
Pro Rege

Volume 29 | Number 4

Article 2

June 2001

Government, Religion, and Social Welfare in Canada and The Netherlands: Implications for the Welfare State

Jim Vanderwoerd
Dordt College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege



Part of the [Christianity Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Vanderwoerd, Jim (2001) "Government, Religion, and Social Welfare in Canada and The Netherlands: Implications for the Welfare State," *Pro Rege*: Vol. 29: No. 4, 13 - 27.

Available at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege/vol29/iss4/2

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Publications at Dordt Digital Collections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pro Rege by an authorized administrator of Dordt Digital Collections. For more information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu.

Government, Religion, and Social Welfare in Canada and The Netherlands: Implications for the Welfare State



by Jim R. Vanderwoerd

Introduction

At the opening of the twenty-first century, one of many questions being debated by scholars and policy-makers concerns the viability of that peculiar twentieth century institution, the welfare state. Many observers now seem to agree that in a post-Keynesian, post-Cold War, global economy, twentieth century models of state-dominated approaches to welfare no longer are fiscally viable or provide the best incentives and encouragement for solving

Mr. Jim Vanderwoerd is Instructor of Social Work at Dordt College. His paper was prepared as part of his Ph.D. studies at Mandel School of Applied Social Sciences, Case Western Reserve University.

compelling social problems. This realization has renewed interest not only in the role of the “third sector”—otherwise called the independent sector, the nonprofit sector, or civil society—in providing social welfare, but also in its relationship to the public and the private sectors.

In discussions of the role of the third sector, much attention is turning to whether and how faith-based organizations (FBOs)—organizations which are historically and ideologically linked to a particular religious perspective—should be included in the welfare state, and what role they should play in relation to the government. Recent studies of the history of social welfare and social work in the United States, for example, have highlighted the central, but often neglected, role of religiously-based groups (Skocpol, 2000; Cnaan, 1999). As Monsma and Soper (1997) suggest, debates about the role of FBOs involve the perpetual struggle to clarify “how two of the most powerful and longest lasting of human institutions—the church and the state—are to relate to each other” (p. 1).

To explore the implications and possibilities of FBOs in providing social welfare, this paper compares trends in two countries: Canada and the Netherlands. According to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) seminal work on welfare state regimes, these two countries represent respectively the liberal and the corporatist regimes (though, as will be shown, the Netherlands is more properly categorized as social democratic [Goodin & Smitsman, 2000; Goodin, Headey, Muffels & Dirven, 1999]). Each of these countries offers a unique history and useful case study of relating religion and social welfare.

Canada represents a moderately liberal social welfare regime that is somewhat "softer" and more compassionate compared to the United States, but one where the public role of religion is currently much less visible than in the U.S. Meanwhile, compared to the Scandinavian countries that are typically held up as the best models of social democratic welfare regimes, the Netherlands provides an interesting example of both generous social welfare provision *and* accommodation to both a public role for religion and religious plurality in social welfare provision. After reviewing the development and contemporary challenges of each country's welfare state, our comparison of the two will be guided by three crucial questions: 1) To what extent does the state's relationship with FBOs explicitly or implicitly condone or further the advancement or establishment of particular religious groups over others? 2) To what extent does the state encourage or encroach upon the free expression of religious diversity for those groups providing social services? 3) To what extent does the state's relationship with FBOs indicate a retreat from state responsibility for addressing social problems (i.e., "off-loading" or "devolution"), rather than partnering with other organizations in a complementary relationship? In answering these questions, we will see that the examples of both countries offer not only warnings but also useful and optimistic instances of a positive role for FBOs in the welfare state of the twenty-first century.

Canada

Canadians who support social democratic policies often portray Canada as having a vastly more progressive social welfare state than the United States (e.g. Barlow & Campbell, 1995; McQuaig, 1995; Novick & Shillington, 1996). However, Esping-Andersen's (1990) thorough analysis shows that Canada is much closer to the liberal/individual social welfare regime exemplified by the United States than it is to social democratic regimes such as the Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands.

The similarity between Canadian and American welfare state regimes is not surprising given their shared history of new world colonization, and in particular, the influence cast by their British origins. For example, both countries' social welfare regimes bear the legacy of the English Poor Laws (for Canadian history see Guest, 1997; Meilicke &

Storch, 1980; Turner, 1995; for American history see Axinn & Stern, 2001; Day, 2000; Jansson, 2001; Trattner, 1999). Despite some similarities, however, the Canadian welfare state developed in quite different ways than its southern neighbor. One of the most profound differences was in the way that Canada became an independent country. In contrast to American colonists' emphasis on autonomy and independence from any government power (Jansson, 2001), Canadians had a much more conciliatory relationship with the British crown and tended to be more trusting of government powers. Hence the founding document of Canada, the British North America (BNA) Act of 1867, emphasized "peace, order, and good government," and enshrined the most important powers and authority to the federal government (Guest, 1997).

Since it implemented its major social welfare programs only after World War II, and thus after the U.S. social security system and the "New Deal" of the 1930s, Canada appears to be a latecomer to the social welfare state compared to other industrialized countries. However, in his comparison of the timing of welfare state development in six countries (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, and USA), Banting (1987) argued that Canada's welfare state developed early in relation to its own economic and political development because it implemented widespread social welfare programs (in the 1940s) before its industrial economy had reached stability and maturity (in the 1950s).

The development of Canada's welfare state represents a gradual shift from a residual to an institutional approach (Guest, 1997). This development is another way in which the Canadian welfare state is similar to European countries and different from the US. The emergence of Canada's institutional approach to welfare was prompted by the influential *Report on Social Security for Canada* in 1943. Authored by Leonard Marsh, and consequently known as the "Marsh Report," this document outlined a universal, national system of social security for Canada (Guest, 1997; Meilicke & Storch, 1980). Interestingly, Marsh worked for William Beveridge in England before coming to Canada; his report borrowed heavily from Beveridge's ideas about social citizenship, and had an impact in Canada similar to the impact of Beveridge's more famous report in England (Bellamy & Irving, 1995). Influenced by

the Marsh report, as well as by the 1930s depression and drought and by World War II, Canada implemented national unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and family allowance programs in the late 1940s. However, it was not until the mid-1960s that Canada achieved a fully institutionalized social-welfare system with the addition of a national health-care insurance program and a federally funded and mandated program for income assistance and welfare (Guest, 1997; Yelaja, 1992).

