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# History as Process: Meaning in Change

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## Introduction

As human beings we are subject to time, to change. We are timed creatures. We are born, we live for a time, and we pass away. The process is relentless—ask anyone middle-aged or older. Our duration seems to expend itself at increasing acceleration. Beginning, enduring, and ending, describes the process of all created things. Historical studies focus on that process, concentrating on the process of culture-making, not just on the nature of culture. What happens when a timed thing changes in process from one point to another? How does such change occur? How do humans make things? Is there, can

there be, any meaning in change?

In a previous article<sup>1</sup> I suggested that there is a way of understanding history as God's story. Ordinary historical methodology which does not depend in a unique sense upon revelation cannot capture the moving of the Spirit of God. His Spirit and revelation are nevertheless critical as a framework for understanding human culture-making. Without history as God's story, history as human culture-making is sound and fury, signifying nothing. I also briefly explored the character of human culture, its typical shape, its dependence on a view of ultimate reality, and the way its operative values relate to structure and

behavior. That is still not enough, however. Historical studies has to come to grips with process. Without that, the discipline is simply some other kind of analysis operating on the past.

In this essay I shall make some observations on culture-making, on human culture in process, and conclude with some implications of what I have argued for school curricula.

### **The Unfolding Process: Historicism and Christianity**

The pattern and structure humans give to culture, to their collective life, is the way they exercise dominion. Dominion is culture-making which has a certain unfolding, disclosing, opening-up character about it. It took historians a long time to define their discipline in relation to this concept of process.

Nineteenth century historicism, while unfortunately deifying process, nevertheless helped to make this aspect of dominion more evident to the historical profession, including Christian historians who caught only moments of a profound truth. The Jewish understanding of history as God's redemption, derived from the Old Testament, gave the world a linear concept of history, gave time special significance, and gave history a direction and a consummation. Most other ancient societies, in contrast, had "refused history," looking back to a golden age or looking for an escape into quietism. Ancient peoples lived in a timeless dimension where creation, destruction, and new creation went on endlessly.<sup>2</sup> The Greeks, in believing that humans had some degree of control over their destiny—though fate always loomed in the background—advanced beyond primitive and ancient Near Eastern perspectives of history to the point where they became intensely interested in investigating their own past. For reasons that remain obscure they broke the bondage of nature's cycles. Their approach, however, was mired in the substantialism of ancient philosophy. Believing that humans have a given nature, an essence which does not change, they looked for the general in specifics so they could learn from history.<sup>3</sup> Thus even so acute an observer of history as Thucydides

could ignore important events because the point he wished to make about humans in war had already been made. The Roman historians continued in much the same approach, though with a strong moralistic emphasis. Great deeds were held up to be emulated, evil ones displayed so they could be avoided.

With the rise of medieval, Christian historiography, historians generally appreciated the creation-fall-redemption motif. But it was seldom integrated adequately with the ongoing events of everyday life. Bede introduced his society to the dating system based on the life of Christ and some of the later millenarians preserved the notion of rectilinear movement, but most writers produced uncritical chronicles or continued in the mode of moralism. The framework for the understanding of history as unfolding was in place, but it was never systematically or adequately grasped.

It was the historicism of the nineteenth century, feeding on the idealistic philosophy of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which brought home to Western culture the truth of the Christian teaching of history as teleological movement, though it did so from an idolatrous standpoint. Meyerhoff defines historicism succinctly:

The substance of history is human life in its totality and multiplicity. It is the historian's aim to portray the bewildering, unsystematic variety of historical forms—people, nations, culture, customs, institutions, songs, myths, and thoughts—in their unique, living expressions and in the process of continuous growth and transformation.... The meaning of history does not lie hidden in some universal structure, whether deterministic or teleological, but in the multiplicity of individual manifestations at different ages and in different culture. All of them are unique and equally significant strands in the tapestry of history; all of them in Ranke's famous phrase, are "immediate to God."<sup>4</sup>

