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Reformed Theological Ethics of Speech Communication

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Abstract

This project develops and applies a Biblically-based Reformed theological system of ethics for speech communication.

The dissertation includes a review of literature on ethics in speech communication and indicates that: 1) ethics is a significant concern in the field of speech communication, 2) no single normative ethical theory dominates, 3} each normative ethical theory currently advocated faces significant problems, 4) critical pieces applying normative standards are few, 5) little attention is given to ethics of religious speakers or broadcasters, and 6) the normative ethical theory based in Reformed theology, which is the subject of this dissertation, is undeveloped in the present literature.

Chapter Four develops the Reformed theological ethical system for communication. Grounding the nature of man in the image of God, this position yields three basic principles which form an organic whole: a high regard for the process of communication, a person's communication should show concern for the full direction of the life of the other person, and people should be given full respect. A description of subprinciples and practices implied by this position illustrates how this system is implemented and demonstrates it to be a comprehensive ethical theory for communication. Comparison of this position with other normative ethical theories being advocated currently in speech communication shows that this theory handles many problems better than other theories and thus it should receive a commensurate place in our discipline.

Several speeches of Dr. Joel Nederhood, radio minister of *The Back to God Hour* which is under the auspices of the Christian Reformed Church, are examined to discover how the Reformed position for ethics operates in guiding rhetorical choices in public discourse.

It is recommended that the Reformed position for ethics be applied to other types of communication to further demonstrate its potential for communication.Also, it might be applied fruitfully to other media

preachers to determine the extent to which they are communicating ethically in this view. Questions of the relation of ethics and success in communication need further study. Finally, a suggestion is made that this perspective be further examined for its implications toward a comprehensive theory of communication in terms of the possibility of the term "normative" being broader than an ethical concept.

Keywords
speech communication, ethics, Christianity, Reformed theology, public discourse, Back to God Hour, Joel Nederhood

Disciplines
Christianity | Communication | Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion | Speech and Rhetorical Studies

Comments
- A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, University of Nebraska
- Dr. James F. Klumpp, Major Professor
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A REFORMED THEOLOGICAL ETHICS OF

SPEECH COMMUNICATION

by

Charles D. Veenstra

A DISSERTATION

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The Graduate College in the University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements

For the Degreee of Doctor of Philosophy

Major: Interdepartmental Area of

Speech and Dramatic Art

(Speech Communication)

Under the Supervision of Professor James F. Klumpp

Lincoln, Nebraska

October, 1981

A REFORMED THEOLOGICAL ETHICS OF

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Charles D. Veenstra, Ph.D.

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Advisor: James F. Klumpp

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Chapter I

Introduction

A Biblically-based system for ethics is the oldest

ethical system in recorded history. The ethical impera-

tives of man's relationship to man were echoed already

in Cain's complaint: "Am I my brother's keeper?"[1] The

ethical code for communication was made more specific by

the commandment: "You shall not give false testimony

against your neighbor."[2] The New Testament continued

the Old Testament's exhortation to love God and one's

neighbor with the requirement of "speaking the truth in

love."[3]

Although interpretations of the Biblical perspective

for ethics have varied and the vitality of this perspec-

tive in many people's lives has continued throughout

history, neither moral philosophers nor communication

scholars have systematically developed a Biblical pers-

pective for the ethics of communication. In recent times,

[1] Gen. 4:9.

[2] Exod. 20:16.

[3] Eph. 4:15.

moral philosophers seem implicitly to have left Biblical
Christian ethics to the theologians or to have dismissed
summarily a Biblical system of ethics as inadequate for
modern man. Certainly they have not applied Biblical
ethics to communication. Meanwhile, theologians have
developed normative ethical systems based on the Bible
but have neither applied these systems to communication
nor have shown how these systems can or should be applied
to communication. Communication scholars have either
neglected systematic study of ethics in speech communica-
tion, alternatively arguing that such topics belong to
philosophers and that they are personal matters for scho-
lars,[4] or have borrowed the ethical systems of moral
philosophers and applied them quite loosely to communica-
tion situations.[5]

The major objective, then, of this project is the
development and application of a Biblically-based system
of ethics for public discourse. Interpretations of the
Bible vary considerably and no attempt will be made here
to synthesize these various, and at times conflicting
views. Instead, I will develop and apply to communication

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[4] Gordon I. Zimmerman, James L. Owen, and David R.
Siebert, Speech Communication: A Contemporary Introduc-
tion (St. Paul: West, 1977), p. 370.

[5] See Chapter Three of this dissertation.

a system of ethics which grows out of the Reformed tradi-
tion. This tradition developed out of the Reformation of
the sixteenth century which sought a return to Biblical
Christianity from the doctrines the Roman Catholic Church
taught and practiced at the beginning of modern history.
The tradition maintains that it is faithful to the
teachings of the Scriptures. Important scholars in the
Reformed tradition include, in chronological order:
John Calvin, Abraham Kuyper, Louis Berkhof, Gerrit C.
Berkouwer, Henry Stob, and many others. Since this tra-
dition is not simply concerned with theology but seeks a
consistent world-and-life view with practical applica-
tion to all of daily living, it is appropriate for us to
examine its implications for ethical communication.

The plan for this project includes six chapters.
The present one introduces the subject and states the
problem to be addressed. The second discusses the ap-
proach for developing a Reformed theological perspective
and applying it to the ethics of communication. The
third chapter is a comprehensive review of literature on
ethics of speech communication. The fourth chapter de-
velops the Reformed theological perspective for the
ethics of speech communication, describing the faith as-
sumptions inherent in this view, the major tenets de-
veloped by important theologians, particularly those

tenets which have reference to communication. Exposition
of the value propositions which these tenets imply for
the ethics of communication is a major goal. The fifth
chapter examines the functioning of the Reformed view
of ethics of speech communication in the speaking of
Dr. Joel Nederhood, radio minister of the Christian
Reformed Church's <u>The Back to God Hour</u>. The final chap-
ter elaborates on some conclusions about ethics and
speech communication and indicates some directions for
future work.

Chapter II

Developing and Utilizing an Ethical System

Since speech communication scholars have not fully explored procedures for developing and utilizing ethical systems, this chapter is important in establishing the method of approaching ethics and communication. Rhetorical critics certainly have made ethical judgments about speakers and speech practices but they have been far from systematic in describing how such procedures should be done. Relationships between ethics and communication seem to be assumed rather than explained by communication scholars. Consequently, tracing out the connections between these two areas of study should help sensitize communicators to the inherent ethical issues in communication. This groundwork is necessary before an adequate ethical system can be developed and applied in discourse. It will demonstrate the complexities involved in evaluating communication ethics.

The Nature of Ethical Study

Ethics is that branch of philosophy which deals with conceptions of the good and with right and wrong behavior. Far from an isolated discipline, it intricately relates to study of human behavior. The study of ethics is generally divided into two parts or types: metaethics, also called analytical ethics, and normative ethics. Metaethics is a highly technical discipline which analyzes the meaning of technical terms and sentences. Students of metaethics ask such questions as: What is the meaning of the term "good"? How is "good" to be distinguished from "right"? Can "good" be defined in naturalistic terms or is it a simple quality which is not analyzable into constituent parts? Can an "ought" be derived from an "is"? How does the ethicist arrive at his conclusions? Metaethics is concerned with logical study of moral language: Is a method possible at all? And if so, what are the methods by which moral judgments are established? McCloskey adds:

> We enter the sphere of meta-ethics when we
> reflect about what we are doing when we make
> a moral judgement, for instance, whether we
> are reporting on the nature of certain moral

> facts, or simply expressing our feelings,
> or reporting[1] on what we believe to be willed
> by God, etc.

Normative ethics, on the other hand, involves a critical study of various questions, such as: What things are good? What acts are right? What is praiseworthy? And what is the basis for calling acts ethical or unethical? Taylor defines a normative ethics system as a "set of principles by reference to which anyone can determine, in any situation of choice, what he ought or ought not to do."[2] Normative ethics involves inquiry into the grounds for justifying a set of moral norms applicable to all people and inquiry into procedures for constructing systems of norms. Thus normative ethics seeks the development of particular ethical systems or principles or treats ethical aspects of certain issues.

To these two generally recognized types of ethical study, McCloskey adds:

> There is therefore clearly a distinction to be
> drawn between the making of moral judgements
> and the expressing of moral points of view on

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[1] H. J. McCloskey, Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1969), p. 1.

[2] Paul W. Taylor, ed., Problems of Moral Philosophy: An Introduction to Ethics, 2nd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson, 1972), p. 137.

the one hand, and the philosophic activity of
developing a normative ethic on the other.
Nevertheless, in practice there is not always
a sharp distinction, and the one may merge into
the other in such a way that it is not always
easy to decide when a person is setting out his
moral views and when he is doing more, namely
developing a normative ethic.[3]

McCloskey also argues that the present century's distinc-

tion between metaethics and normative ethics is no easier

to maintain than the separation between normative ethics

and the making of moral judgments:

Similarly, whilst there is a clear conceptual
distinction between meta-ethics and normative
ethics, it can be misleading to press the dis-
tinction too sharply, for the moral philosopher
who embarks on a normative ethic must . . .
ultimately move into meta-ethics to complete
his inquiry. Hence it is that it is misleading
to press a very sharp distinction between the
two sorts of inquiry.[4]

The development of an ethical system as this project

envisions involves all three aspects of ethical study:

metaethical considerations, the development of a normative

ethic, and the application of that ethic to public dis-

course. In developing the ethical system, a Reformed

theological view, we will need to consider metaethical

questions such as: What does "good" mean in this view?

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[3] McCloskey, *Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics*, p. 4.

[4] McCloskey, *Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics*, p. 4.

What is right? What types of arguments are used in the construction of this system, i.e., how does one get from the grounds of moral norms to conclusions for communication? Specifically, I will build from assumptions about the religious nature of man toward a basis for judgments of ethical and unethical communication. The development of a normative ethical system requires that we consider questions such as: What is the basis of the Reformed view? What ethical norms derive from this view? What ethical norms specifically apply to communication? The application of this normative system to a particular speaker, Dr. Joel Nederhood, will involve the third type of ethical activity that McCloskey suggests. The process of application will also help to better understand both the normative ethical system for communication and the answering of the metaethical questions in concrete situations.

Normative ethical theories are frequently divided by the argumentative roots of moral judgments of an act. Teleological ethical theories argue from the consequences of an act. For example, in a utilitarian theory, an act or rule is judged moral or right if it produces the best possible consequences for the people involved. Deontological ethical theories argue from principles; that is, an act is right or wrong by virtue of its being an act of

this or that kind. For example, in Kant's theory, an act

is moral or right if it is in accord with a good will.

Dewey and Hurlbutt explain this distinction more fully:

> In the first place, there are those theories
> which tend to take the rightness or wrongness
> of actions or rules as basic. For them, judg-
> ments of moral obligation are logically and
> conceptually prior to judgments of value. They
> are called deontological theories. . . .
>   A profound contrast is found in the ethical
> ideas of the second group of thinkers who make
> judgements of value basic. Their theories are
> called teleological. They maintain that men
> can know how they ought to act, only if they
> know whether their actions are likely to pro-
> duce good results. . . .[5]

Perhaps it is best not to think of these as entirely

exclusive types of ethical theories but rather as elements

balanced differently in distinctive ethical theories.

Certainly conceptualizing an ethical theory which totally

avoids any consideration of consequences is difficult.

Even Kant considers in applying his supreme principle of

morality what the consequences would be if everyone per-

formed a certain kind of action, e.g., made a lying pro-

mise even though his moral criterion is not called utili-

tarian. Likewise ethical theories which concentrate on

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[5] Robert E. Dewey and Robert H. Hurlbutt, III,
eds., An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Macmillan,
1977), p. 106. Taylor states that all normative ethical
theories can be divided into these two camps. See Taylor,
Problems of Moral Philosophy, p. 197.

consequences as the essential element in the considera-
tion of right and good tend to establish rules of es-
sences for guidance in ethical decisions. For them,
definitions of "good" need to be at least partially
standardized across situations. Nevertheless, each of
these types of theories has quite different starting
points.

The system to be developed in this paper would pro-
bably be called "deontological" since it argues from
principles, that is, it judges actions to be inherently
morally right before considering consequences. Because
it is a deontological system, I will have to explain the
nature of man in relationship with God which forms the
basis for principles of right action. Nevertheless, con-
sequences are important as factors in the implementing
of these principles. And, it seems that a desirable
deontological system would also have beneficial conse-
quences. Thus I will examine how these principles for
communication work out in society, keeping in mind that
consequences are not a starting point or beginning ground
of this ethical system but the logical result. Ulti-
mately the two should fit together comfortably as Eubanks
recommends when he says that the deontic and the telic
will come together in an adequate ethical system for

communication.[6]

Another important distinction in ethical study is
the separation of ethical theories into either theono-
mous or autonomous ethics.[7] Theonomous, or "God-cen-
tered," ethics account for the being of God and His way
of dealing with people in relationship to Him. These
ethical theories begin and end with God while autonomous
ethical theories begin and end with man. The division
between these two types of theories is radical. Auto-
nomous ethics would cut man loose from any references
to divine commands or divine standards of morality.
Although both of these two groups are concerned with
proper actions of people, any ethical theory will fall
into one or the other.

Since this paper is about theonomous ethics, I will
discuss man in relationship to God, i.e., his religious
character and how this character is manifested in commu-
nication. Furthermore, since a presupposition of this
view is that man is created by God and therefore in re-
lationship with Him, we cannot begin to understand this

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[6] Ralph T. Eubanks, "Reflections on the Moral Dimen-
sion of Communication," Southern Speech Communication
Journal, 45 (Spring 1980), 304-305.

[7] Nick Van Til, Ethics (unpublished manuscript
available at Dordt College, Sioux Center, Iowa), p. 2.

ethical view by examining autonomous man, i.e., trying to see man existing without his being in relationship to God would be ignoring essential aspects of this view. Nor can we begin our discussion by considering consequences or situations. Of necessity that must come later. The starting point must be in the religious nature of man.

The above two approaches to ethics should not be confused with the separation that is sometimes attempted between theological ethics and philosophical ethics. Theological ethics begins with the study of God while philosophical ethics may or may not begin with the study of God. While it is true that philosophy and theology often function as separate disciplines and a tradition of separation has developed in the study of ethics, this does not mean that they are always separate on the basis of principle. Since ethics itself is a branch of philosophy, philosophical ethics can include theological ethics even though one rarely finds much discussion of theological ethics in modern ethics textbooks. Neither is ethical study the sole property of philosophy. Ethics is quite rightly the concern of many disciplines in much the same way that many disciplines are concerned with philosophy.

Having made some necessary distinctions at the

outset, we can now examine the constituents of an ethical theory. Any ethical theory or system contains within it certain assumptions which the proponent accepts as given. These assumptions underlie propositions of value and constitute the faith that the advocate of a particular ethical theory maintains. An advocate's faith may lie, for example, in his confidence that he can trust reason to guide in the formation of ethical propositions and value judgments. Another's faith may perhaps lie in his own intuition as the ultimate guide. These assumptions guide the activity of the ethicist in the construction of an ethical thory, although they are not always stated explicitly. From these underlying assumptions the ethicist develops ethical theory which involves standards of value and standards of acceptable action based on the standards of value. As noted above, the ethicist will generally argue on a teleological or a deontological basis to justify right actions. At times, he will pronounce and defend judgments of ethical conduct in a particular situation. Much of the activity in ethical study consists of logical defense of the methods of making judgments as well as defense of the actual decisions.

Since much of the work of Chapter Four is of a philosophical nature, an additional comment about the nature of the philosopher's task is warranted. The

philosopher's responsibility is to recognize connections
and presuppositions and attempt to justify positions.
Although logic plays an important role in the philoso-
pher's work, logic alone is ill-equipped to explain the
underlying faith assumptions on which a particular
theory is based. He can examine the connections of this
faith to principles and practice and it is at this point
that logic will serve as one important tool in this
study. He also studies the implications of these faith
assumptions. By explaining connections and implications
without insisting on a logical critique of faith assump-
tions per se, the philosopher does not automatically
presuppose that ultimate validity is grounded in natural
reason. He does recognize the influence of presupposi-
tions.[8] Faith assumptions play an important part in
the philosopher's justification of ethical positions.

Development of a Religious Perspective
for Ethics of Communication

In a comprehensive treatment of the development of
an ethical system, the scholar explains the *a priori*

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[8] Cf. Peter A. Schouls, "Communication, Argumenta-
tion and Presupposition in Philosophy," Philosophy and
Rhetoric, 2 (Fall 1969), 183-99.

assumptions underlying the system he is explaining, the grounds for value propositions, the means of deducing the meaning of the value propositions and why they are defensible, and the final application of these standards to particular actions. At each step he provides explanation and justification for the necessary connections. Thus the procedure for my development of a Christian ethic of communication is: 1) stating faith assumptions which are involved in the Reformed theological perspective for ethics, 2) describing the basic tenets of the Reformed position which grow out of its faith assumptions, 3) explaining the value propositions that follow from the basic tenets, 4) discussing how one who holds the Reformed view arrives at standards which guide action--and specifically which guide communication, and 5) examination of the standards in practice in public speeches of a radio minister. The first four of these items constitutes Chapter Four of this project while Chapter Five involves an examination of the communication strategies of a speaker as they relate to ethical standards.

I implement this format in the following way. A survey of literature in Chapter Three demonstrates the paucity of studies in ethics of speech communication from the particular religious perspective that is the

subject of this dissertation. Then Chapter Four develops the Reformed perspective. Based upon research in Reformed theology, I state the faith assumptions that are inherent in this view. Next, I describe the basic tenets of this position that grow out of its faith assumptions. This involves an examination of the tenets developed by such theologians and scholars as, for example, John Calvin, Abraham Kuyper, Louis Berkhof, Gerrit C. Berkouwer, and others who stand within the Reformed tradition. Major tenets of Reformed theology which deal specifically with the nature of man are developed with necessary reference to the centrality of communication to the nature of man as created in the image of God. Inherently involved in this discussion of the nature of man is the religious character of that nature and thus definitions and characteristics of religion need to be explored briefly. Following exposition of major tenets of Reformed theology which have application to ethics of speech communication, I discuss the value propositions these tenets imply. I also deal with the question of how one who holds this view arrives at standards which guide ethical communication. The practical application of these standards for ethical communication is more fully demonstrated in Chapter Five where I examine selected speeches of a radio minister.

Later in this chapter I specify in greater detail how I will describe the rhetorical techniques he uses, identify the standards to be applied, and make an ethical evaluation with appropriate justification.

A few additional comments on the procedure for developing a religious perspective for the ethics of speech communication are needed. As indicated, the method of procedure involves developing arguments of major theologians within the Reformed tradition. Although these theologians base their position on the Bible, I do not get deeply involved in hermeneutics.

Reformed theologians have dealt extensively with the nature of man in relation to God and also with man's responsibilities, but generally they have not developed necessary implications of their positions on the nature of man as created in the image of God for communication. It is at these points where implications for communication have not been developed that I argue that a particular position for communication can be developed from the bases laid by various theologians. I use their positions as starting points and argue the logical extensions that result. These logical extensions yield major principles for ethical communication from a Reformed perspective. In other words, I use their tenets to develop standards of value which serve as ethical

guidelines for speech communication.

At times I move beyond Reformed theologians' comments to discover principles of ethical communication which are inherent in the view of the Bible held by these people but which are not discussed by them. Furthermore, some principles for ethical communication are spelled out quite clearly in the Bible itself and thus theologians may not have thought it necessary to discuss these.

In sum, this is not primarily a theological treatise. Rather than doing theology, I demonstrate how theologians' positions can be used to help us in thinking about ethical communication.

The Relation Between Ethics and Communication

Much has been written on the relation of ethics and human communication. Chapter Three extensively reviews these writings. A brief discussion here of the relation between them is needed in order that we may see that the subject of this dissertation is a unified whole rather than a study of ethics and then a study of communication.

Human communication may be defined as the dynamic, interactive process of engendering meaning in persons

by means of signals and symbols. In this paper the concern is with one type of communication--oral public discourse. Traditionally public discourse refers to a speaker talking to an audience. Size of the audience is insignificant for our purposes here.

Since communication is a mutual influencing process, one person cannot help but have an impact on others. The axiom "one cannot not communicate" illustrates the dynamic function of communication.[9] Whenever one person affects another, questions that necessarily arise include: Is the person who is influencing another doing so from proper principle? Are his motives right? Is he influencing the other in right or wrong ways, for good or bad ends? Thus we are directly involved in ethical questions for ethics deals with conceptions of the good and with right and wrong behavior. Ethical questions are a type of value question concerning proper principles and action. Hospers indicates that "ethics is concerned with pronouncing judgments of value upon human behavior."[10] Certainly communication ought to be

[9] Paul Watzlawick, Janet H. Beavin, and Don D. Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), p. 48.

[10] John Hospers, Human Conduct: Problems of Ethics, Shorter ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), p. 6.

considered a type of human action or behavior. "What
is good communication?" is thus an ethical question be-
cause it involves conceptions of the good. This project
demonstrates this integral relationship. Ethics deals
with more than simply describing moral or immoral
action; it analyzes theoretical bases and practical
application of moral standards in particular situations.
The question "What is good communication?" implies that
our concern is with theoretical bases and practical
application of moral standards.

The study of communication raises questions such
as: How does a technique work? Under what circum-
stances does it work? What are the effects of its
use? Such study, however, if it only extends to these
types of questions, is necessarily incomplete because
the questions implicitly assume that communication is
an amoral activity. On the contrary, by its very na-
ture, any communicative act is not neutral. Communica-
tion is central to man and man is not a neutral crea-
ture. Eubanks insists that man's essential nature is
one of valuing: "To live as a man is to choose between
better or worse on the basis of values. . . ."[11]

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[11] Eubanks, "Reflections on the Moral Dimension of
Communication," p. 305.

Communication then reflects this valuing, as does all
of a person's behavior. A person's moral code is his
basis for guiding action.

People are influenced through communication accor-
ding to right or wrong principles, in right or wrong
ways, for good or bad ends. If communication scholars
ignore questions of moral value involved in communica-
tion techniques or acts, then practitioners are left to
make decisions on the basis of personal moral standards
without help from the scholar who may be in a position
to assist the practitioner. Furthermore, if the scholar
ignores ethical questions, the implication may be left
that the technique is indeed neutral. The presence
of brief comments in communication literature about
such things as falsification of evidence, for example,
testify that at least some techniques are not neutral.
This literature seldom clearly draws distinctions be-
tween some techniques as amoral and others as moral or
immoral. My position is that no techniques are amoral,
that is, there is always a moral dimension inherent in
a rhetorical technique.

Several communication scholars stress the inherent
relation between ethics and communication. Arnold

argues that rhetorical acts "always have ethical dimensions."[12] Johannesen writes:

> Potential ethical issues are inherent in any instance of communication between humans to the degree that the communication involves possible influence on other humans and to the degree that the communicator consciously chooses specific ends sought and communicative means used to achieve those ends.[13]

The matter of conscious choice is important since ethics concerns itself primarily with the conscious. Nilsen puts the issue this way:

> Every act of speech is essentially a social act, influencing the attitudes or behavior of others. Therefore, rather than attempt to divide communication into moral and nonmoral, we will think of every communicative act as having an ethical component--as carrying some degree of ethical charge. Virtually every act of speech, then, involves an ethical obligation.[14]

Patton and Giffin argue similarly about language:

[12] Carroll C. Arnold, _Criticism of Oral Rhetoric_ (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1974), p. 274.

[13] Richard L. Johannesen, _Ethics of Human Communication_ (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1975), pp. 11-12.

[14] Thomas R. Nilsen, _Ethics of Speech Communication_, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), p. 17.

"It is ridiculous to consider language a neutral medium

of exchange. Specific words are selected for our use

because they do affect behavior."[15]   I would argue that

to the extent we influence others we become responsible

for our influence. We have influenced them to act in

one way or another by our communication. In discussing

the ethics of interpersonal communication, Condon con-

cludes: "No attempt to describe what we feel interper-

sonal communication _is_ can be fully separated from what

we feel interpersonal communication _ought to be_."[16]

Consequently Rogge affirms that the speech critic is

not accorded the "luxury of philosophical detachment

from worldly affairs . . . the critic must be a moral-

ist."[17]

Thus we see that communication ethics are integral

to comprehensive social ethics. However, one finds

little treatment of communication in the work of moral

philosophers. In fact, the trend in moral philosophy

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[15] Bobby R. Patton and Kim Giffin, _Interpersonal
Communication in Action: Basic Text and Readings_, 2nd
ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 290.

[16] John C. Condon, Jr., _Interpersonal Communica-
tion_ (New York: Macmillan, 1977), p. 202.

[17] Edward Rogge, "Evaluating the Ethics of a
Speaker in a Democracy," _Quarterly Journal of Speech_,
45 (Dec. 1959), 419-25.

in recent times has moved in the direction of abstract metaethical thinking rather than analysis of concrete ethical problems in daily life. Bok explains why this is so:

> In most fields, theory is more congenial, less frustrating, than application. Ethics is no different. Many hesitate to grapple with concrete ethical problems intertwined as they are with psychological and political strands rendering choice so difficult. Why tackle such choice when there are so many abstract questions of meaning and definitions, of classification and structure, which remain to challenge the imagination?[18]

She adds that the result is that "practical moral choice comes to be given short shrift."[19]

Application to a Speaker

Those writing about the methods of rhetorical critics have said little about methods of making ethical evaluation.[20] Several important books on rhetorical criticism provide no help at all in explaining the

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[18] Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 10.

[19] Bok, Lying, p. 11.

[20] James W. Chesebro, "A Construct for Assessing Ethics in Communication," Central States Speech Journal, 20 (Summer 1969), 105.

methods of ethical criticism even though some admit that

ethical criticism is important.[21]

Cathcart's prescriptions for ethical criticism are

extremely limited. About the speaker's ethics he says:

> The critic will analyze and judge the means by
> which the speaker reveals his sincerity, his
> trustworthiness, and his knowledge in the
> speech. The critic will not make absolute
> judgments about the speaker as a man, but will
> judge the man as a speaker. He will condemn
> the speaker who misleads an audience about his
> expertness or authority. He will equally con-
> demn the speaker who is an authority but fails
> to reveal this to his listeners. . . .[22]

In explaining the ethical component of the system

of dramatistic rhetorical criticism, which she prefers,

Campbell argues:

> The ethical criterion determines the social
> worth of the rhetorical act and defines stan-
> dards for the humane use of persuasive

[21] See, for example, Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criti-
cism: A Study in Method (New York: Macmillan, 1965);
Anthony Hillbruner, Critical Dimensions: The Art of Pub-
lic Address Criticism (New York: Random House, 1966);
Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963); Thomas
Nilsen, ed., Essays on Rhetorical Criticism (New York:
Random House, 1968); Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock,
Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth Century
Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); and Lester
Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York:
Ronald Press, 1948).

