were to facilitate the eventual transition from *res publica romana* to *res publica christiana*. It also led to the transformation of Seneca's conception of a universal mankind held together by universally valid moral ties to the notion of an imperial theocracy imposing a universal dogma binding on rulers and their subjects alike.²⁵

The transition from Roman Empire to Holy Roman Empire was not a rapid one, however. The process took centuries. The most important figure during the transition was St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.), and the thinker who best represents the culmination of the process is St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).

Augustine takes the Stoic idea of an eternal, natural law and identifies it with the eternal law of the Biblical God.²⁶ The special revelation of God to the Jews and through Christ is an explication of the eternal, natural law.

Since natural law or the law of conscience is innate in man, it has existed since the creation of Adam. Therefore, it precedes the Fall and the introduction of sin into the world, and it antedates and is distinguished from the written law given directly by God to the Jews through Moses as well as the law of Christ in the Gospels. The Ten Commandments and the Gospel precepts do not contradict or annul the law of nature; rather, they make it more explicit and overt and give it the greater force of God's direct commandment to men.²⁷

The crucial difference between Augustine and the Stoics, however, is his conviction that while *social* life is natural to humans, *political* and *legal* orders are not. The latter are divinely instituted, remedial orders given on account of human sin and designed to restrain sin in this age. They are not originally part of human nature. The very existence of diverse political entities, therefore, is evidence of the disunity and brokenness of natural society among humans. The recovery of true social life, of true justice, will occur only in the City of God — the eschatological community of God's new people which is being redeemed by Christ in the midst of this age, but which will appear concretely and fully only after Christ returns to judge the earth. The present age, therefore, can only be an age of relative order and

justice coercively maintained in the midst of injustice, war, and disorder. The earthly political orders themselves can never achieve true justice, and an international order of justice in this world would be even more unthinkable.²⁸

Augustine manifests a degree of Platonism in his notion that the relative justice and equity that are sometimes achieved on earth are due to the fact that "vestiges," "semblances," and "images" of true justice can still be found in human life on earth. Although earthly peace is different from heavenly peace, it may be thought of as a "blurred image" of the heavenly.²⁹ But in the final analysis he does not view the City of God as a paradigm of earthly political order. Rather, the remedial earthly political orders are only temporary, temporal restraining devices that will finally succumb to the triumph of the City of God, which is much more than a polis or an empire.

Augustine's outlook at this point led him along a different path than the one Plato or the Stoics had followed. Augustine was not engaged in a philosophical attempt to define the eternal, universal, paradigmatic political order, nor was he preoccupied with the attempt to relativize all particular earthly political differences before the eternal natural law. Moreover, Augustine certainly did not try to justify the Roman Empire's claim to universality. Rather he kept looking beyond the limited political orders, including Rome, toward the Church which he saw as the earthly anticipation of the City of God. The only true unity and universality that Augustine would admit was that of God's reign in Christ.

In the end Augustine was bold enough to argue that "*it concerns Christian kings of this world to wish their mother the Church, of which they have been spiritually born, to have peace in their*

times."³⁰ Such a wish required action for its fulfillment; thus Augustine argued ". . . let the kings of the earth serve Christ by making laws for Him and for His cause."³¹ The superior authority of the universal Church within this world was not something that Augustine worked out in any great detail as part of a systematic political theory. But the implications of his thinking were worked out both doctrinally and in political fact in Europe during the course of the next one thousand years, and at the peak of the High Middle Ages St. Thomas Aquinas articulated what Augustine had only anticipated but which had in the meantime become the reality of the Christian Roman Empire.

Thomas Aquinas worked out the details of a view of social, political, and religious life that recognized the universal superiority of the Church guiding and integrating the diverse, limited political orders into one *corpus Christianum*, a unified *res publica Christiana*. While weaving together certain Augustinian, Stoic, and Platonic themes, Aquinas made much more use of Aristotle in his political theory. Among other things this meant that Aquinas returned to the Greek idea of the naturalness of political life — political orders exist by nature, not first of all because of sin.

Although Aquinas extends the Aristotelian concept of the polis or city-state in order to refer to the much larger political realms of his day, he nevertheless maintains the conception of political order as a diversity of limited domains. "There is no open mention, in the whole of St. Thomas's work, of the idea of a universal empire," says A.P. D'Entrèves:

No doubt the idea of the fundamental unity of mankind is preserved in the general outlines of St. Thomas's con-

ception of politics. It survives in the very notion of a natural law, common to all men, from which the several systems of positive laws derive their substance and value. It survives in the conception of the *unus populus Christianus*, which embraces all countries and nations, and which finds its highest expression in the *Corpus mysticum Ecclesiae*. But in the sphere of practical politics it is the particular State which carries the day.³²

For Aquinas, then, it is clear that the unity of political realms or domains is to be found not in some form of political unity per se but in the universal embrace by the Church of the different political orders. In fact, the Church actually functioned at that time as an international legal order within Europe. One of Aquinas' important statements on the relationship between the Church and earthly governments is this:

We must note that government and dominion depend from human law, but the distinction between the faithful and infidels is from divine law. The divine law, however, which is a law of grace, does not abolish human law which is founded on natural reason. So the distinction between the faithful and the infidel, considered in itself, does not invalidate the government and dominion of infidels over the faithful. Such right to dominion or government may, however, with justice be abrogated by order of the Church in virtue of her divine authority; for the infidels, on account of their unbelief,

deserve to lose their power over the faithful, who are become the sons of God. But the Church sometimes does and sometimes does not take such steps.³³

Whatever the authenticity and permanence of natural law, natural political life, and natural reason, it is clear in Aquinas that the final authority among nations resides in the Church as the divinely appointed channel of unity on earth. Aquinas is willing to recognize political diversity as natural because he sees the ultimate unity among peoples achieved and maintained by a suprapolitical legal authority — the Church.

The Modern Realism of Hans J. Morgenthau

At this point it will not be our concern to discuss the history of political life and thought after Thomas Aquinas. With the decline of the Holy Roman Empire — unified as it was under the Roman Catholic Church — and the rise of the new states there emerged a different kind of international order in the West, one that no longer reflected the theories of Aquinas, Augustine, Cicero, or Plato. Figures such as Hugo Grotius, Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, and Napoleon Bonaparte were conscious of this fact, and each tried in his own way to reconceive or to rebuild world unity from out of its newly emerging fragmentation. The world with which we are acquainted today is one of supposedly self-determining, sovereign states. Our concern in what follows will be to discover what three contemporary interpretations assume about the unity and diversity among states in this modern period and to discover the significance of the ancient perspectives for understanding the contemporary thinkers.

