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Nick Van Til

Dordt College

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Calvinism and Art (1)

Nick Van Til
Professor of Philosophy



Mr. Van Til received his A.B. from Calvin College. Subsequent to military service in World War II he spent a semester at Westminster Theological Seminary in the study of Apologetics. Thereafter he received M.A. degrees from the University of Michigan in both history and philosophy and followed further graduate studies in philosophy at Michigan State University. Mr. Van Til is a charter member of the Dordt College faculty and is chairman of the Perspectives Division.

In times past, in fact, up to the middle of our century, no one in the Reformed community was professionally engaged in the study of aesthetics or art theory. More than that, there were few who had the professional responsibility for bringing the lofty concepts of the Calvinistic world and life view to the practicalities of everyday life in such areas as economics, politics, and art. At Calvin College before World War II it was customary to lay that weighty responsibility on the shoulders of H. Henry Meeter, the one-man Bible Department. Meeter invariably sent his students to Abraham Kuyper's *Stone Lectures*. Through these they raced with whatever speed was commensurate with their ability to pick up the information needed to pass the ensuing exams. Obviously, that kind of speedy romp through Calvinism scarcely brought

them to the level of a dilettante, let alone a perceptive Calvinist.

The cursory nature of the exposure was not the only hazard along the route into Calvinism at that time. At that stage of development the student had not acquired the knowledge that could serve as a basis for criticism of what Kuyper offered. In fact, the student often came from a background of such veneration of Kuyper that his words came with the force of the *ex cathedra*, only one step removed from the canonical. With that also in my background, when I turned to a critical study of Kuyper's pronouncements on art this past summer, I suffered no little "appallment." I then discovered that there were ideas in Kuyper's lecture on art which are inconsistent with the Reformed tenor of his other lectures.

Early in his *Stone Lectures* discussion of art, under the heading

“Calvinism and Art,” Kuyper establishes his reasons for holding that art is a lofty endeavor. He wrote:

[W]hen I plead the significance of Calvinism in the domain of art, I am not in the least induced to do so by this vulgarization of art, [commercial and intellectualist interests] but rather keep my eye fixed upon the Beautiful and the Sublime in its eternal significance, and upon art as one of the richest gifts of God to man.²

The last phrase I can understand, appreciate, and lend my agreement to as being foundational in a Calvinistic discussion of art. But the “Beautiful” and the “Sublime” beginning with upper case letters carry the suggestion of transcendent, non-creational entities. They carry the hew and stamp of a residual Platonism which should not have escaped the reformatory refiner’s fire by which Kuyper was attempting to cast art theory into a Calvinistic mould.

Coming to art and aesthetic theory with Reformed and/or scriptural sensitivities, we can speak of things and qualities as beautiful. To my mind, however, there is no intimation in the Bible that we can elevate beauty to the status of the transcendent and eternal. And as related to art, beauty should not be given any transtemporal significance except by some kind of distant analogy. I should add here that we owe the New International Version of the Bible a debt of gratitude. In all cases but one, where the King James Version uses “beauty” with reference to the worship of God, the NIV uses the word splendor. Aside from the fact that according to the translators it is obviously the best rendering, it relieves us from what, for some, seemed like an obligation to make beauty something divine while

also making beauty the essence of aesthetic quality and the *sine qua non* of art.

As Kuyper continues his discussion, he defends the lack of art production in the world of Calvinism, that is, art associated with worship, by referring to Calvin’s *Institutes*. When we go to the *Institutes*, we find that Calvin speaks with consummate competence in theology. In art and aesthetics, understandably, he is somewhat less than expert. Calvin brings up the subject of art in connection with the use of images in the churches. He condemns the use of images not only because God may not be physically represented, but also because they are “exhibitions of the most shameless luxury and obscenity.”³ Moreover, images are not to be used as sermons for the ignorant and illiterate.

His [God’s] injunction is, that the doctrine common to all should there be set forth by preaching the word and the administration of the sacraments—a doctrine to which little heed can be given by those whose eyes are carried to and fro gazing at idols.⁴

Five sections later when Calvin discusses the uses of the graphic arts, he conveys the impression that he has little more than a layman’s appreciation for that medium.