[22] Robert S. Cathcart, Post Communication: Criticism
and Evaluation (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 25.

discourse. In using this criterion, the critic selects the values or ideas he believes rhetoric should support or exemplify.[23]

She adds:

> The critic is involved in difficult appraisals as he evaluates to what extent discourses give evidence of mutual understanding and increase the audience's capacity to choose, to act, and to unify into groups so that identification and cooperation become possible.[24]

While she thus clearly states what needs to be considered, she offers little help on the method of justifying an ethical judgment, i.e., what must go into the argument.

Chesebro is more specific:

> When applying an ethical standard to a particular case of communicative behavior, initially the critic must determine the full meaning of the communicative act by examining the act from all possible perspectives. The critic, then, would seek to understand and describe the relationships that exist between the communicative act or message and the nature of the speaker, rhetorical situation, the rhetorical techniques, and the stated motive as given by the speaker.[25]

[23] Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, _Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric_ (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1972), p. 34.

[24] Campbell, _Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric_, p. 37.

[25] Chesebro, "A Construct for Assessing Ethics," p. 111.

From this point he suggests using Kenneth Burke's pentad
to identify all possible rhetorical relationships and
explains its application to ethical assessments:

> A critic must first select a standard or set
> of standards to measure the morality of the
> speaking act. The critic then employs the ten
> ratios to describe the act within a context.
> Finally, the ethical decision is made by
> checking or measuring the ethical standard
> against the descriptive analysis of each of
> the ten ratios.[26]

He does not say whether the analysis of each of the ten
ratios would go into the <u>writing</u> of ethical criticism.
If so, the ethical piece would become extremely cumber-
some. He does say: "In large measure the critic's con-
clusions regarding the speaker's motives must stem from
both the <u>completeness of the method of analysis</u> and the
<u>quality of the evidence</u> offered to sustain the conclu-
sions."[27]

Croft works with evaluation of idea adaptation, but
does not specifically discuss ethical evaluation. He
says rhetorical evaluation will attempt to discover:

[26] Chesebro, "A Construct for Assessing Ethics," p.
112.

[27] Chesebro, "A Construct for Assessing Ethics," p.
114.

(1) the basic values on which the speaker rests
his specific proposals; (2) the specific pro-
posals themselves; (3) the manner in which the
speaker attempts to connect values with propo-
sals in the minds of his audience; (4) the
extent to which these connections were appro-
priate to the audience being addressed.[28]

Certainly discovery of these things would be essential to

an ethical critique.

Arnold adapts Frankena's method of making ethical

critiques to speech acts and argues:

. . . the specifications are no more rigorous
than the specifications we impose on a compe-
tent critique of the art of a speaker. In
both cases we ask for: a defense of the norms
applied, an explanation of their appropriate-
ness in the case at issue, reasons for admiring
achievement of the possible and for regretting
any shortcoming, a defense of one's evaluation
in light of the data and the "ideal," and
inferences concerning whether the critical
judgment can be generalized to all like
cases.[29]

In asking that scholars conduct both rhetorical and ethi-

cal criticism, Arnold asserts that each is based on a

different set of norms--a position which is difficult to

maintain. Apparently he views a rhetorical principle as

one which is concerned with success in speaking while an

[28] Albert J. Croft, "The Functions of Rhetorical
Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 42 (Oct. 1956),
283-91.

[29] Arnold, Criticism of Oral Rhetoric, p. 276.

ethical principle deals with right and wrong, although
he suggests that ultimately the two should come together
in criticism.[30]

Johannesen not only urges ethical criticism of com-
munication, but also offers guidelines for it:

> In making judgments of the ethics of our own
> communication and the communication to which
> we are exposed, our aim should be specific
> rather than vague assessments, and carefully
> considered rather than reflex-response "gut
> level" reactions.[31]

He explains that one avoids "gut level" reactions:

> (1) by specifying exactly what ethical crite-
> ria, standards, or perspectives we are ap-
> plying, (2) by justifying the reasonableness
> and relevancy of these standards, and (3) by
> indicating in what respects the communication
> fails to measure up to the standards.[32]

I would immediately modify his third statement by insis-
ting that when communication succeeds in measuring up to
ethical criteria, we ought to commend the speaker.[33]

We may conclude, then, that the application of
standards in the making of an ethical judgment seems to

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[30] Arnold, Criticism of Oral Rhetoric, pp. 277-78.

[31] Johannesen, Ethics of Human Communication, p. 15.

[32] Johannesen, Ethics of Human Communication, p. 15.

[33] Hillbruner, Critical Dimensions, p. 155.

require the following. 1) Standards must be clear. If
necessary, a brief defense of these standards may be
given. 2) The technique to be evaluated should be des-
cribed, analyzed, and interpreted. 3) The extent to
which the technique measures up to the ethical criteria
being used should be indicated. 4) Additional reasons
or arguments to justify the ethical evaluation should be
offered if necessary. As Arnold suggests, a defense of
one's evaluation in light of the data and the ideal may
be required. 5) Finally, it may be helpful for the
critic to consider the extent to which this judgment can
be generalized to other cases.

The objects for analysis and evaluation in this
project are selected representative speeches of Dr. Joel
Nederhood, radio minister of The Back to God Hour. Seve-
ral reasons can be offered for my choice of this particu-
lar speaker. First, there has been no rhetorical criti-
cism of him that has been published in scholarly works.
Thus my work is original. Second, Dr. Nederhood is a
significant speaker in terms of his tenure on the program
as the principal speaker since 1965, the expansion of
the program into nations beyond the United States and
Canada, the large number of stations (269) that carry
this broadcast and thus the large audience of an esti-
mated 1,100,000 listeners that he reaches, and the growth

of the organization he heads into television as well as radio.[34] Third, Nederhood stands within the Reformed tradition and it seems fair to say that he would probably agree with the developed perspective. Although it can be argued that this ethical perspective is one that can be applied to speakers in many traditions, it seems safer to apply it to one who is familiar with the Reformed position. Nederhood holds two degrees in theology--a B.D. from Calvin Seminary and a Th.D. from the Free University in Amsterdam--and he has been a Fulbright scholar. So he can be expected to know Reformed theology. And since his speeches are under the auspices of the Christian Reformed Church, one can expect that he would be sensitive to the Reformed tradition. In addition, some of his audience, even though they may be a minority, are those who accept the Reformed position and thus he would expect them to apply critical standards to him as much or more than to any other speaker. Fourth, I am familiar with Nederhood's speaking since I have heard many of his speeches, a few in person, but most by way of

[34] These figures are taken from The Back to God Hour committee's annual Report in which the committee says: "These figures are very conservative and have been arrived at by taking into consideration the number of letters received and the various ratings for the stations." 1980 Agenda for Synod (Grand Rapids: Board of Publications of the Christian Reformed Church, 1980), p. 14.

radio. Consequently, I believe there would be less risk that I would misinterpret either his intent or his technique than if he were a speaker with whom I had not had as much previous experience. Fifth, I am interested in his speaking, not only because of the perspective he holds, but also because he is different from many other media preachers, as I think the analysis in Chapter Five suggests. Sixth, although it seems easier to pick for analysis a speaker whom the critic has prejudged to be unethical, a better method may be to pick a speaker toward whom the critic does not have such predispositions. My reactions to Dr. Nederhood before beginning the study were not negative. At least for a study of this nature, then, one can avoid the charge that the critic is developing a particular perspective in order that he can call fouls against techniques or speakers that he initially disliked for whatever reason.

The criticism examines five representative speeches of Dr. Nederhood as broadcast on The Back to God Hour. The speeches I have selected are from the year 1979. There is no significance in picking 1979 except that it was the most recent year when this study was begun. The speech entitled "The Man Who Missed Easter" was given on an important holiday on the Christian church calendar and illustrates the speaker's approach to matters of

faith. "Are Preachers Necessary?" provides insight into how the speaker perceives his responsibility and thus offers indication of the standards by which he judges his task. "Establishing Religion," a speech on the nature of education, and "The Abortion Issues" represent topics that Nederhood has frequently addressed. Since he considers these topics to be very important, it is interesting to see how he treats these controversial topics, especially when he knows he faces opposition. "Fast People" deals with what he believes to be a very common problem that most people might not consider major, although he never minimizes the problems he addresses. The number of speeches chosen is not important. I simply wanted to be sure that I would have enough material with which to work in presenting a representative picture of this speaker. In my opinion, nearly any of the speeches Nederhood has given would suffice for analysis in a study of this nature. These speeches are addressed to general audiences and may be of interest to anyone reading this dissertation. Particular speeches are not needed to prove the ethical theory. Instead, speeches are used here to demonstrate how ethical standards from the Reformed point of view function in public discourse. My plan involves analysis of techniques which clarify how particular ethical principles operate. These

speeches enhance our understanding of particular ethical principles in action.

Conclusion

Considerable new ground is broken in this dissertation in that a normative ethical standard for speech communication, which has received almost no treatment in the literature on ethics of speech communication, is developed in Chapter Four. And an important speaker who has not been studied by speech communication scholars is examined in Chapter Five to determine the functioning of an ethical system in guiding rhetorical choices. Furthermore, since the literature of speech communication includes little actual application of ethical standards to public discourse, this project helps to fill in that gap.

A difficulty in the project results from the attempt to work out of several disciplines: theology, speech communication, and moral philosophy. The methods of writing do not neatly dovetail and, thus, sections may reflect one methodology more than another. Nevertheless, the effort proves worthwhile in demonstrating the interdisciplinary nature of this subject.

Chapter III

Review of Literature

The diversity of the literature demonstrates the variety of scholars' perspectives on ethics of speech communication. In contrast to moral philosophers, speech communication scholars argue little with each others' positions. In the development of normative ethical standards, for example, one finds standards offered without significant critique of previously offered normative standards. The literature on the subject in our field seems not only to discuss a plethora of problems in communication ethics but also tolerates endless multiplication of positions without relationship to the strength or validity of alternative positions. This uncritical attitude contributes both uneven quality and diversity to the literature.

The purpose of this chapter is to survey the literature on ethics published by scholars of speech communication. A critical survey will illumine some questions this project must address. Ultimately the choice of an ethical system rests on an individual's faith in how communication relates to human existence; but in the

meantime, not all systems are equally viable for a person's choice. Criticism based on internal insufficiency of systems judged by their own criteria will be included in this chapter. A comparison of the Reformed ethical system with other normative ethical theories must await its explanation in the next chapter.

Any review of such an extensive body of literature of necessity involves establishing parameters. I will deal primarily with ethics of speech communication. I will treat materials on journalistic ethics or advertising ethics only with reference to these in surveys. Also excluded from this review are convention papers. Some of these are inaccessible and others are published following conventions. A sampling of textbooks remains secondary to scholarly books and articles.

The research surveyed in this chapter is organized according to the following framework: the first section discusses materials which focus on problems and issues in ethics of speech communication; the second section treats articles and books which primarily advocate or attempt to develop a particular normative standard for judging ethics of speech communication (essentially this section categorizes systems to evaluate the ethics of speech); the third section reviews applications of normative ethical systems to speaking situations; and

finally some conclusions are offered.

Problems in Ethics of Speech Communication

Scholars in speech frequently alert readers to the lack of ethical communication in society. Several years ago Murphy urged the Speech Association of America (now the Speech Communication Association) to adopt a code of ethics comparable to codes of other professional associations such as the American Medical Association.[1] Gulley discusses ethical problems in communication common in the late sixties.[2] He claims that these problems bode ill for society but he provides little help toward solving them. In a 1973 speech to the Speech Communication Association, which was later published, Jeffrey reiterated Gulley's claim and described updated problems of the Watergate crisis.[3] He delineated several responsibilities of speech communication scholars and teachers and urged that they accept some of the blame for the low

[1] Richard Murphy, "Preface to an Ethic of Rhetoric," in The Rhetorical Idiom, ed. Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 125-43.

[2] Halbert E. Gulley, "The New Amorality in American Communication," Today's Speech, 18 (Winter 1970), 3-8.

[3] Robert C. Jeffrey, "Ethics in Public Discourse," Vital Speeches of the Day, 40 (Dec. 1, 1973), 113-16.

level of public discourse. Johannesen worried about
"Public Confidence in Truthfulness of Public Communica-
tion," explained the dimensions and consequences of
weakened public confidence, and offered some suggestions
for improvement.[4] And, since a chapter in this disser-
tation will deal with application of ethical standards
to a radio preacher, we should note Martin's article,
"The God-Hucksters of Radio," in which he condemns some
religious broadcasters' techniques.[5] He demonstrates
no clear ethical standard in his attack, but does give a
clear description of problems in certain broadcasts.
Otherwise, the ethics of religious broadcasting has re-
ceived almost no attention in the scholarly journals of
communication. Thayer's anthology is a series of public
addresses by scholars dealing with ethical and moral
issues in communication.[6] The issues vary widely and
the authors provide little help for the communication
scholar who is interested in normative systems of ethics
for speech communication. Throughout these materials

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[4] Richard L. Johannesen, _Ethics of Human Communica-
tion_ (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1975), Ch. 1.

[5] William C. Martin, "The God-Hucksters of Radio,"
The Atlantic, 225 (June 1970), 51-56.

[6] Lee Thayer, ed., _Communication: Ethical and
Moral Issues_ (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1973).

we see ample warning and sketchy analysis of need to
consider ethics. While little disagreement exists on
the need for ethical communication, scholars are not
united on how to solve these problems.

On the relation of speech communication ethics to
social ethics in general, Schrier gives an unequivocal
response: "persuasion ethics is general ethics!"[7] He
argues that speech is a reflection of everyday life and
issues such as means justifying ends are no different
in speech than in other disciplines. His rejection of
those who isolate an ethics of speech communication pro-
vides a reasonable warning but fails to consider that the
minimal attention of general ethicists to speech communi-
cation behooves speech communication scholars to be con-
cerned about ethics in their own field.

The issue of the separation of the ethics and the
effectiveness of particular communication techniques
arises frequently in persuasion textbooks. Oliver ar-
gued, "for students of persuasion, it is helpful to
make a clear-cut distinction between what is effective
and what is ethical."[8] On the other side, Simons argued

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[7] William Schrier, "The Ethics of Persuasion,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 15 (Nov. 1930), 476-86.

[8] Robert T. Oliver, The Psychology of Persuasive
Speech, 2nd ed., (New York: Longmans, Green, 1957), p. 25.

that effectiveness and ethics can be fused by a critic who is concerned with the social consequences rather than the personal consequences of a rhetorical act.[9] Oliver states that both should be taught.[10] A major problem, peculiar to Oliver's work, is the lack of a clear-cut definition of "effective." The same could be said about definitions of the ethical. Apparently the issue is unresolved although speech scholars appear to be moving away from the position that rhetoric is amoral.

The thesis of Parker's "Rhetoric, Ethics, and Manipulation" is that "most human relationships are manipulative in nature."[11] He does not regard manipulation as negative but develops the notion that questions of ethics arise whenever one person influences another. Most writers on speech ethics would likely agree. Rhetoric, Parker argues, is the preferred means of manipulation. His attempt to turn the term "manipulation," with its negative connotations, into something which may

[9] Herbert W. Simons, "Toward a New Rhetoric," Pennsylvania Speech Annual, 24 (Sept. 1967), 7-20.

[10] Oliver, "Ethics and Efficiency in Persuasion," Southern Speech Journal, 26 (Fall 1960), 10-15.

[11] Douglas H. Parker, "Rhetoric, Ethics, and Manipulation," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 5 (Spring 1972), 69-87.

be positive fails. He further discusses the extent to which the persuadee bears responsibility along with the persuader. Anderson and Anderson put this issue in stronger terms with their "200 percent responsibility" theory in which they argue that each person is 100 percent responsible for the persuasion that occurs.[12] Coercion, according to Parker, is unethical, and other scholars agree with him.[13] Although Parker does not overtly advocate a perspective for judging ethics in communication, he seems to consider reason the ultimate guide:

> In closing, let it be stated that rhetoric may be viewed as noncoercive where it involves no threat by the speaker that he will impose or initiate the imposition of a detriment or the withholding of a benefit, a right or a privilege if adherence is withheld, and where the other interlocuter is left a free agent to decide solely upon the basis of persuasion that appeals to reason.[14]

[12] Kenneth E. Anderson and Mary Klaaren Anderson, "Ethics and Persuasion," in Kenneth E. Anderson, Persuasion: Theory and Practice (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1971), pp. 324-26.

[13] See, for example, James R. Andrews, "Confrontation at Columbia: A Case Study in Coercive Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 55 (Feb. 1969), 9-16; and Thomas R. Nilsen, Ethics of Speech Communication, 2nd ed., (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974).

[14] Parker, "Rhetoric, Ethics, and Manipulation," p. 85.

A careful justification of appeals to reason as the basis for ethics would have been more worthwhile than his attempt to broaden the definition of manipulation.

Ethical problems in the use of language for technical descriptions is the concern of Bierstedt's article.[15] He acknowledges the need for a precise, technical language, but believes it results in parochialism and an inability to communicate with the laity. Therefore, he supports the Aristotelian mean: "We need technical languages in intellectual discourse but we need also to recognize the temptations they contain."[16]

Language functioning in moral discourse is Stevenson's focus.[17] As an emotivist, he portrays moral discourse serving a dynamic function as well as a descriptive one--language expresses, states, and influences. His argument is similar to Weaver's that language is sermonic.[18] Stevenson was also interested in the use of

[15] Robert Bierstedt, "The Ethics of Cognitive Communication," Journal of Communication, 13 (Sept. 1963), 199-203.

[16] Bierstedt, "The Ethics of Cognitive Communication," p. 203.

[17] Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1944).

[18] See, for example, Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

definitions to persuade others. Garver responded

effectively that Stevenson miscontrued persuasion as

irrational and thus defined the concept inadequately.[19]

Stevenson further argued that when there is a disagree-

ment in attitudes not based in a disagreement in beliefs,

we have an ethical dispute. True moral statements, in

his view, reflected the feelings of the speaker. He

has received little attention from speech communication

scholars, probably because of his limited definition of

persuasion.

Besides dealing with the sermonic function of

language, Weaver also worked with types of arguments,

some of which, he asserted, are more ethical than others.

His book, The Ethics of Rhetoric, has received consi-

derable attention from speech communication scholars.[20]

The basis for Weaver's standards for ethical rhetoric

[19] J. N. Garver, "On the Rationality of Persua-
ding," Mind, 69 (April 1960), 163-74.

[20] Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chi-
cago: Regnery, 1953). On the attention communication
scholars have given to Weaver, see, for example, Dennis
R. Bormann, "The 'Uncontested Term' Contested: An
Analysis of Weaver on Burke," Quarterly Journal of Speech,
57 (Oct. 1971), 295-305; Richard L. Johannesen, "Richard
M. Weaver on Standards for Ethical Rhetoric," Central
States Speech Journal, 29 (Summer 1978), 127-37; and J.
Michael Sproule, "Using Public Rhetoric to Assess Private
Philosophy: Richard M. Weaver and Beyond," Southern
Speech Communication Journal, 44 (Spring 1979), 299-308.

lies in his Platonic idealism and,thus, arguments should conform to the ultimate Idea of the Good. He ranks types of arguments, moving from the most ethical to the least ethical: 1) argument from genus or definition, 2) argument from similitude, 3) argument from cause and effect, and 4) argument from circumstance.[21] Furthermore, Johannesen finds among Weaver's communication techniques several which Weaver believed to be ethically suspect: pseudo-neutrality in language usage, unwarranted shifts in meanings of words, communication which blurs necessary distinctions, and public discourse which focuses solely on the realm of the ideal or hypothetical--avoiding attempts to link the ideal with the actual.[22] Weaver goes beyond the manner of arguments to insist that the ethical speaker exalt the intrinsic worth of the audience and demonstrate attitudes of respect, concern, selflessness, involvement, and a desire to help the audience actualize its potentials and ideals.[23]

[21] Johannesen, "Richard M. Weaver on Standards for Ethical Rhetoric," pp. 127-37.

[22] Johannesen, "Richard M. Weaver on Standards for Ethical Rhetoric," pp. 130-34.

[23] Johannesen, "Richard M. Weaver on Standards for Ethical Rhetoric," p. 134.

The ethical issues in the ghostwriting of speeches arise occasionally in speech communication. Bormann argued in 1961 that at a certain point ghostwriting is dishonest since the speech does not reveal the speaker as he really is.[24] He explained that ghostwriting may involve a double standard in that we allow it for politicians but not for students. Furthermore, it depends on deception for effectiveness. In reply to Bormann, Smith insisted that the starting point for determining whether a ghostwritten speech is ethical should be the speaker's task, i.e., will the viability of one's office be maintained if he continues to use ghostwriters?[25] Thus the student in a public speaking class could not ethically deliver a speech written by someone else whereas the President could do so. The President's office would be enhanced by ghostwriting since he simply cannot take the time to write all his speeches, but the student's office as student would be destroyed by such activity. For Smith, circumstances are a major determinant of ethics. Bormann's reply to Smith acknowledges that ethics are best judged on a

[24] Ernest G. Bormann, "Ethics of Ghostwritten Speeches," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 47 (Oct. 1961), 262-67.

[25] Donald K. Smith, "Ghostwritten Speeches," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 47 (Dec. 1961), 416-20.

continuum but argues that a point on the continuum should be found beyond which one cannot ethically go.[26] Discussion of the issue has diminished recently in speech communication literature. Apparently scholars agree that students should not use ghostwriters but that politicians may do so. Different circumstances in which one may use ghostwriters fall along an ethical continuum from the unobjectionable to the completely unethical. Bormann leaves us uncertain as to where along such a continuum different specific instances of ghostwriting would fall.

In the literature of speech communication, one finds little extensive treatment of the ethics of lying, albeit lists of ethical criteria in textbooks warn almost without exception against forms such as fabrication of evidence. While not a speech scholar, Bok has written a popular book on lying.[27] In it she weaves the effects of various types of lying on public and private institutions with ethical considerations. Her helpful book "aims to narrow the gap between the worlds of the moral philosopher and those confronting urgent

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[26] Bormann, "Ghostwritten Speeches—A Reply," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 47 (Dec. 1961), 420-21.

[27] Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

moral choices."[28] She chides moral philosophers for not

getting more actively involved in practical problems and

her book amply justifies the importance of her critique

of them. But she could also have indicted speech com-

munication people for failing to attempt her extensive

analysis of the ethical problems of lying. Fairly

typical is a recent article in which Hample researched

purposes and effects of lying but barely mentioned

ethics.[29]

Often communication textbooks contain a chapter on

ethical problems. Two sources are noted here which

perhaps best exemplify strategies toward problems in

ethics. On the interpersonal level of communication,

Condon discusses the issues of candor, social harmony,

fidelity, deception, acknowledgement, consistency of

word and act, keeping and sharing confidences, and

invasions of privacy.[30] He says: "We may argue any of

these issues in two ways: 1) that there can be no

absolute ethical standard; but also 2) that you have to

[28] Bok, Lying, p. xxii.

[29] Dale Hample, "Purposes and Effects of Lying,"
Southern Speech Communication Journal, 46 (Fall 1980),
33-47.

[30] John C. Condon, Interpersonal Communication
(New York: Macmillan, 1977), Ch. 8.

draw the line somewhere--some behaviors are harmless,
some merely annoying, but some downright unethical."[31]
Like most other textbook writers, he urges that we think
about these issues and develop ways to decide the ethi-
cal but offers no clear-cut standard of his own. He
seems to lean in the direction of a situational perspec-
tive. Likewise Anderson and Anderson discuss several
dilemmas in ethics of persuasion: 1) Are persuasion
and ethics related? 2) Should ethics be discussed
abstractly or concretely? 3) Is there value in saying
anything about ethics? 4) Should one persuade lacking
certainty? and 5) Can ethical elements be separate
from pragmatic questions of effectiveness?[32] Then they
describe briefly several currently used normative stan-
dards but they do not defend particular ethical stan-
dards. Quite typically these textbook writers raise and
discuss ethical issues, urging students to answer these
questions for themselves without substantial help from
the authors. Raising ethical issues is fairly simple;
helping students resolve the issues is not. Too often
authors neglect their professional responsibility to

[31] Condon, _Interpersonal Communication_, p. 200.

[32] Anderson and Anderson, "Ethics and Persuasion,"
pp. 313-16.

provide this help.

The lack of adequate teaching of ethics in speech courses is another problem. In his survey of literature on teaching ethics in public address, Jensen notes that the writers agree on the need for teaching ethics: "The authors are virtually unanimous in the opinion that the speech teacher ought to educate the 'whole man' and not teach only skills."[33] Braden challenges: "We must be more than teachers of how-to-do-it. We must be teachers of attitudes and ethics."[34] In 1974, a Doctoral Honors Seminar on "Ethics of Public Discourse," sponsored by the Speech Communication Association and in which this writer participated, recommended that "study of the ethical dimension of human communication ought to be encouraged" and offered several guide questions to direct further investigation.[35] More recently, Hopkins urged a refocus on ethics in our communication textbooks.[36]

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[33] J. Vernon Jensen, "An Analysis of Recent Literature on Teaching Ethics in Public Address," <u>Speech Teacher</u>, 8 (Sept. 1959), 226.

[34] Waldo Braden, "What Can Be Done to Preserve Freedom of Speech: A Symposium," <u>Southern Speech Journal</u>, 19 (May 1954), 335.

[35] <u>Spectra</u>, 10 (Aug. 1974), 9-10.

[36] Richard Hopkins, "Refocusing on Ethics," <u>Communication Education</u>, 26 (Nov. 1977), 359-60.

He asked that we add "maturity of ethical choices" to our list of criteria for evaluating students' speeches in order to train them better for making ethical choices in communication. These suggestions and recommendations are worthwhile. Whether they are being implemented, or soon will be, is nearly impossible to determine.

At first glance, Gronbeck's article "From 'Is' to 'Ought': Alternative Strategies," appears to be a treatment by a communication scholar of a problem discussed extensively by moral philosophers.[37] Although he makes some reference to moral philosophy, he instead complains about argumentation textbooks that do not treat the logic of advice-giving. He argues that if debaters desire to reach agreement on a resolution, they must investigate the ethical logics underlying each position rather than hoping to win an argument by simply piling on more facts. This treatment may be important to debaters, but the article contributes little to our understanding of ethics of communication. Also concerned with debate, Newman explains that ethical presuppositions of arguments should be identified and used as organizing principles in the processes of argumentation: "If we do not bare the

[37] Bruce E. Gronbeck, "From 'Is to 'Ought': Alternative Strategies," Central States Speech Journal, 19 (Spring 1968), 31-39.

ethical presuppositions with which we operate, issues tend to pile on top of each other willy-nilly."[38] He, too, is concerned with a broader context than constructing ethical arguments, and thus he offers the ethicist little help.

Like those who argue for greater pedagogical focus on communication ethics, rhetorical critics frequently call for more attention to ethics in critical works. Croft writes: "Historical interpretation, critical evaluation, and creative theorizing must all become directly concerned with the ethics of rhetoric."[39] Hillbruner insists that the rhetorical critic be sensitive to the need for ethical judgments about the means and ends in public discourse.[40] He says that the critic "must be sure that ethical factors enter into his assessments."[41] Also, Cathcart says that no judgment of the

[38] Robert P. Newman, "Ethical Presuppositions of Argument," The Gavel, 42 (May 1960), 51-54, 62-63.