Radical historicism reacted against system, whether theological or philosophical, being imposed on history from outside of history. In its reaction it made the historical dimension of life the source and criterion of truth. The core of historicism's teaching was that "the nature of anything is entirely comprehended in its development."<sup>5</sup> Barraclough points out the revolutionary significance of historicism:

The result was that history was raised up to a perilous eminence as the ultimate *magistra vitae*, and an imperious, self-confident Clio displaced religion and philosophy as the deity before which we bowed.<sup>6</sup>

Historicism could not escape the relativistic implications of its point of view, however. If history's meaning lies in "the multiplicity of individual manifestations at different ages and in different cultures," all of which are "unique and equally significant," then every metaphysical and religious doctrine is equally relative; there is no ultimate truth or moral absolutes left.<sup>7</sup> In the absence of meaning, history becomes sound and fury, signifying nothing. One feels with Stephen Dedalus in the novel *Ulysses*, when he said, "History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awaken." As Lowith put it, "The problem of history is unanswerable within its own perspective."<sup>8</sup>

We should not dismiss historicism quite so easily, however. In its very deification of the historical dimension it brought to the mind of Western culture a greater appreciation of individuality and development—though the stability of the human being as created individual was swept away by the stream of history. Historicism as a *Weltanschauung* gave rise to a particular methodology, a specific historical way of thinking which is comprehended in the concepts of individuality, development, and relatedness.<sup>9</sup> Historicism implies that the historian must "look upon each person, event, nation, or era as a unique individual, which develops over a period of time through its own internal means and through casual interaction with other developing in-

dividuals."<sup>10</sup> By its elevation of historical process into a *Weltanschauung*, historicism emphasized certain aspects of experience that were built into reality in creation, but which Christian historians, caught in ancient exemplarism, lost sight of when studying human culture.

C.T. McIntire's article "Historical Study and the Historical Dimensions of Our World" helps, I think, to focus the legitimate insights of historicism for a Christian.<sup>11</sup> McIntire argues that reality exists according to three dimensions—time, space, and spirit (the historical, the structural, and the ultimate, respectively):

There are three total ways in which our world and everything in it exists, the three most comprehensive and three mutually irreducible ways in which the world exists. Anything else we may say about our world may be taken as a subpoint under one of these dimensions.<sup>12</sup>

The historical dimension he identifies as follows:

the temporal process of coming into being, carrying on, modifying, perhaps developing, and then passing away. We may describe all phenomena, whether human or nonhuman, as existing in time relationships according to three constitutive processes; first, *becoming*, which involves beginning and integrating; second, *being*, which involves continuing as integral with modifications, including in some cases developing; and third, *ceasing to be*, which involves disintegrating and ending. The phenomenon coheres historically by continuing in existence from moment to moment. What we call the history of something is the actual temporal course of the phenomenon in its becoming, being, and ceasing. The historical dimension thus discloses two elements; 1) time and 2) becoming, being and ceasing to be. Humans and human products

manifest the second element by means of "culture-making"; by this term I refer to human existence as historically creative.<sup>13</sup>

Historical studies, then, while concerned at points with the structural and the ultimate dimensions of reality, is centrally concerned with time, with temporal process—a characteristic of individual things and of reality as a whole.

McIntire makes a critical point in observing that time as one ongoing and continuous process from beginning to end can only be understood by biblical revelation; we do not experience it empirically in that full sense.<sup>14</sup> Lacking that perspective in rejecting transcendence, historicism could only experience time as process without direction. For the Christian, the movement of creation on toward the eschaton discloses the increasing presence of God's kingdom and gives meaning to our temporal existence. The passage of time leads to the final triumph of Christ and the final disclosure of the inner meaning of history.

