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History and the Unfolding of Society*

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Near the end of the eighteenth century a special type of argument began to appear supporting the societal differentiation process. We might call it simply the argument from history. Many of those who began to argue from history still held onto aspects of older arguments—arguments based on natural law or divine right or hierarchical order—but a new mode of reasoning was emerging.

To understand some of the arguments from history, one must

recognize the importance of the so-called romantic reaction to the French Revolution. For example, the abstract, individualistic character of Enlightenment rationalism came under attack from conservative “reactionaries,” some of whom idealized the seemingly organic, balanced, well-ordered, many-sided, communal character of medieval society in contrast to the society that liberals and revolutionaries wanted to construct. Other romantic critics of the Revolution began to notice the unique

*As the editorial to this *Pro Rege* issue indicates, this essay will serve as the basis for an introduction to the section of the Reader on societal pluralism that approaches the subject from the perspective of “history and the unfolding of society.” This introduction will be followed by selections from Edmund Burke, Groen van Prinsterer and Jose Míguez Bonino.

characteristics of French, Spanish, Dutch, English, or German cultures—each the fruit of a long historical process of differentiation. These critics believed that the colorless, abstract, anti-social spirit of liberalism would eventually level and destroy these unique historical creations. They wanted to elevate and glory in what was historically and culturally unique.¹

Of course, there were many different kinds of historical arguments. Some merely stressed the historical unfolding process; others absolutized it. Some saw history as the unveiling of autonomous human creativity; others saw it as an organic process where various institutions, communities, and cultural characteristics flowered together as integral expressions of unique national spirits. Some of these thinkers were self-conscious Christians; others were engaged in explaining away the original meaning of Christianity.

But the argument from history did not remain the monopoly of those who looked backward through time. In our own day new schools of thought, some influenced by Christian motives, have focused attention on the future. Coming primarily from Europe and Latin America, these more recent arguments start with “hope,” “expectancy,” and “longing” for what will arise in the future. In Jurgen Moltmann’s “theology of hope” or Gustavo Gutiérrez’s “theology of liberation” history is viewed as a process of unfolding and liberation that leads people out of past and present bondage rather than confining them within their traditions. Interestingly enough, however, this mode of argument is frequently quite similar to that of the “backward lookers.” Divine authority, when it is invoked, for example, is an authority that displays itself in the actual unfolding of history rather than in some rational, structural

order of principles or laws behind or above history.

A brief discussion of three representative figures will introduce a variety of “arguments from history.” Edmund Burke (1729-1797) is the well-known Irish-born conservative who wrote the first major critique of the French Revolution. His influence has remained strong for almost 200 years. Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876), a little-known Dutchman who had an immense influence in his own country, also reacted to the French Revolution. But his opposition to the spirit of revolution and liberalism was fired by a more explicit and historically progressive Christian confession than was Burke’s. Finally, we will consider the work of Jose Míguez Bonino in the context of Latin American liberation theology. Míguez Bonino is from Argentina, and the fact that he is a Protestant helps to show that liberation theology is not simply a Roman Catholic phenomenon.

When Edmund Burke, in his famous *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), expressed strong objections to the French Revolution, he was arguing from history. The Revolutionaries in France were engaged in the process of eliminating the monarchy, the aristocracy, and much of the influence of the Roman Catholic Church. Treating French society as if it were a collection of building blocks that could be knocked down and built up again at will the Revolutionaries went about their work ignorant of the power and meaning of history. They imagined they were free to start “from scratch” to construct a new government and social order solely on the basis of abstract reason. “Such a claim,” Burke explained, “is as ill-suited to our [British] temper and wishes as it is unsupported by any appearance of authority. The very idea of the fabrication of a new government is

enough to fill us with disgust and horror.”²

Burke chose his words carefully; when he spoke of “disgust and horror,” he expressed the deep feeling of many in his day. In the English Revolution of 1688, Burke argued, the British did not do what the French were doing in 1789. We wished then, “and do now wish,” Burke argued,

to derive all we possess as an inheritance from our forefathers All the reformations we have hitherto made have proceeded upon the principle of reverence to antiquity; and I hope, nay, I am persuaded, that all those which possibly may be made hereafter will be carefully formed upon analogical precedent, authority, and example.³