Visible representations are of two classes—viz. historical, which give a representation of events, and pictorial, which merely exhibit bodily shapes and figures. The former are of some use for instruction or admonition. The latter, so far as I can see, are only fitted for amusement.⁵

It is well that Calvin prefaces his statement with the qualifier “so far as I

can see.” In so doing he avoids giving the impression that he would lay his conclusion on us as categorically authoritative.

Before evaluating Calvin’s conclusion as to the uses of graphic art it may be well to note that Calvin creates some confusion as to categories. Visible and pictorial arts are hardly mutually exclusive categories with separate uses; but the latter ought to be thought of as a subclass of the former. Just what Calvin intended by the choice of those classifications is not entirely clear except that he wanted to separate them according to use. The historical is considered more useful than the merely amusing.

To my mind, however, there is no intimation in the Bible that we can elevate beauty to the status of the transcendent and eternal. And as related to art, beauty should not be given any transtemporal significance except by some kind of distant analogy.

On the basis of Calvin’s judgment as to use, it seems obvious that Calvin might have shared the opinion of those today who hold that the artists who are painters have been rendered to a great extent superfluous by the advent of the color camera. Cameras can record the present much more accurately than brush on canvas. “Pictorials” in the churches, according to Calvin, only create “foolish and injudicious longings.”⁶ It is not clear what Calvin meant by “amusement” as a use for painting, but it does seem that it is something that should not take place during a worship service.

By consigning all graphics which do not provide a record of the past to the category of the amusing, Calvin gives evidence of his limited understanding of art. Calvin did not seem to appreciate the fact that art provides a language particularly suited to carry emotions. Or if he did understand, as Kuyper maintains he did, Calvin chose to limit that function mostly to music. Visual art in the context of worship would be judged mostly as distraction.

In his attempt to make an apology for the paucity of art forms associated with worship in Geneva and places where Calvin’s influence dominated, Kuyper advances a reason which, it seems, was not argued in the same way by Calvin, but which sounds plausible as an implication of Calvin’s general approach to worship.

Kuyper argues that Calvinists advanced to a position beyond and above that of their pre-Reformation, Roman Catholic predecessors:

Because Calvinism preferred a worship of God in spirit and in truth, to sacerdotal wealth, it has been accused by Rome of being devoid of an appreciation of art, and because it disapproved of a woman debasing herself as an artist’s model *or casting away her honor in ballet* its moral seriousness has clashed with the sensualism of those who deemed no sacrifice too sacred for the Goddess of Art [emphasis added].⁷

Kuyper then shows how art and worship were associated before the Reformation. He then argues

Now, of course, if this wedding of art-inspired worship, with worship-inspired art be no intermediate stage, but the highest

end to be obtained, then it must frankly be confessed that Calvinism cannot plead guilty. [Or cannot qualify as the highest.] If, however, it can be shown that this alliance of religion and art represents a lower stage of religious and in general human development, then it is plain that in this very want of a special architectural style Calvinism finds an even higher recommendation. Being fully convinced that this is the case, I proceed to account for this conviction.⁸

Kuyper continues his argument by suggesting that a particular architectural style was generally the result of national identity and financing. The Reformation not only broke up the former cohesion, but with it "religion also rises to that higher plain [sic] where it graduates from symbolical into clearly conscious life."⁹ What Kuyper fails to appreciate, it seems to me, is the fact that much of life is not lived at the "clearly conscious" level because it is felt meaning which is not conveyed by cognitive statements. In fact, I think one could claim that most people, including Calvinists, never "rise above" the need for symbolization in their modes of worship so that the religious truth associated with that worship may the more fully be imprinted on their conscious life. The repetitious use of the sacraments attests to that need.

The use of art in worship does not stand or fall by reason of its association with Roman Catholic sacerdotalism, that is, its sacramental system. The appropriation or rejection of a sacerdotalism depends on what kind of soteriology one believes the Bible yields. Using the now hackneyed but in this case fully appropriate figure of speech, I would say that Kuyper is on the verge of abandoning the aesthetic

baby because he once found it immersed in a sacerdotal bath.