Hans J. Morgenthau is perhaps best known for the many editions of his text, *Politics Among Nations*. But in 1970 he published a collection of essays, including some of his best philosophical ones, entitled *Truth and Power*.³⁴ One of the essays in *Truth and Power*, "On Trying to be Just," first published in 1963, reveals Morgenthau's basically agnostic, secularized Augustinianism. Human nature is fundamentally faulty in a moral sense, according to Morgenthau, and for this reason anything like a just state or a just world order is simply out of the question:

Justice, immortality, freedom, power, and love — those are the poles that attract and thereby shape the thoughts and actions of men. They have one quality in common that constitutes the distinction of men from beasts and gods alike: Achievement falls short of aspiration

Man alone is, as it were, suspended between heaven and earth: an ambitious beast and a frustrated god. For he alone is endowed with the faculty of rational imagination that outpaces his ability to achieve His freedom is marred by the power of others, as his power is by their freedom.³⁵

But whereas Augustine's pessimism about sinful human nature was controlled by his faith in the ultimate will and purpose of God in Christ, Morgenthau's pessimism is qualified only by agnosticism. Even if we assume that justice is a reality, argues Morgenthau, "we are incapable of realizing it" and incapable of knowing what it demands:

The position we are taking here has the advantage, at

least for cognitive purposes, that it coincides with the one men have always taken because they could not do otherwise. Men have always thought and acted *as though* justice were real. We are proceeding here on the same assumption, trying to show that, even if justice is real, man cannot achieve it for reasons that are inherent in his nature. The reasons are three: Man is too ignorant, man is too selfish, and man is too poor.³⁶

It is immediately apparent that Morgenthau is working with a negative universality in his concept of both human nature and political reality. He puts forth a thesis that few would attempt to deny, namely, that human creatures manifest selfishness, ignorance, and poverty. But the almost self-evident truthfulness of this thesis comes to us as a "self-evident truth" only because of the historical backdrop of modern relativistic cynicism and skepticism regarding the norms that the ancient traditions believed could be known. If we did not have firm roots in traditions that established norms of "unselfishness," "knowledge," and "richness" of human life, we would not be able to be so *certain* now about the negations of those norms. Morgenthau's "agnosticism," in other words, has an eerie sense of "certainty" about it; he knows with certainty a great deal about what we cannot know with any certainty. Counting on the universality of his readers' skeptical, agnostic relativism, he can depend on their agreement with him that injustice can be recognized without having any sure knowledge of what justice is, that selfishness can be known without being sure of what unselfishness is.

In sum, our knowledge of what justice demands is predicated upon our knowledge of what the world is like and what it is for, of a hierarchy of values reflecting the objective order of the world. Of such knowledge, only theology can be certain, and secular philosophies can but pretend to have it.

However, even theology can have that knowledge only in the abstract and is as much at a loss as are secular philosophies when it comes to applying abstract principles to concrete cases.³⁷

Augustine located true justice in the City of God and for that reason never adequately accounted for its relationship to earthly political life. In that sense his "theology" was too abstract in Morgenthau's terms. But Morgenthau simply finalizes the abstract Augustinian separation of justice from the real world without accounting for his dismissal of the City of God from our consideration. With assured certainty that his readers in this modern age will not try to recover any of the ancient moral arguments, Morgenthau can dispense with considerations of "justice" for all practical purposes, even if he allows that justice might exist beyond our knowledge or ability to realize it. Then he can move forward confidently with the primary thrust of his negation, namely, the belief that human creatures are *universally* self-deceptive and selfish. Moreover, he will assume that this universal condition of humans essentially explains international political behavior.³⁸ Without any doubt about the universality of his claims, Morgenthau argues that

All of us look at the world and judge it from the vantage point

of our interests. We judge and act as though we were at the center of the universe, as though what we see everybody must see, and as though what we want is legitimate in the eyes of justice....

This propensity for self-deception is mitigated by man's capacity for transcending himself, for trying to see himself as he might look to others. This capacity, however feeble and ephemeral it may be, is grounded in man's rational nature, which enables him to understand himself and the world around him with a measure of objectivity. Yet where rational objective knowledge is precluded from the outset, as it is with justice, the propensity for self-deception has free rein. As knowledge restrains self-deception, so ignorance strengthens it. Since man cannot help but judge and act in terms of justice and since he cannot know what justice requires, but since he knows for sure what he wants, he equates with a vengeance his vantage point and justice. Empirically we find, then, as many conceptions of justice as there are vantage points, and the absolute majesty of justice dissolves into the relativity of so many interests and points of view.³⁹

The consequence of this argument is that both the human quest for a normative understanding of true justice as well as human receptivity to God's revelation are excluded without exception (i.e., universally) from the realm of politics, if not from life altogether. The

only *reality* in political life, as Morenthau sees it, is the self-interested quest for power, and that reality is truly universal, not as a norm but as a natural fact.⁴⁰ Thus Morgenthau would resolve the tension that existed between the normative Stoic universalism and Roman imperial expansionism by eliminating the former from consideration. The autonomous voluntarism of particular states is the *only* international reality. In this sense, Morgenthau responds to those who would criticize as immoral and unjust the post-World War II struggle between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. to secure "spheres of influence" in the rest of the world by saying,

Spheres of influence, as Churchill and Stalin knew and Roosevelt recognized sporadically, have not been created by evil and benighted statesmen and, hence, cannot be abolished by an act of will on the part of good and enlightened ones. Like the balance of power, alliances, arms races, political and military rivalries and conflicts, and the rest of "power politics," spheres of influence are the ineluctable byproduct of the interplay of interests and power in a society of sovereign nations.⁴¹

The only way to stop the struggle for spheres of influence is to change the world from one of competing sovereign states to one where a single "sovereign government can set effective limits to the expansionism of the nations composing it."⁴² This suggestion for global politics, though he does not argue morally for it at this point, is an enlarged version of Hobbes' answer to the domestic power struggle among competing individuals. Only Leviathan, a

superpower, can put an end to the minipower struggle.⁴³

Since international politics is essentially a power struggle, this explains why no predictive or normative theory of international relations is possible, according to Morgenthau.⁴⁴ The only "unifying" factor in interstate relations is the universality of the power struggle. But the fact of the struggle implies that unpredictable competitive diversities will rule the world until a single world organization of power is attained — something which itself cannot be predicted. The new post-war theorists of international relations are not really offering "theories," says Morgenthau; they are simply putting forward new dogmas of their own construction. "They do not so much try to reflect reality as it actually is as to superimpose upon a recalcitrant reality a theoretical scheme that satisfies the desire for thorough rationalization. Their practicality is specious, since it substitutes what is desirable for what is possible."⁴⁵ A new era of international relations theory does not exist in fact but only in rhetoric or in hope. The distinctive quality of politics is the struggle for power, and just as this struggle is morally repellent to Christians, it is intellectually unsatisfactory to theorists because power, like love,

is a complex psychological relationship that cannot be completely dissolved into a rational theoretical scheme. The theoretician of international relations who approaches his subject matter with respect for its intrinsic nature will find himself frustrated morally, politically, and intellectually; for his aspiration for a pervasively rational theory is hemmed in

by the insuperable resistance of the subject matter.