Identity derives in part from that process. McIntire points out that "the temporal continuity of reality from beginning to end is a constituent of the ongoing identity of anything."<sup>15</sup> Things hold together as units of the time process. Thus anything that occurs is unique; it happens only once. It has an identity. Secondly, time as past-present-future is a referential viewpoint which directs us in the ongoing process of our existence. It gives us a sense of the process in which we live and enables us to make plans for the future based on past experience.<sup>16</sup> Finally time is change; as such it enables us to make beginnings and endings, thus helping us understand that the future holds various possibilities, that history is not predetermined.<sup>17</sup> Understood in that way—as process, as past-present-future and change—time characterizes all phenomena and is the unique perspective by which historical studies examines things.

It is important, I think, for historians to keep this distinctive focus in mind. It is very common to carry over the naive, everyday notion

of history as "the past" into academic studies; any study of past phenomena from whatever perspective then becomes history. Historical studies becomes a totalitarian science and everyone is a historian; it loses all definition as a discipline. Furthermore, the dimension of temporal process is easily lost or blurred and a critical perspective on things is lost.

Time as "the coming into being, carrying on, modifying, perhaps developing, and then passing away" in cultural entities is expressed in the creativity of humans in culture-making.<sup>18</sup> Humans, as stewards exercising dominion in the name of God, bring things into existence, sustain and develop them and cause them to cease. In God's creating things as timed things, and in giving humans the capacity likewise to create, He established the ground of the uniqueness of each thing, and thus the validity of historical studies focusing on the unique as an aspect of its particular field of investigation. Historicism rightly understood this, though without seeing any meaning in process apart from each individual thing in its autonomous existence.

We should note, further, that in forming things, in creating things, all of which have their own unique process of becoming, being, and ceasing to be, there is a complex inter-relatedness that historians have to deal with in their inquiry—another special emphasis of historicism. McIntire comments:

The active combination of the multifunctional make-up of any phenomena with the many diverse environmental phenomena means that many different kinds of factors, as well as many particular factors, are at work in the making of anything. The way in which the many factors interact varies according to the case. No one factor or kind of factor is always the most crucial—not the economic, nor the psychological, not the intellectual-confessional, not the social, for example. In each case we must find out what factors are most crucial and how they are configured.<sup>19</sup>

The historian must determine how these various factors shape the ongoing existence of the particular thing under scrutiny.

The historian, then, is centrally concerned with time. Our focus on time as process is linked to creation-fall-redemption as the eschatological movement of creation on to consummation. That framework alone provides substantive meaning for timed existences and validates the uniqueness of each event and each individual. Since the life process of an individual thing is interconnected with many other things and since our analysis of culture as a whole involves the inter-relatedness of all the phenomena of that culture, historical studies is

process. Humans are responsible beings and were given the capability, the power, the freedom to unfold culture either in conformity with the structural principles founded in the order of creation or in violation of them. In the first case, the result is a kind of "automatic" shalom and temporal harmony because people are obeying the law "written on their hearts" (Romans 2:14,15), while in the latter case there occurs a kind of natural revenge—disorder, distortion, violence, poverty, disharmony. To the process of differentiation, itself a norm for human dominion, Dooyeweerd applies the norms of individuation and integration.

In understanding the unfolding process as

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properly concerned with integration. It is properly considered a synoptic discipline. More on that point later.

### The Nature of the Unfolding Process

In trying to understand history as process, I find some of the ideas of Herman Dooyeweerd helpful and stimulating, especially those concerning the opening process relative to societal entities. The creation mandate of Genesis 1:26-28 puts humans in charge of creation, meaning, to me, that we are to unfold creation's potential as responsible stewards of God's world. Dooyeweerd's concept of cultural differentiation helps, I believe, to put meaning into the biblical mandate. As he puts it, humans are to "bring the wealth of creational structures to full, differentiated disclosure"; the unfolding process is "the working out of creation in time."<sup>20</sup>

It is important to understand that for Dooyeweerd the opening process is a normed

differentiation, he maintains that it is a process of development which discloses the full wealth and diversity of creation through the free creative power of human agency. The process moves from an undifferentiated society such as the early kinship community to a more differentiated stage in which creational structures are disclosed, that is, to a stage in which they take cultural, historical form. To move in the other direction is to interrupt the disclosure of creation and thus to impoverish society. The process must maintain continuity; tradition is valid and helpful when it gives rise to progress and renewal, but anti-normative when it holds rigidly to the past.<sup>21</sup> Revolution is the opposite distortion. To break continuity and attempt to start over, as revolution often does, is to violate the unfolding process from the direction opposite of tradition. There are, obviously, various kinds of nuances in the reactionary or revolutionary breaking of continuity.