John Fisher, Professor of Philosophy at Temple University and editor of *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* in a lecture at the 1977 Wheaton Philosophy Conference entitled "Aesthetic Experience and Religious Experience"¹⁰ stressed the following contrasts between those experiences: (1) Religious experience has as its reference a transcendent entity while the aesthetic experience begins with some kind of perceptual object. (2) Religious and aesthetic experience elicit different kinds of emotions. For example, hope is not in the list of emotions that the aesthetic experience as such is able to arouse. (3) In the religious experience one has to be an active participant in order that there be an experience while the aesthetic experience is more of a spectator nature, though, as Theodore Lipps would insist, in the aesthetic experience there must be *emfühling*, that is, some empathy for the object.

In spite of these basic and noteworthy distinctions I do not believe that we must conclude that because the religious experience and the aesthetic experience are by no means identical that therefore they are inimical as complementary or concurrent experiences.

Most people feel that the physical setting can assist or interfere with the mood for worship, a mood of thought and feeling from which the act of worship is fed. For example, during a church building program when services may be held in a gymnasium people are sometimes heard saying, "It doesn't seem like church to me when we meet in the gym." I don't think we need to allege that such people are possessed of a lower spirituality when they miss some of the symbols which allude to their Christian faith. I don't want to indict their attitude as one that stems

from a hankering after things sensual.

In his lecture Professor Fisher mentioned a connoisseur of church architecture who proposed the idea that perhaps the Greek temple was a more fitting structure for Christian worship than a cathedral since temples let in more sunlight, for God is the God of light. (Fisher suggested that perhaps the observation was made while standing amidst the roofless columns of a Greek ruin.) By contrast the medieval cathedral would seem dingy. But then on a cloudy day the temple would also be without splashes of light. I think one could catch the mood of worship were the sun refracted through a rose window while all the interior lines drew one's thoughts and feelings upward.

The use of art in worship does not stand or fall by reason of its association with Roman Catholic sacerdotalism, that is, its sacramental system. The appropriation or rejection of a sacerdotalism depends on what kind of soteriology one believes the Bible yields.

Perhaps some would maintain that we are now back to physicalizing the act of worship and the concept of God. But I dare say that in a Christian worship service people do not pray to the God round them. We are taught to pray, "Our Father which art in heaven." While it may be childish to conjure up visions of the kind of old man pictured in Michelangelo's *Creation of Adam*, we can hardly avoid praying to God as away from us if not up from us even though it his Spirit within which must prompt the act of prayer in the first place. To speak

of praying to "the God within" would be to pick up the language of pantheism.

In order to support his insistence that at the higher levels of spirituality symbolism must fall away, Kuyper takes us through the history of progressive revelation as it developed during the Old Testament period. As it was rudimentary it was highly symbolical and often allegorical. For Kuyper Jesus set all the need for symbol and allusiveness aside when he said to the Samaritan woman at the well of Sychar, "Yet a time is coming and has now come when the true worshipers will worship the Father in spirit and truth, for they are the kind of worshipers the Father seeks. God is a spirit, and his worshipers must worship in spirit and in truth" (John 4: 23, 24 NIV).

In drawing that conclusion from that passage Kuyper, I believe, is in error exegetically. I don't think the question is whether any sensuous or physical symbols are appropriate as part of the context of worship. It is a question as to location and as to the control of the true God. Jeroboam began a competition between Jerusalem and other locations to decide the place where God would dwell. This question also degenerated into the notion that those who controlled the authenticated location would have special access to the power which Jehovah could wield for their benefit. Though the woman undoubtedly asked the question to divert attention from her shady past, it was not a trivial question but one of importance to her and her people. As was his custom Jesus gave her a straight answer. It is not location but attitude that must characterize true worship. I don't find in it the elimination of works of art as the context for true worship, that is, worship in spirit and in truth.