Canada's development of a social welfare state was complicated by its system of federalism. Under the BNA Act of 1967, provinces were given jurisdiction over health, education, and social welfare on the assumption that these were relatively minor areas (Guest, 1997). Since then, the role of the federal government in these areas has been a matter of debate (Yelaja, 1992). By the end of the 1960s, the consensus—and practice—that emerged in the Canada Assistance Plan of 1966 was a complementary relationship in which the federal government shared the financial burden and also set national standards, while the provinces implemented and operated the programs.

Since the mid-1980s, however, a number of pressures have resulted in a reduction of the federal government's role in health, education, and social welfare. These pressures are similar to developments in other industrialized countries in the past three decades: stagflation in the 1970s, mounting public deficits in the 1980s, and the growing popularity of neo-conservative and neo-liberal ideologies advocating smaller government and a greater reliance on local government and the voluntary sector. In Canada, these pressures resulted in an end to the open-ended cost sharing agreement legislated by the Canada Assistance Plan and its replacement in 1995 with a block grant program called the Canada Health and Social Transfer [CHST] (Guest, 1997). Under the CHST, provinces have more power to set their own priorities for welfare programs; they also have less federal money to help pay for programs. Consequently, the federal government has less ability to set or enforce national standards, and provinces have greater freedom to implement more restrictive and punitive regulations in an effort to find savings. For example, in 1995 the newly elected Progressive Conservative government in Ontario fulfilled a campaign promise by cutting its welfare payments by

22% within one hundred days of taking office (Ontario Federation of Labour, 1996; Progressive Conservative Party, 1994). Since the passage of the CHST, some policy-makers have attempted to develop a voluntary "social union" between the federal and provincial governments which would set standards for social welfare (Vandezande, 1999). To date, however, these talks have failed to produce agreement, and the discussion has been tabled.

As Canadians faced the so-called "crisis" of the welfare state (Mishra, 1999), many turned their attention to the voluntary or independent "third sector" as an alternative to the welfare state (Brock,

*Canada and The
Netherlands provide
warnings, but also hopes for
a positive role for FBOs.*

2000a, 2000b; Hall & Banting, 2000), paralleling developments in the U.S. and Britain. Few basic details are known, however, about the role of this sector in Canada's social welfare regime. Consequently, the current debate in Canada about the future of the welfare state appears to be focused on two issues: (a) major initiatives by government, academics, and nonprofit organizations to conduct research on the extent, nature, activities, and impact of nonprofit organizations (Brock, 2000b; Shannon, 1999), and (b) efforts to defend the traditional federally-driven welfare state and resist "offloading" to the voluntary and private sectors (Jackson, 2000; Townson, 1999).

The Netherlands

Compared to many other western European countries, the Netherlands is a relative latecomer to the modern welfare state. Even though it began to implement a number of welfare programs at the turn of the twentieth century along with many of its European neighbors, these programs were not universalized until nearly a half century later. Indeed, it was not until after World War II that the Netherlands began to significantly expand their welfare state under the leadership of Social Affairs Minister G.M. Veldkamp in 1961-1966 (Goodin & Smitsman, 2000).

The generosity and coverage of welfare benefits grew from this period until the early 1980s, financed by North Sea natural gas, a highly successful externally-oriented economy, and concessions from trade unions for wage restraints in return for a shorter work week (Goodin et al., 1999). However, pressure mounted to cut back its welfare benefits when the Netherlands, along with most other industrialized countries, began to encounter increasing social welfare expenditures, global competition, and a decreasing ratio of working participants to welfare dependents. Faced with this crisis, however, the Netherlands has not gone the way of many other advanced welfare states by severely reducing benefits or questioning its commitment to social equality. Instead, analysts argue that the Netherlands has been able to weather the globalization crisis with its welfare state more or less intact (Hemerijck, 1999; Slomp, 2000). Dubbed the "Dutch Miracle," Hirst (1998) comments about this development that

... the Netherlands seems to have somehow achieved a remarkable turnaround—boosting employment, reducing the costs of welfare without fundamentally undermining the welfare state, and achieving modest but non-inflationary growth. The Netherlands have broken out of the path apparently ordained by its institutional structure. (p. 10)

The institutional structure that would apparently render the Netherlands unable to respond flexibly and successfully to globalization is at first glance the advanced social democratic state embodied by the Scandinavian countries. But, Hirst argues, the peculiar mix of the Netherlands's traditionally hierarchical corporatist history and structures with the "politics of accommodation" (Lijphart, 1968) and compromise among competing groups explains the Dutch success compared with other countries.

How was the Netherlands able to develop a welfare state with outcomes comparable to the most advanced social democratic states of Scandinavia despite its hierarchical corporatist traditions? Furthermore, how was it able to achieve political stability and economic prosperity without becoming immobilized, as some other countries had, by the competing claims of major religious and ideological groups? One of the most extensive and influential explorations of these and other questions was developed by Arend Lijphart (1968) in his book *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and*

Democracy in the Netherlands. Lijphart described the deep divisions along religious lines that characterized Dutch society and that had roots in three influential movements in western civilization: Roman Catholicism, the Renaissance, and the Protestant Reformation. Labeling these as "deep cleavages" (p. 182), Lijphart chronicled the emergence of four distinct religious-ideological communities, or "blocs": Catholic, Calvinist Protestant, and two groups emerging from the Renaissance, Liberal and Socialist. As the country evolved into a modern democratic nation state in the nineteenth century, these four blocs competed for political power and legitimacy. Rather than descending into political conflict and instability, however, the Dutch developed a "third model" between "the predominantly Anglo-Saxon two-party model with political stability, and the predominantly continental European multi-party system that has tended to produce political instability" (Blom, 2000, p. 153).

This third model was the politics of accommodation between the elite representatives of the four highly distinct blocs. According to Lijphart, compromise and stability were achieved by a spirit of cooperation that was institutionalized and formalized into a political structure that he called "confederalism," or what is more commonly referred to as "consociationalism" (Wintle, 2000). "Consociation" refers to a democratic political structure that applies proportional representation, or in which political parties, usually representing distinct religious and ideological traditions, are elected to legislative office based on the proportion of the popular vote they receive in general elections. Under this system, five parties (representing the four blocs, with the exception of the Calvinist bloc, which was represented by two parties) gained roughly 90% of the popular vote through most of the first half of the twentieth century (Lijphart, 1968). Consociation, however, is not unique to the Dutch since there are variations of proportional representation in other European democracies. However, it has come to be particularly associated with the Dutch style of accommodation and compromise because of its ties with another Dutch concept: pillarisation.