Differentiation must proceed hand in hand with harmonious integration. The unfolding

that humans bring about results, at various stages, in new institutions and societal relationships—the phenomenon of individuation. The new entities and relationships, themselves proper expressions of differentiation, require integration into society.<sup>22</sup> Without adequate integration of societal structures in changing circumstances, conflict and fragmentation will likely occur. A classic example of differentiation, individuation, and integration is the late medieval era when the feudal world gradually had to make room for new societal entities such as guilds, universities, cities, and states and the new kinds of callings and people they involved. In trying to direct all this, the church found itself in an uncomfortable, internally paradoxical and anti-normative role. We shall find as many reasons for the decline of the Roman church in this process, I suspect, as in its superstitious, works-oriented theology.

Finally, in relation to the unfolding process, there is the norm of cultural economy. Dooyeweerd defines this norm as requiring “that the historical power sphere of each differentiated cultural sphere should be limited to each life sphere.”<sup>23</sup> If one sphere enlarges to engulf or restrict others in a kind of totalitarian dominance, the other aspects of life will experience atrophy and loss or distortion of necessary function. For Dooyeweerd, any kind of totalitarianism which undermines sphere sovereignty is a reactionary direction in history. He points out that the principle of cultural economy “is nothing other than the principle of sphere sovereignty applied to the process of historical development.”<sup>24</sup>

If dominion, in the sense that God places that responsibility on humans in Genesis one, implies a process of gradual, harmonious opening of creation’s potential, both with regard to natural creation and human societal relationships, then Dooyeweerd’s ideas on differentiation and sphere sovereignty provide significant insights to our reflection on the human cultural task. His thinking helps one to understand better and reflect further on the consequences of a static culture, on the negatives of a reactionary direction, on the proper role of institutions both in fulfilling their assigned task and in their

relation to other societal relationships, and on what constitutes a harmoniously functioning whole. His emphasis on the various modes of human functioning and on the richness and diversity of the creation ordinances helps prevent one from falling prey to one-dimensional analysis of human culture, endemic to those who reject a transcendental perspective.

For the historian, Dooyeweerd’s philosophy presents some special difficulties. At the heart of the problem is the ambiguity that exists between his view of historical studies as a modal science and his concept of the opening process which is at the heart of the historian’s concerns; the latter, however, is a trans-modal concept. For further analysis of that issue along with critique of other problems, I highly recommend C.T. McIntire’s article, “Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy of History” in *The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd*.<sup>25</sup> It is a very sensitive and helpful analysis by a historian well-qualified for the task. I find myself with reservations at a few key points, however.

McIntire’s criticism that Dooyeweerd reads history backwards, defining it from the present, and further defines societies “in relation to a norm which looks like the present state of society,” is a warning which should be kept in mind; to me, however, it is just that—a warning to be careful.<sup>26</sup> All historians understand the past by either an explicit or implicit comparison to the present as well as vice versa. Even if Dooyeweerd himself makes blunders at times in an excessively rigid application of his theory, the value of the perspective is not thereby invalidated.

McIntire further feels that the theory of differentiation cannot handle the future.<sup>27</sup> I have difficulty following his critique at that point. I understand the theory to relate normativity to specific structures and relationships in context of the unfolding process. Degrees of normativity are present at various points, but that does not imply that further differentiation will not occur or that normativity is frozen in a particular constellation of societal relationships. The theory applied to feudalism, for example, would indicate that in certain respects, though an undifferentiated societal relationship, it

possessed elements of normativity relative to the situation in A.D. 1100. Is it not possible to analyze whatever comes in the future with the same kind of flexibility?