Kuyper goes on to becloud the discussion even more by calling in sup-

port for his opinions with an appeal to Hegel and Van Hartmann, two most unlikely candidates when looking for support for a Christian position. When calling on Hegel's opinions Kuyper writes:

Hegel says that art, which at a lower stage of development, imparts to a still sensual religion its highest expression, finally helps it by these very means to cast off the fetters of sensuality; for though it must be granted that at a lower level it is only aesthetical worship that liberates the spirit, nevertheless, he concludes, "beautiful art is not its highest emancipation," for that can be only found in the realm of the invisible and the spiritual.¹¹

Here the notion that the spirit is fettered by its association with the physical and sensual is reminiscent of Plato's teaching that the soul is in captivity to the body as its prison. It can best rise to its true spirituality relieved of the trammels of the physical.¹² This tenet of Plato's has had a long and by no means salutary influence on western thought as it assesses the value of the physical and the sensuous in human life and relationships. It tends to denigrate the physical.

The idea that art is a kind of mediatorial halfway house which helps the spirit to rise above the physical is not singular with Hegel either. Plato thought of the work of art as twice removed from reality, an imitation of the physical which is already an imitation of the true reality, the eternal Idea. Aristotle thought of the artist, particularly the poet in contrast to the historian who deals with particulars, as one who conveys the universals as they are carriers of true and eternal meanings.¹³ Nor was Hegel the only one

in his century to give a kind of mediatorial role to art. The pessimist Arthur Schopenhauer saw no possibility for salvation from the enslavement of sensual desire except by way of the alleviation provided by an aesthetic experience. Schopenhauer chooses music as the best candidate for the job. He writes:

The unutterable depth of all music by virtue of which it floats through our consciousness as the vision of a paradise firmly believed in yet ever distant from us, and by which also it is so fully understood and yet so inexplicable, rests on the fact that it restores to us all the emotions of our inmost nature, but entirely without reality and far removed from their pain.¹⁴

Schopenhauer is right in his contention that music is a conveyor for our feelings. But I believe he is just as wrong as Aristotle and Hegel in the suggestion which seems to be corroborated by Kuyper that art, and particularly music, mediates between a lower and higher self or a lower and higher world. Is it not rather the case that the rake will use music to stir and carry his eroticism; the folk singer uses it to carry his sentimentalism; the lover of beauty and sublimity his aestheticism; and the Christian to sing the praises of his Creator?

The uses and presence of feeling are much the same as the uses and presence of reason in that respect. Of and by themselves they do not lift us up to spiritual planes which we do not generally inhabit. They cannot lead us to the God of the Bible if we do not already know him.

Next, Kuyper argues, again with approval from Hegel and Hartmann, that

Religion and art each have a life-sphere of their own; these may at first be scarcely distinguishable from each other and therefore closely intertwined, but, with richer development these two spheres separate. Looking at two babies in a cradle you can scarcely tell which is boy or girl, but when, having reached the years of maturity, they stand before you as man and woman, you see them both with forms, and traits, and modes of expression peculiarly their own. And so, arrived at their highest development, both Religion and Art demand an independent existence, and the two stems which at first were intertwined and seemed to belong to the same plant, now appear to spring from a root of their own. This is the process from Aaron to Christ, from Bezaleel and Aholiab to the Apostles. And, by virtue of that same process, Calvinism occupies a higher standpoint in the 16th century than Romanism could reach. Consequently, Calvinism was neither able, nor ever permitted, to develop an art-style of its own from its religious principles.¹⁵

At this point Kuyper could have brought some clarity into the discussion by clearly indicating what he was trying to separate from what. To bring about this clarity it would have been helpful had he indicated how he was using "Religion" and "religion." In the discussion up to this point it seemed as if he was using "Religion" to refer to institutional or official religions and "religion" and "religious" to refer to one's most basic life commitment or as Tillich termed it, one's ultimate concern. But now in the middle of the second paragraph beyond the last quote

above, after saying that art cannot flow from one's intellectual life as its source, Kuyper writes the following:

Our intellectual, ethical, religious and aesthetic life each commands a sphere of its own. These spheres run parallel and do not allow the derivation of one from the other. It is the central emotion, the central impulse, and the central animation, in the mystical root of our being, which seeks to reveal itself to the outer world in this fourfold ramification. Art also is no side-shoot on a principal branch, but an independent branch that grows from the trunk of our life itself, even though it is far more nearly allied to Religion than to our thinking or to our ethical being.¹⁶

At this point Kuyper had a good opportunity to fall back on his Calvinism to explain how all those central impulses are tied to the religious base of one's life through the heart as the center of one's life's commitments. Kuyper does not do this. He lapses back into Platonic and abstract language as follows:

If, however, it be asked how there can arise a unity of conception embracing these four domains, it constantly appears that in the finite this unity is only found at that point where it springs from the fountain of the Infinite. There is no unity in your thinking save by a well-ordered philosophical system, and there is no system of philosophy which does not ascend to the issues of the Infinite. In the same way there is no unity in your moral existence save by the union of your inner existence with the moral world-

order conceivable both for the impression of an Infinite power that has ordained order in this moral world. Thus also no unity in the revelation of art is conceivable, except by the art-inspiration of an Eternal Beautiful.¹⁷

“Unbelievable,” you say. “That kind of vocabulary in Kuyper’s writing?” Yet it may not be inexplicable if we realize how thoroughly Christianity has been shot through with Platonism. It remains highly inconsistent, nevertheless.

In the next paragraph Kuyper adopts a more Calvinistic vocabulary and writes:

Understand that art is no fringe that is attached to the garment and no amusement that is added to life, but a most serious power in our present existence, and therefore its principal variations must maintain, in their artistic expression, a close relation with the principal variations of our entire life; and since, without exception, these principal variations of our entire human existence are dominated by our relation to God, would it not be both *degradation* and an *underestimation* of art, if you were to imagine the ramifications, into which the art-trunk divides itself, to be independent of the deepest root which all human life has in God?¹⁸

It would have served “Calvinism and Art” better had Kuyper skipped all that Platonic vocabulary and moved directly to the last quoted explanation which comports better not only with Calvinism but in that measure also with the Bible.

Even so Kuyper does not seem to come to the conclusion that when man

does not relate to the God of the Bible as the foundation of his life then he relates to some willfully-chosen substitute. Kuyper argues that no art style sprang from 18th century Rationalism because art styles must spring from a religious root. The conclusion we draw is that Kuyper did not consider Rationalism a religion but a secularism, and art could not spring from a secular source. I believe that since Kuyper’s time Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven have correctly amended Kuyper’s perspective on the nature of religious influence to include all secularisms, including rationalism, in the category of “immanentisms.” These turn man inward to the creation with claims of human autonomy supplying substitute deities as idolatries. Since Kuyper’s time we can relate art styles to these with more specific association than Kuyper could find for the influence of Rationalism. It is doubtful, though, whether any artist aligns himself with some particular school of philosophy and then self-consciously attempts to symbolize its thought.

In the third and last section of his lecture Kuyper begins by claiming that Calvinism was largely responsible for liberating art from the domination of the Church. He recognizes some work in that direction in the Renaissance, but the Renaissance paganized art while Calvinism did not. Kuyper insists that only Calvinism reached the spiritual maturity to do the job.

Now Luther certainly desired such a pure, spiritual Religion, but Calvinism was the first to grasp it. First under the stirring of Calvinism, our fathers broke with the *splendor ecclesiae*, i.e., with her outward glitter, and so also with her vast possessions, by which art was financially held in bondage.¹⁹

If art is to be liberated from servitude to the church, and if the inspiration of the artist does require that it be tied to Religion, how do we explain the gifts of artistic ability which do indeed appear where there are no Christian motifs to inspire or lead them. The answer? Common grace. Kuyper explains:

If you limit the higher enjoyment of art to regeneration, then this gift is exclusively the portion of believers, and must bear an ecclesiastical character. In that case it is the outcome of *particular grace*. But if, at the hand of experience and history, you become persuaded that the highest art-instincts are *natural* gifts, and hence belong to those excellent graces which, in spite of sin, by virtue of *common grace*, have continued to shine in human nature, it plainly follows that art can inspire both believers and unbelievers, and that God remains Sovereign to impart it, in His good pleasure, alike to Heathen and Christian nations.²⁰

No doubt today many, along with me, would dispute with Kuyper the opening statement of the quote above. I do not agree that art associated with believers need have an ecclesiastical character. Why Kuyper says so when he just called attention to Calvinism's liberation of art from bondage to the church is puzzling. But for all that, we agree with his common grace explanation as to the general distribution of the gifts of artistic talent and appreciation.