The concept of *verzuiling*, or pillarisation, is critical to the Dutch approach to political accommodation, and to how the Netherlands has balanced the roles and relationship between church and state

(Blom, 2000; Terhorst & Van de Ven, 1995; Toonen, 1996, 2000; Wintle, 2000). Pillarisation emerged as the political solution to three potentially divisive conflicts in the late nineteenth century: funding of education; the right to vote; and the rights of labor unions. Beginning with education, Catholic, Calvinist and secular (both “liberal” and “socialist”) groups vied for state funding for their schools (McCarthy, Oppewal, Peterson & Spykman, 1981). Catholics and Calvinists, recognizing the long term implications of access to public money, agreed to work together across historically deep divisions, and were successful in achieving the right to state funding for private schools, a policy that has been maintained and supported to the present (Monsma & Soper, 1997).

The basis of this compromise was the ordering of society, not on the basis of federalism, which distributes political power among regions, but on the basis of belonging to communities of faith. In this notion, federalism is seen as a lateral or horizontal arrangement, whereas pillarisation is vertical. Vertical suggests—and in practice meant—that persons lived their lives virtually completely within institutions affiliated with their religious tradition. While these divisions are roughly regionally represented in the Netherlands, by far the most important contexts are not geographic place but communities of meaning that transcend region and which bind members within “an integrative force” (Toonen, 1996, p. 173). Therefore, each of the four pillars developed its own unique institutions and structures within which its members lived, worked, worshiped, shopped, and spent their leisure time. This infrastructure included not just churches, but schools, media (newspapers, radio and television), labor unions, hospitals, social and welfare services, and even, more informally, patronage of businesses. One telling example of this pillarisation is the unique Dutch arrangement of the Red Cross, which, in fact, is not merely one Red Cross, but a Yellow-White Cross for Catholics, an Orange-Green Cross for Calvinists, and a plain Green Cross for “seculars” (Goodin & Smitsman, 2000, p. 43).

From the early twentieth century to about the 1960s, Dutch society was organized primarily along these pillars. The concept of pillars rests on the image of a building in which the roof represents the public (or government) authority that is both overar-

ching but also held up by the four pillars. According to this understanding, and based on the Catholic principle of subsidiarity and the Calvinist concept of sphere sovereignty, government’s responsibility and reach should not interfere with those parts of life that are properly left to other, more locally connected institutions. However, government did have a role in supporting and protecting each pillar through legislative, judicial, and financial arrangements. In terms of financial support, proportionality was the rule for distribution of state funding to the pillars. This rule was established with the agreement in 1917 to fund all schools representing the four pillars

The Netherlands has weathered the globalization crisis with its welfare state intact.

(including both the “public” schools—liberal and socialist—and the “private” schools—Catholic and Calvinist [Lijphart, 1968; McCarthy et al., 1981]). From this precedent, covering all education from kindergarten through university, came similar arrangements for funding media, welfare services, hospitals, and other social services according to the proportion of the population represented by each of the four pillars.

Pillarisation also rested heavily on the corporatist traditions that the Netherlands shared with other continental European countries. For pillarisation to work required a willingness on the part of the general membership to trust in and support their leaders. This hierarchical relationship, in which laypersons vested authority in educated elites, was necessary in order for the politics of accommodation to overcome very distinct and opposing pillars. Lijphart (1968) for example, provided compelling evidence of the interlocking concentration of power among the elite within each pillar. True to the corporatist tradition, however, this was not seen as a problem; citizens were content to trust their leaders, and successes in accommodation generally proved that their trust was well-placed. Dutch pillarisation and consociationalism also rested on the tripartite representation of business, labor and government which is central to the corporatist model (Wintle, 2000).

This history of corporatism led Esping-Andersen (1990) to categorize the Netherlands as primarily a corporatist welfare regime along with countries such as Germany, Austria, and France. However, in their re-analysis of the practices of the Dutch system during 1970-1980 and 1984-1994, Goodin & Smitsman (2000) demonstrate that the Dutch welfare state has acted more as a model social democratic regime similar to Scandinavian countries than as a conservative-corporatist regime (Goodin & Smitsman, 2000, p. 45; Goodin, 1999, p. 246).

Pillarisation continues to have a substantial impact on public policy in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, it is clear that the golden age of pillarisation—from the 1930s to the 1960s—is now well past. Since then, the walls of separation and exclusivity have gradually eroded. Where before it was conceivable that a person could live her life completely within a single “pillar,” it is now much more common for people to move between pillars based on their own individual preferences (Blom, 2000). Furthermore, in 1994, for the first time in the twentieth century, a political party not representing one of the two religious pillars gained a majority in the Dutch parliament (Wintle, 2000). Since the 1970s, a process of *ontzuiling*, or depillarisation, has characterized Dutch society. However, pillarisation continues to influence public policy. In fact, some now refer to the accommodation of increasingly diverse immigrants as a process of repillarisation, in which traditional pluralist principles of pillarisation are adapted to fit the new demographic realities in the Netherlands (Slomp, 2000).

Roles of Faith-Based Organizations in Each Country

Our comparison of the roles of FBOs in social service provision, and their relationship to government, will be guided by the three questions mentioned at the outset. For comparative purposes, the first two questions are framed having in mind the two clauses of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which reads in part that: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” (Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment 1).

The first clause—the “establishment” clause—was developed out of the new liberal democracy’s concern to avoid the imposition of religion by the state (or crown). The practice of state- or crown-

established churches had long roots in Europe, and even some American colonies had established churches. The underlying rationale for the clause was that religion was believed to be outside the authority of government, and therefore, government must not take actions that have the effect of making any particular religion more or less likely to flourish or advance (Dionne & DiIulio, 2000; Skillen, 1994).

As we apply this idea to the role of FBOs, then, our first question is this: to what extent do government actions have the effect of furthering the development or maintenance of particular religious groups over others? A more specific way of asking this question is to consider whether a particular religious group, in response to a given government action (i.e., legislation or funding) would have followed the same path of development without such government action. If the answer is no, then the government action is presumed to be in violation of this principle because it had the effect of “establishing” a particular religion.

By this measure, it seems fairly clear that Dutch pillarisation, first applied to schools and then, by extension, to many other areas, has indeed had the effect of establishing certain religious groups (namely, Catholic and Calvinist). The constitutional right, established in 1917, of the religious pillars to public funding for their private, religious schools set a principle and precedent for government funding of religious activities that continues to the present (Monsma & Soper, 1997). Applied specifically to nonprofit organizations providing social services, the same pattern has been followed. The Dutch approach to social services has been to provide most of its personal social services through nonprofit organizations (Johnson, 1987; Kramer, 1981). Consistent with pillarisation, organizations receiving public funding belonged to one of the four pillars.