In Burke’s view, conserving tradition is important not simply because it provides continuity and stability but also because it is essential to the religious nature of man. Human beings should not discard what God in His wise providence has built through the actions of wise leaders in the past. “We know,” said Burke, “and what is better, we feel inwardly, that religion is the basis of civil society and the source of all good and of all comfort.”⁴ The growth of society is not the result of arbitrary human whims. Social structures interlaced in a civil society have emerged gradually through history as human beings have acted out of a proper religious sense of their place in God’s design. The uniform and common religious sense of mankind has functioned, and should continue to function, as “a wise architect” building up and preserving the structure of society “from profanation and ruin,” gradually purging from it “all the impurities of fraud and violence and injustice and tyranny”⁵

But what, precisely, had tradition established in the British Isles? What type of social order was Burke defending? There is no doubt that he wanted to maintain the established church, the aristocracy, and the monarchy. Yet he wanted to hold onto those institutions not simply to preserve privileges of the few, but also to maintain the variety of associations, institutions, rights, and freedoms that had achieved public recognition and protection over the years. He lived in fear of the destructive leveling tendencies of the French Revolution—a revolution that promised freedom and equality for individuals but had no other ground for freedom and equality than revolutionary violence and governmental power.

Burke insisted that he stood for the *real* rights of man as opposed to the abstract rights of man praised so highly by the Revolutionaries. For Burke, justice meant the maintenance of stability and order among the variety of recognized institutions, authorities, and individual rights. He writes:

If civil society be made for the advantage of man, all the advantages for which it is made become his right [Men] have a right to the fruits of their industry and to the means of making their industry fruitful. They have a right to the acquisitions of their parents, to the nourishment and improvement of their offspring, to instruction in life, and to consolation in death. Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself.⁶

As the last sentence indicates, however, Burke was not very clear about how the different “rights” of people originated or how they should be defined in principle. Does he really begin with the idea that individuals are

free to do what they can for themselves, as a matter of right? This sounds very much like the liberals whom Burke criticized so vigorously. At many points he speaks of social structures and relationships as artificial and constructed by contracts among individuals.⁷ At other points, however, he sounds as if he recognizes the integral identity and rights of different institutions in themselves, not as if they were artificial constructions dependent on individual rights.⁸

Groen did not want to hold onto the old order entirely, but neither did he want to destroy the true work of God in history. To follow the Bible in reforming zeal would require the maintenance of what God had already done in history.

Arguments from history, particularly conservative arguments, frequently have the problem that Burke's arguments had. The existing (or idealized) reality should be preserved, so the argument goes, even if the basis for recognizing the proper and legitimate identity of different social entities is unclear.

Burke was convinced, nonetheless, that history had brought forth a relatively wise and healthy flowering of human potential in Great Britain and in much of continental Europe up to the time of the French Revolution. English law did recognize a wide variety of individual and institutional rights, freedoms, and privileges in the context of a traditional and aristocratic society. These fruits of history should be preserved, he believed, because they were the outgrowth of reasonable Christian in-

fluences that had been at work for centuries. Burke was open to change and reform, and he did not argue that every existing institution was good, but he placed the burden of proof on the present generation's proposals for change rather than on tradition itself.⁹

In Holland around the middle of the nineteenth century Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer also directed a sharp attack against the French Revolution and its consequences. But even though Groen shared many of Burke's concerns, he was uncomfortable with the reactionary conservatives of his day. Even more than the pull of tradition, Groen heard the normative admonitions of the Gospel which often denounced evils and injustices of the existing order. He was less willing than Burke to acknowledge the authority of history by itself. The foundation of justice, he said, "lies in the law and ordinance of God."¹⁰

Nevertheless, much of Groen's argumentation is "from history." The type of differentiated social order that had developed in Holland during the centuries prior to the French Revolution as well as after the Revolution was being threatened by revolutionary fanaticism and liberal individualism. Groen did not want to hold onto the old order entirely, but neither did he want to destroy the true work of God in history. To follow the Bible in reforming zeal would require the maintenance of what God had already done in history. Thus, Groen called himself an anti-revolutionary,¹¹ opposing the Revolutionaries and the liberals who had no interest in obeying God or in respecting God's historical providence. Groen began to feel his way toward a gradually progressive societal pluralism based on God's revelation in the Bible and in history.