One final note on how Dooyeweerd's thinking relates to cultural analysis. People who write in the Kuyper-Dooyeweerd tradition, as well as those who oppose it, often treat his concept of creation ordinances (structures for) as if they were a version of *a priori*, Platonic ideals that exist apart from historical entities and historical situations.<sup>28</sup> He points out, however, that "social structures of individuality and the types of their intertwinements cannot be detected in an *a priori* way...our knowledge of these principles is always *implied* in our experience of concrete variable societal phenomena."<sup>29</sup> To me, his theory helps more as a way to think about social reality rather than to provide handy, ready-made models to be rigidly applied to a complex, historical reality. His emphasis on a created reality with God-given structure and norms seems consistent with Scriptural revelation, and it is important, above all, to keep that in sight. Humans cannot treat reality as they wish or give it any meaning they desire. Without that commitment, we are left in the morass of historicism.

To speak of norms, of course, implies judgment. The question of moral judgments in historical studies has been and continues to be a matter of considerable controversy in the historical profession. There are several reasons for the reluctance of historians to make moral judgments. Since historical studies became an academic discipline in the context of nineteenth century historicism, a tradition which eschewed any form of judgment, but saw all historical phenomena as equally valid for its time, historians hesitated to use a moral perspective. The early belief in objectivity as a necessary characteristic of the historical method reinforced that reluctance. The historian was simply to tell the story in an impartial fashion. It is certainly true that if the primary emphasis in historical studies is to make moral judgments, the central task of the analysis of process in human culture is lost and the historian becomes something of an ethicist. Roman historiography

usually suffered from such a perspective. Christian historians and history teachers are especially prone to moral analysis. The law of God is pretty clear, after all, about a range of human actions which have direct bearing on cultural formation. How does one proceed without losing the central task of the discipline and yet not write and teach as if culture is morally neutral?

Langdon Gilkey notes that "human beings are never just *objects* of historical forces but also *subjects* of political action and so of centered responses, responses in judgment, decision and action; and these responses invariably have a moral component."<sup>30</sup> This is based on the fact that all cultural ways of life are systems of meanings pointing to an ultimate of sacred dimension of reality.<sup>31</sup> It is impossible, therefore, if the above is true, for the historian to proceed as if there were no moral dimension to human culture. The question really is not *if* but *how* one should come to grips with that moral dimension in a way consistent with the nature of historical studies.

I have argued that the central focus and task of historical studies is to elucidate the unfolding process and those factors behind the beginning, being and ceasing to be of phenomena, both of individual things such as a person, a family, or an institution, but also of interrelated phenomena such as societies, nations, and cultures. The special task of history is to explain that process—its nature, duration, and the reasons for it. To lose that focus in favor of moral judgment is to miss our calling. I have also argued, however, that the unfolding process is a normed process, that is, that certain structural principles are founded in the order of creation that humans need to follow to experience cultural shalom. If the unfolding process is the central focus of the historian and if that process is a normed process, the historian needs to make judgments about that process after reconstruction and analysis. In fact, one's analysis is going to proceed along the lines of definition which by its character involves recognizing norms.

Norms relative to differentiation, therefore, such as integration, continuity, and cultural economy, properly belong to the discipline of



historical studies as means of assessing and evaluating. It seems to me that norms related to structure (as well as those related to personal morality) may and should be used when they help to elucidate development. But since structure as such is a secondary concern of the historian, judgment about structure should be related to process and should usually be implicit. We have to take care to write neither arrogantly or neutrally. The historicist tradition, in deifying historical process, would rob us of the right to appeal to any transcendent criterion or pass any kind of judgment on history. We should resist that. To fall prey to a kind of moral suspension would be to invite the inference that life, after all, is not religion and

the high priest of science for a change. Historicism does have a point, however. If historical process does not define things, there is at least a historical aspect to all things. If no one takes the time to analyze this historical aspect, individual things will not be adequately understood.