However, depillarisation has introduced new dilemmas into the extension of public funding to religious groups other than Catholics and Calvinists. While school funding for any religious group (based on meeting certain criteria regarding population density and geography [McCarthy et al., 1981]) is protected in the Dutch constitution, the same does not apply for social services. Thus, decisions regarding granting of public funds to the increasing numbers of religious and ideological groups have created additional conflict, in part involving government estab-

lishment of religion. To avoid giving preferential treatment to the two major religious groups in the country, Dutch governments since the 1980s have granted public funds to many other religious groups to provide explicitly religiously-oriented social services, including groups such as Jews and Muslims (Monsma & Soper, 1997).

In summary, the Dutch approach has indeed tended to "establish" particular religious groups, particularly during the expansion of social services in the 1960s and 1970s when the vast majority of state funding for social services was funneled through nonprofit organizations, and the two major religious recipients were Catholics and Calvinists. However, this establishment effect has been restrained more recently as the Netherlands has struggled, like many other European countries, with the influx of a much more diverse group of immigrants (Slomp, 2000). The combined consequences of depillarisation and diverse immigration have tested the early commitment to religious freedom extended to Catholics and Calvinists. As Monsma & Soper (1997) concluded, "the theories of religious pluralism were much more than a rationalization for the advancement of its members' own causes. It was an ideology to which they were in reality committed. Jews, socialists, and secular humanists were early included within it, and today Muslims and Hindus are as well" (p. 82).

In contrast to the Netherlands, Canada's experience in relating church and state has been more ambiguous. Canada does not have a constitutional restriction separating church and state. While there have been, and continue to be, instances in which government has explicitly supported religious activities, the current practice is to regard religion as essentially a private affair over which government should have no authority or influence (Greene, 1999). The issue of public funding for religious activities is most pronounced in education. The BNA Act of 1867 gave a constitutional guarantee that religious minorities of that day would be eligible for complete public funding as an alternative to the provincially established public school for the religious majority. This constitutional guarantee was included as part of a complex deal to which both the French majority in Lower Canada—today the province of Quebec—and the English majority in Upper Canada—today the province of Ontario—could agree. In Lower Canada, the Roman Catholic

church was the religious majority, and the public schools were, therefore, Catholic. In Ontario, Protestants were in the majority, and public schools were Protestant. The constitutional compromise ensured that Protestants in Quebec and Catholics in Ontario would be guaranteed public funding for their alternative school system (Sweet, 1997; Morton, 1982). Over time, in English Canada, the established denominational majority schools became non-denominational, and the Catholic schools became known as the "separate schools."

On the question of the establishment of religion, it seems clear that governmental treatment of schools

*The Dutch compromise was
based on a social order
organized according to
faith communities.*

helped to advance the two most prominent religious groups in Canada at the time of confederation. Despite this establishment precedent, however, subsequent policy regarding schools has been mixed. Five of the ten provinces provide some form of financial support for religiously based schools other than Roman Catholic. Until proposals for change in spring of 2001, Canada's largest province, Ontario, has consistently refused to grant funding to private schools, partly on the grounds that it would undermine support for public schools, and that such funding would lean too far in government support for religion (Parents for Educational Choice, 2001).

The history of establishing faith-based social welfare organizations in Canada is much less clear. Virtually no attention has been given to the issue of FBOs providing social services and to what role they should play in providing public social services (Heimstra, 1999). The general practice appears to be an informal policy of allowing religious organizations to compete for public dollars for social services if they limit their activities to "secular" or religiously non-specific programs. Initially, then, the policy does not appear to advance any particular religious group over others, although much more information is needed before such a claim can be substantiated.

Our second question, namely to what extent does

the state encourage or encroach upon the free expression of religious diversity for those groups providing social services, relates to the so-called "free expression" clause of the First Amendment (Monsma, 2000). In other words, is government funding of faith-based social services accompanied by regulations that unduly limit a group from conducting its business in a way that is consistent with its religious beliefs? The challenge here is to find the right balance between appropriate monitoring of public funds on the one hand and the autonomy of religious organizations to incorporate specific religious practices into the way in which publicly-funded services are provided on the other hand (Frumkin, 2000). A related issue is whether individuals requiring services have their individual religious freedom curtailed by being forced to participate in religious practices against their will as a condition of receiving the services.

The Netherlands' approach to religious social service providers is widely seen as a more substantive and proactive defense of religious freedom than other more narrowly defined interpretations. Until recently, the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has interpreted religious freedom through the "no aid to religion" principle. This principle protects religious freedom by granting public funding only to groups that eliminate explicit religious expression from their publicly funded activities. However, an increasing number of scholars have used the Netherlands' approach to argue for "equal treatment" (Monsma & Soper, 1998), "positive neutrality" (Esbeck, 1996), or "substantive" neutrality (Monsma, 2000). Monsma & Soper (1997) show that Dutch government regulation of nonprofit activities is very extensive, but that these regulations and requirements are applied equally to activities common to all religious nonprofit organizations. The particular religious activities of the organizations are not regulated, however. Thus, FBOs receiving public money to provide publicly available social services are permitted to engage in such religious activities as prayer; reading from sacred books; adhering to personal lifestyle guidelines for behavior, dress, and conduct; and hiring on the basis of religious commitment. Monsma & Soper (1997) summarize regulation in this way:

The control of the Dutch government over nonprofit service organizations that receive public funding is great On the other hand, . . . the control exercised

by government officials usually does not extend to the religious activities and identifications of nonprofit organizations.(p. 79)

It seems clear that the Dutch have built on the foundations of pillarisation an approach that has not only protected religious expression, but more positively, has fostered it in a way that encourages all religious groups and disadvantages none. Furthermore, protecting and fostering of religious expression has been done while also recognizing individuals' and groups' rights to expression of secular belief systems.

As in the question about religious establishment, there is virtually no information about faith-based social service providers in Canada and the extent to which they feel their religious expression is restricted by government treatment. Hiemstra (1999), in a survey of 77 faith-based social agencies in the province of Alberta, found that the majority of agency directors found little curtailment of their religious expression as a consequence of government funding. At the same time, however, those organizations that had the most clearly articulated and distinct religious practices experienced greater restrictions to their religious expression. This suggests a tendency in Canada to restrict religious freedom unless the expression of it is more benign and limited to issues which are more likely to be less divisive. Again, the case in public education is instructive. As noted above, some provinces do provide public funding for independent, religiously-based schools. In these provinces, school officials generally have reported that government monitoring and accountability has been limited to provincial standards for curricula, and that religious instruction, symbols, activities, and hiring have been relatively free from government intrusion (Sweet, 1997).