In his most important publication, *Unbelief and Revolution* (1847), Groen was unambiguous in stating the an-

tithesis that stood between the spirit of the Revolution and the will of God.

Viewed in world-historical perspective, the Revolution is to Christendom what the Reformation was, but then in reverse. The Reformation rescued Europe from superstition; the Revolution has flung the civilized world into an abyss of unbelief. Like the Reformation, the Revolution touches every field of action and learning. In days of the Reformation the principle was submission to God; in these days it is revolt against God.¹²

Groen was an aristocrat who nonetheless dared to take his distance from aristocratic reactionaries of his day in order to continue with the work of the Reformation in his time.¹³ In Parliament he frequently stood alone, a "general without an army" as he was called, in order to point the way toward a Christian-historical as well as anti-revolutionary movement.

The first watchword for Christians, Groen argued, should be: "It is written!" "Unconditional submission to the Word of God has always been the guarantee of dutiful obedience and of dutiful resistance."¹⁴ The second watchword should be: "It has happened!" History provides "an uninterrupted refutation of the Revolution maxims."¹⁵ "Everything that leads to genuine knowledge of Revelation and of History," Groen said, "is anti-revolutionary in nature and serves as an antidote to the spell of the intoxicating drink."¹⁶

Typically Groen did not make reference to a rational, hierarchical world order as the normative framework by which to measure the justice and injustice of societal structures. He was a Calvinist who did not, for the most part, think from out of the framework of older Thomism and the subsidiarity of smaller

social units under state and church. Nor did he argue as strongly as Burke did that tradition should set the direction for future change. Groen's argument from history was an affirmation that the diverse freedoms of individuals, families, churches, schools, businesses, and the government itself were freedoms that had been established and recognized in Holland in the process of a somewhat organic growth of Dutch history especially since the time of the Reformation.

Groen was influenced at an early stage by Edmund Burke and a German conservative, Karl von Haller; later he was influenced by the historicism of F.J. Stahl who stressed the organic character of every social order. The work of Lammenais can also be seen as a shaping influence in Groen's thinking. But these influences are not sufficient to account for Groen's view of society.

In the early part of *Unbelief and Revolution* Groen shows why he objected to the Revolutionary rejection of the principle of "divine right" of kings. His objection is not one of simple conservatism that would defend the authority of any king to rule in any fashion. Rather, he criticizes the Revolutionaries for throwing out the baby with the bathwater. There have, indeed, been acts of oppression by monarchs in the past—acts violating principles of justice that should not be condoned. Legitimate rule is lawful rule, and lawfulness refers beyond itself to God's authority. Without the normativity of divine authority there can be no healthy and just government. The Revolutionaries were reacting against abuse without having anything substantial to put in the place of God's authority which they discarded.¹⁷

In the same context Groen discusses other criticisms made by the Revolutionaries against the old order, and he agrees with the criticisms with-

out drawing the same conclusions. He admits, for example, that there had been exaggerated respect for historical rights in the pre-revolutionary period, and this had led to injustice. He admits, as well, that past struggles to centralize state authority had violated some freedoms of institutions, groups, and persons. And he shows how a forced connection between church and state had done grievous harm. But in each case Groen responds as he did to the opponents of divine right, namely, that the objection to abuses does not provide a sufficient basis for rejecting historically acquired rights altogether, or for rejecting properly qualified state authority, or for rejecting a constructive relationship between state and church.¹⁸

With respect to the church-state relationship, for example, Groen was opposed to absolute separation; but his idea of their close relationship was one that he called *souvereiniteit in eigen kring*—sphere sovereignty.

With respect to the church-state relationship, for example, Groen was opposed to absolute separation; but his idea of their close relationship was one that he called *souvereiniteit in eigen kring*—sphere sovereignty. The church should not be viewed as an organic part of the state, nor should the state exist in subordination to the church, but the two should be distinguished and related “in order to submit Church and State, each in its own sphere, to the immediate power of Him to Whom has been given all power in heaven and on earth, in order to establish not an atheistic state but a lay (secular) state; not an absolutist state, but a state subordinated

to the divine will, a Christian state.”¹⁹

The growth of liberalism following the French Revolution was threatening real freedom and pluralism in Holland. Unbelief had to be exposed and opposed by Christian witness, Groen believed, because the fruits of unbelief would lead in history to further oppression of the people by unjust governments. Groen’s careful and appreciative study of history was guided by his confidence that the Word of God would expose just and unjust social structures in history and that God’s revelation would point the way to a just society. If people in Holland would turn to heed the Word of God, then they would be able to continue the gradual differentiation and reformation of society in accord with biblical principles and historical reality.