Secondly, historical studies examines the ongoing life process of cultures or other such wholes composed of interrelated entities. In this sense historical studies provides integration and wholeness to our understanding of life. Thus it is not so much an area discipline as a perspective discipline. Its field is not delimited by area but rather by aspect. It studies anything or everything but only from a particular point of

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that culture-making is a fundamentally neutral business. We cannot leave our readers or our students with such an impression. If there are norms, we ought to apply them properly, with understanding and humility, and identify with those fellow human beings whom we are studying.

#### **Historical Studies in the School: Its Relation to Other Disciplines**

Historical studies, of course, does not stand above the other disciplines or alone as the ultimate *magister vitae* as some historicists once viewed it. Since history was, as they believed, an all-embracing process, characterizing all aspects of life, there was no escape; the viewpoint of process was the most fundamental one. Obviously such a view is unsatisfactory, though it would be nice if historians could be

view—that of process. By its nature as aspect discipline, however, it needs the help of other disciplines to define what it studies. The better one understands state or family, for example, the better one can trace the history of state or family. The more that the political scientist or sociologist can tell me about the norms for state or family, the better able I am to trace their differentiation and role in the cultural whole. At the same time, without some notion of the history of state or family, the political scientist or sociologist will not come to an adequate understanding of these structures.

In his curriculum study, Philip H. Phenix groups history together with philosophy and theology as integrative or synoptic disciplines.<sup>32</sup> While his characterization of each individual discipline has its weakness, his view that these three deal with wholes in relationship rather than with segments of reality does touch

on a characteristic of these three disciplines which seems to distinguish them from the others. For him, history is synoptic in that its focus is on events which are concrete, existential wholes; in events many elements "are united in the actuality of any given happening."<sup>33</sup> The historian "must bring together the various aspects of human experience into significant wholes, relating past occurrences in the light of all the ingredients that go into the formation of a complex real-life happening."<sup>34</sup> While I am not prepared to argue what the central characteristics of philosophy and theology as scientific disciplines may be, they do seem to share a common characteristic in the sense that each concerns itself with relationships and whole entities in a way that other disciplines do not. Each then ought to have a specific place in the core curriculum of educational institutions. Each fosters integrated knowledge so crucial in our fragmented age. The long-standing debate about whether history is a social science or a humanity is futile debate and rests on a mistaken notion of methodology. History belongs in the same category with philosophy and theology.

### Historical Studies in the Curriculum

To summarize briefly, I have argued above that historical studies in its broadest focus examines the process of culture-making as the unfolding of the creation order by humans. In that inquiry it embraces all cultural phenomena in their life process in the context of culture's interrelatedness. As such it helps other disciplines to see themselves and their area of study in the unfolding process of the whole of culture. The insight that genesis and continuity provide will help them to better understand and define their subject matter in relation to the whole.

In the second place, insofar as historical studies help us understand where we are today in the opening process and what norms apply, it provides insight into what kinds of priorities to establish and what kinds of tasks to pursue so that our dominion responsibility is carried out obediently and fruitfully. In that sense, historical studies help determine the cultural

time of a particular society. We should be, then, more obedient members of God's kingdom.

The general education part of the curriculum should, therefore, include enough history about the society in which the school is located, and about the contemporary world, so that the above objectives may be met. For the American high school curriculum, this means required American history for all students. It should be American *history*, not civics or sociology or economics in the American context. Such studies have their own legitimate place but trendy social science courses are not a substitute for history. Students need to sense their own cultural identity and the nature of their age.