The case of government mandated and funded residential schools for Canada's aboriginal peoples operated by the major mainline Christian churches up to 1969 provides a tragic example of the violation of the religious freedom of minority groups (Miller, 1999). Both the churches and the federal government currently face massive lawsuits initiated by aboriginal persons who were victims of abuses in the schools (Ottawa may aid, 2000). In addition to suffering horrendous physical and sexual abuse at the hands of church officials, aboriginal residents clearly had their religious practices systematically

and intentionally stripped from them. This example points to the extreme ways in which the partnership of church and state can be used to restrict and punish religious minorities. While these abuses have been acknowledged by both the churches and the federal government, this experience has understandably caused Canadians to be wary of infringements upon religious expression that can come from church-state partnerships.

The third question considers more specifically the implications of government-FBO partnerships for the welfare state and the appropriate role of government in relation to other sectors of society in providing social welfare (Berger & Neuhaus, 1996; Green, 1998). In debates of this topic, those on the political right have argued that the welfare state of the twentieth century set unrealistic expectations about what can be funded publicly, and what the proper role of government should be in meeting social needs (Brilliant, 1997; Johnson, 1987; Olasky, 1992). In the United States (De Vita, 1999), as well as in Europe (Lloyd, 2000), calls for greater responsibility for mediating institutions have been accompanied by, or some would argue, driven by, concomitant pressure for the devolution of responsibility for social welfare from the federal government to state and local institutions. Phrases such as "the third way" and "civil society" reflect moves toward greater responsibility for individuals and their immediate networks (such as family, church, school, and community), combined with decreasing responsibility from national governments (Burbidge, 1997). The question this trend raises is the extent to which "those most loudly calling for renewal of civil society insist that vibrant local communities are the *alternative* to governmental responsibility for social provision" (Bane et al., 2000, p. 11; emphasis added). Put another way, is new interest in the role of FBOs and their relationship to government part of an agenda to reduce governmental roles for social welfare (Johnson, 1987)? Are FBOs being asked to shoulder more of the social welfare load, and if so, is this motivated by declining commitment to collective social provision and a desire to reduce government's role in alleviating social problems?

The long history of support for religiously-based public services in the Netherlands shows that government funding of FBOs is not a new development,

and therefore it is illogical to link state-FBO partnerships with a reduced commitment to public social welfare. In the Netherlands, unlike many other industrialized welfare states, state support for particular religious groups predates extensive state welfare provision. Like other welfare states, the Netherlands has had to adjust to pressures such as globalization, high unemployment, and government deficits. However, the Dutch response has not been to question its commitment to the welfare state. Hemerijck (1999) documented the Netherlands' successful response to structural inactivity in the labor force, and concluded the following:

To what extent does the state encourage or encroach upon free expression of religion by groups providing social services?

[T]oday's social policy-makers have to deal with demographic aging, the new shape of working life and the new realities of double-income households and the new rules of global competition. The Dutch experience . . . gives reason for moderate optimism. Despite some continuing weaknesses, it has contradicted the scenarios of welfare without work and of jobless growth through its combination of sustained economic growth, low inflation, responsible wage moderation, extraordinary full-time, part-time and temporary job creation together with a revolutionary increase in female labour force participation, accompanied by important social policy reform. (p. 19 - 20)

Increasing economic and demographic pressures have resulted in adjustments to the way in which the Dutch government funds and regulates religious social service providers, however. First, increasing immigration representing many more cultures and religions has forced the Dutch to put their commitment to pluralism to the test. As noted above, the response has been a continued commitment to the underlying ideas of pillarisation such that religious groups other than the two main Catholic and Calvinist pillars have received public support. Monsma & Soper (1997) found that religious organizations have experienced increasing scrutiny from public officials driven by the need for greater accountability of public spending. Similarly, government has had to restrict funding to some religious

groups based on changing thresholds and criteria, and has forced some independent religious organizations to merge their services in order to realize some cost savings. On the whole, however, the Dutch commitment to the welfare state remains strong while at the same time support for faith-based social service providers has been maintained, not as a way to reduce governmental responsibility for social welfare, but because of a longstanding and deep commitment to religious and cultural pluralism.

Contrary to the Dutch experience, there seems to be little question that one of the central motives behind the increased attention to the third sector in Canada has been a search for more efficient and effective alternatives to a state-dominated social welfare system (Hall & Banting, 2000; McFarlane & Roach, 1999; Roach, 2000). While initially it was mostly neo-conservative and right wing groups arguing for this shift (April, Clemens, & Francis, 2000; Picard, 1996), more recently others from the center and left of the political spectrum have been exploring the viability of nonprofit organizations as well (Brock, 2000b; Lauziere, 2000). This recent focus has led to major initiatives by both the third sector and the government to explore the potential and challenges of strengthening the relationship between the two sectors (Brock, 2000b). As a result of work by task forces in both sectors, the federal government and an organization representing nonprofit organizations have launched a funded office to encourage and expand the capacity of the third sector (Voluntary Sector, 2000).

According to the best available information (Hall & Banting, 2000; Hirshorn, 1997), religious organizations constitute nearly half (estimates range from 40 - 45%) of all charitable organizations—the single largest category among all charitable nonprofit organizations in Canada. Unfortunately, as noted above, little attention has been given to the unique role and characteristics of these organizations. Similarly, in all the recent studies by government and nonprofit task forces, private think-tanks, and various policy analysts, religion is mentioned only in passing, despite the fact that 88% of Canadians identify themselves as religious adherents (Bibby, 2000). It is unclear why there is so little attention to the specific role of FBOs, even though it appears that they have had, and continue to have, a role in providing social, health, and educational services (Heimstra,

1999). Some observers have speculated that the general trend to secularization in Canada has led to a widespread assumption that religion is an individual and private matter, and therefore should have no bearing or role in public affairs or public policy (Stackhouse, 1994; Vandezande, 1999).