The new theories of international relations have yielded to the temptation to overcome this resistance of the subject matter by disregarding its intrinsic nature.⁴⁶

Does this mean, then, that international relations cannot be studied in any fruitful theoretical manner? Does it mean that the contingent, unpredictable behavior of autonomous states will yield no theoretical generalizations? No, Morgenthau does not want to come to that conclusion. Instead, what he proposes is that the right kind of reflection on the actual history of international relations can help "to bring order and meaning into a mass of unconnected material and to increase knowledge through the logical development of certain propositions empirically established."⁴⁷ But how is this possible? Did not Morgenthau contend that the struggle for power is not amenable to "intellectual ordering?" Can one develop logical propositions on the basis of the empirical struggle for power? Morgenthau's answer is that while a final and complete predictive theory of international relations is impossible, nevertheless, if we see political theory from the standpoint of its practical function within a relatively limited "political environment," then we will be able to see that a theoretical clarification of different practical political alternatives is indeed possible.⁴⁸

Edmund Burke is a typical example of how great and fruitful political theory develops from concrete practical concerns. It is not being created by a professor sitting in his ivory tower and, with his

publisher, looking over a contract that stipulates the delivery of a manuscript on the "theory of International Relations" by a specified date. It is developed out of the concern of a politically alive and committed mind with the concrete political problems of the day. Thus, all the great political theory, from Plato and Aristotle and the Biblical prophets, to our day, has been practical political theory that intervenes actively in a concrete political situation with the purpose of change through action.⁴⁹

Clearly, then, Morgenthau's agnosticism with respect to the normative considerations of justice as well as with respect to modern scientific theories of social behavior is not a *total* agnosticism. His estimate of the ignorance, poverty, and selfishness of human creatures is not *completely* pessimistic. While giving up the Platonic and Biblical convictions that universal justice can be known, he nevertheless holds on to the hope that some "practical wisdom" can be gained for life in this world. While rejecting the modern social scientific pseudo-hope of achieving a complete empirical theory, Morgenthau nevertheless believes that historical empirical evidence can yield some generalizations of a practical sort that are relatively universal. Morgenthau's scepticism about human nature is not total; the practical wisdom of a few realistic men in this world can transcend the almost universal ignorance, selfishness, and poverty of humankind.⁵⁰

Thus Morgenthau lives with the problems of the international power struggle not as a man without any knowledge or hope, but as one who is

dismayed only by the normative moralist and by the pseudo-scientific system builder. If we could do away with those who believe that they know what justice is and with those who hope that they can predict with certainty what will happen in the future, then we could begin to have real confidence in the practical theory of the Hans Morgenthau of this world. In fact, the ultimate task that a Morgenthau-style theory can perform, argues the author, "is to prepare the ground for a new international order radically different from that which preceded it."⁵¹ How, we might ask, can a practical theory devoid of any ultimate moral norm as well as of predictive powers nevertheless prepare the ground for a new world order? It does so, according to Morgenthau, because the rational powers of the practical theorist can "anticipate" the future on the basis of past experience. The political power struggle is sufficiently universal and repetitive that logical extrapolation from past circumstances, which takes into account new technologies such as nuclear weapons, can foretell and lead into the future even without being able to predict it.

It is a legitimate and vital task for a theory of politics to anticipate drastic changes in the structure of politics and in the institutions which must meet a new need. The great political utopians have based their theoretical anticipation of a new political order upon the realistic analysis of the empirical *status quo* in which they lived. Today, political theory and, more particularly, a theory of international relations, starting from the understanding of politics and international relations as they are, must attempt to

illuminate the impact nuclear power is likely to exert upon the structure of international relations and upon the functions domestic government performs. Further, it must anticipate in a rational way the intellectual, political, and institutional changes that this unprecedented revolutionary force is likely to require.⁵²

Karl W. Deutsch's Analysis of International Relations

While Morgenthau is skeptical of the moralist as well as of the scientific system builder, he is still hopeful about the potential of a practical political theory that can guide the actions of real statesmen in real states toward a new international order. Karl Deutsch, on the other hand, is the kind of scientist that Morgenthau would criticize for attempting the impossible — that is, attempting to rationalize or systematize in an almost natural scientific fashion a reality that cannot be so reduced. Deutsch's assumptions are clear and simple in their reductionistic disregard of human political and moral reality in its integral complexity. He is much more than an agnostic when it comes to considerations of "justice," "morality," and "truth." Deutsch's view of human nature and the world is that of a closed universe manifesting stimulus-response actions and reactions based on the struggle for satisfaction and survival against pain and death. True justice is not merely unknowable; it is an irrelevant matter in the context of a scientific examination of the "facts."

What governments do, says Deutsch, is to "pursue their goals in either a conscious or a machine-like fashion."⁵³ The term "goal" in this sentence should be defined as follows:

*A goal (goal state [condition]) for any acting system is that state of affairs, particularly in its relationship to the outside world, within which its inner disequilibrium — its drive — has been reduced to a relative minimum. If a state is in some sort of disequilibrium or tension — and most states, like most other acting systems, are in some disequilibrium of this kind — it will tend to change some aspects of its behavior until this disequilibrium is reduced.*⁵⁴

If this quotation gives the reader an initial impression that Deutsch is working with abstract physical, mechanical, or psychological concepts and analyses that do not explain the full and integral reality of human political life, it is a justifiable impression. Repeatedly Deutsch makes use of a physical, mathematical, or mechanical illustration in order to render his analysis of political life. For example:

The making of foreign policy thus resembles a pinball machine game. Each interest group, each agency, each important official, legislator, or national opinion leader, is in the position of a pin, while the emerging decision resembles the end-point of the path of a steel ball bouncing down the board from pin to pin. Clearly, some pins will be placed more strategically than others, and on the average they will thus have a somewhat greater influence on the outcome of the game. But no one pin will determine the outcome. Only the distribution of all the relevant pins on the board —

for some or many pins may be so far out on the periphery as to be negligible — will determine the distribution of outcomes. This distribution often can be predicted with fair confidence for large numbers of runs, but for the single run — as for the single decision — even at best only some probability can be stated.⁵⁵

One need not read too far into Deutsch, therefore, to discover that the

necessity of interactions within a system where equilibrium is pursued and disequilibrium is avoided. It is a unity to be abstracted by use of the proper scientific tools of measurement that can “cut into” the vast array of facts.⁵⁶

What makes Deutsch so interesting in connection with the topic of this paper is that his method and approach to the subject matter of international relations keep him from adequately answering three very important questions that he poses at the beginning of his book. Of twelve fun-

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“unity” which holds the field of disparate political facts together is the unifying concept of the “system” — an unqualified and highly abstract general concept that is used to describe any complex set of interactions. Unity and diversity among states, then, for Deutsch, has nothing to do with divine sovereignty over our *one* world or with universal moral or political principles that can be discerned by a common rational quest. If there is any unity in the political world, Deutsch believes that it is to be found in the universal mechanical

damental questions that he asks, the first two are concerned precisely with the unity and diversity among states.