[39] Albert J. Croft, "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 42 (Oct. 1956), 283-91.

[40] Anthony Hillbruner, "The Moral Imperative of Criticism," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 40 (Spring 1975), 228-47.

[41] Hillbruner, Critical Dimensions: The Art of Public Address Criticism (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 155.

effectiveness of a speaker or the artistic qualities of a speech can be complete without ethical evaluation.[42] "However," writes Chesebro, "procedures or specific methods necessary for an application of a particular standard have not been widely discussed."[43] The call for more ethical criticism is justified. More importantly, the need for additional work on how-to-do ethical criticism remains urgent.

The function of ethical codes in argumentation involved in the context of an ethical charge is the subject of Crable's recent article on ethics.[44] He says we should be aware of how these codes function either as defense or as part of the formulation of an ethical charge. He goes on to point out that once the rhetorical critic has described and interpreted the agent's defense, he can "begin more confidently the evaluation of the ethical defense in terms of ethical norms."[45] The thrust

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[42] Robert S. Cathcart, Post Communication: Criticism and Evaluation (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 107.

[43] James W. Chesebro, "A Construct for Assessing Ethics in Communication," Central States Speech Journal, 20 (Summer 1969), 105.

[44] Richard E. Crable, "Ethical Codes, Accountability, and Argumentation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64 (Feb. 1978), 23-32.

[45] Crable, "Ethical Codes," p. 32.

of his article is to provide critics advice on how people
use ethical codes rather than how to construct an ethical
critique of public discourse.

Calling attention to ethical problems in speech
communication is abundant as this review demonstrates.
The hard work of solving these problems in ethics has
hardly received comparable attention. This significant
gap in the literature on speech communication indicates
that scholars in our field have found it far easier to
call "foul" than to draw distinct boundaries for ethical
communication.

Attention to metaethical issues by speech scholars
has been sparse. Although the work of metaethics by
moral philosophers is not being surveyed here, it should
be noted that moral philosophers concerned with meta-
ethics have been little concerned with communication.
For example, they do not seem to be aware of a major
tenet of communication theorists that meanings are in
people and not only in words. Moral philosophers spend
much time dealing with the meaning of ethical terms
without sufficiently considering the different meanings
that laymen may have in mind when using such terms. On
the other hand, communication scholars pay little atten-
tion to the contribution of moral philosophers on the
nature of making ethical arguments. More working

together by these two disciplines would be helpful in understanding the nature of ethics in speech communication.

Perspectives for Judging
the Ethics of Communication

Before examining the various normative ethical systems--more commonly called "perspectives"-- found in speech communication literature, I would like to note a few survey works on the ethics of speech communication. Johannesen has compiled an anthology of reprints of articles and chapters of books on various perspectives on ethics of persuasion.[46] His major work, however, is his book, Ethics in Human Communication, which at this point is probably the most useful book on ethics in our discipline.[47] In it he discusses problems, issues, and offers examples for analysis. In addition to an explanation of various perspectives, this book contains reprints of four articles from communication journals which apply ethical standards to discourse. He divides ethical

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[46] Richard L. Johannesen, ed., Ethics and Persuasion: Selected Readings (New York: Random House, 1967).

[47] Johannesen, Ethics in Human Communication.

perspectives into seven categories according to the normative standards he finds people using or advocating: religious, utilitarian, legal, political, ontological, dialogical, and situational. Generally, he draws from the work of communication scholars on ethics for his description and explanation of these normative standards. Little reference is made to the work of moral philosophers. His definition of the religious perspective reflects a narrow, sociological view of limiting religion to only certain groups. Consequently, his very brief description of this position is inadequate in explaining religion in a broader context and that it need not be limited to certain groups or aspects of life.[48] His description of the utilitarian and legal perspectives is also extremely brief. Treatment of the other four perspectives is much more extensive and helpful.

In his survey of literature on teaching ethics in public address, Jensen found three primary sources of ethical standards: 1) values of a given political state, 2) immediate social context, and 3) Judeo-Christian

[48] Charles Veenstra, rev. of _Ethics in Human Communication_, by Richard L. Johannesen, _Christian Scholar's Review_, 5, No. 2 (1975), 170-72.

heritage.[49] About this last source, which is the primary
concern of this project, he claims that:

> virtually all of the authors reveal a reliance
> upon the Judeo-Christian tradition as a source
> of ethical standards. This is done only impli-
> citly, however, in fact, there seems to be a
> studied attempt to avoid reference to that
> religious origin.[50]

No evidence demonstrates that this situation has changed.
In a later work, he properly urges us to recognize our
religious heritage.[51]

In an important article, exceptional in its discus-
sion of the history of ethical study, Voegelin treats
moral bases for communication.[52] He shows how the onto-
logical reduction of order has slid from God as the
summum bonum to reason, to pragmatic intellect, to use-
fulness, to biological drives. He argues that in order
for communication to be formative rather than destructive,

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[49] Jensen, "An Analysis of Recent Literature on
Teaching Ethics in Public Address," pp. 219-28.

[50] Jensen, "An Analysis of Recent Literature on
Teaching Ethics in Public Address," p. 222.

[51] Jensen, Perspective on Oral Communication
(Boston: Holbrook Press, 1970), pp. 107-108.

[52] Eric Voegelin, "Necessary Moral Bases for Commu-
nication in a Democracy," in Problems of Communication
in a Pluralistic Society (Milwaukee: Marquette Univer-
sity Press, 1956), pp. 53-68.

it must move on the highest levels, i.e., the moral basis should move away from these reductions.

A. Rationalist Perspectives

The first set of perspectives or normative ethical standards developed in the literature of speech might properly be called rationalist. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics was probably the first work to develop a perspective based in reason.[53] Aristotle argued that ethics should be based on what the practical man of wisdom would do in particular situations. His famous "golden mean," for example, attempted to determine rationally acceptable emotional appeals. One decides the "good" by rationally avoiding excesses. Desires were not bad if controlled by reason. He said: "the proper function of man consists in an activity of the soul in conformity to rational principle."[54] Thus, practical wisdom, for him, was the power of right deliberation about things good for oneself. Right rules, he said, are determined by intellectual processes. In this perspective, reason

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[53] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Oswald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).

[54] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, section 1098a.

ultimately reigns. Self explains Aristotle's position
as suggesting that men should follow the practical man
of wisdom (phronesis).[55] Whereas Aristotle had described
the golden mean in his Rhetoric primarily in terms of
what would work, Anderson expands Aristotle's ideas to
show how the doctrine of the mean also relates to ethics
in rhetoric.[56] Flynn's article states clearly the ra-
tional basis of Aristotle's position: "A truly human act
proceeds from a rational agent who knows what he does
and freely chooses to do it."[57] While Aristotle's per-
spective can be viewed as quasi-democratic, democracy
in Aristotle's Athens was only for the elite.

Torrance's study of Bertrand Russell stresses
the uniquely human capacities of reason and language.[58]
From this philosophy he draws normative ethical standards
of being tentative, giving evidence whenever possible,

[55] Lois Self, "Rhetoric and Phronesis: The Aristo-
telian Ideal," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 12 (Spring 1979),
130-45.

[56] Douglas Floyd Anderson, "Aristotle's Doctrine of
the Mean and Its Relationship to Rhetoric," Southern
Speech Journal, 34 (Winter 1968), 100-107.

[57] Lawrence J. Flynn, S.J., "The Aristotelian Basis
for the Ethics of Speaking," Speech Teacher, 6 (Sept.
1957), 179-87.

[58] Donald L. Torrence, "A Philosophy for Rhetoric
from Bertrand Russell," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 45
(April 1959), 153-65.

and using emotional appeals only when evidence is lacking.
This position has not been widely adopted since most
speech communication scholars reject Russell's dichoto-
mizing logical and emotional appeals.

Some scholars who hold primarily to a democratic
perspective have also contributed to the formation of a
rationalist position. Haiman emphasizes the opportunity
for rational choice as basic to democracy and thus an
ultimate criterion of ethical communication.[59] One of
Rives' three principles is that of being rational because
an ideal democratic society recognizes this value.[60]
Parker, as indicated above, suggests that ethical commu-
nication must appeal to reason. Although it is difficult
to neatly categorize Nilsen's perspective, and Johannesen
calls Nilsen's position "political,"[61] it seems that we
might also place him with the rationalists since he
emphasizes a person's ability to make a "significant
choice" as central in the functioning of a human being
and that this rationalist principle is at the foundation

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[59] Franklyn S. Haiman, "Democratic Ethics and the
Hidden Persuaders," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 44
(Dec. 1958), 385-92.

[60] Stanley G. Rives, "Ethical Argumentation,"
Journal of the American Forensic Association, 1 (Sept.
1964), 79-85.

[61] Johannesen, Ethics in Human Communication, p. 24.

of democracy:

> It is a working belief in freedom and the pos-
> sibility of rational choice that lies at the
> foundation of our system of political democracy
> with its provisions for the freedom we feel
> essential to the optimum development of the
> person. Our concept of the dignity of man is
> in large part based on and derived from our
> belief in the rationality of man. . . . When
> we say, therefore, that those things are good
> which enhance and enlarge the human personal-
> ity, we are saying that that is good which
> makes possible and contributes to the indi-
> vidual's making informed, independent, and
> critical choices that are meaningful in his
> life.[62]

He applies this specifically to speech communication:
"The moral rightness of our speech then turns in large
part on the kind of choice making our speech fosters."[63]
Gulley provides an application of Nilsen's concept of
the "good" in his discussion textbook.[64]

The contribution of Diggs to the rationalist norma-
tive ethical system is his statement that the thrust of

[62] Thomas R. Nilsen, Ethics of Speech Communication.
2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), p. 43.
See also his "Confidentiality and Morality," Western
Journal of Speech Communication, 43 (Winter 1979), 38-47;
and "Free Speech, Persuasion, and the Democratic Pro-
cess," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 44 (Oct. 1958),235-43.

[63] Nilsen, Ethics of Speech Communication, p. 45.

[64] Halbert E. Gulley, Discussion, Conference, and
Group Process, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, &
Winston, 1968), Ch. 8.

his article is to be "concerned with the general con-
textual character of ethical standards which govern per-
suasion."[65] Thus Johannesen categorizes Diggs as a situ-
ationalist but Diggs' grounding of his perspective in
the rational is clear: "At its best persuasion . . . is
a sharing of reason, a union of rational beings in which
foggy vision in one is made up for by the keen insight
of another."[66] He seems to suggest that one cannot de-
termine ethical standards by reason alone but needs
others to confirm reason.

Ehninger's rationalist position is not as clear-cut
as some others. He seems to imply in his "Validity of
Moral Obligation" the necessity for good reason, but he
does not offer logic in its strictest sense as the

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[65] B. J. Diggs, "Persuasion and Ethics," _Quarterly
Journal of Speech_, 50 (Dec. 1964), 359. Martin responds
to Diggs in a complaint that we should not waste our
time trying to teach ethics of persuasion since students'
values are set, society is pluralistic, and each person
operating in his own self-interest will ensure action
that will preserve society. See Howard H. Martin,
"Ethics and Persuasion: An Impertinent Rejoinder,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 51 (Oct. 1965), 329-31.
Diggs replies to Martin that self-interest does not tell
one how or when to act or what to do and thus rules are
needed for right action. Consequently the young must be
taught the rules. See Diggs, "Ethics and Persuasion:
Author's Reply," _Quarterly Journal of Speech_, 52 (Oct.
1965), 331-33.

[66] Diggs, "Persuasion and Ethics," p. 373. See also
Johannesen, _Ethics in Human Communication_, pp. 58-59.

ultimate criterion for ethics.[67] Because the require-
ments for good reason are not clearly spelled out, his
contribution to this perspective is minimal. In con-
trast, Kruger leaves no doubt that persuasion must be
rational.[68] He roundly condemns techniques which bypass
or demean logical proof. Appeals which play on desires,
prejudices, hostilities, etc., violate rational princi-
ples and thus, in his view, are unethical. He fails to
discuss carefully the relation of emotion to reason,
although he asserts that these are not as congruent as
some scholars maintain. Instead of recognizing that
emotion and reason often work together in persuasion and
can hardly be separated, he declares "Persuasion by
ethos or pathos either eliminates, obscures, distorts,
or actually does violence to reason and hence by its
very nature is incompatible with the rational ideal."[69]

Yoos equates rational and ethical: " . . . to
appeal rationally is, in itself, to appeal ethically--

[67] Douglas Ehninger, "Validity as Moral Obligation,"
Southern Speech Journal, 33 (Spring 1968), 215-22.

[68] Arthur N. Kruger, "The Ethics of Persuasion: A
Re-examination," Speech Teacher, 16 (Nov. 1967), 295-305.

[69] Kruger, "The Ethics of Persuasion: A Re-exami-
nation," p. 302.

to act on a moral consideration of the highest order."[70]

He does not, however, include only logical argumentation or reason-giving, in "rational appeals." He defines "rational appeal" as "appeal for consideration and re-flective deliberation on the part of an audience."[71] Ethical (i.e., ethos) and motive appeals, he says, "can seek, culture, and nurture deliberation, and appeal for considerate and reflective thought by an audience. Thus ethical and motive appeals can be rational."[72]

One finds little critique of the widely held ration-alist position. For the most part, the rational as an ultimate value for the ethics of communication is assumed by these scholars. Instead of carefully defending the standard, they simply censure those who violate it.

The thread which holds the fabric of this position together is the assumed centrality of the rational in the essence of being human. The view tends to exclude from the realm of the ethical the extra-logical functions of language, for example, style or word choice. Appeals

[70] George E. Yoos, "Licit and Illicit in Rhetorical Appeals, Western Journal of Speech Communication, 42 (Fall 1978), 222-30.

[71] Yoos, "Licit and Illicit in Rhetorical Appeals," p. 229.

[72] Yoos, "Licit and Illicit in Rhetorical Appeals," p. 229.

to ethos of a speaker and emotional appeals are also
extra-logical, except as Yoos indicates that they are
appeals for deliberation and, therefore, "rational."
Logic may not necessarily be the major element in every
aspect of communication, e.g., greetings or goodbyes.
Nor does all communication involve decisions. Yet these
extra-logical functions are important in communication
and should neither be regarded as unethical nor be ex-
cluded from ethical criticism. But the rationalist
position is ill-equipped to handle them. Kruger admits
that people are influenced by these extra-logical func-
tions of language, but he thinks they should not be.
The rationalist position is a limited and reductionistic
view of what it means to be human. A human being is more
than rational and is legitimately influenced by style,
emotion, and ethos, for example. Consequently, a norma-
tive ethical standard should be broad enough to cover
all of what it means to be human.

The view also assumes that all people can be taught
the rules of logic and will follow them when given ade-
quate evidence and good reasoning, i.e., that reasoning
has a universal character. The assumption of the inde-
pendence and autonomy of human reason seems to say that
all that can be asked of communication is conformation
to rules of sound reasoning.

B. Other Perspectives Which Focus

on Essence of Human Nature

Like those supporting a rationalist ethics, a few

scholars focus on other concepts of human nature to

define ethical communication.[73] From their view, tech-

niques which dehumanize would be considered unethical.

Wieman and Walter center on human symbol-using capacities

as the essence of humanness:

> Rhetoric, if it is to be ethical, must create
> conditions favorable to the expansion of
> symbolism and mutual understanding and control.
> We would define ethical rhetoric, therefore,
> as the discovery of the means of symbolism
> which lead to the greatest mutual understanding
> and mutual control. . . . ethical rhetoric has
> the promise of creating those kinds of commu-
> nication which can help save the human being
> from disintegration, nourish him in his growth
> toward uniquely human goals, and eventually
> transform him into the best that he can be-
> come.[74]

The need for appreciative understanding is combined with

the need for expansion of symbolism by Wieman and Walter

to prescribe what ethical rhetoric should be. Their

[73] Johannesen terms this perspective "ontological."
See his Ethics in Human Communication, p. 31.

[74] Henry N. Wieman and Otis M. Walter, "Towards an
Analysis of Ethics for Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of
Speech, 43 (Oct. 1957), 266-70.

sketchy explanation sheds little light on how they arrive at the notion that the essence of humanness lies in the capacity to use symbols. Nor do they define "symbol."

After criticizing rationalist and behaviorist theories as foundations for rhetorical theory, Campbell asserts that man is rhetorical because he is a symbol-using creature.[75] She favors this theory because it provides a basis for scrutiny of all persuasive language, but she does not carefully work out the details of the operation of this system, nor the methods of ethical scrutiny. Almost the same can be said for Langer, Richards, and Burke.[76] That symbol-using constitutes the essence of being human is generally asserted rather than argued.

Eubanks, in a 1968 article, sees man's essential nature as a symbol-using animal,[77] but in his 1980

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[75] Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical Theory," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 3 (Spring 1970), 97-108.

[76] Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), Ch. 2; I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 131; and Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), p. 43.

[77] Ralph T. Eubanks, "Nihilism and the Problem of a Worthy Rhetoric," Southern Speech Journal, 33, (Spring 1968), 187-99.

article he develops this thesis far beyond symbol-using
capacity: the "crowning conception from which a personal
code of communication ethics must take its specifics" is
the "primacy of the person."[78] Quoting Vivas, he says:

> The person deserves unqualified respect because
> he is not merely psyche but also spirit, and
> spirit is, so far as we know, the highest form
> of being. . . . <u>The intrinsic value of the
> person is constituted by the value he possesses
> as spirit.</u>[79]

Unfortunately, he fails at this point to elaborate on
"spirit" and, instead, jumps to the suggestion that
genuinely ethical communication begins in a civilized
will. Then he turns to the second formulation of Kant's
Categorical Imperative for guidance. The civilized will
is not carefully tied to the value a person possesses
as "spirit."

In a slightly different vein, Scott sees the ability
to create knowledge through rhetoric as a unique human
capacity.[80] From this notion he draws ethical principles

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[78] Eubanks, "Reflections on the Moral Dimension of
Communication," <u>Southern Speech Communication Journal</u>,
45 (Spring 1980), 297-312.

[79] Eubanks, "Reflections on the Moral Dimension of
Communication," pp. 306-307.

[80] Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epis-
temic," <u>Central States Speech Journal</u>, 18 (Feb. 1967),
9-17.

not unique to this perspective: tolerate the viewpoint
of others, be willing to participate in the development
of truth, and accept responsibilities for the conse-
quences of communication. In his "On Viewing Rhetoric
as Epistemic: Ten Years Later," he reaffirms the values
of tolerance, will, and responsibility but does not sig-
nificantly advance this position as a basis for an ethi-
cal stance.[81] The notion of rhetoric as epistemic as
the sole basis for ethical communication is at this point
scarcely developed.

Although focus on the essence of human nature as a
starting point for ethics is important, human symbol-
using capacity as grounding for a normative ethical
system remains incomplete and practical application of
this position is largely absent. Part of the problem
lies in the proponents' failure to demonstrate the con-
nection between theory and practice. The faith assump-
tions of the position specify man will be able to trans-
form himself, save himself from disintegration, and make
himself more human through expansion of symbolism.
Symbol-using perspectives are thus as reductionistic as
rationalist approaches. They reduce a human being to

[81] Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten
Years Later," Central States Speech Journal, 27 (Winter
1976), 258-66.

one of his capacities and then exalt this capacity as
the qualifying characteristic.

C. Democratic Perspectives

Probably most popular of the various normative ethi-
cal theories for evaluating communication is the democra-
tic perspective. Eubanks and Baker argue that value
analysis is necessary "for making rhetorical education
more directly a function of democratic ideology."[82]
Ethical communication becomes the servant of democracy.
This position draws on values of a democratic society--
equality of opportunity, free and open discussion,
equality of individuals, belief in the inherent dignity
of man, the right of freedom of information--as the
ultimate basis for ethics. In some instances this posi-
tion overlaps with the rationalist position since the
democratic position assumes that man is by nature pri-
marily rational and, thus, he must be given adequate
evidence and reasoning in order that he may make a free
choice.

Speech communication textbooks frequently advocate

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[82] Ralph T. Eubanks and Virgil Baker, "Toward an
Axiology of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 48
(April 1962), 157-68.

a democratic basis for ethics. For example, Jeffrey and
Peterson's basic speech text proffers: "if speech is
to function as it should in a democracy, the speaker
must adhere to certain ethical standards" so that speech
can "fulfill its vital role in giving the public the
insight and understanding necessary for the efficient
functioning of democratic government."[83] Many textbooks
similarly advocate this popular position for ethics.

Wallace develops the democratic perspective by
asserting first that "communication inevitably must stand
for and must reflect the same ethical values as the po-
litical society of which it is a part."[84] He proceeds
to explain four basic beliefs of a democratic society
which become standards for judging ethics of communica-
tion: 1) individual dignity and worth, 2) profound
faith in equality of opportunity, 3) freedom, and 4)
every person is capable of understanding the nature of
democracy's goals, values, procedures, and processes.
From these he draws four ethical guidelines: we should
search for knowledge, develop a habit of justice, prefer
public to private motivations, and respect dissent. His

[83] Robert C. Jeffrey and Owen Peterson, Speech: A
Basic Text (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 22.

[84] Karl R. Wallace, "An Ethical Basis of Communica-
tion," Speech Teacher, 4 (Jan. 1955), 5.

later article, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," shifts slightly from a primarily democratic perspective to one based more fully on reason, although he still notes that "what a good reason is is to some extent fixed by human nature and to a very large extent by generally accepted principles and practices. . . ."[85]

In a series of articles, Haiman combines the democratic perspective with the idea that in a democracy the people must act rationally.[86] For Haiman, a democratic perspective is more than simply obeying laws which have been made in a democratic way--the channels of information must be kept open to preserve freedom of choice and thus extra-legal means might be justified to maintain open channels. His position on the importance of the law as a firm guide was tempered somewhat in the turmoil of the late sixties and particularly as his involvement in the American Civil Liberties Union and freedom of speech issues grew.

[85] Wallace, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 49 (Oct. 1963), 248.

[86] Haiman, "A Re-examination of the Ethics of Persuasion, Central States Speech Journal, 3 (March 1952), 4-9; "Democratic Ethics and the Hidden Persuaders," 385-92; "The Rhetoric of the Streets, Some Legal and Ethical Implications," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (April 1967), 99-114; and "The Rhetoric of 1968: A Farewell to Rational Discourse," reprinted in Johannesen, Ethics in Human Communication, pp. 108-21.

Other scholars have contributed to a democratic
ethical system for communication. Hook offered ten
"truisms" which he thought should serve as ground rules
for controversy in democracy.[87] These ten rules can
function directly as ethical standards for judging
communication since these express democratic values in
concrete communication principles. McKeon suggested that
the function of communication is to contribute to truth
values, freedom, and community and he implies that to
the extent communication does this, it is ethical.[88]
Rives argues that the values of society should yield the
responsibilities of knowing the truth, dedication to the
welfare of others, and of being rational--three prin-
ciples which, for him, form the foundation for a code of
ethics for debate.[89]

What would happen if a democratic society decided
democratically that these values were not of high pri-
ority in society is problematic for proponents of this
perspective. Even constitutional protection of minority
rights does not ensure the promulgation of these values

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[87] Sidney Hook, "The Ethics of Controversy," The
New Leader, 1 February 1954, pp. 12-14.

[88] Richard McKeon, "Communication, Truth, and
Society," Ethics, 67 (Jan. 1957), 89-99.

[89] Rives, "Ethical Argumentation," 79-85.

if the majority changes its mind. Day's ethical stan-
dard may also be categorized as democratic, although it
does not appeal to the same democratic values espoused
by the advocates mentioned so far. Instead, he sees a
commitment to debate as democracy's ultimate value and,
hence, the standard which must be applied in order to
determine if the particular communication is ethical:
"A commitment to debate as the method of democratic de-
cision-making demands an overriding ethical responsibi-
lity to promote full confrontation of opposing opinions,
arguments, and information relevant to a decision."[90]
In this sense he is closer to letting the people decide
democratically what values are important. Yet the prob-
lem of the people deciding by debate and democratically
that democratic processes should be replaced by non-
democratic processes is not entirely solved.

Dupuis, nearly alone, criticizes the democratic
basis, particularly the democratic presuppositions under-
lying the position of some group dynamics proponents.[91]
He argues that the democratic way in education, and thus

[90] Dennis G. Day, "The Ethics of Democratic Debate,"
Central States Speech Journal, 17 (Feb. 1966), 5-14.

[91] Adrian M. Dupuis, "Group Dynamics: Some Ethical
Presuppositions," Harvard Educational Review, 27 (Summer
1957), 210-19.

also in communication, results in ethical relativism which is dangerous and possibly counter-productive.

The faith of this ethical system lies in the belief that all people wish to act democratically. This position assumes that society basically has correct values, that the democratic way yields the best decisions, and that basic democratic values will be supported. Further, as Dupuis indicates, this view assumes that all communication relates to a political system, that what is viable for political institutions is also viable for other institutions when, in fact, much communication is extra-political. In addition to schools, families are not democracies. Thus this perspective fails to provide the comprehensive ethic it seeks.

Although individual interpretations of this perspective vary, some critical comments characterize the perspective as a whole. First, rationalism seems to lie at the foundation of this position. Democratic values are based in the ability of each person to make rational choice. To the extent that democratic values are based in rationalism alone, this perspective, like rationalism, is reductionistic. Second, the democratic position runs potential risks of rank individualism (when people assert their "rights" to selfish interests) and majoritarianism (when rights are ultimately subject to the whim of a

"changing" majority or the individual interpretation of judges). Means of maintaining appropriate balance between these two extremes have yet to prove themselves successful. One's rights will be maintained provided the majority agrees that they should be maintained. This inherent problem of the democratic system for ethics appears insoluble.

D. Dialogical Perspectives

Conceptualizing communication as dialogue has yielded another perspective for deciding the ethics of communication. The dialogic view of communication, as espoused recently by several communication scholars, is largely rooted in the I-Thou notions of Martin Buber.[92] Johannesen writes: "Dialogical perspectives for evaluating communication ethics focus on the <u>attitudes toward</u>

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[92] Works frequently cited by communication scholars for an understanding of Buber's view include Martin Buber, <u>I and Thou</u>, 2nd ed., trans. Ronald Cooper Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958) and Maurice S. Friedman, <u>Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue</u> (1955; rpt. New York: Harper & Row, 1960). Bormann finds earlier roots of the dialogic view in the writings of Adam Muller. See Dennis R. Bormann, "Adam Muller on the Dialogic Nature of Rhetoric," <u>Quarterly Journal of Speech</u>, 66 (April 1980), 169-81. Another important article which explores the philosophical bases of dialogue is John Stewart, "Foundations of Dialogic Communication," <u>Quarterly Journal of Speech</u>, 64 (April 1978), 183-201.

each other held by the participants in a communication transaction. Participant attitudes are viewed as an index of the ethical level of that communication."[93] Attitudes conducive to dialogical communication, and consequently ethical communication, include genuineness, accurate empathic understanding, unconditional positive regard, presentness, spirit of mutual equality, and supportive psychological climate.[94] Monologue, the opposite of dialogue, is characterized by "self-centeredness, deception, pretense, display, appearance, artifice, using, profit, unapproachableness, seduction, domination, exploitation, and manipulation."[95] How these attitudes are manifested in communication is not clearly spelled out.