There are, however, signs that this attitude is changing. In the most recent federal election, in November 2000, the role of faith in public life came to the forefront when the leader of one of the political parties refused to downplay his evangelical Christianity (O'Leary, 2001; Walker, 2000). Despite controversy around this campaign, there has been increasing public discussion about the legitimacy of including religion in public life (Hoy, 2000; Public Justice Resource Centre, 1999). Nevertheless, this recognition seems to be limited to those who are already members of religious organizations. At this stage, discussion of the role of faith-based organizations and their relationship with government in the provision of social services is mostly ignored. There is, however, growing emphasis on a greater role for the nonprofit sector in the welfare state. Inasmuch as religious organizations are acknowledged as being part of this sector, it seems the primary motive, so far, has been to find ways of decreasing public responsibility for social welfare.

Implications for the Welfare State

Whether it will be the result of pressure to reduce the financial responsibility of governments or to rebuild the capacity of other social institutions, it seems clear that the welfare state of the twenty-first century will not look like the state-dominated versions of the twentieth century. The Netherlands has found a way to combine an advanced social democratic welfare state with faith-based institutions, while accommodating religious differences and providing generous benefits to its citizens. Because of these successes, the Dutch approach is often held up as an example that other countries should emulate. Though we cannot expect to transplant the Dutch model from the Netherlands' unique "soil" to other countries, it may be possible to learn from and incorporate its lessons into other contexts.

On that basis, the Netherlands' approach to religious diversity in providing social services has much to offer and is being tested in other contexts. For example, recent initiatives to provide government

support for FBOs providing social welfare in the U.S., referred to as “charitable choice,” borrow from the Dutch model (Glenn, 2000). One wonders whether a similar adaptation might also be possible in Canada or in other liberal welfare states.

Of course, this question assumes that increasing involvement of faith-based organizations in providing social services—and increased partnerships with government to do so—is a worthwhile pursuit in the first place. While some may lament the passing of the government-dominant welfare state (Johnson, 1987), the most compelling and convincing analyses of the future of the welfare state do not lie in attempts to recapture the twentieth century model. Whatever the motives, it seems that the “third sector” will have an increased role in providing social welfare in the future.

But, one may counter, does this necessarily mean that religion must be given a role too? On this question, the observation of one civil society analyst is instructive:

Where in this triangular framework of the first, second, and third sectors do we, or should we, locate the organizational structures of the faith communities of the world religions? Is it possible to bring to life proclaimed third sector values such as solidarity, compassion, responsible behavior, refusal of violence and oppression without seeking strategic alliances with the major world religions— Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism? In the pursuit of a more just society, the sector represented by organized religion, which I call the fourth sector, cannot be overlooked in any strategic design for societal transformation.... For the protagonists of civil society, the issue is not whether one does or does not welcome religion’s existence, influence, and involvement. They are simply there. (Verhagen, 1997, p. 265)

Verhagen is not alone in recognizing the crucial role of religion in the social fabric of twenty-first century life. Those who study religion as a sociological phenomenon increasingly recognize that, contrary to the predictions of nineteenth century rational modernists, religion is not simply a vestige of a less civilized era, but is fundamental to lived human experience (Bane, Coffin & Theimann, 2000; Cipriani, 2000; Ellwood, 1992). Even if one doubts the significance of religion for oneself, it would be simplistic to minimize the role of organized religion

in social welfare systems for tomorrow, particularly given the increasing attention to the third sector.

Assuming, then, that religion does have a legitimate role to play, what do these two countries teach about what may be possible for the welfare state? First, it seems important to disentangle the dual motivations to reduce the state’s role and to enhance the role of the religious voluntary sector. Canada’s experience indicates that when the motivation is narrowly focused on getting government out of the business of social welfare provision, the third sector can find itself potentially prostituted and co-opted. Worse, the role of

*Providing social welfare in
the future will require
balancing responsibility
between government and
other groups, including FBOs.*

religious organizations as part of this sector is virtually ignored, and the idea that religious faith can or should have any bearing on public issues is seen as anachronistic, fundamentalist, oppressive, or exclusive. However, we learn from the Netherlands that supporting religiously diverse groups to participate in the common good does not necessitate intolerance or exclusion. The commitment to public responsibility for social welfare and the commitment to religious diversity must be independent of one another. It seems neither viable nor just to make one a condition for the other.

Second, commitment to religious involvement in social provision must be deep enough to respect smaller minority groups who differ greatly from more established religious organizations. Failure to do so will result in violations of both the establishment and the free expression principles. If certain dominant or influential religious groups consistently appear to benefit from government funding or other policies to the exclusion of smaller groups, then, as argued in the American context, the practical application of the policy *de facto* favors (or “establishes”) certain groups over others (Minnow, 2000). Similarly, government partnering with religious organizations must be monitored carefully to

prevent the kind of gross violations of minority groups' religious expression demonstrated in the Canadian residential schools fiasco.

Finally, room must be given for persons to opt out of explicit religious expression or activity. Whether this choice is called secular, neutral, public, or something else matters less than that there is freedom on the part of individuals, groups, and government to live according to their own beliefs. The Dutch model of including secular as well as other religious pillars provides one example of how to do that. The Canadian model assumes that all public activity is secular and therefore neutral; while this approach certainly protects those who choose to be free from organized religion, it does so at the cost of violating both the establishment principle, by extending state support to a secular institutions over other equally legitimate (but religious) institutions, and the free religious expression principle, by forcing religious adherents to privatize their faith as a condition of public participation.

Conclusion

The pioneers and architects of the twentieth century welfare state might be horrified to see the edifices of social welfare provision dismantled. Defenders of the traditional welfare state view this dismantling as regressive. Another way to view this change, however, is that nation-wide systems of collective welfare provided important foundations upon which to develop more responsive, inclusive, sustainable, and participatory approaches to social welfare provision. Certainly, recent attention to civil society and the third sector have demonstrated both the limitations of state-driven models and the importance of contributions from other social groups and institutions.