1. *Nation and World*: What are the relations of a nation to the world around it? When, how, and how quickly are a people, a state, and a nation likely to arise, and when, how, and how quickly are they apt to disappear? While they last, how do they relate to other peoples, states, and nations?

How do they deal with smaller groups within them, and with individuals, and how do they relate to international organizations and to the international political system?

2. *Transnational Processes and International Interdependence:* To what extent can the governments and peoples of any nation-state decide their own future, and to what extent does the outcome of their actions depend on conditions and events outside their national boundaries? Are the world's countries and nations becoming more "sovereign" and independent from each other, or are they becoming more interdependent in their actions and their fate? Or are they becoming both more independent and more interdependent, but in different sectors of activity? What will the world look like in, say, 2010 A.D. in regard to these matters?⁵⁷

The fifth question that he poses is perhaps the most important preliminary one for the scientist or theorist: "What is political in international relations, and what is not? What is the relation of international politics to the life of the society of nations?"⁵⁸

The problem in Deutsch's presentation is that his questions are confined dogmatically to the "hows" that might possibly yield empirical descriptions and measurements. He does not ask about the "whys" and "oughts" or about the conditioning assumptions that guide his investigation of the "hows." Moreover, after raising the questions, his first step is to adopt a concept of "system" that is too abstract and general to serve as a sufficient "tool" for selecting and collecting in-

formation about specifically *political* "facts." Only after he has defined what a "system" is, in general, does he begin to define politics, but by that point the full reality of political life can no longer be grasped or contained in his reductionistic concept of "system." Thus, his fifth question is never answered satisfactorily.

It is legitimate, of course, to ask the present critic to explain what he means by his accusation that Deutsch's system-concept is reductionistic and therefore faulty. In his writings, Deutsch shows great dependence on the work of Norbert Wiener, the mathematician and cybernetic theorist, and Talcott Parsons, the sociological systems theorist.⁵⁹ From Parsons he obtains an idea of the social system — unqualified in any specific way. Deutsch accepts Parson's conclusion that "there are certain fundamental things that must be done in every social system, large or small (that is, in every group, every organization, every country) if it is to endure."⁶⁰ The things which must be done by a social system include (1) maintaining itself, (2) adapting itself to change, (3) attaining its goals, and (4) integrating its own internal and complex diversity. The scientific key to getting at the functions of any social system, according to Deutsch, is to map the "flow" of the system's communication network which functions as a cybernetic web within the system and which also connects it with its external environment.

It should be clear to any social scientist that Deutsch, following Wiener and Parsons, has indeed abstracted certain dimensions, modes, or functions of universality that characterize any social entity. It is hard to object to Deutsch's conclusion that *all* social entities seek to maintain their identities, adapt to change, maintain a flow of communication, and so forth. The fundamental problem, however, is

that the study of any particular *mode* or *function* of a social system presupposes the system's *prior identity* as a social whole. Deutsch does not indicate an awareness of this, and as a consequence he tends to reduce the political (or any other) system to its communication patterns or to its general functions without explaining *what* it is that is thus functioning or processing information. Instead of first accounting for *what* is political and then carefully examining the abstracted communication flows, Deutsch works backward in a typical, reductionistic fashion by first positing a general social or cybernetic system and then using that abstraction to identify political life and processes. The effect is to reduce the integral reality of political life to one or two of its modes or functions.⁸¹

Furthermore, even though Deutsch is not claiming to say anything normative with this approach, he nevertheless believes that a political system which suffers a communication breakdown, or disappears, or fails to adapt quickly to change, or fails to attain its goals, or remains disorganized, is not living up to the universal necessity of survival and development which is incumbent upon all systems, by definition. In other words, it is not doing what it *ought* to do if it wants to survive and grow. The conceptual tool of "system" thus enables the theorist to do more than simply describe facts; it also helps him to make judgments about successful and unsuccessful systems based on the analyst's predisposition to believe that things (including social things) *ought* to survive rather than perish.

Every social system is defined by the above abstraction, in Deutsch's view. What, then, is a "political system" as distinguished from a non-political system? Deutsch is not any more helpful than Morgenthau at this point. Each

man more or less assumes that by common sense we are acquainted with "laws" and "forces" which define states or "nation-states."⁸² Morgenthau moves on from that point to work with an assumed macrocosmic "person" or "actor" known as the state or political system which seeks (or should seek) to maintain and enhance its own self-interest. The nominalistic and behavioralistic Deutsch does not so readily admit to the existence of a structured social "whole." Instead, his "political system" is a pattern of combined individual behavior patterns.

Politics consists in the more or less incomplete control of human behavior through voluntary habits of *compliance* in combination with threats of probable *enforcement*. In its essence, politics is based on the interplay of habits of cooperation as modified by threats.⁸³

Deutsch does not stop to address the objections that might be raised by those who do not accept his assumptions. He does not ask whether the individual habits preceded and helped to shape the particular contours of the political system or whether, to the contrary, they were created by the system. He does not ask why such systems came into existence in the variety of shapes and sizes in which we find them. He does not defend himself against the charge that the above definition no more defines a *political* system than it defines a family, a school, or a business enterprise, since all social systems depend on voluntary compliance and the use of some kinds of enforceable threats. Deutsch goes on to talk about "law," but he does not distinguish state (political) law from church law or school rules or business regulations for employees. In other

words, the very thing which needs to be accounted for, namely, the identity of the political system, is passed over rather quickly with some statements about behavior patterns. If this seems inadequate or peculiar, it is so only for the person who is looking for something more than measurements of, and probability predictions about, certain functions carried out by existing domestic and international habits of political behavior.

By the time we reach the concluding sections of Deutsch's *Analysis of International Relations*, where he discusses international interdependence and interrelationships, we find nothing that contributes additional insight into the question of the unity and diversity among states. The *diversity* of states is simply assumed to exist as a fact of modernity. The *unity* that he looks for is the universality of shared system properties and the growing complexity of system interdependencies that would seem to require change in the future if the many separate state systems and the world as a whole are to survive.