The dialogical view is also maintained by Keller and Brown who argue that communication which enhances the ability of the other for self-determination is more

[93] Johannesen, _Ethics in Human Communication_, p. 43. See also his "The Emerging Concept of Communication as Dialogue," _Quarterly Journal of Speech_, 57 (Dec. 1971), 373-82.

[94] Johannesen, _Ethics in Human Communication_, pp. 45-46.

[95] Johannesen, _Ethics in Human Communication_, p. 47.

ethical than that which does not.[96] Inherent in Keller
and Brown's view is, again, the attitude of the communi-
cator toward the one with whom he is communicating.
Harral expands a bit on Keller and Brown's dialogic view
and argues that choice is the essence of ethics:

> Acceptance of the range of choices another
> person may make is an essential ingredient for
> ethical communication. In other words, as a
> fundamental ethical standard for interpersonal
> communication, the attitudes toward each other
> of the people in the communication are more
> significant than content elements of the mes-
> sage.[97]

The separation between attitudes and content, however,
is problematic for a person who is judging ethical com-
munication.

Brockriede uses the sexual metaphors of rape, seduc-
tion, and love in order to explain practically his dia-
logical view.[98] Rape involves threats, commands, coer-
cion, etc., by a communicator who sees the relationship
with another as unilateral. Seduction involves deceit,

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[96] Paul Keller and Charles T. Brown, "An Interper-
sonal Ethic for Communication," _Journal of Communication_,
18 (March 1968), 73-81.

[97] Harriet Briscoe Harral, "An Interpersonal Ethic:
Basis for Behavior," _Religious Communication Today_, 2
(Sept. 1979), 42-45.

[98] Wayne Brockriede, "Arguers as Lovers," _Philosophy
and Rhetoric_, 5 (Winter 1972), 1-11.

harm, fallacies, etc., in order to manipulate the per-
suadee. Lovers, on the other hand, have appropriate
attitudes toward those with whom they communicate and,
therefore, their communication is ethical. Later Brock-
riede elaborated these three types of relationships to
a continuum from rape on one end to love on the other.[99]

Although Kale mixes Buber's I-Thou concept (which
he says Buber bases on people being created in the image
of God), Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson's concept of
communication having report and command aspects, and the
concept of speaking the truth in love as drawn from the
Bible, his perspective can perhaps most accurately be
labelled dialogic.[100] But since his mixture is drawn
from what seem to me radically different bases and he
is unable to mesh them together comfortably, his contri-
bution is minimal in presenting a unified system of
thought.

The dialogic position for judging ethics is rela-
tively new in the speech communication field so it re-
mains to be seen how important it will become. A major

[99] Donald K. Darnell and Wayne Brockriede, Persons
Communicating (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1976), pp. 162-65.

[100] David Kale, "An Ethic for Interpersonal Communi-
cation," Religious Communication Today, 2 (Sept. 1979),
16-20.

difficulty for the ethicist is in determining how one is to evaluate the intents of another communicator. An analysis of this position indicates that attitudes are primary, so it is not a big step to then argue that the communication is ethical if intents are good. Whether the communication actually demonstrates dialogic attitudes appears less significant. If a communicator claims to have held these attitudes while communicating, the evaluator would be hard pressed to deny this. Since the judgment rests on individual assessment of attitudes, the critic must be able and willing to thoroughly understand the other's perspective or phenomenological field. Furthermore, one who holds the dialogic position can hardly engage in ethical criticism of the communication of another person who practices monologue because the dialogic perspective emphasizes that the communication must not be judgmental. The critic immediately opens himself to the charge that he is not being "supportive" or "accepting" or demonstrating "unconditional positive regard" for the other and he runs the risk of being called unethical from this position. In essence, the dialogic critic is trapped by his own position.

A more significant critique of the dialogic perspective for ethics zeroes in on the basic assumption of this view, namely, that man determines his own self

and his society through correct interaction with others.
For Buber, the future of man depends on a rebirth of
dialogue.[101] Stewart reports that one of the common
features which characterize the work of communication
scholars and teachers who adopt a dialogic perspective
"is a focus on the self and subjectivity."[102] The pur-
pose for engaging in dialogue seems to be one of main-
taining one's own selfhood. Hence, this position,
which claims to be other-directed, appears, at its roots,
self-centered. It is an egoistic view. This position
thus appears inconsistent within itself.

E. Situational Perspectives

In another perspective, absolute standards are
usually avoided in favor of an important role for the
context of the communication in judging ethics. This
perspective may be called situational. Diggs represents
this perspective.[103] Essentially, by relying heavily
on consideration of consequences, and thus is a

[101] Friedman, _Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue_,
pp. 146-47.

[102] Stewart, "Foundations of Dialogic Communica-
tion," p. 185.

[103] Diggs, "Persuasion and Ethics."

teleological normative ethical theory, the situational

approach becomes utilitarian. Brembeck and Howell as-

sert: "ethics of persuasion is a function of con-

text."[104] From this beginning they develop their well-

known "social utility" approach: "Because persuasion is,

essentially rearranging the lives of other people, we be-

lieve that the persuader's sincere effort to abide by

some social utility principles is the first and perhaps

the most important step toward being ethical."[105] Thus,

while they carry certain principles across situations,

the implementation of these principles varies as the

situation dictates. Minnick clearly indicates his utili-

tarian view: "the best way of judging the ethical

quality of a persuasive message is by looking at the

consequences it will have."[106] He adds: "Ethics spring

from enduring social values. Ethics requires con-

sensus."[107] He further tries to eliminate the distinction

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[104] Winston L. Brembeck and William S. Howell,
Persuasion: A Means of Social Control, 2nd ed. (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 242.

[105] Brembeck and Howell, Persuasion, p. 245.

[106] Wayne C. Minnick, "A New Look at the Ethics of
Persuasion," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 45
(Summer 1980), 352-62.

[107] Minnick, "A New Look at the Ethics of Persua-
sion," p. 362.

between deontological and teleological approaches to ethics by saying they are almost identical. This distinction has long been maintained by moral philosophers and Minnick's assertion fails to refute their arguments for this distinction.

Rogge offers a clear example of situational ethics: "The basic premise of this paper is that in a democracy the standards of value by which a speaker and a speech are evaluated must be the standards established by the society."[108] He carries this view farther than many others who propound the democratic perspective when he states: "As the principle of democratic persuasion is applied in this paper, suggestion, if knowingly and willingly submitted to by a majority of persuadees, is an ethical method of persuasion."[109] In addition: "Because of the varying standards, the ethics of a situation cannot be determined by checking any timeless, universal set of standards."[110] Standards vary in this perspective as the situation and people vary. Rogge

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[108] Edward Rogge, "Evaluating the Ethics of a Speaker in a Democracy," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 45 (Dec. 1959), 419-25.

[109] Rogge, "Evaluating the Ethics of a Speaker in a Democracy," p. 420.

[110] Rogge, "Evaluating the Ethics of a Speaker in a Democracy," p. 423.

hints that whatever the majority of the people determine to be ethical is then appropriate behavior. Smith takes strong issue with Rogge on this point by arguing that "qualitative values are never arrived at by quantitative tabulation;" that democracy is structured on the premise that truth, not hyperbole, must be heard; and that value cannot be "absolutely relative."[111] In reply, Rogge denies that any individual critic or speaker has the right to designate public values. Only as a citizen, not as a critic, says Rogge, may one seek to change public morals.[112] Most rhetorical critics would probably not agree with Rogge since they accept as one function of criticism the teaching of ethical communication.[113]

Although he implied that consideration of ethics is nice if only you have time for it, Alinsky did discuss ethics and is probably one of the most extreme situationalists.[114] His position is one of the ends

[111] Robert W. Smith, "Ethics--Relative and Absolute," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 46 (April 1960), 196-97.

[112] Rogge, "Rejoinder," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 46 (April 1960), 197-98.

[113] See, for example, Hillbruner, "The Moral Imperative of Criticism," and Cathcart, Post Communication.

[114] Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals: A Primer for Realistic Radicals (New York: Vintage Books, 1972).

justifying the means. He was a pragmatist who believed
in getting things done and whatever worked he considered
ethical. For instance, after describing what he con-
sidered to be a "loathsome and nauseous" technique which
he could have used but did not, he said, " . . . but, if
I had been convinced that the only way we would win was
to use it, then without any reservations I would have
used it."[115] He also declared: "To me ethics is doing
what is best for the most."[116]

These writers seem to fear that absolute standards
are too rigid and the way they try to solve this problem
is to insist that the situation be taken into account.
This excessive fear of standards results in a problema-
tic absence of guidelines for judging the situation or
the consequences. Therefore, people have difficulty
integrating a situational system meaningfully into
their lives. A sound situational ethic would detail
the factors which must be considered in evaluating the
ethics of communication.

[115] Alinsky, _Rules for Radicals_, p. 33.

[116] Alinsky, _Rules for Radicals_, p. 90.

F. Existentialist Perspectives

A brief note should address the infrequently advocated existentialist perspectives. Anderson writes on Kierkegaard's existential theory of communication.[117] In this view, communication must foster subjectivity if it is to be ethical. Each person's consciousness of self is the crucial starting point for existentialism. Practical implications of this theory for a normative ethical system for communication remain incomplete.

McGuire also develops an existential ethic for rhetoric, based instead in Nietzche's will to power.[118] This ethic assumes that life is meaningless and, therefore, language is a lie. McGuire says: "As a guiding ethic for rhetoric, the will to power judges knowledge to be moral to the extent that it enhances life's value to the individual."[119] But he does not describe clearly what kinds of communication would enhance life's value. This ethic, too, is very subjectivistic.

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[117] Raymond E. Anderson, "Kierkegaard's Theory of Communication," Speech Monographs, 30 (March 1963), 1-14.

[118] Michael McGuire, "The Ethics of Rhetoric: The Morality of Knowledge," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 45 (Winter 1980), 133-48.

[119] McGuire, "The Ethics of Rhetoric," p. 148.

Campbell considers Sartre's existential philosophy applicable in ethical judgments of communication.[120] In his philosophy she finds values of authenticity as the highest good and that communication should encourage humans to recognize that certainty is impossible and that life is tentative.

The existential positions have not become popular among communication scholars interested in ethics even though existentialism is not new. Perhaps it is the subjectivistic character of these perspectives that causes scholars to shy away from them. Subjectivism tends toward ethical relativism. The individual can say only for himself what life's value is, according to the existentialists. Therefore, a normative ethical standard of existentialism would be different from person to person. No set of standards would cross situations except that each person must be free to make his own choice, and the individual person must be completely free to decide what is meaningful for himself. Ethical communication, in this view, would foster choice but offer few, if any, important guidelines for making choice.

[120] Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Rhetorical Implications of the Axiology of Jean-Paul Sartre," Western Speech, 35 (Summer 1971), 155-61.

G. Religious Perspectives

Thus far we have seen virtually no attention given to religious bases for ethics of communication and no treatment of Christian foundations. Attention to Christian ethics in speech communication is minimal. Voegelin argues that ethics has slid away from Christian bases. Jensen noted that scholars avoided reference to Judeo-Christian influences in ethics.

McMillan attempts to apply Christian ethics to advertising and uses the principles of: 1) primary responsibility must be to God, 2) love must be for one's neighbor as oneself, and 3) the truth must be spoken in love.[121] From these principles he draws ethical responsibilities advertisers must face.

Griffin's book, intended for popular audiences, aims to show how Christian ethics should be implemented in evangelical persuasion.[122] His basic principle is that persuasive efforts must not restrict one's freedom to choose. He then works with the two requirements of love and justice, using the metaphors of the non-lover,

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[121] John E. McMillan, "Ethics and Advertising," America, 107 (Sept. 29, 1962), 806-809.

[122] Em Griffin, The Mind Changers: The Art of Christian Persuasion (Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House, 1976).

the flirt, the seducer, the rapist, the smother lover, the legalistic lover, and the true lover. Although these metaphors appear similar to the ones used by Brockriede, they are not. Griffin's concept of "love" is Biblical rather than secular humanistic. A major problem with this book is that he only deals with evangelism, his definition of Christian persuasion.

McLaughlin's recent book attempts to develop a Christian position on the ethics of persuasive preaching for seminary students and pastors.[123] A teacher of homiletics and a preacher himself, he became concerned with some present practices in preaching. He deals with several ethical questions, one of which is whether to measure preaching by the ends sought or the means employed. He answers that both must be examined because rhetorical scholars would do so, rather than giving a Biblical basis for his answer. Furthermore, he regards some persuasive methods as inherently ethical, others as inherently unethical, and a third set as neutral which acquire rightness or wrongness from usage by, or possibly intent of, the preacher.

Essentially McLaughlin's view seems to be a curious

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[123] Raymond W. McLaughlin, The Ethics of Persuasive Preaching (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979).

wedding of secular and Biblical standards for ethical communication. He attempts to begin building a "super-structure for Biblical ethics" into which he can fit standards which rhetorical scholars have developed—regardless of the ethical perspectives of these scholars. He works from Biblical commandments of love and the Sermon on the Mount, while not excluding other passages from the Bible. He says the Christian persuader is not free from responsiblities of other standards but must "merge all of these standards with his Biblical-theological-anthropological commitment."[124] Herein lies the major problem of the book. Combining several standards with fundamentally different roots is awkward in building a system even though perhaps possible in practice. One suspects that one or another of the standards would come to the fore at various times. He focuses more on a Biblical perspective, but his effort to reconcile it with other standards is unsound.

Two articles by my colleague and myself contain brief sketches of the Reformed theological perspective for ethics of communication that is the subject of this

[124] McLaughlin, The Ethics of Persuasive Preaching. p. 135.

project.[125] Primarily these articles describe a few
principles for ethical communication, but do not fully
develop the theoretical foundations for this perspective.

Although the next chapter describes a particular
religious perspective in detail, some clarification
may distinguish religious perspectives from "humanistic"
perspectives which focus on the essence of human beings
as a starting point for ethics. One type of religious
perspective draws on the sacred literature for normative
standards for ethics, e.g., the Bible for Christians,
the Koran for Muslims. When the sacred literature con-
tains a proscription or prescription for communication,
the ethicist simply compares the communication practice
or technique against the requirement as stated in the
sacred literature and makes an ethical judgment. This
is a religious perspective in the narrower sense. Per-
haps religious perspectives are most commonly thought of
in this sense.

A second type of religious perspective sees religion
as much broader than a set of statements for ethics in
sacred literature. Life, in this perspective, is seen

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[125] Daryl Vander Kooi and Charles Veenstra, "Ethics
of Persuasion--Reconsidered," The Communicator, 7 (1977),
82-86; and Charles Veenstra and Daryl Vander Kooi, "Ethi-
cal Foundations for 'Religious' Persuasion: A Biblical
View," Religious Communication Today, 1 (Sept. 1979), 43-48.

as fundamentally religious in character and thus all
ethical perspectives are regarded as reflecting a parti-
cular religion, although the religion may not necessarily
be a formalized one. Chapter Four describes religion in
this broader sense in much greater detail in order to
set the framework for understanding the Reformed perspec-
tive.

The broader view of religion, such as the Reformed
perspective sees the essence of human nature only in re-
lation to God. God created man as a human being. Con-
sequently the commandments for ethical behavior which
are contained in the sacred literature, namely the Bible,
are intended to nourish this essential nature of human
beings, or to put it another way, they are intended to
allow people to live out their created nature. Since
this view is concerned with the essence of human nature,
in a sense it might be called "humanistic."

Humanistic perspectives may be divided into secular
and non-secular. The secular humanistic perspective
generally involves a view of man qua man without refer-
ence to God. For example, those who see symbol-using
capacities as the qualifying characteristic of what it
means to be human argue that man makes other people human
by developing these capacities. Thus only communication
which fosters this development would be ethical. In

non-secular humanistic perspectives, although this term
is seldom--if ever--used, the focus is on the essence
of human nature, but the essence of human nature is seen
only in relation to God. That is, any description of
human nature aside from its relation to God, according
to this view, would of necessity be incomplete. Further-
more, the reason why the term "humanistic" is not used
for this second type of perspective is that this term
in itself seems to focus on man alone whereas non-secular
humanistic perspectives view man always in relation to
Someone beyond himself.

Only in the limited sense that the Reformed perspec-
tive is concerned with the nature of man is the term
"humanistic" proper. And it must be sharply distin-
guished from secular humanistic perspectives. When the
Reformed perspective talks about the nature of man, it
begins with the position that man is created in the
image of God and thus immediately points beyond man to
God.

The faith of religious perspectives lies in belief
in God or some other being as the foundation for de-
velopment of an ethical position. Some religious posi-
tions are quite simplistic in taking maxims from sacred
literature as standards for communication. Others limit
religion to its formalized manifestation. Still others

seek a comprehensive world-and-life view for how man should live in this world. The Reformed perspective is of this latter kind.

Religious perspectives for the ethics of communication deserve more attention from scholars. Christian ethics in particular has been studied by scholars in other fields to a much greater extent than it has by people in communication. A significant gap in the literature is apparent and thus the focus of this project is to fill partially that gap by development of one religious perspective.

Application of Normative Ethical
Standards to Speaking Situations

Far less scholarly work pursues critical application of normative ethical standards to speaking situations than develops normative systems for communication. A few instances of articles which specifically deal with ethical criticism may shed light on both the frequency and methodology of criticism.

The standard procedure seems to be to pick a speaker whom the critic believes to have engaged in unethical practices and condemn the practices with some explanation of how the critic arrived at that judgment. This

explanation is brief, however, in comparison to the
condemnation itself and prediction of consequences for
society if the condemned communication continues. Thus
Baskerville's article on Joe McCarthy, Bormann's analysis
of Huey Long, Lomas' article on the rhetoric of dema-
goguery, and Thompson's study of Henry Harmon Spalding
deplore the speaking of demagogues.[126] Primarily these
articles aim at exposing the technique of a demagogue
rather than demonstrating the application of a normative
ethical system. These articles contain little help on
procedures for applying normative ethical standards to
communication and the normative standard being applied
is often obscure.

Operating from the premise that the speaker who
shortcircuits the listeners' rational capacities through
emotional appeals is acting unethically and undemocra-
tically, Flynt condemns the persuasive techniques in the

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[126] Barnet Baskerville, "Joe McCarthy: Briefcase
Demagogue," Today's Speech, 2 (Sept. 1954), 8-15; Ernest
G. Bormann, "Huey Long: An Analysis of a Demagogue,"
Today's Speech, 2 (Sept. 1954), 16-19; Charles W. Lomas,
The Rhetoric of Demagoguery," Western Speech, 25 (Sum-
mer 1961), 160-68; and Ernest C. Thompson, "A Case Study
in Demagoguery: Henry Harmon Spalding," Western Speech,
30 (Fall 1966), 225-32.

1963 Birmingham crisis.[127] His method charges unethical emotional fear appeals and then he documents the charge through the words of the speakers.

In his critical piece on the "Rhetoric of 1968" Haiman tried to maintain his previous commitment to the rational system while at the same time avoiding a charge that the new rhetoric which utilized increased emotion and abrasiveness was unethical.[128] The result is a weak, half-hearted evaluation. After explaining how new techniques in rhetoric are moving away from the rational, he argues that some of these new techniques are matters of taste rather than ethics but also that others cannot be defended by the ideal standards for ethical communication. At some point, he says, techniques of controversy must give way to reasoned discourse. Thus, he seems to suggest that some non-traditional forms of communication may be ethical so long as they yield to the rational at a later point, but where that point is, he does not say. In this article Haiman seems uncomfortable with the previous stand he had taken on ethical

[127] Wayne Flynt, "The Ethics of Democratic Persuasion and the Birmingham Crisis," Southern Speech Journal, 35 (Fall 1969), 40-53.

[128] Haiman, "The Rhetoric of 1968: A Farewell to Rational Discourse."

rhetoric.

Using the broad framework of Brembeck and Howell's "social utility" approach, Freeman evaluates the strategies of Glenn W. Turner by examining the nature of the course of àction he urges and his means to persuade.[129] She begins by charging that Turner's course of action is unethical because it is based on inappropriate values and is deceptive. From this point she describes the values he espouses, shows how the pyramid scheme he advocates cannot work to everyone's benefit in the long run and describes how his promotion of self-actualization is based only in financial status. Secondly, she condemns Turner's persuasion because it does not permit the free, informed rational choice that Nilsen advocates as necessary for speech to be ethical. In essence, she evaluates the ends of Turner's communication by the "social utility" approach and the means he uses by Nilsen's rationalist perspective.

Rasmussen also applies two ethical perspectives.[130]

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[129] Patricia Lynn Freeman, "An Ethical Evaluation of the Persuasive Strategies of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 38 (Summer 1973), 347-61.

[130] Karen Rasmussen, "Nixon and the Strategy of Avoidance," Central States Speech Journal, 24 (Fall 1963), 193-202.

She evaluates former President Nixon's strategies in the
1972 campaign by the democractic and the dialogic norma-
tive ethical standards. After describing and analyzing
Nixon's use of the media and his avoidance of confronta-
tion with McGovern, she discusses how Nixon's strategy
falls into the unethical category of "seduction" on
Brockriede's continuum of interpersonal relationships.
She argues that his strategy of avoidance did not pro-
tect the audience's freedom of choice and discourages
substantive conflict. Therefore, it is dehumanizing as
well as counterproductive to the democratic decision-
making process. Essentially her procedure is to make
an ethical judgment about this strategy and then offer
reasons for her judgment.

The four articles just cited are unusual in the
literature in focusing primarily on an ethical evalua-
tion of speaking situations. More common are articles
which add an ethical judgment to broader evaluation.
For example, Burke's primary aim in "The Rhetoric of
Hitler's Battle" is to explain Hitler's success in
wooing the German people.[131] A secondary aim is to show

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[131] Kenneth Burke, "The Rhetoric of Hitler's Bat-
tle," reprinted in Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock,
Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth Century
Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 239-57.

Hitler's tactics to be unethical, and in so doing, warn
the American people. Using the notion that symbol-using
is the key to delimiting ethical communication, he ex-
plains that Hitler's distortion of religion was unethi-
cal because he corrupted a value system to serve as
symbolic support for his own ends. Burke's method
explains Hitler's subtle techniques that induced uncon-
scious symbolic change. Burke says: "our job, then, is
to find all available ways of making the Hitlerite dis-
tortions of religion apparent."[132]

Campbell provides additional examples of a critic
doing ethical evaluation of speaking in her book on
rhetorical criticism.[133] Although her articles are not
primarily ethical criticism, she does comment on the
ethics of the speakers. She judges Nixon's speech first
by criteria Nixon himself suggested in the speech but
she goes beyond this to condemn him, in what she calls
her most significant criticism, for perpetuating what
she believes to be myths about America.[134] Her method
involves an ethical charge followed by assertions that

[132] Burke, "The Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle," p. 257.

[133] Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, _Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric_ (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1972).

[134] Campbell, _Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric_, p. 56.

the truth is opposite of what Nixon says it is. Her
second critical piece finds George Wald's speech ethical
because it is a "masterpiece of moral and philosophical
analysis" of ideas she believes important.[135] Her cri-
tique of Agnew argues that his rhetorical strategems are
unethical because they establish conventions of argumen-
tation and persuasion that diminish the ability of so-
ciety to reach good decisions.[136] Her method describes
Agnew's rhetorical techniques. Although not explicitly,
she seems to be using the symbol-using ethical standard
in her critique. One senses, however, that she is more
inclined to evaluate as ethical only those people who
advocate ideas she prefers--her biases overwhelm her
critique.

Occasionally one finds pieces in rhetorical criti-
cism which focus on special topics as obscenity[137] and

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[135] Campbell, Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric,
p. 71.

[136] Campbell, Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric,
pp. 94-109.

[137] Haig A. Bosmajian, "Obscenity and Protest,"
Today's Speech, 18 (Winter 1970), 9-14; and J. Dan
Rothwell, "Verbal Obscenity: Time for Second Thoughts,"
Western Speech, 35 (Fall 1971), 231-42.

coercion.[138] The emphasis generally is on certain tech-
niques functioning rhetorically rather than on an ethical
evaluation of these techniques.

While this review may not completely exhaust every
instance of a critic making an ethical evaluation, it
does indicate the extent to which one finds ethical
evaluation of speaking. Flynt says: "While much has
been written about unethical persuasion, there has been
little attempt to demonstrate its influence in an his-
torical context."[139] Chesebro noted increasing stress
on the development of standards for evaluating discourse
rather than on developing procedures for actually doing
the evaluation.[140] Thus ethical evaluation of discourse
is sparse.

Conclusions

This review merits several conclusions about the
state of ethical theorizing in speech communication.

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[138] Andrews, "Controntation at Columbia;" and
Lawrence B. Rosenfeld, "The Confrontation Policies of S.
I. Hayakawa: A Case Study in Coercive Semantics,"
Today's Speech, 18 (Spring 1970), 18-22.

[139] Flynt, "The Ethics of Democratic Persuasion and
the Birmingham Crisis," p. 40.

[140] Chesebro, "A Construct for Assessing Ethics,"
p. 105.

First the considerable work on ethics of communication

demonstrates that ethics is a significant concern.

Second, no single ethical theory or normative standard

dominates. Instead a wide variety of oten overlapping

positions are advocated. Neatly categorizing writers

according to the normative positions they advocate is

nearly impossible, as Anderson and Anderson indicate:

> At first it seems relatively easy to maintain
> quite distinct conceptual approaches. When
> specific writers and specific situations are
> examined, however, the clarity and uniqueness
> of these conceptual categories tends to break
> down. An examination of many writers on per-
> suasion ethics in communication journals sug-
> gests that no taxonomy can fully differentiate
> the approaches unless one is willing to accept
> a good deal of overlapping and focus upon
> general tendencies and emphases as the key.[141]

Third, while writers' calls for attention to ethics are

abundant, there is an obvious lack of critical pieces

applying normative standards to actual communication

situations. Part of this lack of application may be due

to limited work on the methodology of ethical criticism

in speech communication. Fourth, little attention has

been paid to the ethics of religious speakers and broad-

casters. No criticism of any kind appears on Dr. Joel

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[141] Anderson and Anderson, "Ethics and Persuasion,"
p. 317n.

Nederhood whose speaking will provide material for analysis in Chapter Five. Fifth, the position which will be maintained in this project is undeveloped in the literature on ethics of speech communication. And, except for two short articles by my colleague and myself, the Reformed theological perspective for the ethics of speech communication remains largely untouched.