The first impression that one receives from reading the so-called “liberation theologians” of contemporary Latin America is that they stand closer to modern revolutionaries than to Edmund Burke or Groen van Prinsterer. They argue for liberation from all confining traditions rather than for continuity with tradition. They are more prone to see injustice and dehumanization in their past and present than to see signs of God’s providence there. Stating the problem of modern man in its broadest sense, Gustavo Gutiérrez says that the social life of human beings is reaching its maturity.

It is the behavior of man ever more conscious of being an active subject of history; he is ever more articulate in the face of social injustice and of all repressive forces which stand in the way of his fulfillment; he is ever more determined to participate both in the transformation of social structures and in effective political action.²⁰

But liberation theology is not so much anti-historical as it is futuristic. Gustavo Gutiérrez, José Míguez Bonino, and other liberation theologians take history as seriously as did Burke and Groen. Yet they view history more in the light of its future goal and destiny than from the standpoint of its past traditions, and their study of history is guided by a critical sociopolitical analysis.²¹ Moreover, it is clear that they want neither liberalism nor totalitarian collectivism in their future.

Liberalism for many Latin Americans represents something quite negative. It is the ideology emerging in the 19th and 20th centuries in Latin America which helped to bring independence from Spain and Portugal for many states, which led to the separation of church and state, which aided the growth of business freedom, and which inspired the constitutional recognition of a number of individual and democratic freedoms. But liberalism's impact was primarily felt by the small, educated, propertied elite rather than by the poor peasants and Indians. As Enrique Dussel explains:

From 1850 to 1929 we see the unfolding of a whole new project in Latin America, a project sponsored by a liberal oligarchy rather than by a conservative one. In general we could say that it looked to France for its cultural ideals and to the United States for its technological ideals. It was in these places that it would find its concrete historical ideals, rejecting our past as a period of barbarism.²²

Or as Míguez Bonino puts it:

The class structure obtaining at the time of the colonies carried over into the new economic and political conditions. The leaders of

the emancipation and modernization had their faces turned toward Europe and the U.S.A. and their backs to the interior of the countries. There, Indians and peasants were simply incorporated as cheap labor for production. Their condition was, if anything, worse than it had been before under a sometimes more or less lenient paternalistic system. A free press, free trade, education, politics—all the “achievements” of liberalism—were the privilege of the elite.²³

The opposition to totalitarian collectivism is also clear in most of the liberation theologians. They are vigorous critics of every form of oppression, imperialism, dictatorship, and dehumanization. Brazilian Archbishop Dom Helder Câmara once said,

“I am a socialist.” . . . “But I don't see the solution in the socialist governments that exist today The Marxist record is awful.” . . . “God made man in his image and likeness, so he could become his co-creator and not a slave.” “My socialism is a special one which respects the human person and turns to the gospel. My socialism is justice.”²⁴

In 1971 the bishops of Peru formulated a statement arguing that “Christians ought to opt for socialism.” But by “socialism,” they said, “We do not mean a bureaucratic, totalitarian, or atheistic socialism; we mean a socialism that is both humanistic and Christian.”²⁵

Míguez Bonino draws on the covenantal and prophetic revelation of the Bible for his vision of a healthy unfolding of social life. That revelation is rooted in God's love for His creatures and His will for their liberation and

renewal. The background of Jesus' ministry and proclamation, says Míguez Bonino,

is the jubilee tradition and the prophetic promise of God's ultimate peace—his *shalom*—a very rich expression which embraces the total welfare of the individual and the community: health, abundance, just relations, prosperity, harmonious family relations, personal fulfilment, faithfulness to God, a just government.²⁶

Clearly, Míguez Bonino's appreciation of Marxist social analysis, however problematic, does not mean that his vision of the future social order is a collectivistic one. He is guided by a biblical vision of both individual and communal diversity, harmony, and freedom.