Once again, however, without first accounting for the identity of inter-state political relationships (as compared with the identity of a state) Deutsch simply assumes the validity and sufficiency of a general systems concept for analyzing international relations. He introduces Chapter Fifteen ("Integration: International and Supranational") this way:

To *integrate* generally means to make a whole out of parts — that is, to turn previously separate units into components of a coherent system. The essential characteristic of any system, we may recall, is a significant degree of interdependence among its com-

ponents, and *interdependence* between any two components or units consists in the probability that a change in one of them — or an operation performed upon one of them — will produce a predictable change in the other

Integration, then, is a relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack.⁶⁴

When Deutsch takes up a discussion of the United Nations, he explicitly refers to "two themes" that can be traced throughout the history of that organization: (1) "the search for centralizing power" and (2) "the search for pluralistic communication and accommodation."⁶⁵ In other words, the very identity of the U.N. is connected with the problem of *unity* and *diversity* in global politics. Deutsch makes the judgment that a true unification of the world by means of a greater centralization of world political power in the U.N. is not likely to happen in the near future. But, he is not unwilling to follow the suggestion of a "second way" made by Senator Arthur Vandenberg in 1945.

It is to make the United Nations the town meeting of the world, where all issues can be brought out into the open, and where governments can learn how to manage differences of interest and ideology, and how to avoid head-on collisions In these respects, the United Nations since 1945 has been remarkably successful.⁶⁶

Almost unrelated to his "scientific" study of communication flows and

system functions, and certainly without adequate historical evidence or argument, Deutsch voices his hope for the eventual attainment of world security and unity. His expression of hope seems to be rooted in nothing more than his belief that human beings, when forced up against the wall, will find a way to survive rather than perish. Deutsch believes that somehow a "fit" system will appear that can survive.

An era of pluralism and, at best, of pluralistic security communities, may well characterize the near future. In the long term, however, the search for integrated political communities that command both peace and power, and that entail a good deal of amalgamation, is likely to continue until it succeeds. For such success, not only good will and sustained effort, but political creativity and inventiveness will be needed, together with a political culture of greater international openness, understanding, and compassion.

Without such a new political climate and new political efforts, humanity is unlikely to survive for long. But the fact that so many people in so many countries are becoming aware of the problem, and of the need for increasing efforts to deal with it, makes it likely that it will be solved.⁶⁷

Unfortunately Deutsch contributes little or nothing to our understanding of how compassion, openness, understanding, inventiveness, and political creativity can be found and nurtured. He offers no explanation of why these ingredients will be or should be desired

and sought after by the same human beings that Hans Morgenthau believes are all too ignorant, selfish, and poor. One is even left wondering whether Deutsch and Morgenthau, who share so many characteristics of the same culture, language, and political culture, understand each other.⁶⁸

Keohane and Nye: Complex Interdependence

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye are fully aware of both Morgenthau's realism and Deutsch's more general and abstract systemic analysis. The thesis of their book, *Power and Interdependence*, is that a more sophisticated approach to the study of world politics is necessary today that can take into account the partial truthfulness of both realism and various forms of systems analysis. Neither "modernists" (a term that would characterize Deutsch in several respects⁶⁹) nor "traditionalists" (the Morgenthaus) have an adequate framework for understanding contemporary international politics, according to Keohane and Nye.

Modernists point correctly to the fundamental changes now taking place, but they often assume without sufficient analysis that advances in technology and increases in social and economic transactions will lead to a new world in which states, and their control of force, will no longer be important. Traditionalists are adept at showing flaws in the modernist vision by pointing out how military interdependence continues, but find it very difficult accurately to interpret today's multidimensional economic, social, and ecological interdependence.⁷⁰

In contrast to Morgenthau's traditionalism Keohane and Nye argue that states are not "persons" with single "wills" confronting each other as military powers with a single overriding national interest.⁷¹ States are interdependent not merely as potential military allies or enemies but also as economic, social, and ecological entities. Moreover, many international relationships are of a non-governmental character, and these many "complex interdependencies" are not always organized within each state as parts of a fully integrated, hierarchically arranged, coherent plan of self-interested state action. "In the Canadian-American relationship, for example, the use or threat of force is virtually excluded from consideration by either side. The fact that Canada has less military strength than the United States is therefore not a major factor in the bargaining process."⁷² And if we consider U.S.-Canadian relations apart from military interdependence, we discover that there is not a single or uniform "national interest" on each side. The interdependence is more complex than the realist would imagine.

On the other side, however, it is not possible to assume with the "modernist" that the complex interdependence of states within a shrinking global "system" can simply be taken for granted as a single-system fact that will yield empirical measurements of interactions within "the system." The concept of "system" must be used with more agility if we are to be able to take into account both the many different kinds of systemic interdependencies in the world as well as the ways in which systems themselves can change. In the main body of the book Keohane and Nye examine two major issues and two inter-state relationships: international monetary systems from World War I to 1976 and the international ocean

regimes during the same period, and American-Canadian and American-Australian relations over a significant period of time. They seek to demonstrate from these analyses that there is no single model of a "system" that can be used to explain either the changes of "regimes" in money and oceans or the changes in bilateral relations between the U.S. and Canada and between the U.S. and Australia. In fact, in certain cases, the older realist framework comes the closest to providing an adequate account of the circumstances and events being considered. "Our conclusion is that the traditional tools need to be sharpened and supplemented with new tools, not discarded."⁷³

What we find in Keohane and Nye, then, is a more systems-analytical, multidimensional, functionalistic, and prediction-oriented approach than in Morgenthau. At the same time, however, the authors display a sensitivity to, and a concern for, the policy-oriented, practical, and historical sides of international politics that are the primary concern of the realists. Given this breadth and complexity, what do Keohane and Nye assume about the unity and diversity among states?

On the basis of *Power and Interdependence* it is difficult to answer this question. In one respect, Keohane and Nye are only testing a few limited hypotheses about the predictive power of certain methods and theoretical approaches, and therefore they end their book with a series of qualifying statements suggesting the necessity of further research rather than with a series of general conclusions that would more clearly reveal their standpoint. In another respect, however, their book makes a case for the severe limits that must be faced in a scientific study of international politics because the closer they get to an account of all the elements of complex interdependen-

dence the farther away they stand from any ability to produce clean predictive conclusions. This would seem to imply that Keohane and Nye might want to examine the assumptions of contemporary theorists rather carefully since they are calling into question some of their methods and conclusions. Nevertheless, Keohane and Nye do not follow a path of critical reflection on the basic assumptions of international theorists. Instead, they appear to be calling merely for greater empirical completeness within the framework of assumptions that the traditionalists and the modernists already make. At the conclusion of the book the authors return to a note sounded at its beginning, namely, that they want to synthesize and enlarge traditional and modernist contributions in the direction of greater empirical completeness. Traditional views, on the one hand,

fail even to focus on much of the relevant foreign policy agenda — those areas that do not touch the security and autonomy of the state. Moreover, the policy maxims derived from such traditional wisdom will often be inappropriate. Yet the modernists who believe that social and economic interdependence have totally changed the world fail to take elements of continuity into account. As a result, their policy prescriptions often appear to be utopian. All four of our cases confirmed a significant role, under some conditions, for the overall military power structure. Appropriate policies must take into account both continuity and change; they must combine elements of the traditional wisdom with new