I believe that one may assume that Kuyper wrote this lecture on art with the doctrine of common grace as part of his prolegomena. That creates a fundamental puzzle. If the gifts of art are common

gifts commonly shared, why did Kuyper succumb to the Hegelian suggestion that art has some kind of special status which carries one from the physical to the spiritual? I presume that we may suggest that Kuyper had not detected and therefore had not divested himself of that kind of idealism which seems to lie here and there as a residual deposit of alloy, an alloy which as yet had not been refined out of Reformed thinking on art and aesthetics. It had escaped sufficient reformatory heat.

I do not agree that art associated with believers need have an ecclesiastical character. Why Kuyper says so when he just called attention to Calvinism's liberation of art from bondage to the church is puzzling.

Even here puzzles do not end. Kuyper reviews some art history and calls attention to what he sees as a scarcity of art expression among the Israelites. Deficient in arts and crafts, they had to call on Hiram to get the temple built. (Incidentally, Kuyper seems to have overlooked the great poetry of the Psalms.) Kuyper writes:

Every utterance of human life requires a special disposition in blood and in descent, and proper adaptations of lot and incident as well as of natural environment and climatic effects are to contri-

bute to its development. In Israel all this was adapted to the holy heritage which it was to receive in the Divine Revelation. But if Israel was chosen for the sake of Religion, this in no way prevented a parallel election of the Greeks for the domain of philosophy and for the revelations of art, nor of the Romans for the classical development within the domain of Law and of State.²¹

Having just made the distinction between particular grace gifts and common grace gifts and having put art in the latter category, why does Kuyper now use particular grace language to refer to common grace gifts? That is a puzzle.

Nor is the puzzle resolved when Kuyper continues:

The life of art also has both its provisional development, and its later unfoldings, but in order to insure a more vigorous growth, it wanted first of all clear self-consciousness in its centrum that, once for all, the unchangeable foundations of its ideal existence might be brought to light. Such a phenomenon as art arrives at this self-revelation once only, and that revelation, once granted to the Greek, remains classical, tone-giving and forever dominant.²²

On the basis of Kuyper's theological writings we would not want to conclude that he would authenticate Greek philosophy and art as well as Roman law with that kind of unction of the Holy Spirit which rendered the Bible infallible. What does come through again are the predilections of his idealism and now newly added a very pointed classicist's bias as to art. The

latter is the more note-worthy when we recall that up to Kuyper's day the deviations away from classicism were romanticism and impressionism. He wrote before the advent of Picasso, Duchamp, Pollock, and Dali to mention only a few of a later day, who undoubtedly would really have jarred Kuyper's classicist's sensibilities.

In conclusion Kuyper calls our attention to some of the works of art for which he could claim some Calvinistic influence. The Dutch poets may be taken as examples but they are limited in influence because the Dutch language has such limited use. Louis Bourgeois is given credit for assisting in liberating church music from its bondage to the monophonic monotony of the chant by his innovations in polyphonic music. As is customary with people who come from the Netherlands, Kuyper lays claim to Rembrandt as one who at least lived within the orbit of Calvinistic influence. He rightly cautions that we probably should not claim that it is necessarily Calvinism which comes to expression in the faces of Rembrandt's various characters as he painted them.

In sum, and in final assessment, I conclude that Kuyper's lecture did nothing that would allow us to celebrate it as a kind of milestone in the advancement of our understanding of art in a biblical perspective. His idealistic tendencies and finally his classicism constantly intrude to prevent conclusions that could be helpful. It is not unfair to write that his Princeton sponsors fell into the fallacy of misplaced authority. Because Kuyper spoke with such good effect in other areas of vital interest, it should not have been assumed that his competence extended *ipso facto* to art as well. The fact that this lecture on art seems to have been referred to with approval for better than a half century in Christian Reformed circles only points

to the fact that nothing much was being done in the study of aesthetics during that time.