One reason why there is so much more criticism of tradition in the liberation theologians than in Burke or Groen is that they see what older conservatism and newer liberalism have accomplished in the past two hundred years in Latin America.

The gospel is central for Míguez Bonino as it was for Groen. He confesses that it is the power of new life from God in Christ. The resurrection of Christ, therefore, cannot be reduced to a sign of hope for spiritual life after death which leaves the profane history of this world largely untouched. The

gospel will not allow us to bypass the unjust liberal and collectivist ideologies and social structures of our present age. No, says Míguez Bonino, the resurrection of Christ is the promise that God's Kingdom will be built, and it is a call and a challenge to the unfolding of every dimension of earthly life.

Resurrection far from being the rescue of a spiritual element in human life, cleansing it from the bodily experience and identity obtained throughout life, is the total redemption of man, the true unhindered realization of a bodily life cleansed from self-deception and self-seeking (flesh) and made perfect in transparent (glorious) singleness of purpose and experience (spiritual) and full community with God.²⁷

One reason why there is so much more criticism of tradition in the liberation theologians than in Burke or Groen is that they see what older conservatism and newer liberalism have accomplished in the past two hundred years in Latin America. Many Latin American institutions, social structures, and economic and political traditions are highly inflexible and extremely unjust for large portions of the population. Míguez Bonino and others are criticizing liberalism and conservatism after decades of social, economic, and political developments that Groen and Burke could not have anticipated. The Word of God, which Groen wanted to obey in history, has been ignored and twisted, says Míguez Bonino. Thus, the will of God, the Kingdom of God, is not to be found by looking around among the historical institutions and structures of the day. Rather it is a call to keep on moving toward human maturity, liberation, full responsibility, and justice for all in the

promised future. He explains:

Instead of asking, where is the Kingdom present or visible in today's history? we are moved to ask, how can I participate—not only individually but in a community of faith and in a history—in the coming world? The main problem is not noetic but, so to say, empirical. It has to do with an active response. The Kingdom is not an object to be known through adumbrations and signs that must be discovered and interpreted but a call, a convocation, a pressure that impels. History, in relation to the Kingdom, is not a riddle to be solved but a mission to be fulfilled.²⁸

Just as Burke and Groen were confident that God *had acted* in history, and that many historical patterns of political, economic, and ecclesiastical life should be preserved because of their historical legitimacy, so Míguez Bonino is confident that God *will act* in history, that God is calling human beings to create *new* social, economic, and political structures that will free men rather than keep them enslaved. The liberation theologians want societal pluralism of a kind that does not now exist in Latin America. From the grass-roots “base communities” in urban areas, to the development of differentiated economic and political organizations, liberation theology calls for the unfolding of human life in freedom. Enrique Dussel concludes:

The mission of the Christian is not performed solely by building churches. It is carried out by participating in real-life history in its many different aspects. The kingdom of God is fashioned through these projects. If they are not carried out, the kingdom will never come. We

must get rid of many of the false antinomies that still weigh down upon us.²⁹

Christian faith, says Míguez Bonino,

provides today both a stimulus and a challenge for revolutionary action when it encourages us to look and work for historical realization in the direction of the Kingdom in terms of justice, solidarity, the real possibility for men to assume responsibility, access of all men to the creation which God has given to man, freedom to create a human community through work and love, space to worship and play.³⁰

The arguments from history, whether oriented to the past or the future raise many questions for those who are looking for a solid foundation on which to build a theory of societal pluralism. Many of those questions have not been (and I think, cannot be) answered by arguments from history alone. For example, how does one avoid arbitrariness, historicism, or mere traditionalism in judging the legitimacy or illegitimacy of particular social institutions and groups that have arisen in the past or that will be created in the future? What criteria does one use in deciding when particular forms of social life are enslaving, and how does one break them to achieve liberation? What constitutes positive, liberated social life? Burke, Groen, and Míguez Bonino seem to be more certain of what they reject as unhealthy forms of society than of what they accept as legitimate societal structures. Is there a genuine societal pluralism implicit in their arguments, or are they simply rejecting individualistic and collectivistic options?

It is clear that institutions, com-

munities, and other manifestations of social life do emerge in history. There is an undeniable historical dimension of the process of societal differentiation. The questions raised by the arguments made here must be faced if one wants to develop an understanding of principled societal pluralism.