insights about the politics of interdependence.⁷⁴

What we can gather from this is that Keohane and Nye stand precisely where Morgenthau and Deutsch stand with regard to basic assumptions about the unity and diversity among states. On the one hand they simply accept as a fact of modernity the existence of separate states without attempting to define the identity of a state. And with Morgenthau and Deutsch they are looking to empirical theorists to come up with an adequate understanding of changing world conditions in order to help states (and humanity) survive. They want to point out the growing significance of the universal ecological, technological, economic interdependencies among states that function as limiting global necessities which those states ought to acknowledge. But there is no hint in Keohane and Nye that they are interested in reopening the older normative debates about what kind of justice or equity or unity ought to characterize the world in its diverse interdependence. They are quite willing to remain entirely agnostic with regard to the normative obligations that states, statesmen, and international organizations have for one another and for the creation in which we all live. Although just as with Morgenthau and Deutsch they want to see into the future, they are skeptical about all forms of foreknowing other than scientific prediction.

If Keohane and Nye are more exhaustive than Morgenthau in their empirical examinations, they are nevertheless realists at heart who want to provide non-utopian help to policy makers. If they are less optimistic and less reductionistic than Deutsch in paying careful attention to actual institutions, to historical developments,

and to complex system changes, they are nevertheless systems analysts who limit themselves to the study of the functional relationships among states — especially the developed western states. They do not leave the positivistic terrain to reflect on and evaluate the assumptions that have guided the states and statesmen who have created the modern institutions and regimes. Thus they have no apparatus, no criteria for assessing and judging the various normative “visions” that statesmen have worked with during the past several centuries of nationalism, imperialism, anti-colonialism, and neo-colonialism. They merely fall back on the rather simplistic distinction between realism and utopianism hoping to avoid the latter at all costs.

The closest that Keohane and Nye come to a recognition of international political norms is when they conclude that political scientists must give greater attention than they have yet given to international *organizations* and *leadership*.

Our analysis implies that more attention should be paid to the effect of government policies on international regimes. A policy that adversely affects or destroys a beneficial international regime may be unwise, even if its immediate, tangible effects are positive. Concern with maintenance and development of international regimes leads us to pay more attention to problems of *leadership* in world politics. What types of international leadership can be expected, and how can sufficient leadership be supplied? And focus on contemporary world leadership stimulates increased attention to problems

of *international organization*, broadly defined.⁷⁵

But even here it is apparent that Keohane and Nye do not attempt to define either “adverse” or “positive” effects, nor do they explain what a “beneficial” international regime would be. And their questions about leadership are the positivistic ones about “what might be expected” and what is “sufficient” without considering what leadership ought to be or even what “sufficiency” means.

Conclusion

What we have in the writings of Morgenthau, Deutsch, and Keohane and Nye should not be underestimated, nor should their approaches and findings be dismissed lightly because of their inadequacies. Global relations among states are so complex, so rapidly changing, and so resistant to scientific analysis and measurement that we should not be surprised or disappointed in finding only limited insights and highly tentative conclusions. Instead, we ought to try to understand how the contributions of these thinkers can be picked up and gathered into a more encompassing and adequate philosophy and science of international politics.

In spite of his agnosticism, for example, we find in Morgenthau an appreciation for at least two crucial things. First, his realism, for all of its shortcomings, is fixed on the important awareness of the *identity-structure of the state and the lack of a similar structural identity in inter-state relations*. Morgenthau has not brought this awareness to the forefront of his attention for theoretical analysis, but his disdain for the abstract system builders who ignore the fact that states act as integral wholes reveals his keen historical insight into a fundamental feature of the

modern global arena. *The first task* of the political scientist, then, is to clarify the identity-structure of the modern state, and to do so in a way that illuminates the important similarities and differences between the newer and older states, between complex, highly developed states and simpler, less integrated public entities. And along with this goes the task of distinguishing inter-state relations from intra-state activities. Morgenthau is certainly correct in stating that military power and potential power are crucial at this point, but Deutsch, Keohane and Nye are also correct in pointing to the other complex dimensions of inter-state relations today.

Secondly, Morgenthau is aware of the importance of *practical political knowledge*. That is to say, he is conscious that international relations are shaped by real persons making concrete decisions in their political offices on the basis of judgments about what ought to be done to secure peace or prosperity, to preserve peace or to end war, to advance "justice" or to promote certain interests. Keohane and Nye show their dependence on Morgenthau when they, too, indicate the importance of understanding "leadership." An analysis of international relations which does not seek to explain and evaluate this "moral," "judgment-making," "decision-making," human dimension of international politics but tries only to measure quantities is an analysis that will not come closer to an exact science but one that will only distort more completely the very reality of politics. *The second task* of political science, then, is to reconsider, through critical reflection, the proper assumptions that are necessary to allow for a fully empirical examination of international politics — "fully empirical" meaning the full reality of relationships that are human, institutional, moral, juridical, social in

character. To continue refining natural scientific, cybernetic, and mathematical models that simply continue the process of abstracting modes and functions from the integral totality of international politics is to continue a dogmatically blind effort rather than to advance empirical science.

We find in Deutsch, in contrast to Morgenthau, however, an awareness of some of *the universal modes or dimensions of social structural identities* that can be abstracted from real states and actual inter-state relations. Deutsch's specialty, of course, is the study of communications systems and networks. International relations are not simply the "free" and autonomous relations among separate states in an open field. Especially in the last one hundred years, with the advance of modern technologies, communications systems, and military and economic interdependencies world wide, a more interrelated "global village" is manifesting the rise and triumph of the West. It is important then to consider the universal social modes and functions that characterize all states and inter-state relations and which limit the more individualistic quests for national self-interest on the part of particular states. Quantification procedures which can help to make us more fully conscious of these universal characteristics should not be ignored or rejected simply because they are reductionistic. They should be employed carefully in the context of a larger, more adequate, non-reductionistic science of politics. The fact that Deutsch has only abstracted one or more functional elements of social systems, ignoring moral, juridical, aesthetic, historical, and other modes of political existence, as well as almost obliterating the very identity-structure of state and inter-state systems, should not lead us to reject entirely the information that he

has accumulated or the methods by which he has done so. *The third task* of political science, therefore, must be the careful analysis of all the functional modes of existence that characterize state and inter-state systems, clarifying the differences between intra-state political, inter-state political, and non-political system functions. If this is pursued in the context of the first two tasks mentioned above, then the work of Deutsch and others can be mined with value even if with minimal results.