Can or should organized religion be part of these new visions, and if so, how should religious organizations and governments relate to one another? While some may be wary of the increasing role of organized religion in public welfare provision—and point to compelling historical atrocities to substantiate their caution—the following questions raised by Verhagen issue a persuasive challenge to find ways to admit a positive role for religion in social well being:

The civil society agenda demands concerted action at community, national, and international levels to solve global issues. Can this agenda materialize if citizens themselves are not filled with an irrational faith, belief, and hope; a spiritual vision which rec-

ognizes that poverty and injustice can be overcome; a belief that conflicts can be prevented and peace will prevail; a recognition that each person is unique and deserves respect for his/her own sake and which sees each human being as belonging to a wider, interdependent universe? Who will feed that irrational optimism and spirituality at the personal, community and higher levels? In other words, can the aspirations of a value-driven, civil society movement be realized without due recognition of religious inspiration and motivation as underlying forces? (Verhagen, 1997, p. 266)

Although their approaches to social welfare and the roles of religious organizations vary widely, the Netherlands and Canada offer important lessons about the future of welfare provision and the interaction of state and faith-based organizations to meet collective needs. Proactive protection of religious (and other) diversity is clearly necessary in our multiethnic, pluralistic societies. However, pluralism cannot be reduced to individual differences that justify the retreat of the state from its responsibility for collective well-being. Instead, providing social welfare will require a delicate balancing of multiple and mutual responsibilities between government and other social institutions, including faith-based ones. Furthermore, the commitment to diversity and to religious freedoms must protect the smallest and most vulnerable groups from exploitation at the hands of dominant groups, and it must also allow citizens and groups to participate in public life without explicit adherence to formal religious doctrine and outside membership in religious organizations. Both the Netherlands' history of religious accommodation and recent openness to the role of faith in public life in Canada give hope for those committed to exploring new options for social welfare in the years ahead.

References

- April, B., Clemens, J., & Francis, J. (2000). *Preserving Independence: Does the Canadian Voluntary Sector Need a Voluntary Sector Commission?* Vancouver: The Fraser Institute.
- Axinn, J. & Stern, M. (2001). *Social Welfare: A History of the American Response to Need, 5th Ed.* Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
- Bane, M.J., Coffin, B., & Thiemann, R. (Eds). (2000). *Who Will Provide? The Changing Role of Religion in American Social Welfare.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Banting, K. (1987). *The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism, 2nd Ed.* Kingston, ON: McGill Queen's University Press.
- Barlow, M., & Campbell, B. (1995). *Straight Through the Heart: How the Liberals Abandoned the Just Society.* Toronto, ON: Harper Collins.
- Bellamy, D. & Irving, A. (1995). The bases of Canadian social welfare: Pioneers, in J. C. Turner & F.J. Turner (Eds). *Canadian Social Welfare, 3rd Ed.* Scarborough, ON: Allyn & Bacon, 89 - 118.
- Berger, P., & Neuhaus, R. (1996). *To Empower People: From State to Civil Society, 2nd Ed.* Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- Bibby, R. (2000). Canada's mythical religious mosaic: Some census findings, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 39, 2, 235 - 239.
- Blom, J.C.H. (2000). Pillarisation in perspective, *West European Politics*, 23, 3, 153-164.
- Brilliant, Eleanor L. (1997). Nonprofit organizations, social policy, and public welfare, in M. Reisch & E. Gambrill (Eds), *Social Work in the 21st Century.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 68-79.
- Brock, K. (2000a). Was Seattle Significant? The Emerging Interest in the Third Sector, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, [<http://qsilver.queensu.ca/sps/ThirdSector/Research>].
- Brock, K. (2000b). Sustaining a Relationship: Insights from Canada on Linking the Government and Third Sector, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for Third Sector Research, Dublin, July 5-8, 2000, [<http://policy.queensu.ca/sps/ThirdSector/Papers>].
- Burbidge, J. (Ed). (1997). *Beyond Prince and Merchant: Citizen Participation and the Rise of Civil Society.* New York, NY: Pact Publications.
- Cipriani, R. (2000). *Sociology of Religion: An Historical Introduction.* New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Cnaan, R. (1999). *The Newer Deal: Social Work and Religion in Partnership.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Day, P.J. (2000). *A New History of Social Welfare, 3rd Ed.* Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
- De Vita, C. J. (1999). Nonprofits and devolution: What do we know? in E.T. Boris & C.E. Steuerle (Eds), *Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and Conflict.* Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 213-233.
- Dionne Jr., E.J. & DiIulio Jr, J.J. (Eds). (2000). *What's God Got to do With the American Experiment?* Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press.
- Ellwood, R. (1992). *Many Peoples, Many Faiths: An Introduction to the Religious Life of Humankind, 4th Ed.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Esbeck, Carl H. (1997). A constitutional case for governmental cooperation with faith-based social service providers. *Emory Law Journal*, 46, 1, 1-41.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Frumkin, P. (2000). After partnership: Rethinking public-nonprofit relations, in M.J. Bane, B. Coffin, & R. Thiemann (Eds) *Who Will Provide? The Changing Role of Religion in American Social Welfare.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 198-218.
- Glenn, C. (2000). *The Ambiguous Embrace: Government and Faith-Based Schools and Social Agencies.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Goodin, R.E. & Smitsman, A. (2000). Placing welfare states: The Netherlands as a crucial test case, *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 2, 39-64.
- Goodin, R.E., Heady, B., Muffels, R. & Dirven, H.J. (1999). *The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Green, D. (1998). *Reinventing Civil Society: The Rediscovery of Welfare Without Politics.* London, GB: Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Greene, B. (1999). Public religion in a pluralist society: New ways of engaging civil society, in *Faith and Public Life: Challenges, Choices, and Opportunities: Examining the Public Role of Religion in a Changing Canada.* Toronto, ON: Public Justice Resource Centre.
- Guest, D. (1997). *The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, 3rd Ed.* Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press.
- Hall, M. & Banting, K. (2000). The Nonprofit Sector in Canada: An Introduction, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University [<http://policy.queensu.ca/sps/ThirdSector/Papers>].
- Hemerijck, A. (1999). Prospects for inclusive social citizenship in an age of structural inactivity, Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Working Paper 99/1, February 1999 [www.mpi-fgkoeln.mpg.de/publikation/working_papers/wp99-1].
- Hiemstra, J. (1999). *Government Relations with Religious Non-Profit Social Agencies in Alberta: Public Accountability in a Pluralist Society.* Calgary, AB: Canada West Foundation.
- Hirshorn, R. (Ed). (1997). *The Emerging Sector: In Search of a Framework.* Ottawa, ON: Canadian Policy Research Networks.
- Hirst, P. (1998). Can the European welfare state survive globalization? Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands in Comparative Perspective, *Working Paper Series in European Studies, Volume 2, Number 1*, Center for European Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