The required history curriculum should also include, it seems to me, a course that is both contemporary and global in scope.<sup>35</sup> This contention perhaps requires explanation. To argue a case for contemporary history almost seems a contradiction in terms. The very word "history" conveys the notion of time, development, change. How can the historian, within his own time, isolate the deeper currents from the surface movements of the age? Can such an effort rise above the journalistic reporting of events? Despite the problems involved, contemporary history has taken on dimensions that give compelling reasons to include it in the curriculum. Industrialization and the accompanying expansion of the West have brought about basic structural change in the world. The twentieth century world is globally interdependent in a unique sense. In recognition of that fact, especially since the publication of William H. McNeill's *The Rise of the West*, world history texts have begun to offer a global perspective of the world from earliest times. I believe that to be a healthy development. A global view of history prior to the nineteenth century, however, remains something of an option. In the major regions of the globe, people lived out their lives in "relative" independence. Valid regional and national histories were possible. In the twentieth century a global perspective is no longer an option. Without it our teaching distorts and misleads. Without it

the students will not adequately understand the world in which they live.

The challenge is intimidating, especially for us whose graduate training exalted specialization. What sensitive teacher dares claim more than initiation into his own more limited field? To attempt global history requires an audacity that most of us would hesitate to admit. And yet, if the globe really did become one in the twentieth century, we face a reality that we dare not ignore. We may not train our students as if the United States or the West were the whole. If the task seems large, so too are the stakes. Ignorance is too dangerous in the world of today. Von Laue expresses the dilemma well and I opt for his choice:

How, they (specialists) ask, can one mind, with its limited time and energy, hope to master the galaxy of fact which, by present standards of erudition, goes into his subject? While lauding the audacity of intention they repudiate every detail. Yet their work, for all its exactitude, simply does not interest the troubled questioners that stand nearer the center of contemporary life. It is further evidence of a world grown over our heads that we are made to choose between proof that is irrelevant and relevance that has no proof. If this book leans toward the latter, it is because truth and life favor the bold. There is no more creative act of the human will than to search for the vital center of awareness appropriate to the age.<sup>36</sup>

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup>"History: Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?" *Pro Rege* XVI (March 1988), 2-12.

<sup>2</sup>Paul K. Conkin and Roland N. Stromberg, *The Heritage and Challenge of History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 3.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>4</sup>Hans Meyerhoff, ed., *The Philosophy of History in Our Time* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), p. 10.

<sup>5</sup>Dagobert D. Runes, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Totowa: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1962), p. 127.

<sup>6</sup>Meyerhoff, *The Philosophy of History*, p. 29.

<sup>7</sup>See Herman Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight of Western Thought* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co., 1960), pp. 62-63.

<sup>8</sup>Karl Lowith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 191.

<sup>9</sup>Calvin G. Rand, "Two Meanings of Historicism in the Writings of Dilthey, Troeltsch and Meinecke," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 25 (October, 1964), p. 507.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup>*History and Historical Understanding*, ed. C.T. McIntire and Ronald Wells (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1984), pp. 17-40.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>18</sup>See McIntire's discussion, pp. 30-38.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>20</sup>*Roots of Western Culture*, trans. John Kraay (Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1979), p. 79.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>22</sup>*Twilight*, p. 102.

<sup>23</sup>*Roots*, p. 81.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup>(Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1986). For a review of the study, see Robert Eells, *Fides et Historia*, 19, No. 3 (October, 1987), pp. 80-82.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup>Nicholas Wolterstorff rejects the idea that one need hold to the ontology of Dooyeweerd with its system of categorically distinct societal structures in order to engage successfully in normative reflection on society. See his *Until Justice and Peace Embrace* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1983), p. 62. His own principles, justice and shalom, need to be translated into something more concrete before they can be successfully used for social analysis. For a short critique of Wolterstorff, see James Skillen's review in *The Reformed Journal* (Dec., 1984), pp. 17-22.

<sup>29</sup>*A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*, trans. D.H. Freeman & H. De Jongste (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co., 1969), III, p. 264.

<sup>30</sup>*Reaping the Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation of History* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), p. 63.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>32</sup>*Realms of Meaning* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 235.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 236.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup>The following brief argument for contemporary history is taken, with permission, from my longer article, "Contemporary History in the Curriculum," published in *The Christian Educator's Journal*, (Dec. 1984-Jan. 1985), pp. 25-28.

<sup>36</sup>Theodore Von Laue, *The Global City* (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1969), p. xi.