If Jensen is correct that "there seems to be a studied attempt to avoid reference to that religious origin" of ethical standards, then the question that naturally arises is why is this so. Certainly Christian ethics generally has been studied and applied extensively by scholars in other fields. This lack of attention to this normative ethical position in our field provides ample justification for the study that is attempted here. Application of a religious perspective, namely the Reformed theological perspective, to a speaker who has not been analyzed anywhere in the literature will help answer the question of the viability of this position.

Chapter IV

The Reformed View of Man and Its

Implications for Ethical Communication

The Reformed view of man brings a vibrancy to the
life and history of its adherents. Although opponents
have assailed from time to time its rigidity, its vi-
tality has persisted for many generations. Although
rooted in theology, this view has developed far beyond
theology to become a system of philosophical thought
with practical implications for all of life. It seeks
to avoid the dualism of religion and the so-called "non-
religious" or secular side of life. Its vitality in-
heres in a holistic view which integrates the religious
character of man with other aspects of his existence.
This chapter builds from a Reformed view of man a system
for judging ethical communication.

A Brief Description of

the Reformed Tradition

A summary of the Reformed tradition at this point
may provide a grounding for a system of ethics for

communication. The Reformed view takes its name, of course, from the Reformation of the sixteenth century. The Reformation sought a return to a Biblically sound view of the church, doctrine, and daily life. At bottom, those who hold this view accept the Bible as authoritative for all of life. This perspective finds its roots primarily in the work of John Calvin (1509-1564). His work has been refined, developed, and modified by many thinkers since his time, including, for example, Abraham Kuyper, Louis Berkhof, Herman Bavinck, Cornelius Van Til, and Gerrit C. Berkouwer. Consequently the name Calvinism, which is often taken as the term most descriptive of the Reformed view, has come to represent not only the work of Calvin himself, but also the development and modification of his thought by those who tried to remain faithful to the primary principles which he developed. Calvin remains a respected theologian in this tradition, but faithfulness to the Bible, which was a prime principle of Calvin, takes precedence over the writings of Calvin in theological argument among Reformed theologians and philosophers.

The Reformed tradition maintains three primary

tenets.[1] The first holds that man stands in relation to God who is sovereign. Kuyper writes that Calvinism "proclaims the exalted thought that, although standing in high majesty above the creature, God enters <u>into immediate fellowship with the creature. . . .</u>"[2] Thus, adherents of this view maintain that the whole of one's life is to be lived in the Divine Presence. The second principle maintains that man's relation to man must be governed by the belief that each person should be recognized, respected, and treated as a creature who has been created in the image of God. Distinctions among people are certainly accepted, but these differences yield no claim of superiority. That each person has been given different gifts is also recognized and these gifts are then to serve others. The third principle involves man's relation to the world. The Reformed perspective believes the world is God's creation and, thus, man ought to be busy in this world as a steward of this creation. World-flight mentality--the notion prevalent among some groups of Christians that they ought <u>only</u> be concerned with the

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[1] Abraham Kuyper, <u>Lectures on Calvinism</u> (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), pp. 19-32. This volume consists of six lectures delivered at Princeton University in 1898 under the auspices of the L. P. Stone Foundation.

[2] Kuyper, <u>Lectures on Calvinism</u>, p. 21.

salvation of men's souls for the life hereafter and consequently what happens in this world is of little concern--is foreign to the Calvinist. Man's relationship with God is demonstrated by his relation with other people and by his activity in the world. These three tenets together comprise an integral unit in Reformed thought and practice.

The Nature of Religion

A search for starting points for ethics must begin by considering the nature of man which, in turn, must, in the Reformed view, consider the nature of religion. The Reformed position claims that all people are religious. Narrow definitions of religion have resulted in common misconceptions of its nature. First, religion is often confined to institutionalized religions such as Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Islam, etc. Thus, some people are thought to be religious if they are members of a formal, institutionalized religion and non-religious if they are not members of such formal institutions. Consequently, the term "worship" is practically limited to formal reverence given to God (or some other ultimate being) via a formal worship service performed in church by religious people. Those who do not attend

church services are then thought to be without religion or to be non-religious persons.

Secondly, religion is frequently compartmentalized as something personal rather than public. Many people go to church on Sunday to become involved in religion, and go to work on Monday, supposedly leaving religion behind at church or at least in the confines of their home. Religion is thus treated as something which is other-worldly—as something that is important for salvation of souls or the life hereafter—but is not directly concerned with, or a part of, one's daily work. The two sides of a person, the religious and the secular, are seen as separate and without mutual influence. This dichotomy dominates education in the public schools where religion is not supposed to influence teaching. Under the notion of maintaining separation of church and state, the U. S. Supreme Court has ruled against religious influence in education.

Both limitations may help explain why scholars in communication, if they hold these views of religion which seem to be prevalent in the popular mind, have paid little attention to the development of religious perspectives for ethical communication. Both limitations, however, deny the nature of religion.

While the popular mind may have limited its

definition of religion, scholars of religion are not

making the same limitations. King explains that "we

must always remain aware of the wider-than-traditional

application of the term 'religious' and be sympatheti-

cally open to its manifestations."[3] Streng argues that

"the central dimension of human life is, and will remain,

religious."[4] Nevius makes clear the all-encompassing

nature of religion when he says that it "is the total

response of man's nature to what he apprehends of that

Power recognized as supreme, and upon which his highest

well-being depends."[5] Anthrolopogists agree with theo-

logians that religion is a universal aspect of life.[6]

[3] Winston L. King, Introduction to Religion: A
Phenomenological Approach, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper &
Row, 1968), p. 12.

[4] Frederick J. Streng, Understanding Religious Life,
2nd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson, 1976), p. 12.

[5] Warren Nelson Nevius, Religion as Experience and
Truth: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1941), p. 42.

[6] See, for example, Louis Berkhof, Introductory Vol-
ume to Systematic Theology, Rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerd-
mans, 1932), p. 100; Anthony F. C. Wallace, Religion:
An Anthropological View (New York: Random House, 1966),
p. 4; and Johannes G. Vos, A Christian Introduction to
Religions of the World (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965), pp.
10-11. Even language scholar Richard M. Weaver claimed
humanity includes "what can only be suggested, a yearning
to be in relation with something infinite. This last is
his religious passion." See his "Language is Sermonic,"
reprinted in Contemporary Theories of Rhetoric, ed.
Richard L. Johannesen (New York: Harper & Row), p. 165.

Even the skeptic Hume recognized the pervasiveness of
religion when he warned: "Look out for a people, en-
tirely destitute of religion: If you find them at all,
be assured, that they are but a few degrees removed from
the brutes."[7] In his work, The Nature of Religion,
Schrotenboer offers a definition which forms the thrust
of the view of religion taken in this project: "Reli-
gion is what we may call man's integral heart reaction
to something or someone behind or beyond man."[8] He
elaborates by borrowing from the work of Calvin and
Dooyeweerd the implication that "religion is always and
everywhere response."[9]

Not only are such scholars unwilling to limit reli-
gion to the formal, institutional definitions of the
.popular mind, they also do not limit religion to one
particular segment of a person's life. The term Weltan-
schauung, or world-and-life view, more accurately des-
cribes the nature of religion than do the popular

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[7] David Hume, The Natural History of Religion, ed.
H. E. Root (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956),
pp. 75-76.

[8] Paul G. Schrotenboer, The Nature of Religion
(Hamilton, Ontario: Association for Reformed Scientific
Studies, 1964), pp. 11-12.

[9] Schrotenboer, The Nature of Religion, pp. 11-12.

traditional definitions of religion.[10] According to

this explanation, secular humanism would be as much a

religion as Christianity. Indeed, Erich Fromm argues

for a secular humanistic religion which centers around

man, or to rephrase, man becomes the god that man wor-

ships.[11] Worship of the American democratic system might

be called a branch or type of secular humanistic religion.

In a secular humanistic religion, man is worshipped in

the sense that the adherent believes that ultimately

man can save himself from his condition. The secular

humanist argues implicitly that if people would concen-

trate on developing distinctively human qualities, man

will be transformed into the best he can become.

The point is that all people are religious--they

have a religion--whether they formally recognize it or

not, whether it is an institutional one or not. The

actions of people often indicate the character of their

religion more clearly than do their formal creeds.

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[10] For a more extended discussion of the history and
meaning of the term Weltanschauung, see James Orr, The
Christian View of God and the World (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1954), pp. 365-67. This volume consists of the
Kerr Lectures at Princeton University in 1890-1891.

[11] Erich Fromm, "What is Humanistic Religion," in
Philosophy of Religion: A Book of Readings, ed. George
L. Abernethy and Thomas A. Langford (New York: Macmil-
lan, 1962), pp. 58-69.

Furthermore, religion influences the direction of peo-
ple's lives and, thus, has an important bearing on the
nature of ethical standards developed for communication.
Ethical standards need to account for the religious
nature of a human being, particularly as one's religious
direction is manifested through and influenced by com-
munication.

The Reformed perspective has long recognized the
pervasiveness of religion. It has argued that the
character of life is religious. Consequently, Reformed
scholars have asked that adherents to this position
consciously and consistently live all of life according
to Reformed principles. Kuyper, for example, argued
that Calvinism, which he said most consistently and
logically followed out the Reformation, was a life
system which should be manifest in art, politics, and
culture.[12] More recently, Wolterstorff, a philosopher,
argued that one's religious "control beliefs" should
function importantly in one's scholarship.[13] Kuyper
insisted that the Reformed view of religion is a world
view, not a view limited to only one aspect of a person's

[12] Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism, p. 190.

[13] Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Reason Within the
Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), p. 66.

life: "A religion confined to the closet, the cell, or the church, therefore, Calvin abhors."[14]

Although the broad view of religion is prominent in the work of scholars of religion in other perspectives, the Reformed view goes beyond simply asserting that religion seems to be universal in culture to argue that religion is central in the nature of man as a created being in the image of God. The explanation for religion lies in creation. This religious nature will have direct implications for standards, or principles, of ethical conduct in communication.

The Meaning of the Image of
God in Reformed Theology

The basis for the religious nature of man in Reformed theology is explained by Berkhof: "Religion is rooted in the image of God and that image is central, revealing itself in the whole man with all his talents and powers. Consequently, man's relation to God is also central and involves the whole man."[15] The belief in

[14] Kuyper, _Lectures on Calvinism_, p. 190.

[15] Louis Berkhof, _Manual of Christian Doctrine_ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1933), p. 19.

the image of God, which is an important concept in the Reformed tradition, comes from Gen. 1:27: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." Man's nature, according to Reformed scholars, is religious in character because God created man for response to God.

Orr stresses the importance of the image of God in man by arguing that this conception runs throughout the Bible and forms the basis of man's relation to man.[16] Reformed scholars generally agree with Orr's position and have sought to draw out the meaning of this conception. The earliest and most important Reformed theologian to expound on this meaning was Calvin. In his commentary on Gen. 1:26-27, he explains that this image means that man was created with "right judgment . . . and truly excelled in everything good" because the Divine image was eminent in his mind and heart.[17] Man was created a religious being who was to mirror his Creator. However, the fall of man into sin severely

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[16] James Orr, _God's Image in Man and Its Defacement in the Light of Modern Denials_ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), p. 36. This volume consists of lectures delivered at Princeton University in 1903 under the auspices of the L. P. Stone Foundation.

[17] John Calvin, _Commentaries_, trans. John King (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), I, p. 95.

cracked this mirror and Calvin argues that "some obscure lineaments of that image are found remaining in us" but they are "vitiated and maimed."[18] The image is now a distortion of what it was originally intended to be. The true image can be restored only by redemption in Christ and thus Calvin says "we may judge from its restoration what it originally had been."[19]

Two aspects in the Reformed conception of the image of God, although not readily apparent, have a crucial bearing on ethical standards. The first aspect presents man as created for fellowship with God. He is a religious being who, by his very nature, must respond to God--whether this response be for God or against God. Before the fall of man into sin, man responded correctly in praise to God and after the fall, man turned against God, but since his nature was such that he needed to respond to someone or something ultimate beyond himself, he turned to other gods. Kuyper clarifies the relation of religion to the image of God:

> But just as the entire creation reaches its
> culminating point in man, so also religion
> finds its clear expression in man who is made
> in the image of God, and this is not because

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[18] Calvin, _Commentaries_, I, p. 95.

[19] Calvin, _Commentaries_, I, p. 94.

> man seeks it, but because God Himself implanted
> in man's nature the real essential religious
> expression, by means of the "seed of religion"
> . . . as Calvin defines it, sown in our human
> heart.[20]

No part of man's life is separate from his relation-
ship with God. He is a directional creature and all
of his life constitutes a response to God. Here we find
the essence of religion. The very nature of man is
religious--man has been created for response and he can-
not escape his created nature. By responding correctly
to God's call, man becomes a responsible being. The
term "responsible" implies a response to someone and,
in this view, man is responding to God. The term "cove-
nant," which is very prominent in Reformed theology,
refers to this sense of fellowship and response which
forms the moral life.

The religious character of man's response is re-
flected in all of his actions. Man is called to respond
by means of praise in worship and also through his rela-
tionships with his fellow man. The New Testament makes
the necessity of this response clear in Matt. 22:37-39
when Jesus said: "Love the Lord your God with all your
heart, with all your soul and with all your mind. This

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[20] Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism, pp. 45-46.

is the first and greatest commandment. And the second
is like it: Love your neighbor as yourself." This text
indicates the totality of one's response. Through inter-
actions with other human beings, a person demonstrates
his response to God. In this sense, Reformed scholars
say that man's life in its entirety is directional.

The second aspect involves the likeness of man to
God. This aspect has received more specific attention
from Reformed theologians describing the image of God.
These two aspects are woven together in the literature
of Reformed theology. The only way man can correctly
fulfill his created religious nature and respond appro-
priately to God is to reflect the undistorted created
image back to God by demonstrating that he is _like_ God.[21]

Explaining this second aspect, theologian Charles
Hodge says that Reformed theologians, and the "majority

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[21] Most Reformed theologians explain that no distinc-
tion should be made between the terms "image" and "like-
ness" since these are used interchangeably in Scripture.
See, for example, Charles Hodge, _Systematic Theology_ (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895), II, p. 96. The
distinction I am making here on the likeness-to-God as-
pect of the image is done only for analytical purposes in
order to separate these concepts from the concept of
religion-as-response, all of which are integrally in-
volved in the image of God. We need some term to sepa-
rate the two aspects and so I have chosen to use "like-
ness-to-God" to represent one aspect. It must be kept in
mind that this use of the term is not drawn from Reformed
theologians who use the terms interchangeably because,
they say, Scripture does as well. Nor does this use
intend to make a substantive distinction.

of the theologians of other divisions of the Church,"
think that man's likeness to God includes the following
points.[22] First, the likeness involves an intellectual
and moral nature including reason, conscience, and will.
He argues that this nature "is also the necessary condi-
tion of our capacity to know God and therefore the foun-
dation of our religious nature."[23] Second, the likeness
includes original knowledge, righteousness, and holiness.

[22] Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, p. 96.

[23] Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, p. 97.
See also Archibald Alexander Hodge, Outlines of Theology,
Rewritten and Enlarged, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957),
p. 200; Gerrit C. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God,
trans. Dirk W. Jellema (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962),
p. 84; and Herman Hoeksema, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand
Rapids: Reformed Free Publishing Association, 1966),
pp. 206-208. Hoeksema explains that Reformed theologians
after Calvin made a distinction between "the image of
God in a wider and a narrower sense. To the former,
then belong man's rationality and morality and so-called
immortality; to the latter belong his true knowledge of
God, righteousness, and holiness. The former implies
all that distinguished man from the lower animals; the
latter is his original state of righteousness. The lat-
ter was lost through the Fall; the former, however, was
retained. Man still possesses the image of God in a
wider sense, though he no more possesses his original
integrity." He rejects this distinction and instead
distinguishes between the image in a formal and a mate-
rial sense: "By the former is meant the fact that man's
nature is adapted to bear the image of God. . . . It is
evident that it requires a rational, moral nature to bear
that image of God. And by the image of God in a material
sense is meant that spiritual, ethical soundness of the
human nature according to which man actually shows forth
the virtues of knowledge of God, righteousness, and holi-
ness." See Hoeksema, Reformed Dogmatics, pp. 206-208.

And third, this likeness involves dominion over the creatures. Man stands as God's representative on this earth: "It was therefore as a ruler that he bore God's image, or represented Him on earth."[24] Each of these three elements or parts of the likeness to God will be examined briefly.

Hoeksema explains that man as image bearer "means that he is a personal being with a rational, moral nature, capable of standing in a conscious, personal relation to God. . . . Always he remains a personal, rational, moral being, who ought to live in covenant fellowship with God."[25] Thus, ethical conduct is required of man since he has the opportunity to know right from wrong and to make moral choices. Furthermore, these are inherently moral choices because they indicate a response to God. After discussing the moral quality as definitive of man, Verduin explains:

> Another way of putting all this is to say that man is a creature with a conscience. Conscience is a Biblical concept, a Biblical word. We read in Romans 2:15, for instance, that the Gentiles have a "conscience" which "accuses" or else "excuses" them of items of human behavior. Since "Gentile" is the name given in the Bible to a person who lives outside the

[24] Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, p. 101.

[25] Hoeksema, Reformed Dogmatics, p. 209.

> pale of redemptive revelation, we find the
> Bible saying here that man as such has a still
> small voice, a voice forever testifying, for-
> ever analyzing specific behavioral items, con-
> stantly listing them on one or the other side
> of the ledger of life.[26]

This view coincides closely with popular notions that

somehow we feel or know what is right or wrong without

being able to articulate a clear reason for why it is

right or wrong. Intuitionism, which Frankena describes

as "the view that our basic principles and value judg-

ments are intuitive or self-evident. . . ," is common in

moral philosophy.[27] The Reformed view locates the

source of this innate feeling in man's being created in

the image of God.

Hodge's second point--that man was created with

original knowledge, righteousness, and holiness--is inte-

grally related to the first. Man was created with a

correct knowledge of God, was able to discern clearly

what was right, and was able to act accordingly. Man's

intellectual and moral integrity was revealed in his

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[26] Leonard Verduin, Somewhat Less Than God: The
Biblical View of Man (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970),
p. 50.

[27] William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 85. He adds that this
view is held by several writers: Sidgwick, Rashdall,
Moore, Prichard, Ross, Carritt, Hartman, and Ewing (p. 86).

fellowship with God and man. It is especially this element which Reformed scholars say was radically distorted by the fall of man into sin, and its restoration can only come through Christ. Man can no longer know God without Christ, nor can he have a correct understanding of man's relation to man. In probably the most important book on this subject in Reformed theology, Man: The Image of God, Berkouwer argues that the image of God, particularly this element, is in need of redemption in Christ. Through restoration in Christ, man is enabled to begin to demonstrate properly the image of God through his relationships with people, i.e., being like Christ who perfectly reflects God's image.[28] He says: "The whole Scriptural witness makes clear that our understanding of the image of God can be sound only when in unbreakable relation to the witness regarding Jesus Christ, who is called the image of God."[29]

Although minor differences occur between Reformed theologians on the exact meaning of the third element or part of man's likeness to God--that man has dominion over the creatures--most agree that it grows out of the other

[28] Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, pp. 115-17.

[29] Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, p. 107.

two elements. Man was created to serve as God's representative on earth. Berkouwer explains that:

> the content with which this concept is concerned is without a doubt central in Scripture. The idea of representation refers to man in the concreteness and visibility of his earthly life; . . . and who is called to represent and portray this image here on earth.[30]

The appropriate result of man's moral likeness to his Creator is to exercise dominion over the earth in God's place. The term "cultural mandate" is often used to describe the responsibility man has in exercising dominion over the creation.

This image of God in man, with its three elements of man's likeness to God, forms a basis for man's relation to man. Calvin states that because of this image, "man is possessed of no small dignity."[31] Kuyper also bases respect for man upon the image of God when he insists that man "should be recognized and respected and dealt with as a creature created after the Divine likeness."[32]

The life of Christ concretizes the meaning of the

[30] Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, p. 114.

[31] Calvin, Commentaries, I, p. 296.

[32] Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism, p. 27.

image of God. Not only does Christ restore the image
but through his life we see a true picture of the image,
as Berkouwer explains:

> . . . in this "imitation" of Christ, we come
> in contact with the deepest meaning of the re-
> newal in God's image; a direct echo of the Bib-
> lical admonition which applies this "being
> like" to our daily lives: "Forbearing one
> another, and forgiving one another, if any man
> have a quarrel against any; even as Christ
> forgave you, so also do ye" (Col. 3:13).[33]

Holders of the Reformed position do not maintain, of
course, that all people believe that each person has been
created in the image of God. They say that because of
man's fall into sin, people are unable to respond to God
correctly and frequently they have no desire to do so.
But these adherents maintain that the image of God, how-
ever distorted the reflection might be, remains in each
person. Although severely damaged, the image was not
thoroughly destroyed by the fall. Thus each person car-
ries dignity. For the Christian, redemption in Christ
restores the image. Furthermore, the Christian who

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[33] Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, p. 101. Van
Til agrees with Berkouwer that our understanding of the
image of God is always analogical. He says: "But it
must be remembered that it is of the essence of the Re-
formed view that a truly biblical system is analogical."
See Cornelius Van Til, rev. of The Image of God in Man,
by David S. Cairns, Westminster Theological Journal, 16
(Nov. 1953), p. 54.

wishes to be faithful to the nature of the image, will
follow the example of Christ who made clear the nature
of the image of God. Proponents of this view also main-
tain that all people would benefit from respect for the
image of God in all people.

Berkouwer, a prominent contemporary Reformed theo-
logian, insists that in order to understand the nature
of man, we must see man in relation to God--man in God's
own image. When discussing Karl Barth's treatment of
the idea that we cannot understand man apart from his
relation to God, he makes a statement which epitomizes
the heart of the Reformed view and provides a conclusion
to this section:

> In our opinion, this position is unassailable;
> man cannot be known with a true and reliable
> knowledge if he is abstracted from this rela-
> tion to God. Man would then be, from a
> Scriptural point of view, nothing but an ab-
> straction, and if we seek to define man merely
> in terms of the various qualities and abili-
> ties, we are not giving a Biblical picture of
> man.[34]

This fundamental relationship must pervade the analysis
of value propositions inherent in the Reformed view of
man--propositions which will lead to a normative ethical
system for communication.

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[34] Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, p. 93.

Value Propositions

Inherent in the Reformed View

A short description of basic value propositions which grow out of a Reformed view of man will bridge the explanation of the meaning of the image of God and the principles for ethical communication. We will view these value propositions as first principles which are grounded directly in the view of man that has been described thus far.

First, the view of man in the image of God presumes without question the sovereignty of God. Throughout the literature of Reformed theology, and particularly in the works of Calvin, the sovereignty of God takes precedence over all. In a sense, this is the highest value proposition in Reformed theology and will permeate any discussion of principles for ethical communication. It becomes the over-arching principle and is on a higher level than the next three.

Second, man was created for fellowship with God and is, therefore, a directional creature. We have seen this in the discussion of the religious nature of man. Man was created to honor God by responding to God in praise. The direction of man's heart is either toward God or away from Him. Man's life reflects this direction. In

Reformed thought and practice, much emphasis is placed on living consistently with one's faith. This concern can be stated in terms of a deep caring for the direction of another's life: Is this person moving closer to God as he should, or is he moving further away from Him? Evangelistic programs demonstrate this concern most clearly perhaps, but this concern permeates the life of the adherents to the Reformed world-and-life view.

Third, because man is created in the image of God, he carries no small dignity. God chose man rather than the animals to carry His image. Animals do not have the capacity, as man does, for fellowship with God. Man can know God. Man is not the highest level of animal. Instead, he has an intellectual and moral capacity that was originally reflected in righteousness and holiness in addition to correct knowledge of God. He was given dominion over the animals and the rest of creation as an aspect of the image of God in him. Although the image is distorted because of sin, the image is not destroyed in man. Since each person carries this image, each person must be respected, and by respecting persons, we respect the Creator.

The fourth important value proposition that results from the Reformed view of man is a high regard for communication itself. This view implies that communication

is inherent in and essential to man's creation as a responding being. Man can address God and express his whole personality before God. Elert says: "This act of expression is a form of response to God who called man into existence by his word. When God created man, he immediately instituted a form of communication which implies man's response to God's call."[35] Without communication man could not engage in fellowship with God.

Furthermore, man's communication and actions vis à vis his fellow man constitute part of his response to God. This view emphasizes that man is a whole being and that all he does stems from the totality of his being. No part of his life or communication is separate from this directional response. Our communication reflects both who we are and our view of who other people are. It is through communication that we can fulfill our nature as created beings who are made in the image of God.

These value propositions translate into primary principles for the ethical communicator. The sovereignty of God governs everything else for the Reformed faith. When this is accepted, one moves to the next three values which are on a different level and more concretely

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[35] Werner Elert, The Christian Ethos, trans. Carl J. Schindler (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957), p. 26.

translate into guiding principles for one's life. This
view holds that if the three values which relate to man
are properly implemented, belief in the sovereignty of
God will be demonstrated. These two levels work together
like the first and second commandments in Jesus' summary
of the law (Matt. 22:37-39). The translation of these
values into guiding principles for communication is
quite direct as the next section shows. The ethical
communicator in this view has these values in mind and
attempts to develop them directly into basic principles
which ought to guide his communication. And communica-
tion should demonstrate these principles in action, or
in other words, it should be characterized by these
principles.

Principles for Ethical Communication
from Reformed Values

The normative ethical system developed in this sec-
tion is a deontological rather than a teleological system.
It involves a set of principles applicable regardless of
the situation or consequences. It holds that these prin-
ciples have value because they are grounded in the nature
of man developed in Reformed theology--aside from the
value they might have in consequences. The principles

are, in effect, criteria for good communication and the basis for "good" lies in the relation of these principles to the nature of man. The principles may have additional value because they result in beneficial consequences when they are implemented, but the basis for calling them "good" does not derive from consequences.

At the same time, however, consequences are not ignored entirely. At times, one has to consider the context to determine exactly how an ethical principle is to be implemented. For example, one of the ethical principles described later in this section is honesty. Now, suppose we have a terminally ill patient who is unaware of the seriousness of the illness. The principle of honesty in informing the patient is not negated since it is grounded in a more basic principle of respect for others because they are created in the image of God. But because the patient may not be able emotionally to handle the information about his illness at this time, another principle of proper attitudes of love for the patient, which is also grounded in respect, may require tact in postponing for a short time the transmission of this information. The principles do not change, but their implementation may vary slightly according to the context.