- [<http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/eur/works/hirst.html>].
- Hodgson, M. (1992). Rebuilding community after the residential school experience, in D. Engelstad & J. Bird (Eds) *Nation to Nation: Aboriginal Sovereignty and the Future of Canada*. Concord, ON: Anansi Press, 101-112.
- Hoy, C. (2000). Pushing the pendulum. *Maclean's*, 113, 37, 26-27.
- Jackson, A. (2000). *Why We Don't Have to Choose Between Social Justice and Economic Growth: The Myth of the Equity/Efficiency Trade-off*. Ottawa, ON: Canadian Council on Social Development.
- Jansson, B. (2001). *The Reluctant Welfare State: American Social Welfare Policies*, 4th Ed. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Johnson, N. (1987). *The Welfare State in Transition: The Theory and Practice of Welfare Pluralism*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Kramer, R. M. (1981). *Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Lauzier, M. (2000). The voluntary sector initiative: An opportunity to strengthen Canada. *Perception*, 24, 4, 2.
- Lijphart, A. (1968). *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Lloyd, J. (2000). The left discovers Adam Smith. *New Statesman*, 13, 609, 21-23.
- McCarthy, R., Oppewal, D., Peterson, W., & Spykman, G. (1981). *Society, State, & Schools: A Case for Structural and Confessional Pluralism*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing.
- McFarlane, S. & Roach, R. (1999). *Strings Attached: Non-profits and Their Funding Relationships with Government*. Calgary, AB: Canada West Foundation.
- McQuaig, L. (1995). *Shooting the Hippo: Death by Deficit and Other Canadian Myths*. Toronto, ON: Viking.
- Meilicke, C.A. & Storch, J.L. (Eds), (1980). *Perspectives on Canadian Health and Social Services Policy: History and Emerging Trends*. Ann Arbor, MI: Health Administration Press.
- Miller, J.R. (1999). The state, the church, and residential schools in Canada. Paper presented at Religion and Public Life, Queen's University, May 13-15, 1999.
- Minnow, M. (2000). Choice or commonality: Welfare and schooling after the welfare state, in M.J. Bane, B. Coffin, & R. Thiemann (Eds) *Who Will Provide? The Changing Role of Religion in American Social Welfare*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 147-177.
- Mishra, R. (1999). *Globalization and the Welfare State*. Northampton, MA: E. Elgar Press.
- Monsma, S. (2000). Substantive neutrality as a basis for free exercise — no establishment common ground. *Journal of Church and State*, 42, 1, 13-35.
- Monsma, S. & Soper, J.C., Eds. (1998). *Equal Treatment of Religion in a Pluralistic Society*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing.
- Monsma, S. & Soper, J.C. (1997). *The Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State in Five Democracies*. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Morton, W.L. (1982). *The Kingdom of Canada: A General History from Earliest Times*, 2nd Ed. Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart.
- Novick, M. & Shillington, R. (1996). *Crossroads for Canada: A Time to Invest in Children and Families*. Toronto, ON: Campaign 2000.
- Olasky, M. (1992). *The Tragedy of American Compassion*. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway.
- O'Leary, D. (2001). A velvet oppression: Conservative Christians are not faring well in Canada's brave new secular society. *Christianity Today*, April 3, 2001.
- Ontario Federation of Labour. (1996). Fact sheet on welfare. Don Mills, ON: Ontario Federation of Labour.
- Ottawa may aid churches in abuse suits. *Christian Century*, 117, 22, August 2-9, 2000, 789.
- Parents for Educational Choice. (2001). Frequently Asked Questions. [www.parentseduchoice.org].
- Picard, A. (1996). *A Call to Alms: The Voluntary Sector in the Age of Cutbacks*. Toronto, ON: Atkinson Charitable Foundation.
- Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario. (1994). *The Common Sense Revolution*. Toronto, ON: PC Party of Ontario.
- Public Justice Resource Centre. (1999). *Faith and Public Life: Challenges, Choices, and Opportunities: Examining the Public Role of Religion in a Changing Canada*. Toronto, ON: Public Justice Resource Centre.
- Roach, R. (2000). *Building Better Partnerships: Improving Relations Between Governments and Non-profits*. Calgary, AB: Canada West Foundation.
- Skillen, J. (1994). *Recharging the American Experiment: Principled Pluralism for Genuine Civic Community*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books.
- Skocpol, T. (2000). Religion, civil society, and social provision in the U.S., in M.J. Bane, B. Coffin, & R. Thiemann (Eds) *Who Will Provide? The Changing Role of Religion in American Social Welfare*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 21-50.
- Slomp, H. (2000). *European Politics into the Twenty-first Century: Integration and Division*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Stackhouse, J. G. (1994). Confronting Canada's secular slide: Why Canadian evangelicals thrive in a culture often indifferent to religious faith. *Christianity*

- Today* [Originally published in the July 18, 1994 issue, reprinted in the April 3, 2001 issue].
- Sweet, L. (1997). *The Fourth "R": Religion in Our Classrooms*. Toronto, ON: Atkinson Charitable Foundation.
- Terhorst, P. & Van de Ven, J. (1995). The national urban growth coalition in the Netherlands, *Political Geography*, 14, 4, 343-361.
- Toonen, T.A.J. (2000). Governing a consensus democracy: The interplay of pillarisation and administration, *West European Politics*, 23, 3, 165-176.
- Toonen, T.A.J. (1996). On the administrative condition of politics: Administrative transformation in the Netherlands, *West European Politics*, 19, 3, 609-633.
- Townson, M. (1999). *Pensions Under Attack: What's Behind the Push to Privatize Public Pensions*. Ottawa, ON: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.
- Trattner, W.I. (1999). *From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America*, 6th Ed. New York, NY: The Free Press.
- Turner, J. (1995). The bases of Canadian social welfare: The historical base, in J. C. Turner & F.J. Turner (Eds). *Canadian Social Welfare*, 3rd Ed. Scarborough, ON: Allyn & Bacon, 75-88.
- Vandezande, G. (1999). *Justice, not just us: faith perspectives and national priorities*, Mark R. Vander Vennen (Ed). Toronto: CPJ Public Resource Centre.
- Verhagen, K. (1997). Organized religion: The forgotten dimension, in J. Burbidge (Ed) *Beyond Prince and Merchant: Citizen Participation and the Rise of Civil Society*. New York, NY: Pact Publications.
- Voluntary Sector Initiative Secretariat. (2000). *Introducing the Voluntary Sector Initiative*. Ottawa, ON: Voluntary Sector Initiative Secretariat [<http://www.vsr-trsb.net>].
- Walker, R. (2000). Pickings are slim as Canadians go to the polls. *Christian Science Monitor*, November 24, 2000, p. 7.
- Wintle, M. (2000). Pillarisation, consociation and vertical pluralism in the Netherlands revisited: A European view, *West European Politics*, 23, 3, 139-152.
- Yelaja, S. (1992). *Canadian Social Policy*, 3rd Ed. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.