In Keohane and Nye we can recognize the contribution of theorists who are becoming empirically careful to the point of almost complete tentativeness in the face of the massive complexity of factual international political relations. The fact that the time period for their historical considerations is less than a century, the fact that their subjects of investigation are the limited issues of money, oceans, U.S.-Canadian, and U.S.-Australian relations demonstrate the narrow focus that is necessary when scientists attempt to do justice to the full complexity of international politics. Such humility and narrowness must be appreciated and imitated by those who wish to do social science. Even a large team of scientists cannot simply study "the" international political system in general. The several different models used for their investigations should be analyzed carefully by those who wish to advance the study of international relations. *The fourth task* of political science, then, should be to test hypotheses and assumptions carefully against actual cases over time in order to see whether all of the elements of the political reality are being taken into account. The problem with Keohane and Nye does not seem to be so much with a lack of carefulness in what they do, but rather with the systems-analytical assumptions and methods of

measurement that circumscribe their project from the outset such that the full integrality of political life is not adequately illuminated for either the scientist or the political decision-maker.

If it is possible for us to bring together some of the theoretical efforts of Morgenthau, Deutsch, Keohane and Nye into a larger political scientific project, it should also be clear by this point that such a project will have to be more grand than a picky eclecticism or an attempted synthesis of existing contributions. In fact, here is where the first half of this paper should be recalled. The contemporary world of international relations along with the general moral disposition of scientists in the West is of relatively recent origin. The fact that Morgenthau, Deutsch, Keohane and Nye are all essentially moral and religious agnostics or skeptics when it comes to human "knowing" and "doing," the fact that the highest moral value which they can allow to enter their scientific work is "survival" — these facts mean that the biggest questions of political concern to humanity now and for the last few millenia are being side-stepped by political scientists. The most fundamental question of all, namely, what kind of *unity*, if any, ought to characterize international political diversity is left untouched by the very persons who supposedly know the most about the "new world" that is emerging. The general tenor of their work, however, is not actually one of empty ignorance about this question as though they could really ignore the question and stick to a "purely scientific" description of the facts. No, instead they are constantly involved in attempts to fill the void by careful qualifications and negations. They must refer frequently to the uselessness of moralists, or to the danger of utopian thinking, or to the necessity of avoiding

nuclear war, or to the value of cooperation for world economic growth, or to the importance of system-maintenance. The unity they want is a world unity sufficient to keep most (or at least enough) humans in existence in this world in a condition of greater pleasure than pain. The means for the attainment of this end (which all hope for but which none can predict) are left in the hands of the political decision-makers — but with the undisguised hope that the decision-makers will heed the scientists' analyses and not get caught in the grip of dangerous moralisms and utopianisms. Given the lack of clear, normative theory among political scientists, it is no wonder that marxist, nationalist, and other ideologies enjoy such power and influence in the world today among statesmen and activists looking for meaning, purpose, and direction for political life.

Political scientists ought to be bold enough to demand that accurate and progressive scientific work must call into question the sterile biases and confining dogmatic assumptions of realists, systems analysts, and functional model builders who stand in the tradition of Enlightenment secularism. They ought to sift carefully through all the work of such scholars, but they also ought to return to a more careful consideration of the works of Plato, the Stoics, Augustine, and Aquinas. Indeed, for the sake of authentic political science, they ought to reconsider the vision of the prophets and of Christ himself which opens the door to a view of this one world that is altogether more substantial than the Enlightenment hope for world unity through scientific progress. A Christian standpoint, no less than a Platonic or Marxist or contemporary secularist standpoint, provides a point of departure for the recovery of ancient questions and

hypotheses, the investigation of historical realities, and the systematic analysis of contemporary structural identities and functional universalities that mark off the political world of our day. With perhaps even greater care and concern for human beings, who are seen by Christians to be made in the image of God, a Christian point of departure can lead political thinkers and students to careful critical reflection on the guiding presuppositions and assumptions that are necessary for the full empirical investigation of political life.

Notes

¹James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1971), p. 3. As the authors indicate, the major exception to this was the various branches of socialist thought.

²Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* (Summer, 1977), p. 42.

³Hoffman, p. 42.

⁴The Marxist influence came from people such as V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, 1939), and Rosa Luxemburg and N. I. Bukarin, *Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital* (London: Allen Lane, 1972). The critics of liberal optimism were E. H. Carr, *Twenty Years Crisis* (London: Macmillan, 1939); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1948); Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribners, 1932), and others.

⁵Hoffman, p. 51.

⁶Martin Wight, "Why is There No International Theory?" *International Relations*, 2, No. 1 (April, 1960), 35-48, 62.

⁷James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Gavin Boyd, *World Politics: An Introduction* (New York: The Free Press, 1976).

⁸On futurological concerns note the work of the "World Order Models Project," introduced in volumes such as Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed., *On the Creation of a Just World Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990's* (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

⁹Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, 2nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978).

¹⁰Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*; Eric Voegelin, "World Empire and the Unity of Mankind," *International Affairs*, 38 (1962), 176ff.;

Voegelin, "Industrial Society in Search of Reason," in Raymond Aron, ed., *World Technology and Human Destiny* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 31-46; John H. Herz, *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics* (New York: David McKay, 1976), especially chap. 9, "Relevancies and Irrelevancies in the Study of International Relations," pp. 253-278.

¹¹Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

¹²F. Parkinson, *The Philosophy of International Relations* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977) [Sage Library of Social Research, Vol. 52]. A recent important contribution to the general problem of scientism in the study of politics is that of Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," *World Politics*, 29 (July, 1977), 489-522.

¹³See Martin Buber, *The Kingship of God*, translated by Richard Scheimann (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967); and Eric Voegelin, *Order and History, Vol. 1: Israel and Revelation* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), pp. 185-352. In addition to the Biblical passages cited below, also note Psalm 47.

¹⁴See Eric Voegelin, *Order and History, Vol. 3: Plato and Aristotle* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957).

¹⁵See Victor Ehrenberg, *The Greek State* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1960), pp. 103-131.

¹⁶Voegelin, *Order and History, Vol. 4: The Ecumenic Age* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), p. 226.

¹⁷Voegelin, *Ecumenic Age*, p. 227.

¹⁸Parkinson, p. 10.

¹⁹Parkinson, p. 11.

²⁰Parkinson, p. 12.

²¹Cicero, *On the Commonwealth (De re publica)*, translated by George H. Sabine and Stanley B. Smith (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1976), p. 216 [Bk. III, 22].

²²Voegelin, *Ecumenic Age*, p. 47.

²³Voegelin, *Ecumenic Age*, p. 47.

²⁴Parkinson, p. 13.

²⁵Parkinson, p. 13.

²⁶See Herbert A. Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 78ff.

²⁷Deane, p. 86.

²⁸Deane, pp. 116 ff.

²⁹Deane, pp. 97, 102.

³⁰Deane, p. 200.

³¹Deane, p. 200.

³²From A. P. D'Entrèves, "Introduction," *Aquinas: Selected Political Writings*, edited by D'Entrèves, translated by J. G. Dawson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), p. XXV.