The value propositions grounded in the nature of

man, described in the previous section, translate into basic principles for ethical communication. "Principle" should be defined as a guide for correct action, or a governing rule of conduct, which the communicator attempts to implement in his communication. Communication practices, in turn, should demonstrate these principles in action, i.e., they should be characterized by these principles. These basic principles work out into subprinciples, as well as directly into practices of ethical communication. "Subprinciples" are elaborations of all three basic principles. Fig. 1 demonstrates the outline of the format for the ethical system and Fig. 2 fills details of this section into the format. Lines are not drawn between the basic principles, thus indicating that they are not isolated from each other. Nor did I draw lines directly from one basic principle to a subprinciple because the subprinciple may be grounded easily in more than one basic principle, albeit at times a subprinciple may more directly relate to one basic principle than another. In a sense, all are principles, yet not all on the same level. These subprinciples may be seen also as characteristics of ethical communication which demonstrate the basic principles in action. Yet, I do not call them simply characteristics since they are also guides for conduct, e.g., one subprinciple as we

Nature of Man

Over-arching Principle

Basic Principles

Subprinciples for Ethical Communication

Practice of Principles for Ethical Communication

Fig. 1

Man in the Image of God	
(nature of man)	
A Religious Being Created for Response to God	Likeness to God 1. Intellectual and Moral Nature 2. Original Knowledge, Righteousness, & Holiness 3. God's Representative on Earth

Communication Links Man with God and thus
God Must Be Honored in All Communication

(Over-arching Principle)

- -

High View of Communication	Recognition of the Direction of One's Life	Others Must Be Given Full Respect

(Basic Principles)

- -

Honesty	Correct Attitudes Toward Others	Proper Word Choice	Respect for Man's Intellectual Capacities	Attempt to Satisfy Others' Needs

(Subprinciples for Ethical Communication)

tell good and bad	combine tact with honesty	elimination of profanity	good evidence and reasoning	audience analysis
make faith assumptions clear	care promote others' well-being	build others up correct bad word choice	emotional appeals consistent with evidence and reasoning	not simply tell others what they want to hear

(Practice of Principles for Ethical Communication)

Fig. 2

shall see is honesty. Thus, the ethical guide here is "Be completely honest" and the characteristic of the communication is that it is honest. The subprinciples are demonstrated in the practice of certain communication techniques which may then be regarded as ethical, as Fig. 2 shows. Many examples of these techniques are offered but the list is not complete since the purpose is to describe how the principles would be implemented rather than to give an exhaustive list of ethical communication techniques from this perspective. Although these principles (and subprinciples), or criteria for good communication, are separated here for analytical purposes, in fact, they often function together.

The over-arching principle for ethical conduct in the Reformed view is that God must be honored in all communication. This over-arching principle is assumed in all that follows. The principle is grounded in the basic value proposition of the sovereignty of God. God's sovereignty is inherent in this view of the nature of man which automatically accepts God as creator who is to be served. Communication which reflects this view of man as created in the image of God would demonstrate the conviction that God is creator and, therefore, sovereign and would be an attempt to serve Him. Reformed theology deals extensively with the sovereignty of God. Honor

is demonstrated largely through interaction with other
human beings by following the basic principles for ethi-
cal communication. The words of Jesus, "whatever you did
for one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did
it for me" (Matt. 25:40), shows that God must be honored
through human interaction and activities. Little separa-
tion is made between that done for God and that done for
people. One does not dichotomize Sunday church services
from Monday work. Essentially this position maintains
that one can hardly hold one ethical perspective part of
the time and another perspective the rest of the time.
This view argues for consistency throughout one's life:
since a person is a bearer of God's image, that image
must always be given respect and, thus, God would be
honored since the image is His creation. To be more
precise, God is honored through obedience. Specifically,
the Ten Commandments were given to show how this obedi-
ence might be practiced. Love is defined in the Bible
in terms of obedience.[36] The Ten Commandments were given
long after creation in order to make clear how the image
of God was to be reflected so that God would be given
honor and people given respect.

A basic principle for ethical communication, under

[36] John 14:15.

the umbrella of the over-arching principle, which grows
out of the Reformed view of man is that, because communi-
cation is central to the nature of the image of God in
man, communicators ought have a high regard for the pro-
cess of communication itself. This value proposition
becomes a basic principle for ethical communication. It
requires that one try to understand the processes of
communication and the ways that it influences people in
ethically justifiable ways. The Reformed view argues
that man was created in the image of God so that man
could enter into relationship with God Himself first and
then also be able to enter relationships with other
people. Communication links man with God and people.
In order for these relationships to exist, communication
abilities were required. Without communication, man
could not respond to God and thus could hardly be a re-
sponsible being. Without communication man could not
live. Without morally correct communication man cannot
live properly.

The implications of the necessary respect for commu-
nication itself is that communication not be treated
simply as a skill to be practiced after learning a few
rules of what works. It must be practiced ethically.
Communication should be esteemed as more than a tool to
be used for so-called "more important" things. For

example, business people should not treat communication simply as something to obtain "more important" things, namely money. Communication is just as important as other aspects of the nature of man, e.g., the social, the psychological. This principle entails that one will not denigrate the communicative nature of a person, but will attempt to promote correct understanding and proper exercise of communication in ways that show respect for people and communication.

The second basic principle, grounded in the value proposition that man is a directional creature who was created for fellowship with God, entails recognition of the influence of communication in the direction of another person's life. No communication event should be seen as an isolated event unrelated to a larger view of that person's life but should be recognized as influencing the direction of that person's life as a responding being and as influencing the quality of that person's response to his created nature. The communicator must be concerned about the other person beyond simply the particular communication that is taking place. He will consider such questions as: Am I influencing this person in right or wrong ways, for good or bad ends? What will be the long-term result of my communication with this person? Am I helping him respond appropriately to

his basic nature? In what direction is this person
headed? Particularly, what is his religious direction?
What am I doing about this direction? These questions
give a flavor of the concern in this basic principle.
The communication process itself is not a series of iso-
lated steps or events but rather is an on-going, influ-
encing process which shapes the lives and direction of
the people involved. The nature of the communication
process seems to fit this basic principle that one be
concerned for the influence of communication on the
full direction of another person's life.

Because each person is seen as a directional being
in the Reformed view, the ethical communicator tries to
be careful about all of his communication practices. All
communication has a moral dimension since it influences
the direction of the persons involved—however great
or miniscule this influencing might be. Each instance
of communication has influence on this direction. The
words of Jesus in Matt. 12:36-37 fit precisely in demon-
strating this moral dimension of all communication:
"But I tell you that men will have to give account on
the day of judgment for every careless word they have
spoken. For by your words you will be acquitted, and by
your words you will be condemned." It is exactly this
text and others like it that led Reformed theologians to

stress that all of life is religious in character and that no area of life is separate from ethical concerns. Distinctions between the moral and nonmoral are thus extremely difficult to maintain.

The third basic principle for ethical interaction, based on the value proposition that man carries high dignity because of his creation in the image of God, is that full respect should be given to all persons. Respect is the term we give to an ethical principle or guide which recognizes the dignity of a person. This principle should be regarded as being on the same level as the other two which have been described thus far. Full respect is not based on what a person has done but, rather, should be for who that person is as a created being. He is respected because he is a religious being who carries in his person some likeness to God, however distorted that likeness may be. Respect for His image results in respect for God Himself. The Bible makes this clear in at least two instances which draw frequent comment from Reformed theologians. Gen. 9:6 presents the reason for punishment for murder: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made man." This reference demonstrates that God not only considers human beings precious and worthy of respect, but also, as Calvin

writes, "He deems himself violated in their person"[37] when they are not given full respect. Similarly, and more specifically related to communication, James 3:9 makes this point precise: "With the tongue we praise our Lord and Father, and with it we curse men, who have been made in God's likeness." The next verse stresses this incongruency: "Out of the same mouth come praise and cursing. My brothers, this should not be." Cursing people is unethical because it involves cursing the image of God in people and thus fails to show respect for them and the Creator. The thrust of the second half of the Ten Commandments is essentially a delineation of the kinds of activities which fail to demonstrate full respect for other people.

The principle of full respect requires that one see another person as an intellectual and moral being--as one who is able to consider information and make choices. A person should regard another person as one who is also called to reflect the righteous element of the image of God. And if people are considered as God's representative on earth with a calling to rule in His place, respect should follow. Full respect is the term which combines all aspects and elements of the image of God

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[37] Calvin, _Commentaries_, I, p. 296.

which give a person dignity and is rooted in these as-
pects and elements. Hence the qualifier "full" is added
to the term respect. We can also see how it functions
together with the other two basic principles.

A way of explaining and illustrating the meaning of
this principle of full respect is to examine what has
often been called the Golden Rule ("Do to others what
you would have them do to you." Matt. 7:12). Full res-
pect involves practice of this maxim. However, many
popular interpretations of this rule turn it around from
its original intent into self-centeredness rather than
respect for others. These interpretations, in practice,
demonstrate that people abide by this rule because it is
in their own interest to do so. For example, a self-
centered motivation would say "I will help you now so
that I can get help from you later." Abiding by this
rule only because it works to one's own benefit is self-
centered or egoistic. An egoist, then, does not practice
this maxim in order to show respect for the other human
being but, rather, just because of what he can get out
of it in the future. The person holding the principle
of full respect for others would regard this self-cen-
tered motivation as wrong and would suggest that the
egoist would not go as far as he would in helping another
person since the egoist is less altruistic. Instead,

the Golden Rule was given so that people can judge their respect for others, as it is operationalized in behavior, by whether they would want others to show respect for them by treating them in the same way. This comparison of others and self helps us understand the degree to which respect is being demonstrated. The basis for full respect, however, does not lie in this comparison, but instead in the created nature of a person.

Several subprinciples, which serve as criteria for ethical communication, grow out of and are grounded upon one or more of the basic principles. In the paragraphs that follow, clarification of the meaning of each of these subprinciples, as well as their grounding in the basic principles, is combined with description of how they are implemented in practices of ethical communication.

The first of these subprinciples is that honesty must pervade all of one's communication. It is grounded in the basic principle of full respect for the other person. Honesty, of course, is defined in terms of telling the truth. It necessitates more than fulfilling the minimum requirements of the law that lies be avoided. Each person must attempt to be completely open with the other person. In practice, this means that one goes beyond simply avoiding lies and instead makes sure that

the full truth is known. If one is selling a product, idea, or policy, for example, he should thoroughly represent all the pertinent information in order that the listener may be able to make a proper decision. A person should mention the problems with the product, idea, or policy as well as explaining the good points about it. When a car dealer sells a used car without providing adequate information about the car, he is not honest and consequently not treating the consumer with sufficient respect.

Honesty applies to a communicator's intents as well as his practices although intents are much more difficult to evaluate. The question an ethical communicator must face is whether or not one's own intents toward another person are respectful in the sense that one should not manipulate another person by giving the impression that his intents are different from what they really are.

Another illustration of how honesty might be implemented in practice is that a scholar and teacher should make clear the faith assumptions which underlie his work. The basis for making this statement is that the honesty subprinciple, in this perspective, is also grounded in the basic principle of recognition of the direction of one's life. For example, if a student is concerned about the direction of the life of a scholar or teacher, he

needs to know what assumptions underlie the teacher's position. The teacher is then required to give honest disclosure. Another way of looking at the same illustration is to argue that the teacher would fully reveal his assumptions because he respects the intellectual nature of the student and wishes to be completely honest with him.

At the same time, however, the subprinciple of honesty is always a two-way street. The listener also should be completely honest with the speaker in order to demonstrate respect for him. In practice, the listener should not pretend that he will give a product or an idea consideration when in fact he does not intend to do so. Faked attention is dishonest. The subprinciple of honesty also requires, for example, that in practice a listener speak up to raise an essential point of disagreement with a speaker rather than simply letting a matter pass, when he does not agree with it. The action of not speaking up when necessary would mislead the speaker into believing everyone in the audience is willing to accept the proposal and, therefore, would not be respectful of the speaker. Another example is that students should give commendation to teachers where it is due since this, too, is a matter of honesty first of all, and more basically, it is a matter of respect

for the position a teacher holds. This position can be
grounded further in the image of God in that the teacher
stands as God's representative. The point should be
stressed that responsibility between listener and speaker
runs fully both ways--each is morally responsible for
the communication.

Maintaining and demonstrating correct attitudes in
communication is the next subprinciple if one seeks to
abide by the requirements of fully respecting the other
person's dignity as an image-bearer of God. Several
attitudes have already been suggested. This position
requires loving one's neighbor as oneself. Yet, love is
more than a feeling for someone. It involves respect.
Each person should promote the other's well-being and
reputation whenever possible. Laws exist against libel
and slander. These laws comprise the negative aspect--
telling us what we may not do to other people with our
speech. The positive side of promoting another's repu-
tation and well-being is provided by the second part of
the following quotation from Eph. 4:29: "Do not let
any unwholesome talk come out of your mouths, but only
what is helpful for building others up according to
their needs, that it may benefit those who listen."
This important building-up function of speech is often
ignored. If people made a sincere effort to promote

the well-being of others, we would have much less sus-
picion and deception. Persuasion should reflect this
attitude of genuine care. Furthermore, related attitudes
of kindness, humility, bearing one another's burdens,
honoring those in authority, etc., are integral to this
view. The Reformed position maintains that those atti-
tudes which are advocated in the Bible demonstrate res-
pect for the image of God in persons and, therefore, are
appropriate subprinciples for ethical communication.

In practice, this subprinciple of having correct
attitudes of love would be combined with other subprin-
ciples, such as, for example, honesty. To illustrate,
we may go back to the example of the sick patient who is
not able emotionally to handle a straight-forward des-
cription of his condition. Since the doctor is concerned
that he promote the other's welfare, he cannot boldly
proclaim the truth without considering the effects on
the listener. Thus, he would have to prepare the patient
for the ultimate truth with appropriate introductory
statements, perhaps detailing causes or events first.
He cannot, however, ethically postpone to the point of
misleading or hurting the patient. "Speaking the truth
in love" (Eph. 2:15) is the implementation of these sub-
principles of honesty and attitudes of love which would,
in turn, demonstrate full respect for the other person.

The manner of implementing these principles and subprin-
ciples may vary across situations, but the principles
themselves do not vary.

A third subprinciple, which is rooted in all three
basic principles, but particularly in the principles of
holding high regard for the communication process and
fully respecting others, is that ethical communication
should demonstrate proper choice of words. Involved here
is not only correct grammar so that the listener is not
confused, but also choice of words which promote under-
standing while respecting others. A high regard for the
communication process entails careful choice of words
because of their power to influence.

Illustration of how this subprinciple of proper
choice of words is put into practice may clarify its
meaning further. Name-calling should be replaced by
words which respect others. Using language which praises
others created in the image of God should replace cursing
them.[38] Profanity and use of vulgar language in commu-
nication violates this subprinciple and shows little res-
pect for people's ability to use language and vocabulary
and consequently shows little respect for people created
for holiness. More basic yet, profanity directly

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[38] See James 3:9-10.

violates the over-arching principle that God must be honored in all communication.[39]

It might be added at this point that this subprinciple of proper word choice is grounded not only in the principles of full respect and a high regard for communication processes as these reflect the likeness-to-God "side" of the image of God but also as they reflect the religous-response "side" of the nature of man. Reformed scholars stress that the direction of one's heart is crucial to one's speech and actions. This relation is based on the view of man as a religious being. Matt. 12:34 clarifies this relation: " . . . For out of the overflow of the heart the mouth speaks." So a proper response to God would require that, in interaction with others, words be chosen which promote honor and build others up. Gossip should be eliminated since it does not perform this building-up function. More specific suggestions for word choices which promote honor are not given by Reformed scholars but they seem to suggest that these are easily found in the Old Testament precepts, in the example and teachings of Jesus, and in the

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[39] The third commandment makes this very clear as it is stated in Exod. 20:7: "You shall not misuse the name of the Lord your God, for the Lord will not hold anyone guiltless who misuses his name."

exhortations of the apostles in the New Testament.

The Reformed position does not ignore the importance of good evidence and reasoning. It sees these as a practice in communication which respects man's intellectual capacities. These capacities are grounded in full respect for the dignity of a person created in the image of God, particularly as having an intellectual and moral nature. Furthermore, this perspective sees that clear and correct thinking is necessary for a proper response as a religious being. Therefore, good evidence should be used wherever possible and conclusions formed logically. It does not argue, however, that logic obviates faith since faith, too, is part of a proper response to God. Although the Reformed position by no means singles out the rational in man as the defining characteristic of what it means to be human, it does frequently call attention to the intellectual nature inherent in the image of God and consequently implies that the rational element be carefully considered. Indeed, Reformed theologians have themselves gone to great lengths to develop their own discipline systematically.

In practice, supplying sufficient evidence demonstrates respect for the other person by enabling him to thoroughly consider the strength of the argument advanced. Manipulation by circumventing one's ability to

reason is unethical. Documentation of evidence is also important since the author's opinion must be represented fairly in order to show respect for the author as well as for the listener. The same can be said for quoting within context. The listener, if he is to be given full respect, should be supplied with the best experts on the topic. The speaker must be concerned with the processes of decision-making that the listener utilizes.

The question of emotional appeals is traditionally raised in communication ethics. How would the Reformed position handle this? The answer is that several subprinciples would have to be combined in such a way that the basic principle of full respect can be seen. First, necessity of good evidence and reasoning in communication suggests that an emotional appeal which is contrary to evidence and reasoning is unjustified. Second, the subprinciple of honesty suggests that a logical appeal which ignores the emotion inherently involved in human decision would be dishonest. Similarly, advancing an emotional appeal while ignoring the inherently logical (or illogical) aspects underlying it would be dishonest. Strict separation of logic and emotion is hardly possible. Third, since people have attitudes which are influenced by emotions, the third subprinciple of proper attitudes is at least tangentially involved. This view

emphasizes that a person is a whole being and so communication should reflect this view. One may neither ignore the emotional aspects nor the logical aspects but, instead, one should seek a holistic approach to communication which would fit a holistic view of a person.

The final subprinciple to be described in this section is that one should work to determine and satisfy the needs of another person. If one recognizes the direction of another person's life, one's attention is directed toward what that person needs to live properly. It may involve consideration of questions such as: What does this person need to help him respond correctly to his basic nature and to God? What would help him improve relations with others? This subprinciple also reflects a broad view of the communication process. If one considers carefully the needs of others through sufficient audience analysis, one increases the likelihood of satisfying audience needs through communication. The nature of communication itself includes response and the ethical persuader would wish to ensure a correct response. By determining another's needs and working to satisfy them rather than fulfilling selfish desires, a person demonstrates respect for the other person by helping him fulfill his created nature. Eph. 4:29 shows the subprinciple quite clearly when it states that we

should say "only what is helpful for building others up
according to their needs, that it may benefit those who
listen" (emphasis mine).

In practice of ethical communication, this sub-
principle of consideration of others' needs will involve
audience analysis before public address. A speaker
should determine not only at what level of education he
should aim his speech, but he should also discover what
would help the audience live more appropriately. Audience
analysis may involve a distinction between needs, which
must be fulfilled in order for one to live according to
his created nature, and wants, which may or may not be
based on needs. When wants are not based on needs, they
are defined more in terms of short-term desires which do
not contribute much toward fulfilling one's nature. Ad-
vertisers notoriously pander to people's wants rather
than seeking to fill the needs people have. For example,
advertisers for cereals on children's television programs
promote their products primarily on the basis of sugar
and flavor added to the product rather than demonstra-
ting the importance of a good breakfast to the child's
well-being and the place that cereal ought to have in
that breakfast. This demonstrates a pragmatic perspec-
tive of doing what works to sell a product regardless
of whether the product is beneficial to the needs of the

person. Such action is disrespectful and unethical in this view. Often advertisers first look for a need in an audience and if one is not found, then they attempt to manufacture a "need" in that audience, i.e., they continue to appeal to the consumer on the basis of a want until the consumer finally begins to believe that it is an actual need. Such activity usually is not respectful of the potential consumer. Someone might argue that it is the consumer's responsibility to determine the distinction between his own needs and wants, not the advertiser's. However, advertisers have already decided what they want a consumer to have by what products they advertise and they do attempt to sell it on the basis of need. Of course, in this view, the consumer is responsible. This problem can be put another way: to simply tell people what they want to hear rather than telling them what they need to hear is not treating them respectfully. Advertisers can hardly justify their actions of simply giving people what the people want, if indeed this happens. Furthermore, if a person loves his neighbor, then he will take responsibility for him and help him decide what his needs are. Manipulation should be foreign to one who cares deeply about others.

The principles and subprinciples described in this section give a fairly accurate picture of the normative

ethical star ards for communication which can be de-
veloped from the Reformed theological view of the nature
of man. Thi list of principles, and particularly the
subprinciple , is not necessarily exhaustive, but is
complete enc gh to indicate clearly what this perspective
entails. Th se principles cover the full range of human
communicatic activities. Brief examples and illustra-
tion of comm nication practices which follow from these
principles s ow how the normative ethical standard is
tied down ir communication. A more complete illustra-
tion of how hese principles, or criteria for ethical
communicatic , can be applied in discourse will be given
in the next hapter where speeches of a minister who
stands withi the Reformed tradition will be analyzed
according to the normative ethical standard which has
been develop d here.

Comparison of the Reformed View
wit other Normative Ethical Standards

Before pplying ethical standards to a speaker,
comparison c the Reformed view with some other norma-
tive ethical standards will demonstrate its distinctive-
ness and yie d a fuller understanding of the ethical
standards cc tained in this view. The concern here is

primarily a comparison with normative ethical standards
being advocated currently in the field of speech communi-
cation to distinguish this view from the others and to
show how it handles some ethical questions better than
others.

Of course, one needs to accept the presuppositions
of the Reformed tradition in order to accept as one's
own the normative ethical standards which this view en-
tails. The same would be true of any normative ethical
standard. Each standard is based on some sort of faith.
Logic itself is ill-equipped to test presuppositions in
isolation. A comparison may involve the examination of
various standards for their consistency from presupposi-
tions all the way to ramifications. The last chapter
considered the inconsistencies within alternative views,
and suggested some problems with certain normative stan-
dards in dealing with some types of communication. This
section examines the implications of the Reformed view
for communication in society in comparison with the
implications of other views. Certainly the empirical
ramifications of a particular view are important in con-
sidering the viability of that perspective.

The basic starting point for the utilitarian, who
is more often called a situationalist in speech communi-
cation literature, is the usefulness of techniques to

society. This is his faith. If the consequences of communication are judged to be useful to society, the utilitarian judges the communication to be ethical. "Usefulness" is generally defined in terms of "good," but a major problem in the utilitarian view is the failure to clearly define the "good." For example, when describing the _ideal_ _utilitarian_, Hospers says: "He will say that what ought to be produced is the maximum possible intrinsic good, leaving it an open question what intrinsic good may be."[40] In contrast, the Reformed view clarifies proper communication by drawing standards from the Bible which demonstrate respect for an individual as created in the image of God. It argues that the concept of good has been set and that a grounding of this concept in presuppositions is preferable to a concept of good which is subject to much greater variance.

The act utilitarian is essentially a situationalist who considers each act's consequences individually, and thus constantly runs into the problem of disagreements among people about the empirical consequences of the action and the goodness of the particular consequences. Hospers, a utilitarian, argues that the nearly

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[40] John Hospers, _Human Conduct: Problems of Ethics_, Shorter ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), p. 200.

insuperable task of assessing consequences is "no fault
of the theory."[41] But the usefulness of a theory lies
in its ability to provide a reliable account of reality
and guidance for future action. The Reformed position
avoids this problem since its principles cover time and
situation.

Some utilitarians, although largely outside of the
field of communication, have attempted to compensate for
this weakness of assessing the consequences of each in-
dividual act by adopting what has been called "rule
utilitarianism."[42] In this theory, rules are estab-
lished on the basis of utilitarianism and then the
moral quality of actions is determined from the rules.
Although this may be an improvement in the theory, it
does not yet solve the problem of defining goodness.
The Reformed view offers rules (called principles) based
upon the nature of man and would argue that these un-
changing rules would be beneficial to society.

Another major question which may be addressed to

[41] Hospers, *Human Conduct*, p. 211.

[42] In his recent article, Wayne Minnick seems to
lean toward a set of rules for utilitarians. A set of
rules, however, is not spelled out. Nor does he acknow-
ledge the work of rule utilitarians in the field of
moral philosophy. See his "A New Look at the Ethics of
Persuasion," *Southern Speech Communication Journal*, 45
(Summer 1980), 352-62.

the rule utilitarian is: Who determines the rules?
And are these rules determined individually or do demo-
cratic processes decide them? Until these questions are
answered definitively, the perspective appears suscep-
tible to arbitrary and changing definitions of what is
ethical. The utilitarian might answer that because the
rules have a rational basis they are not arbitrary; yet,
the utilitarian depends on the availability of evidence
of adequate usefulness of the technique in society to
provide material support for the second premise of his
syllogism. Remaining is the unresolved problem of who
must decide when the material support offered is ade-
quate. The Reformed view does not encounter this prob-
lem of depending on consequences for determining what
is ethical communication. Instead, ethical communication
is based on fixed principles, even though this view con-
siders the situation when deciding how principles should
be implemented. At the same time, one holding the Re-
formed view would maintain that this position yields
consequences for society that are at least as good as
those obtained by the utilitarian view. The standards
for ethical communication which develop from the descrip-
tion of a person created in the image of God provide
considerable help in prescribing practices in communi-
cation which would have beneficial consequences in

society because people would be given full respect.

The rationalist normative ethical standard contains a narrower view of what it means to be human than does the Reformed position. In the rationalist view, reason is exalted and reigns supreme. I indicated that this view selects one aspect of a human being and raises it whereas the Reformed view is more complete.[43] Perhaps Kant can be singled out as one who epitomizes the rational perspective since he placed supreme value on reason. Kant is just beginning to receive attention from communication scholars.[44] He asserted that people had the ability to act from purely moral motives, i.e., they are able to use pure reason: "the basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the conceptions of pure reason."[45] His point of view may be a little more sophisticated than the rationalist positions developed by speech communication scholars but the basis still lies in reason.

[43] Above, pp. 64-65.

[44] Ralph T. Eubanks, "Reflections on the Moral Dimension of Communication," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 45 (Spring 1980), 297-312.

[45] Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Thomas K. Abbott (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949), p. 5.

Everything for the rationalist becomes subservient to reason. With pure reason, according to Kant, one could will the categorical imperative. Thus, only those acts which one could will to be universalizable would be ethical. Even though Kant assumes man is capable of reason, he admits that man "is not so easily able to make it effective in concreto in his life."[46]

The Reformed perspective is similar to the rationalist perspective, and particularly to the Kantian perspective, in that both place high value on reason. But this is about as far as the similarities go. The significant difference lies in the stress that is placed on reason--Kant places supreme value on reason whereas the Reformed perspective does not. Given his overwhelming concern for reason, it appears that the rationalist, and particularly Kant, would permit reason alone as the substance of ethical persuasion. For communication scholars who have advocated the rationalist position, all communication has to be subservient to good reason to be ethical. One holding the Reformed perspective would combine reason with other appeals which demonstrate respect for the other person. Communication

[46] Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 5.

should in this view, do more than simply foster the rational part of one's nature.

A further important difference between the Reformed view and the rationalist view is that the Reformed position goes beyond reason to require that ethical communication demonstrate love, care, and other proper sentiments. Surely Kant, or other rationalists, would not deny the display of affection or attitudes of caring in communication. They would not treat them as characteristics of moral discourse but, rather, as beyond moral consideration. The Reformed view has a much broader position on what is moral, and thus, a more complete picture of what a person is, i.e., since he is more than rational, more communication would come under the control of ethical standards. It would bring all communication under this control.