At Calvin College Professor Henry Van Andel taught a course in Flemish art for about two decades. He tried to instill an appreciation and admiration for those artists but did not busy himself with aesthetic theory. In 1943, Harold Dekker, then Chaplain, ventured into the field in a *Calvin Forum* article entitled "The Christian and Art: Basic Principles."²³ Dekker begins well enough by suggesting that Christians should not approach art with a moralistic censoriousness but that they ought to do fundamental work in constructing a Christian approach to aesthetics. But then he quickly follows old patterns when he defines art as "the expression of man's inward thoughts and feelings in material form, under the aspect of beauty."²⁴

Having joined what I would call the "beauty school" of aesthetics, Dekker falls prey to some of the implications of that approach. He finds biblical support for that approach because the King James rendering makes so many references to beauty. While Kuyper quoted Hegel, Dekker quotes Goethe to stress a similar view of the use of art. "As Goethe says, 'The highest problem of every art is, by means of appearances, to produce the illusion of a loftier reality.'"²⁵ When discussing the Christian's relationship to the aesthetic, Dekker uses language reminiscent of both Kuyper and Plato. "Beauty is in a sense the goal of history, and is eschatologically certain. Real beauty is of God. Real beauty is forever. (Cf. Keat's "a joy forever.") *Let every Christian count it a glorious privilege and sacred duty to serve her*²⁶ (emphasis added).

After that flight into the Platonic Elysium Dekker rightly tells us that we need to develop "a real Christian aesthetics from the principles of God's

creative design."²⁷ No one took that advice seriously until about two decades later.

To that effort I will turn my attention another time.

Notes

¹According to James Kilpatrick, the syndicated columnist, "Appallment" originated with the poet and critic Robert Penn Warren. (*Sioux City Journal*, Oct. 20, 1980). My twinge was somewhat lighter than being fully appalled.

²Abraham Kuyper, "Calvinism and Art," now entitled, *Lectures On Calvinism* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1953) p. 143.

³John Calvin, *Institutes*, Bk. I, Chap. XI, Sec. 7.

⁴Calvin, Bk. I, Chap. XI, Sec. 7.

⁵Calvin, Bk. I, Chap. XI, Sec. 12.

⁶Calvin, Bk. I, Chap. XI, Sec. 7.

⁷Kuyper, p. 145.

⁸Kuyper, p. 146.

⁹Kuyper, p. 147.

¹⁰John Fisher, *Wheaton Philosophy Conference Lecture*, "Religious Experience and Aesthetic Experience," Available in cassette from station WETN, Wheaton College, Wheaton, Ill. 60187.

¹¹Kuyper, p. 148.

¹²Plato, *Phaedo*, Jowett translation, Sec. 64, 65. H.R. Rookmaaker suggests that Gnosticism and mysticism lived on in Calvinism to have an adverse influence with respect to attitudes towards various aspects of life as they relate to the physical and the sensuous. Cf. *Modern Art And The Death Of A Culture*, (Downers Grove, Ill.; Intervarsity Press, 1970) p. 33 ff. "Gnosticism and Mysticism."

¹³Aristotle, *Poetics*, Chap. IX.

¹⁴Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World As Will And Idea*, translated by R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1961) p. 275.

¹⁵Kuyper, p. 148.

¹⁶Kuyper, p. 150.

¹⁷Kuyper, p. 150.

¹⁸Kuyper, p. 151.

¹⁹Kuyper, p. 159.

²⁰Kuyper, p. 160.

²¹Kuyper, p. 161.

²²Kuyper, p. 162.

²³Harold Dekker, "The Christian and Art: Basic Principles," *The Calvin Forum*, November 1943, pp. 68-71.

²⁴Dekker, p. 68.

²⁵Dekker, p. 69.

²⁶Dekker, p. 70.

²⁷Dekker, p. 71.