³³Quoted in the "Introduction," of D'Entrèves, p. XXiii.

³⁴Morgenthau, *Truth and Power* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

³⁵Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, p. 61.

³⁶Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, pp. 62-63.

³⁷Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, pp. 63-64.

³⁸As for the limits and problems involved in this assumption that the "depraved" condition of human nature explains international politics, see Waltz, pp. 16-41, and James Skillen, "International Interdependence and the Demand for Global Justice," *International Reformed Bulletin* (1st and 2nd Quarter, 1977), pp. 20-23.

³⁹Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, pp. 64-65.

⁴⁰Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff comment that the concept of the power struggle "gives continuity and unity to the seemingly diverse foreign policies of the widely separated nation-states. Moreover, the concept 'interest defined as power' makes evaluating the actions of political leaders at different points in history possible." *Contending Theories*, p. 76. In other words, Morgenthau's attempt to define the universal uniformity of human nature provides him with the principle of universality and unity that is necessary without which the diversity would have no meaning or common relationship.

⁴¹Morgenthau, "The Limits of Historical Justice," in *Truth and Power*, p. 80.

⁴²Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, p. 80.

⁴³Commenting on Hobbes, Eric Voegelin puts it beautifully: "The style of the construction is magnificent. If human nature is assumed to be nothing but passionate existence, devoid of ordering resources of the soul, the horror of annihilation will, indeed, be the overriding passion that compels submission to order. If pride cannot bow to Dike, or be redeemed through grace, it must be broken by the Leviathan who 'is king of all the children of pride.' If the souls cannot participate in the Logos, then the sovereign who strikes terror into the souls will be 'the essence of the commonwealth.' The 'King of the Proud' must break the *armor sui* that cannot be relieved by the *amor Dei*." *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 184. For more on this theme of Morgenthau and Hobbes, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and June Savoy, "Hans J. Morgenthau's Version of *Realpolitik*," *The Political Science Reviewer*, 5 (Fall, 1975), 201 ff., and 210 ff.

⁴⁴Morgenthau, "The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory," *Truth and Power*, p. 252.

⁴⁵Morgenthau, "Common Sense and Theories," *Truth and Power*, pp. 242-243. The type of theory that Morgenthau is criticizing is the kind that attempts to reduce politics to some functional interrelationship such as the economic, or the kind that attempts to reduce international relations to quantifiable units that can yield greater predictability.

⁴⁶Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, p. 243.

⁴⁷Morgenthau, "The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory," *Truth and Power*, p. 257.

⁴⁸Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, pp. 256-257. For more on Morgenthau's conception of political theory as rational hypothesis testing, see his *Politics Among Nations*, 4th edition (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 4ff.

⁴⁹Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, p. 257.

⁵⁰Crabb and Savoy comment, "Why the intellectuals within a society escape involvement in the 'universal' power struggle — or why the moral-ethical professions of intellectuals do not also conceal an egocentric quest for power — are questions Morgenthau never clarifies." "Morgenthau's version of Real politik," p. 202.

⁵¹Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, pp. 259-260.

⁵²Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, pp. 260-261.

⁵³Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, p. 91.

⁵⁴Deutsch, *Analysis*, p. 91.

⁵⁵Deutsch, *Analysis*, pp. 89-90. Another example is Deutsch's comparison of the political system with a telephone switchboard. See his *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 76-98. In this latter book Deutsch develops his basic cybernetic-systems theory that underlies all of his political analysis.

⁵⁶Deutsch's book is amazing in its total lack of historical accounting even of its own assumptions. The following statement that introduces Chapter Two on the "Tools for Thinking" is utterly nominalistic in character, but Deutsch nowhere indicates that he is even aware of this. "Since a concept is a symbol, and a symbol is, so to speak, a command to be mindful of those things to which it refers, it follows that a concept is a kind of command to remember a collection of things or memories. It is an order to select and collect certain items of information — these will refer to facts, if they should happen to exist. Hence a concept is a command to search, but it is no guarantee that we shall find." *Analysis*, p. 14. See also the beginning of Chapter Four, p. 45, for a similar comment.

⁵⁷Deutsch, *Analysis*, p. 9.

⁵⁸Deutsch, *Analysis*, p. 10.

⁵⁹See especially Deutsch's *The Nerves of Government*. Also note Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "Karl Deutsch and the Study of Political Science," *The Political Science Reviewer*, 2 (Fall, 1972), 90-111.

⁶⁰Deutsch, *Analysis*, p. 14.

⁶¹When Deutsch, both in this book and elsewhere defines a "people," he does so in a very abstract way: "A people, then, is a group with complementary communication habits whose members usually share the same language, and always share a similar culture so that all members of the group attach the same meanings to words. In that sense a people is a community of shared

meanings." *Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), p. 130; *Analysis*, pp. 76 ff. A state or political system, for Deutsch, presupposes one or more peoples, and it is then defined (also quite abstractly) as "an organization for the enforcement of decisions or commands, made practicable by the existing habits of compliance among the population A state can be used to reinforce the communication habits, the cooperation, and the solidarity of a people." *Analysis*, p. 79.

⁶²The term "nation-state" which Deutsch frequently uses manifests one of the ways in which he has inadequately identified what politics or the state or a political system is. Note especially the criticism of Walker Connor, "Nation Building or Nation-Destroying," *World Politics*, 24 (April, 1972), 319-355.

⁶³Deutsch, *Analysis*, p. 19.

⁶⁴Deutsch, *Analysis*, p. 198.

⁶⁵Deutsch, *Analysis*, p. 224.

⁶⁶Deutsch, *Analysis*, pp. 224-225.

⁶⁷Deutsch, *Analysis*, p. 253.

⁶⁸For more on Deutsch, see Pfaltzgraff, "Karl Deutsch and the Study of Political Science," *The Political Science Reviewer*, p. 107 ff.

⁶⁹At this juncture, however, Keohane and Nye refer specifically to Robert Angell, *Peace on the March: Transnational Participation* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1969).

⁷⁰Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977), p. 4.

⁷¹Keohane and Nye argue that three assumptions are integral to the realist vision: "First, states as coherent units are the dominant actors in world politics Second, realists assume that force is a usable and effective instrument of policy. . . . Third, partly because of their second assumption, realists assume a hierarchy of issues in world politics, headed by questions of military security: the 'high politics' of military security dominates the 'low politics' of economic and social affairs." Keohane and Nye, pp. 23-24.

⁷²Keohane and Nye, pp. 18-19.

⁷³Keohane and Nye, p. 162.

⁷⁴Keohane and Nye, p. 224.

⁷⁵Keohane and Nye, p. 221. On this subject as well as on some others, see the following works produced jointly by Keohane and Nye: "Trans-governmental Relations and International Organizations," *World Politics*, 27 (Oct., 1974) 39-62; "International Interdependence and Integration," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science*, 8 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975) 363-414; and as editors, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).