Against other scholars who have singled out one aspect of what it means to be human and have raised this aspect to the judgment seat for ethical communication, the same charge of reductionism might be lodged. The Reformed position argues that a human being is a whole person created in the image of God, and selecting one aspect of a person as the most important or defining characteristic inaccurately limits a person and shows less than the required full respect.

The symbol-using ethic was criticized in the last chapter for being vague in its description of ethical communication and that it offers no certain guidelines for application.[47] The Reformed position does offer guidelines which translate into concrete ethical communication practices. An implicit assumption of the symbol-using view is that man can save himself from his condition--an assumption which the Reformed position could not accept. It does not see human symbol-using capacities as the savior of mankind. It does not deny that a human being is a symbol-user, but it argues that a person is more than this. Wieman and Walter talk about the "best" a person can become, but they are not very clear in describing what the "best" would look like whereas the Reformed view uses the example of Christ, who perfectly reflects the image of God, to clearly specify what people should be like and how they should communicate with one another.[48]

The Reformed view successfully avoids some of the inherent and apparently insoluble problems of the democratic normative ethical standard since it is not one

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[47] Above, p. 69.

[48] Henry N. Wieman and Otis M. Walter, "Towards An Analysis of Ethics for Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 43 (Oct. 1957), 266-70.

that emphasizes "rights," which often become selfish.[49]

Instead the view insists that each person work for the

other's welfare for reasons beyond the self. Both ends

and means are important and are integrally related to

each other. The Reformed view stresses "responsibilities"

toward one another in place of assertion of rights. Al-

though it does encourage the use of democratic processes

of decision-making as one way of demonstrating respect

for others—allowing people to make decisions on their

own—it does not make this process ultimate. Rather,

the Reformed view insists that certain principles, which

are discussed above, pervade the democratic decision-

making processes. It is concerned that the welfare of

the other person be promoted. Democratic processes must

serve this end. The individual is not exalted at the

expense of the community. Instead, when moral principles

for communication are followed, the community and the

individual benefit.

In the last chapter I argued that the dialogic posi-

tion for ethics emphasizes that communication not be

judgmental.[50] The one who holds this perspective evalu-

ates ethics of communication with difficulty because he

[49] Above, pp. 75-76.

[50] Above, p. 80.

immediately opens himself to the charge that he is not being "supportive" or "accepting" or demonstrating "unconditional positive regard" for the other and, thus, he runs the risk of being called unethical from his own position. In essence, the dialogic critic is trapped by his own position which tells him not to evaluate the other. In opposition, the Reformed view does not hesitate to make an ethical evaluation. It argues that to fail to do so is to fail to demonstrate full respect for the other person. Pointing out the error in another's communication, and thus helping him to correct his actions in the future, is regarded as caring for that person, and particularly caring for the direction of that person's life. Respecting one another requires that we evaluate each other's communication.

Both the dialogic and the Reformed view stress the importance of attitudes. Essentially the dialogic view stresses that attitudes of love are necessary in order for man to exist and, therefore, man is taught to love others so that man can survive himself—i.e., it appears egoistic. In contrast to this view, the Reformed position maintains that a person must love others because they have been created in the image of God. Thus, in both, attitudes are important, but these attitudes are fundamentally different in the Reformed view. According

to this position, a person is called to love, respect, honor, and help his neighbor because he is called to respond to God beyond his neighbor, beyond himself, and beyond his world. Thus the Reformed view is a transcendent one. Man demonstrates his love for God by respecting the person next to him created by God. A person is responsible to God rather than solely to those around him or to himself. This is not an egoistic view. This position stresses that attitudes, which on their face may appear to be similar to those advocated by the dialogic perspective, are very important to ethical communication, but it does not define attitude as the crucial determinant of what a human being is or should be. Nor does it limit the realm of ethics to attitudes. Again, the Reformed position is broader.

In this section, comparison has not been made with all normative ethical systems. Attention has instead focused on those which receive primary attention in the discipline of speech communication. Nevertheless, the character of the comparison gives some indication of comparisons with other normative standards not treated here.

Conclusions

The Reformed theological perspective for ethical
communication is unlike other normative ethical standards
in that it stresses that the religious nature of man as
created in the image of God must be taken into account
when considering ethical communication. The religious
nature of man yields a different starting point for
ethics than do other normative standards. The view of
man created in the image of God yields an extremely high
view of man. It sees the purpose of man's creation as
fellowship with God. Yet, this high view of man does
not ignore ethical problems in communication at the
level of practice. Correct communication is important
in the nature of man from this perspective.

The discussion of the image of God in man by Re-
formed theologians has demonstrated that the essence of
religion is rooted in man's nature as a responding being.
Man's response to God is a reflection of man's moral
character and his response to God is shown through inter-
action with other people. Man's moral, ethical character
is based in his creation in the image of God, as are con-
cepts of righteousness, holiness, and man's service as
God's representative on earth. Communication is inherent
in and essential to man's creation as a responding being.

The principles of a high regard for communication, understanding the influence communication has on the direction of another person's life, and full respect for the image of God yield several important subprinciples for ethical communication. In essence, these subprinciples are manifestations of the basic principles. Together these principles and subprinciples cover the full range of communication activities, such as, using good evidence and reasoning, careful listening, building up others according to their needs, and audience analysis. All communication is seen, from a Reformed perspective, as having a moral dimension and no part of communication is free from ethical concerns. In practice of ethical communication, these principles work together in an organic way that reflects a view of a person as a whole being.

The brief comparison of the Reformed position for ethical communication with other normative ethical standards which have been advocated in speech communication highlights the significant differences between this view and other views. In summary, this comparison shows that the Reformed way of viewing ethics rejects attempts to reduce a person to only one aspect of his created being. It argues that not only is any reduction an inadequate explanation of what a person is, but it also claims that

a reductionistic view fails to yield a complete normative standard for ethical communication. It wants all aspects taken into account so that man can be given full respect.

A second claim for this position is that no other normative standard has demonstrated the concern for the direction of one's life as a response to God that is abundantly evident in the Reformed ethical system. The religious nature of man is almost totally ignored in other systems. The implications for communication of the view that man is a directional being have been suggested and will be traced out more fully in the next chapter.

Thirdly, a claim can be made that the Reformed normative ethical standards for communication yield consequences which are at least as beneficial to society as any other standard. Since this is not the starting point for this view, this claim has not been developed. Yet, this view argues that since its ethical standards are based in the nature of man as created in the image of God, practice of these standards would indeed benefit man by reflecting his nature as created good. Essentially, its definition of good lies in the nature of man rather than in some rather nebulously defined set of consequences as argued by other positions. Proponents of this view would want to maintain that if this normative standard were practiced by all people in their

communication, the consequences would be more beneficial than other positions in promoting full respect for individuals and, thereby, promoting society's welfare as well as that of the individual. Indeed, a trend toward selfishness exists in other standards, which one could argue would be detrimental to society in the long run. The Reformed view does not reflect selfishness.

A related concern is that other normative ethical standards are limited in that they consider how man communicates with man for the purpose of serving man, whereas the Reformed view is transcendent. It argues that one look beyond particular situations, persons, and time to the Creator whom he is called to serve. A person must serve others because this is essential to a correct response to God.

Finally, this discussion has demonstrated that the Reformed position for ethical communication is a distinctive one and deserves careful consideration from communication scholars. The ethical principles are comprehensive, covering the full range of human interaction. Its high view of the nature of man works out in principles that demonstrate how this view can be implemented in the daily practice of communication among human beings.

Chapter V

Functioning of the Reformed View

of the Ethics of Communication in

Speeches of Dr. Joel Nederhood

Interest in ethics functioning to guide a person's

rhetorical choices logically follows from the develop-

ment of a normative ethical standard for communication.

This chapter demonstrates how the Reformed normative

ethical theory guides rhetorical choices in five selected

speeches of Dr. Joel Nederhood.[1] The speeches chosen for

analysis are representative of his speaking. Each illus-

trates the function of different aspects of the ethical

system.

"The Man Who Missed Easter" illustrates a Reformed

speaker discussing matters of deep faith and yet using

a primarily rational approach. This speech also illus-

trates the interactive manner of communication which is

characteristic of Nederhood. "Fast People," a speech

about a problem many people in our society face every

day, gives a deeper sense of the two characteristics of

[1] Transcripts of all five speeches are reprinted in
the appendices.

the Easter speech but also illustrates well the ethical principle that communication should concern the full direction of a person's life and not only salvation at the end of life. A speech which deals with fundamental issues of the relation of religion and education, "Establishing Religion," provides the opportunity to consider how a speaker should ethically approach denunciation of a decision he bitterly opposes. This speech also illustrates communication acknowledging the religious dimension of the whole person. "The Abortion Issues" considers a subject that continues to generate heat in society and poses questions about whether a speaker is ethically required to use a two-sided approach to a topic and how to ethically view intense emotion and strong belief. Finally, "Are Preachers Necessary?" was picked because it lays out Nederhood's view of preaching. He prescribes roles for the preacher in building a proper relationship between God and man and in so doing provides further insight into this fundamental aspect of the Reformed view for ethical communication. This speech further illustrates responsibility in communication--for both speaker and listener. Inherent in this speech is a prescription of an ethical system for preaching which parallels the Reformed view for a broader ethics of communication.

Nederhood's speeches serve here as vehicles for explaining how ethical principles guide rhetorical choices. Evaluation of Nederhood as a speaker may be implicit but is not the primary purpose. Each section will criticize a speech, but will not function as a complete piece of criticism. Rather, each builds on the others so that by the end of the chapter we will have a more complete picture of the ethical system in operation. Although several speeches deal with similar rhetorical and ethical issues, not all issues will be repeated in detail for each speech. Instead, each criticism will highlight particular issues they illustrate.

Questions about the relationship between persuasive effectiveness and ethics arise frequently in analysis and criticism of public address. Although this issue is not at the center of this chapter, a few comments are in order because it does arise. The two are not opposites. Instead, the ethical is often effective rhetorically. The question of which consideration guides the speaker is not always easy to answer, and indeed sometimes the answer is "both" as they function together. Because of this working together, a choice that seems to be persuasively effective may, in fact, have been shaped by ethics. The only time we can say that a choice is solely based on rhetorical effectiveness is when that

choice clearly violates ethical principles. Although
the central purpose of this chapter is not to illumine
these dimensions, at times the relationship will be
clarified.

"The Man Who Missed Easter"

This speech with an intriguing title illustrates
ethics' function in two significant rhetorical strate-
gies. First, this speech shows reason primary in a
subject where basic elements of faith are deeply in-
volved, and illustrates the depth and nature of Neder-
hood's commitment. Rational argument is a characteris-
tic of his speaking because he considers the audience
as reasoning beings, even when faced with religious
messages. Second, in the dramatization of the story
of Thomas we find a clear demonstration of the speaker's
understanding of and respect for the process of communi-
cation as interaction--even in a one-directional setting.
Each of these is discussed separately.

The ethical system suggests that the speaker res-
pect people's intellectual nature as part of their being
created in the image of God. In this speech Nederhood
asks how intelligent people can believe in the resur-
rection, clearly based on faith and which, on its face,

seems to contradict reason. Rather than announcing that
the Christian faith is true and brushing aside objec-
tions to it, the speaker projects an audience of "realis-
tic" people (forms of the word "realist" are used twenty-
two times) who sincerely desire to examine evidence
carefully before giving their assent to the Christian
faith.

The "realism" of the audience is acknowledged in
his handling of three major objections that people would
likely raise to belief in the resurrection. He assumes
they have listened to science, and it may seem that
science contradicts belief in the resurrection. He knows
that logic is important and that logic contradicts rising
from the dead. He suspects, too, that they have listened
to certain theologians who have argued that errors exist
in the Bible, particularly on the matter of the resur-
rection. Each of these objections are treated consi-
derately and answered in a way that gives realists
pause, showing that he understands why people raise them.
His responses to the objections point out significant
problems for those who use these objections. The hazard
in accepting science as the dispenser of truth, he says,
is that those who do fall into the trap of making science
the ultimate guide for life--which will never do because
it is limited to its own area. The example of science

not being able to become a normative ethical standard is
offered as one proof of its limitations. Logic, while
very important, is limited in what it permits one to see,
and, he claims, this is particularly true in this in-
stance. He answers the third objection by showing that
bad theology rests on faulty foundations of ignoring
proof for the truth of the Bible.

His might be regarded as a warmly rational approach.
Thus, he respects people as intellectual beings who con-
sider evidence placed before them. He believes that in-
tellectual problems of faith must be dealt with honestly.
Interestingly, he also uses this ethical dimension as
a rhetorical strategy to challenge their reason while
praising their reason. He commends the realistic ap-
proach, but then challenges them to weigh _all_ evidence
which is presented, not only the part which would, when
considered in isolation, tend toward rejection of the
resurrection: "All right, be a realist. Be like Thomas.
I admire people who are truly realistic. But then note
carefully that the Bible comes with evidence which should
have a powerful impact on the lives of realistic people."

Respect for the intellectual capacities of people
as part of an ethic of communication compels him both to
consider objections people raise and to urge people to
look at the full account. This respect leads him, for

example to take account of some theologians' doubts about the Bible and to remind them that a body of evidence is growing which proves the Bible correct at many points where these theologians thought it was wrong. Being realistic also requires that consequences of belief in the resurrection be compared to rejection, which he does when he answers the objections raised by science, logic, and certain theologians.

His ethic of respect for the listeners' nature as intellectual beings further leads him to clarify the function of faith assumptions which underlie positions. He openly declares his own faith and admits that there are times when "there is not much more that we can say to one another" when another person's faith is radically different. Yet he continues because he recognizes that although positions are based on faith, we can rationally compare implications of each position. His argument indicates in this case that faith leads to a more complete examination as he asks listeners to broaden their view. He recognizes that rational argument, although it has its place in talking about faith, cannot be the ultimate arbiter of truth in this matter of faith: " . . . the Christian faith is not dependent upon anyone's ability to answer all of the objections to it that man is able to put together."

The ethical dimensions perhaps become clearer in a couple of his statements which listeners might find difficult to accept. In one instance, his response to objections people might raise to the Bible reveals the depths of his faith: "But the truth of the Bible is not dependent on the diggings of the archaeologists; it is dependent on the witness of the Holy Spirit of the living God that runs through it from beginning to end." Certainly choice of this statement is governed less by considerations of rhetorical effectiveness than it is by a concern to be completely honest and respectful of his listeners that they be fully aware of his stance. Even when he announces his faith that the Bible is true, he does not insist simply that his audience accept it on his word. Instead, he uses a technique one finds throughout his speeches. Respect for their ability to think for themselves leads him to ask them to check it out for themselves. He recommends that his listeners read the entire Bible from beginning to end several times to see if he is correct. This challenge is extremely demanding and hardly one that the listeners would accept eagerly. Yet, whether or not this technique is rhetorically effective seems less important to the speaker than the ethical need to appeal for the listeners to do their homework. At this point when he

most openly reveals his faith, he could have chosen to say, "Believe it and be saved," as he does at the end of the speech. Instead of taking his word for it, they should read and study the Bible, they should consider that all positions are based on some point of faith, they should examine and compare the full implications of each position, and finally, he implies, they should decide for themselves.

The second major rhetorical strategy, namely the re-creation of the story of Thomas, illustrates the speaker's interactive approach to communication and reflects the operation of several ethical principles. The Reformed view recommends that communicators empathize with listeners. By understanding how meaning is engendered in the other, one shows more respect for him. Attitudes of deep care for others weave together with respect for communication. The communication link between God and man must remain intact so that people may respond in accord with their created nature which was intended for fellowship. To see these principles in operation, we need a description of Nederhood's strategy at this point.

After reading the description of Thomas from John 20, the speaker develops this second major rhetorical strategy. Nederhood imagines how this realistic disciple

thought and felt about the death of Jesus. Dramatization draws the listener into the thoughts that swirled in Thomas' head, of his fear that he had been mistaken in following Jesus, of his courage to ask the hard questions about whether it was all over, and of his disbelief in the disciples' report of the resurrection. The speaker even recreates Thomas' response of doubt to the disciples' announcement that Jesus was alive. And as the audience is still deeply involved in this re-creation, at that point he immediately faces the audience directly:

> Maybe you know exactly how he felt. You've heard about the way it is supposed to change everything and give hope to men again, but you don't believe it either, even though you'd honestly like to. You say, with Thomas, "Just because I would like so very much to believe something is true, that doesn't make it true. I have to be realistic, and I have to remember that Jesus was really dead and He was really buried, so that's the end of Him. I'm still interested in Him, and I think that His teachings are just great, but I still have to say that as a human being Jesus died just like everyone else, and I don't ever expect to see Him. "

Then, after telling them he admired realistic people such as his listeners might be, he goes on to show how Thomas was turned from doubt into belief and overwhelming joy. He implies that realism can also be packed with emotion.

This very interesting technique of re-creation of the account of Thomas, filled with the narration of how the audience might feel and think, illustrates the far-reaching concern and respect for the audience, but more. It signifies Nederhood's view that communication must be interactive, even through the difficult medium of radio. He could have told the story, insisted that the listeners turn from doubt to belief as Thomas had and as a young professor had whom he had described in his introduction, warned of consequences of doubt, and/or announced that what he said was simply true, but he does not.

While considerations of rhetorical effectiveness in choosing this strategy cannot be dismissed (and this ethical system would not disregard this because elements of respect include considerations of effectiveness so that the listeners' needs may be satisfied), an ethical principle seems to operate here. With profound esteem for the nature of communication, he appears to understand and respect the process of how meaning is engendered in the minds of the listeners. "Let's stand in Thomas' place," he intimates, "and try to understand him. Can we see what he saw? Can we think as he did? Can we feel what he felt?" Assuming the narration enables understanding of Thomas, he turns to the audience as he

tries to stand in the place of one who doubts, as Thomas
had done: "So we realists today think this way about
this entire episode." He struggles to empathize with
the audience even to the extent of verbalizing their
imagined thoughts. This identification strategy con-
tains the inherent ethical dimensions of esteeming the
process by which meaning is engendered in communication
and of respecting people as image-bearers of God who were
created for communication. Neither principle of high
respect for persons nor clear regard for communication
is denigrated here. Instead, the principles fuse together.

The third basic principle of the Reformed system,
i.e., that all of communication should reflect a concern
for the full direction of another person's life, is
apparent in this speech and should be briefly mentioned
here although it will be discussed more fully in other
speeches. It leads him to compare the end result of the
positions people may hold to the one he advocates. He
is deeply mindful of the direction of people's lives
and the thrust of his speech reflects his concern that
they walk in the way that leads to life. Ultimate ques-
tions are treated here. Science is very important but
its competence is limited, he says, and therefore it
cannot become the sole directing force in one's life for
that leads to a "very dreary future." And, he says,

"bad theology won't save you either." In the place of these two alternatives which lead in the wrong direction, he forthrightly points his listeners to the life promised those who believe in the resurrection:

> Only Jesus can save you, and He comes to meet you today, not holding out His nail-scarred hands, but He comes to you on the pages of the Bible which present their powerful message about Jesus' life, death, and resurrection. And this message can mean life for you, if you are realistic enough to believe that what God says is the truth.

This third ethical principle, then, appears here as the vehicle on which the other two principles ride.

This principle is also an indicator of his general purpose in all his speeches--to show concern for direction of people's lives, whether that be in spiritual or secular contexts.

"Fast People"

Concern for the direction of people's lives in the Christian context has dealt, as we have seen, with basic issues of salvation. Yet, to limit this concern only to salvation at the end of one's life on earth is to ignore important parts of life here. This principle for ethical conduct asks for a comprehensive view of the person

--for attention to communication impacting on direction
of life, whether in large and dramatic ways or in small
and hardly noticeable ways. The "Fast People" speech
treats a common problem that many people face every day:
getting too deeply involved in our jobs to handle other
responsibilities carefully. He indicates that many of
us live so fast that we lose our sense of direction.
The basic ethical principle of concern for the full
direction of people's lives pervades the entire speech.
The very selection of topic reveals the ethical principle.

This principle of concern for people as directional
in nature suggests several strategies. First, it im-
plies that the speaker foster full awareness that the
audience's lives may be moving rapidly in the wrong
direction. Thus, in the most interesting rhetorical
strategy in the speech, Nederhood narrates the story of
the life of Charlotte Web, a real person whose last name
is fictional. Her lifestyle, explained in a feature
about her in a woman's magazine, provides a graphic
example of the lifestyle he wants people to avoid since
it does not permit them to reflect on where their lives
are going. Her fictional last name assists an accurate
and vivid picture of what the fast life does to people.
Like the well-known story of <u>Charlotte's Web</u>, this

lifestyle entices people into entrapment.[2] Ultimately,
the entrapment leads to the "inevitable" which is "death,
the dust, and the ashes at the end of the road. No mat-
ter how hard we try, no matter how hard we run, the in-
evitable remains inevitable."

Although he does not describe this lifestyle ver-
bally as a spider's web, his choice of this fictional
last name clearly provides a sense of getting caught.
As the speech moves on, the listener senses the web being
wound tightly around fast people. The extended illustra-
tion via example in conjunction with the implicit sense
of a web enables the audience to grasp the concern for
the direction which guides the speaker in the choice of
this strategy.

Another strategy suggested by this principle of con-
cern for the direction of life but also by other elements
of the Reformed ethical system involves identification.
To demonstrate that the speaker cares about his audience
and attempts to fill their needs along with his, he turns
his comments directly to include the audience and himself
with Charlotte after the description of the need for her
to slow down: "It might be better if you did. It might

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[2] This story of the spider is found in children's
literature. See E. B. White, Charlotte's Web (New York:
Harper & Row, 1952).

be better if I did."

If the principles of showing concern for the direction of the audience's life and of fully respecting their needs were not operating, he could have chosen a rhetorical strategy other than this method of identification. He could easily have pointed a finger at Charlotte as if the problem were only hers and that of people like her, and he could have cautioned the audience to watch out for people like that. And he might have stopped with Louis T. Grant's critique of her in a letter to the editor of the magazine which featured her. Although Grant's critique is helpful for the speaker in pointing out significant problems in the fast life, Nederhood is not content to stop at that point. He moves on to include the audience and himself with Charlotte. The web becomes a wide net of identification. The ethical system suggests this strategy because honesty insists that we admit that many of us are entrapped by the problem. Simply accusing others of being guilty of the fast life would not have satisfied the audience's need to slow down and to reflect on the direction of their own life.

Further examination of the speaker's description of improper lifestyle demonstrates how this principle of concern for direction of life recommends concrete

terms which leave no doubt about the impact of this life-
style. People who live a fast-paced life, he says,
" . . . don't think a great deal, they don't reflect,
they don't meditate. They scarcely know who they are;
their children seldom spend much time with them." They
have lost their sense of direction. He points out that
people may be living a fast life because they are afraid
that otherwise their lives will be empty and meaningless.
They strive for material things because they think this
is what life is all about. His concern is not only with
the impact of the here-and-now of this kind of life,
e.g., "their children seldom spend much time with them,"
but this ethical principle. forces him to clarify that
a fast-paced life may be an attempt to avoid facing
ultimate purposes in life: "Always on the go, they
don't really know how to think. They rush through their
lives with unseeing eyes." They are "people who know
how to fly but don't know how to land."

Implicit in Nederhood's examination of "fast people"
is a set of values which he believes are detrimental:
the struggle for material gain cannot satisfy; eating
breakfast on the run allows little opportunity for nur-
turing children; materialism breeds materialism, i.e.,
the only way we can continue to "enjoy" new products is
to make sure that the previous purchases are out of

style; and rushing permits precious little reflection.
Since all of these values indicate a wrong direction,
the speaker must identify them to redirect the audience.
Thus the ethical principle of respect for the needs of
the audience means clarification of these underlying
values which lead people in wrong roads.

The Reformed position for ethical communication also
suggests something about a speaker's discussion of causes
and solutions to a problem. Its respect for man's intel-
lectual nature seems to suggest that he lay out causes
and solutions in such a way that the audience is enabled
to judge for itself and take responsibility for its
direction. In a way, he says, fast people are not en-
tirely to blame for their lifestyle. One cause is so-
ciety's pressure on people to believe that material
things are tickets to the good life and that people must
make every minute count. Furthermore, "it is necessary
to work and to be diligent and not to waste time if we
are to have enough money so that we can have sufficient
food, clothing, and shelter." Part of the problem is
also caused by "continuous advertisements and other
elements in our culture that make us very dissatisfied
with what we have, even if what we have is enough, and
we are urged to strive for more and better possessions."
But Nederhood's perspective will not let him merely

describe causes. Although the image of God in people
requires that they respect one another in the spirit of
that image, it also means that people are religious
creatures who must respond to God in accord with the
purpose of their creation for fellowship.

Here we come to the deepest sense of what the prin-
ciple of concern for direction of people's lives means.
Man as a whole being must respond correctly to God. This
is the essence of religion. The ethical system justifies
the speaker's pinpointing this basic cause for the wrong
direction of many fast people: "Besides, there is a
deeper reason. It's this: many of us have lost our
faith in God and in the fact that He is caring for us
and is moving us toward a future that is even better
than the present." His perspective compels him to point
out this deeper reason when it might have been more com-
fortable to deal only with the other causes since cor-
recting them would not require so radical a change as
this one. It must be stressed that he does not diminish
these other causes. But he focuses on the one he be-
lieves is most fundamental for many in his audience,
and for those who have not lost this faith, the strategy
serves as a reminder to implement what they believe.

In his development of this basic cause, he explains
what happens when people run away from God: " . . . we

continue to batter ourselves to bits against the harsh
wall of our own wills and desires; we trot through our
days, hoping that somehow our harried efforts will pay
off in a little peace later on." He could have talked
at this point in terms of the "inevitable" which he does
near the end of the speech. But here he wants them to
be fully aware of the consequences of the fast life in
their days on this earth. In this part of the speech,
he is not talking specifically about salvation.

As the Reformed view of ethical communication works
its way through a speech it continues to ask that its
principles be practiced. Therefore, the principle of
full respect suggests that solutions to a problem should
account for the position and needs of the audience. Not
all people can be treated alike because of different
individual needs. Nederhood seems to be addressing his
remarks about solutions to those who would be least in-
clined to implement them. In this way he can also
perhaps include everyone.

While this strategy may be rhetorically wise, ethics
also function here. He respects the audience by trying
to empathize with those farthest removed from his recom-
mendations. Whereas he might have made the rhetorical
choice to announce that they must accept his solutions
or face the consequences, or perhaps used his authority

as a preacher to declare that he was right, ethically he
needs to do more to respect them as people with an intel-
lectual nature fully capable of thinking about this mat-
ter of direction of life. And so he carefully works
through causes and solutions.