Notes

¹On the romantic reaction see Herman Dooyeweerd, *Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular, and Christian Options*, translated by John Kraay and edited by Mark Vander Vennen and Bernard Zylstra (Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1979), pp. 175-188, 61-87; and Christopher Dawson, *The Gods of Revolution* (New York: Minerva Press, 1972), pp. 130-154.

²Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, edited with an introduction by Thomas H.D. Mahoney (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955), p. 35.

³Burke, pp. 35-36.

⁴Burke, p. 102.

⁵Burke, pp. 104-105.

⁶Burke, p. 67.

⁷See, for example, Burke, pp. 67-68, 110.

⁸For example, Burke, pp. 39 ff., and 102 ff.

⁹Burke, pp. 181 ff., 196 ff.

¹⁰Groen van Prinsterer, *Ongeloof en Revolutie*, 2nd edition edited by H. Smitskamp (Franeker: T. Wever, n.d.), p. 20.

¹¹In Holland the term "anti-revolutionary" came to stand for a progressive attitude that was opposed to the spirit of liberalism and revolution but an attitude that was not reactionary. The term "counter-revolutionary" or "contra-revolutionary" stands for the reactionary conservative attitude that the anti-revolutionaries opposed.

¹²Groen, p. 24.

¹³Groen's distance from reactionary conservatives is evident in the following quotations taken from Groen's "Handbook of the History of the Fatherland" (3rd edition, 1865). Groen wrote of the Enlightenment and the Revolution: "One may not ignore the many good things that were achieved during this period. The efforts for reform and renewal were not unfruitful. There was remarkable material and intellectual progress and development. To a degree that would not have been thought possible, the forces of nature were made serviceable to human ingenuity. Many social improvements were brought about. And in the basic features of the [new] political forms lay the germ of civil and political liberty.

"Even so, the progress that was made in the

areas of law and morality is to be attributed largely to the work of the Gospel. The history of Europe and especially of the Netherlands in the days of the Reformation had shown experimentally the power of saving truth for emancipation and civilization. And although this power was afterwards assigned to obscurity through the powerlessness of a dead orthodoxy, the improvements realized even then prove that only the Gospel contains the true principle of liberty, equality and fraternization, of philanthropy and efficacious humanitarianism

" . . . The ideas that made [eighteenth-century] philosophy so attractive were of Christian origin; they were wholesome insofar as they were gotten from the Gospel, baneful insofar as they were torn loose from it.

"In Christian love lies true humanity: recognition of the rights of man, even of the humblest, without distinction of race or colour or birth or class. From this follow (as the eighteenth century took to heart with commendable zeal) the abolition of slavery, of serfdom and of the rack; toleration in religion; the extension of political rights to the lower classes; numerous philanthropies; and the intent to secure an adequate standard of living for all." *Unbelief and Revolution, Lectures VIII and IX*, edited and translated by Harry Van Dyke with Donald Morton (Amsterdam: The Groen van Prinsterer Fund, 1965), Appendix A to Lecture VIII, pp. 31-32.

¹⁴Groen, *Ongeloof en Revolutie*, p. 29.

¹⁵Groen, *Ongeloof en Revolutie*, p. 30.

¹⁶Groen, *Ongeloof en Revolutie*, p. 31.

¹⁷Groen, *Ongeloof en Revolutie*, pp. 47-48.

¹⁸Groen, *Ongeloof en Revolutie*, p. 44-59.

¹⁹Groen, *Le Parti anti-révolutionnaire et confessionnel dans l'Eglise réformée des Pays-Bas* (Amsterdam, 1860), p. 89.

²⁰Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation*, translated by Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973), p. 46.

²¹See José Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), pp. 147, 158.

²²Enrique Dussel, *History and the Theology of Liberation*, translated by John Drury (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1976), p. 104.

²³Miguez Bonino, p. 15.

²⁴Quoted in Miguez Bonino, p. 47.

²⁵Dussel, p. 134.

²⁶Miguez Bonino, *Christians and Marxists: The Mutual Challenge to Revolution* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1976), p. 110.

²⁷Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology*, p. 141.

²⁸Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology*, p. 143.

²⁹Dussel, p. 170.

³⁰Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology*, p. 152.