Fully one-third of the speech is devoted to expla-
nation of the three specific recommendations for solu-
tions. Rather than declaring that many people implement
these proposals and therefore are successful in slowing
down their lives and turning around in the right direc-
tion, he supposes that many of his listeners are not used
to doing these things and, therefore, he gives a lengthy
description and justification of them. Whether his
choice was the wisest one rhetorically is difficult to
say. More clearly, however, several ethical principles
operate here. The intellectual capacities of people are
respected by his encouragement of their exploration of
the reasons for his approach. Careful thinking is neces-
sary for proper response. Further, he shows that he wants
to help them find their way back to God and respond in
accord with the purpose of their creation in God's image.
He deeply desires that the communication link between
God and man be reforged as intended at creation. By
responding properly to God, in the Reformed ethical view,
man is enabled to respond more appropriately to his

fellows. The speaker's treatment of solutions illustrates that the vertical and horizontal relationships converge in a proper implementation of the Reformed view for ethics. The over-arching principle that communication must honor God is illustrated by his choice of solutions: a primary way this honor is demonstrated is through restoration of communication with God via prayer, Bible reading, and Sunday worship. Neither he, nor any other communicator, is limited by this ethical system to these solutions. The solutions are, however, an important first step prescribed by this system practiced in its fullest sense.

His approach to communication as interaction is again illustrated in his description of solutions. He shows them how to pray; yet, he recognizes his own limitations and their feelings when he says: "Actually I feel strange telling you what to say but I just wanted to get you started. Say whatever you feel like, but start by saying something to God." And rather than suggesting they begin reading the Bible from beginning to end, he recommends reading the gospel of Mark. His concern for their position shows in his rhetorically wise choice of asking them to read, at first, only a small part of the Bible. In this instance, ethically correct and strategically effective considerations seem

to combine to recommend this approach.

His attitudes of respectfully trying to understand and feel potential reluctance of the audience to his suggestions come through as he carefully explains the advantages of each proposal and how it helps lift one out of the hectic lifestyle and encourages reflection. For example, this is part of what he says about Sunday helping a person change style of life:

> Those who make Sunday a special day find that they are automatically lifted out of the tread-mill existence that so many people are involved in. When Sunday is used for worshipping the Lord, a person naturally has to arrange the rest of his work so that it's possible to break away on Sunday. The very fact that a person is willing to restrict his usual work and play to six days a week is a statement that he makes to himself and to those who know him that he does not consider his work and play all-important. God is important, too.

Sensitivity to people's reaction requires a determined effort on his part since he is unable to see or hear his radio audience. And he understands that if he is to respect people by considering their needs and their capacities for feeling and thinking, he must carefully explain advantages of these prescribed activities.

Yet, he cannot only give his suggestions for solution in a take-it-or-leave-it manner. The issue of confrontation versus choice arises here and he cannot leave

the individual to choose entirely on his own as if either

choice were equally viable. In order to remain honest

to his faith, he must confront listeners with the dif-

ferent consequences. This part of the speech is not as

pleasant. He warns that if they want to continue the

selfish, fast-paced lifestyle after hearing his speech,

the consequences will be disastrous:

> We must listen for our own good--for our own
> mental, emotional, and physical well-being.
> But we must listen too because those who ig-
> nore God and try to make a success out of
> their lives without paying any attention to
> God will ultimately be destroyed. They will
> be conquered by the "inevitable."

He leaves no doubt where he stands: "Ignoring God is

the most ignorant thing anybody can do." Honesty will

not permit him to hedge. Therefore, his concern for

life's direction, in conjunction with his own basic

Christian faith, recommends that he ask that they accept

what God offers for release and relief. With his faith

and the ethical system guided by the over-arching prin-

ciple that God be honored in all communication (and one

important way a preacher yields that honor is by ex-

plaining God's prescriptions for how people should live

as set down in the Bible), he cannot conclude otherwise,

in this instance, than to combine urgent warning with

God's promise of peace. A later speech, "Are Preachers

Necessary?", illustrates this constraint on preachers
somewhat more fully.

The issue of what approach a preacher should take
to this question of direction of life is illustrated by
Nederhood. While some preachers would simply aim at
belief, and particularly faith, by announcement such as
"this is it," or others would talk about moral precepts
with little depth, Nederhood approaches the question
differently. He uses the Bible and other sources, he
weaves faith and rationality, he examines presuppositions,
he discusses consequences, etc., all of which seem
guided by the Reformed view. He is a special kind of
preacher due to his ethical system.

"Establishing Religion"

Questions of the relationship of religion, educa-
tion, and the state combine to form the thrust of this
speech. Through Nederhood's discussion of these rela-
tionships we notice two specific ethical problems and
will examine how the Reformed view addresses them.
First, this speech illustrates how the Reformed view
addresses the whole-man concept in communication.
Second, the problem of how one should criticize a deci-
sion to which one is strongly opposed is clarified

through an analysis of this speaker's strategies in this particular speech.

From the outset he takes issue with a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that relates to justice in education. One would perhaps expect that he would be arguing against the Supreme Court decisions against Bible reading and prayer in the public schools since these decisions have been widely discussed, and one might suppose that a preacher would normally be concerned with these things. He never mentions them. Instead, he strongly disagrees with a decision which outlawed a state tax deduction for parents who send their children to non-public schools.

The reasons for this choice reflect the Reformed view for ethical communication. Seeing clearly that people are religious in nature since they are created in the image of God for correct response to God and man, he struggles to make his audience aware not only of this view of the nature of man, but also to understand the implications of this nature for the way they live. Apparently he thinks the Court's ruling does not reflect an understanding of this fundamental nature. Consequently, belief in the principle that communication must demonstrate concern for the whole person, including this religious nature, encourages explanation and analysis of

this nature. Attitudes of care by the speaker for others are also manifested in the desire that people fully understand their nature as religious in character.

Nederhood's view of people as religious is almost identical to the position described in Chapter Four.[3] Further analysis of the way he develops this view demonstrates the operation of several ethical principles which together show how communication should respect man as a whole person. Respect for the religious aspect of the nature of people combines with respect for their intellectual nature to recommend both that he explain the nature of religion as it relates to education and that he handle this before he answers the question of whether the state is establishing religion. He cannot simply focus on Bible reading or prayer in public schools because the nature of religion, particularly as it manifests itself in education, runs deeper than these two activities in isolation from the educational process. His explanation of religion shows it to pervade all of education and he illustrates this in his comparison of how both types of schools would answer several basic questions, such as, how are student to be viewed? What or whom is to be regarded as the ultimate authority in

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[3] Above, pp. 107-113.

education?

Inherent in these questions is his concern for the direction of students' lives, the principle which underlies the entire thrust of the speech and which grows out of the view of people created as religious beings. He clarifies his view of this ethical principle in his comments about the teacher when he urges the teacher to think about the direction of students' lives: "each human being stands in a very solemn and important relationship to God and when we deal with one another, we either weaken or we strengthen that person's position in God's sight." What he applies to himself he also applies to the teacher. This quotation not only illustrates the ethical principle that all communication should show concern for the direction of a person's life, but it also nicely grounds this principle in the nature of man as created for religious response to God.

All of this concern about the nature of religion must be explained before he faces the question of the state establishing religion. This explanation is a wise rhetorical strategy, but more is involved here than questions of effectiveness. If he has simply charged the state with injustice when people are apt to be less than fully aware of the nature of religion and its function in education, then he would risk the charge of being

unethical in not respecting the listeners' need for
adequate understanding of the fundamental issues. Depth
of understanding and the importance of rational belief
reflect ethical respect for man's intellectual nature.
Although it is probably true that supporters of Chris-
tian schools are aware of these issues, it is reasonable
to assume that many in the audience are not knowledge-
able since these issues had not been widely debated via
the media before he gave this speech. A strong emotional
appeal in urging people to leave the public schools and
help support the private schools he believes in would
not have demonstrated sufficient respect. The audience
needs to know why this is an issue of justice. Only
after explaining how all education is by nature religious
and that the state supports only one type of religious
education, can he then move to charge the state with
violating the First Amendment:

> Never in the history of man has there been an
> establishment of religion more massive and
> effective than the establishment of religion
> that is occurring in connection with the great
> state-controlled systems of education which
> are based oh a religious position that contra-
> dicts the Christian faith.

What he seeks is equal treatment by the state of all
education.

Another significant strategy in this speech centers

on his choice to focus on the Supreme Court's decision
in order that the audience "will be able to think about
education . . . more usefully." Several reasons can be
posited for this choice. Besides the obvious reasons
that the Court represents the state and that a Court
decision is easier to focus on than an abstract issue
like education, he mentions that it is representative of
wrong thinking which he believes is prevalent. Respect
for the listeners' ability to consider reason recommends
that, in an issue as wide and deep as this one, a speaker
focus on material that any audience member can secure.
The Court's decision is public; the audience may very
well be aware of it; they can check it out to determine
his fairness in describing it. Education affects nearly
everyone and so respect for the listeners' ability to
handle evidence and argument leads him to take a prime
example of wrong thinking to make his persuasive effort.
Rhetorically, it is wise to deal with well-known argu-
ments—or at least a Court opinion that can be studied.
But also respect for the whole person as a thinking being
who must respond correctly entails that he openly argue
the best example he can find of the thinking which he
believes denies the religious nature of people and edu-
cation.

An ethical problem develops from the choice of

strategy to deal with frustration with a decision the speaker opposes. He uses several approaches, two of which raise ethical difficulties. The first difficulty occurs in his choice to call the decision "somewhat funny." The amount of time the speaker devotes to justifying this opening statement illustrates the problem of choosing to regard the decision as humorous. The serious tone of the rest of the speech contradicts humor. His choice of words should be consistent with his argument, and they seem not to be consistent here. Furthermore, this technique may unnecessarily irritate listeners before they are fully aware of his justification. Not only might this be rhetorically unwise since some might be irritated enough to tune out the rest of the speech, it also raises ethical questions about fully respecting listeners who might not have his understanding of the issues. It seems that an ethically superior choice would be to deal with the argument one opposes on its face rather than calling it funny. Frequently humor is a way of avoiding analysis of argument. Nederhood does, to his credit, analyze the argument after he has called it humorous and tries to explain why he made the opening statement that he did.

In a second approach he goes beyond saying the decision is humorous to charge the justices with blindness:

> It is another proof that the person who said,
> "There are none so blind as those who will
> not see," was absolutely correct. Once a
> group of persons have made up their minds not
> to respond to evidence that is clearly placed
> before them, there is no amount of persuasion
> that will get them to change their position.
> And the Supreme Court of the United States
> evidently has a very serious blind spot.

If he had informed his audience of exactly what arguments

the Court had before it when reaching its decision and

if he had shown that the Court essentially refused to

look at arguments which showed that all education is re-

ligious in character, his charge of blindness could with-

stand ethical scrutiny. Perhaps the Court did indeed

refuse to consider such arguments, but this is not en-

tirely clear in the speech. Therefore, the charge, as

it stands, appears sarcastic. He handles frustration,

in part, with sarcasm which is ethically questionable in

a view of ethical communication which requires full res-

pect for the image of God in people. Like humor, sar-

casm often is a method of avoiding argument and, instead,

attacking the person.

On the other hand, his third approach which com-

prises most of the speech involves justification of his

frustration in two ways which do reflect the ethical

system more clearly: his careful analysis of the nature

of education, and his appeals to the audience to feel

the frustration of those "who fervently hope that one of
these days the blindness that continues to lay disadvan-
tage on Christian schools while promoting non-Christian
schools will be taken away and that people will see the
real religious issues that are a part of education."
Once again we see his respect for the whole person in
operation. He appeals to reason and emotion together to
help the audience sense the frustration the speaker feels.
This combination which respects the whole person is an
ethically superior way of opposing a decision.

"The Abortion Issues"

This speech focuses on an issue simmering for
several years in American society and which threatens
to boil in the future. Consequently, a speaker faces
several rhetorical difficulties as he decides how to
treat a subject familiar to his audience. Must he pre-
sent both sides? Should he give an emotional pitch for
his point of view? The analysis of this speech will
deal with these two basic questions about rhetorical
choice within the context of the Reformed view for ethi-
cal communication. Given the choices facing the speaker,
we need to understand the ways ethical stance guides
rhetorical choice. It is within the setting of his

purpose to explain the subject as a set of issues rather
than simply one issue which can be decided individually
that we examine his answers to these questions. Even
his topic is governed by ethics. The matter of abortion
is placed in the plural not only because this strategy
might pump new attention into a well-known topic, but
also because he honestly believes, as shown in the speech,
that this matter is far more than an individual decision
for or against abortion. It is a basic question of life
and death.

Speakers are often advised to use a two-sided
approach so that an audience, particularly if it is
well-educated, would be more inclined to accept the
speaker's position. Since the issue of abortion pre-
sents a paradigm of the problem of using this approach,
the problem is treated extensively here in the context
of the Reformed ethical view. Nederhood does not pre-
sent arguments for and against abortion in this speech.
Normally, the Reformed ethical system of respecting
others, especially as people with an intellectual nature,
requires that both sides of an issue be explored if the
audience is unfamiliar with the arguments pro and con.
Respecting their ability to weigh evidence and analyze
arguments would recommend that the audience be given the
arguments. However, when the subject has been debated

as extensively and openly, as this issue has been, this ethical position also allows a speaker to move on to deeper considerations without necessarily answering the arguments of the other side. He may trust that the audience has heard the arguments raised and has considered the responses to them. In this way, he respects their intelligence.

This strategy of moving beyond traditional pro and con arguments enables him to put more of this ethical system into practice. His attitudes toward the audience manifest deep care for them as he leads them to consider more than traditional questions such as, for example, a woman's right to control over her own body. Seeing people as created in the image of God and, therefore, as religious beings created for correct response toward God and toward one another, he urges them to think about the impact this practice has on the direction of society and then to make sure the direction is correct. The way he does this is to argue that the impact of abortion is devastating because the choice basically is between life and death: "If a nation makes an error at this point-- if its evaluation of the basic life of its citizens is not proper--everything within that nation will be destroyed." He pleads with the audience to care for one another--to manifest the concern for the direction of

others' lives. By not treating both sides of the basic
issue of abortion, he runs the risk of alienating part
of his audience and of the charge of being unfair in
only taking one side. Does he not respect his lis-
teners' capacities for choice? Fully aware that not
all would necessarily agree with his position, he
chooses not to talk about pro-abortion arguments, in
part, so that he can demonstrate his care that they look
beyond the arguments to the implications of this issue.

Furthermore, in his mind there simply are not two
sides of equal value and, therefore, it would be dis-
honest for him to present both sides in a disinterested
fashion. His faith is grounded in the Bible and it
governs his position on this issue: "it is simply true
that many of us are unalterably opposed to the destruc-
tion of the unborn because of the way the Bible evalu-
ates the unborn. The Bible supports the view that human
life begins at conception." Moreover, he sees the
results of abortion as so disastrous that he cannot
honestly present the two sides as relatively equal in
their appeal for assent.

But there is more depth here than honesty that
makes him take only one side. This issue of abortion
epitomizes the issues involved in a two-sided approach.
Normally this approach is based in the market-place of

ideas concept so that listeners can choose freely among alternatives. But not every issue can be treated that way. In an issue such as abortion which goes to the heart of Reformed theology of respecting created life, articulation of opposing arguments gives them too much credence. This reason is in addition to his trust, mentioned earlier, that the audience has already con- sidered responses to opposing arguments in this widely debated issue. The action of abortion is itself a question of ethics and is the essential issue here. Ethical speech cannot develop arguments for unethical acts. Therefore, Nederhood is right, in this view, in taking only the side he does.

However, the speaker cannot simply choose whatever approach he wants and remain ethically sound. There are certain matters that he must treat due to the nature of the subject and ethical requirements of honestly dealing with it. For example, in his discussion of the issue of the relation of abortion to religion and the state, he recognizes that religion is pervasive; it influences all of a person's thinking and actions. So he deals with it. Rhetorically, he could have chosen to overlook this complicated business of religion and have dealt only with the ramifications of abortion on society at large. Then he could also have ignored the

arguments of those who want to make abortion an issue
governed only by personal, private religion and who
want to dismiss it as a public issue. But his view of
the nature of man--a person created for religious res-
ponse integral to the image of God in him--constrains
him to treat the relation of religion to major issues of
life as he does here with this most important question
of public policy on abortion.

In essence, throughout the rest of the speech he
answers objections to his position. He shows how we
really do not believe in, nor can we practice, separa-
tion of religion and the state. Quality of life, he
argues deteriorates rather than improves when a society
practices abortion. He claims that it is not a matter
of individual choice because the whole question of
evaluation of life itself is involved, life which the
state must protect: "It is a _social_ evil because le-
galized abortion demands that the entire society provide
the framework in which this crime can occur." Since he
respects people as directional, religious creatures,
he needs to explain that religion of one sort or another
will govern decision in this matter, and, of course, he
advocates his own religion. What impact does abortion
have on society? and why cannot the state be separated
from this religious matter? are questions his ethical

system makes him address. So he cannot totally escape treatment of arguments for the other side.

The problem of whether a speaker should appeal to emotions is highlighted by this speech on a topic which generates strong feeling. A major element in emotional appeals is word choice which is also governed by ethics. Using words which vividly portray a situation is usually recommended as an effective rhetorical strategy, but the Reformed point of view requires the additional ethical consideration of honesty. Words must accurately symbolize reality and must engender correct understanding and meaning in the minds of listeners if they are to be shown respect. Since this speech represents word choice with perhaps more striking quality than other speeches, we consider this question here.

He describes abortion literally as spilled blood: "the crimson tide of abortion has washed over the North American continent." The blood is not a trickle or tiny stream but an ocean which floods the land. Rather than nourishing a nation, the flood is filled with disease: "this crimson tide . . . is part of the world-wide epidemic which now casts its blight over most of the nations." This disease is "abhorrent, a damnable abomination in the sight of Almighty God." " . . . The easy destruction of unborn children" creates a "strong,

demoralizing movement in the direction of death." The
disease is ultimately fatal to a nation: "A nation that
legalizes abortion on demand has made a radical choice
that will ultimately destroy everything." The speaker's
desire to remain ethically honest and consistent with
the view presented by the Bible, on which the Reformed
view is ultimately based, coupled with his care that
the audience see the full results of abortion lead him
to use these striking words. His ethical starting point,
based in the requirement that God be honored in all com-
munication, causes him to use language that pictures
this view in accord with the Biblical description of
the unborn.

His strategy of describing abortion as blood early
in the speech also permits the audience to ask if it is
really that bad. By getting them to ask this question
he prepares the ground for their consideration of his
arguments that abortion affects an entire society detri-
mentally. He gives them plenty of time to think.

After a series of rational arguments, he concludes
with a picture equally vivid with the beginning when he
compares the abortion culture to Jonestown. He recog-
nizes immediately the shock value this comparison carries
but also that he cannot rely only on emotion and shocking
people into action if he is to respect people as whole

beings: "maybe you think I'm being unfair to bring that up." Although he had already given several rational arguments, this comparison is so filled with emotion that he must unpack it. So he grounds his justification first in the argument that in both cases there was a conscious choice for death and, secondly, that abortion and Jonestown look alike to God. His justification of the comparison provides the warrant for the emotional appeal. Otherwise the jump from abortion to Jonestown would have been too great.

Thus the ethical dimension that becomes apparent here is that communication must take into account the whole person who is rational and emotional at the same time. Both types of appeal may be legitimate but not in complete isolation from each other.

The speaker runs into an ethical problem similar to the question just raised by vividly describing the development of the unborn child and its death by the process of abortion in a way that seems to rely heavily on emotion. In isolation from the rest of the speech some might say that the emotion contained in this des-cription seems greater than what is ethically warranted. Yet one must consider any communication technique in the context of an entire speech or communication situation. In this instance, the speaker attempts to overlay a

basically rational speech with emotion in order to add
impact, to cause people to feel as well as think about
the issue, and to move them to political action. For
him to ignore the inherent emotional aspect of abortion
issues would be dishonest. The emotional description
is contained in a quotation from a pediatrician whose
medical style takes the edge off a strictly emotional
appeal. Quotation from this authority allows the speaker
to stand with the audience to witness this picture.
Thus the burden of ethical judgment is made lighter.

Analysis of this speech not only shows the func-
tioning of ethics in guiding rhetorical choices about
whether to use a two-sided approach and the use of
emotion, but also demonstrates how the critic needs to
consider an entire speech or set of events when deter-
mining ethically correct rhetoric. The Reformed view
maintains certain principles regardless of particular
situations, but how these principles are implemented
demands careful consideration of all factors involved.

"Are Preachers Necessary?"

The question "How does Christian faith come?" forms
the central thrust of this speech and it is in this
context that he answers the question of the title.

The speech is interesting because it is about a preacher communicating about his role. Growth of the Christian faith is integral to his life's work. And since many preachers have messed up their calling in promotion of the faith, he feels compelled to raise the basic problem of the role of preachers. In this speech we find his view of preaching which, in some cases, overtly reveals a Reformed ethical perspective for communication in the content of his statements. But also an examination of the rhetorical strategies provides insight into the formative role ethics plays in deciding rhetorical choices. The focus of the analysis of this speech is on the role of the preacher in building the relationship between God and man and on the responsibility for communication.

A significant consideration in this speech, and one that seems unusual for many contemporary media preachers, centers on the role of the intellectual, particularly as intellectual work relates to faith in God and, consequently, to God's relationship with man. In our analysis of this consideration we can appreciate more fully the principle of full respect operating to suggest the role of the intellectual.

At the outset he honestly acknowledges that he does not have all the answers to every intellectual problem of the Christian faith:

> Others say that what we need is to clear away
> the intellectual problems that come up when-
> ever we examine Christianity nowadays. They
> talk about a great intellectual problem like
> the problem of God's great power and govern-
> ance and the meaning of human activity. They
> ask, "If God is all-powerful and in charge of
> everything, how can we believe that our day-
> by-day lives have significance?" Or they
> might ask, "If God is in charge of everything,
> why is He letting me die of cancer?" Or,
> "Why did He allow that little boy to be hit by
> a car and killed?" These kinds of questions
> create great intellectual stumbling blocks
> along the road to the Christian faith, and
> therefore there are some who believe that
> there will be revival of religion only when
> these intellectual questions are cleared up
> one way or another.

Rhetorically, he could have ignored these intellec-

tual questions and focused on the importance of preach-

ing. He could find plenty of material for a speech

without acknowledging intellectual problems, particu-

larly when his purpose is advance of the Christian faith,

but his desire to be completely honest and show full

respect for others leads him to openly admit:

> Well, I suppose it might help to solve some
> of these intellectual problems, though I would
> have to confess that I have certainly not
> found a satisfactory answer to the kinds of
> questions I have posed, and I still believe
> the Bible.

Whether this technique of admitting problems is rhetori-

cally effective seems less important here than the

ethical considerations, although they may go hand in

hand. Had he not made these admissions he might have
left a false impression that he indeed did have answers
to intellectual problems of faith. In his discussion
of intellectual questions and faith, he shows his view
of man as a whole person who depends on both intellect
and faith. One can hardly appeal to one at the expense
of the other without avoiding the charge of reducing man
to one or the other. Both are essential here to a con-
cept of the whole man which ethical communication should
respect.

How to deal with the intellect in matters of faith
is further treated in his discussion of the role of the
intellectual person. A view of listeners as created
with an intellectual nature does not allow a speaker to
simply brush aside or put down the intellectual person
or his work and thereby presumably justify his own lack
of satisfactory answers to significant questions. Such
brushing aside of questions is neither ethical in
preaching nor in any other type of communication. In
this instance, we can use the preacher as an analogy for
understanding ethical communication in other contexts
as well. Even though Nederhood claims that the intel-
lectual's role is not primary in the history of revival
in the Christian movement, he respects their work:
" . . . the intellectual giants of the Christian faith

continue to receive a great deal of respect, and their
books can be found on many shelves. . . ." His descrip-
tion of C. S. Lewis, a famous Christian intellectual,
illustrates the profound respect for intellectual work
we would expect in the Reformed view which locates man's
intellectual nature in the image of God in man. His
point is that both the intellectual and the preacher
have important roles to play but they are not the same.
The emphasis in the work of each may be different, but,
taken together, both are necessary to a full view of
ethical communication.

An interesting aspect of this speech is the func-
tioning of an ethical view to specifically prescribe
proper preaching. Of course, his view is taken directly
from the Bible and applies particularly to one type of
communication—preaching. In many instances these pre-
scriptions suggest a parallel for the Reformed view of
ethics in communication analogous to, but broader than,
preaching. We will examine here some of his concepts for
preaching, and thus other communication, although the
primary focus remains furthering our understanding of
ethics guiding rhetoric in Nederhood's work.

In his recommendations for preaching, he is critical
of preachers who appear to be preaching for selfish
purposes and who use gimmicks to that end. The whole

thrust of the Reformed ethical system argues against
selfishness and instead insists that people fully respect
others as image-bearers of God. Gimmicks do not help
establish a proper relationship between God and man.
His condemnation of certain activities of some preachers
is unflinching: "I think of the religious confusion
that has been sown by preachers who developed this gim-
mick or another one and have used their charisma and
their message to establish kingdoms for themselves."
These charges are harsh, but the ethical principle of
respect demands that he remain honest to the truth. In
addition, his profound care about the direction of the
people whom the preacher is supposed to be leading in
an improved relationship to God constrains him to iden-
tify precisely what he sees. His justification eluci-
dates these principles:

> Well, it's true; we are living in an era in
> which self-styled preachers have done a great
> deal of damage to the cause of Christ. There
> have been preachers who have proclaimed false
> and bizarre teachings. They have collected
> great sums of money for their efforts. They
> have dreamed grandiose dreams and have sup-
> plicated their followers to make their dreams
> come true for them. One would even question
> these days whether preachers are useful at all.
> Do we really need preachers? What do you
> think?

The preacher who misleads people knows what he is doing

and empathy for his manipulation is unjustified. There
is a place for blaming in communication, however, con-
demning activities without prescribing the correct way
would be unjust from this perspective that cares about
helping people see the right way. Therefore, he moves
on to the Biblical view of the methods of preaching which
would help establish a right relationship with God.

The preacher must not be self-centered but must
serve others for their own good, in order that they may
live their lives in more obedient response to the pur-
pose of their creation. This is in line with the Re-
formed view for ethical communication which requires
that respecting others involves consideration of their
needs and welfare. He shows how preaching is an impor-
tant aspect of that link of communication between God
and man which requires, then, implementation of the
over-arching principle that God must be honored in all
communication. After quoting from Rom. 10, Nederhood
offers this explanation:

> Do you know what this means? It means that
> it is true--you need a preacher. It is the
> preacher who is the link that God has estab-
> lished between Himself and the people who come
> to Him in faith. The preacher is the bridge
> between God and man. This is confirmed by
> the New Testament which shows again and again
> that the great initial advance of the Chris-
> tian faith was accomplished by the proclama-
> tion of the Word of God. So it's true. We

do need preachers. Preachers are essential
in the establishment and maintenance of the
Christian faith.

The test he gives for a good preacher is this:

> . . . let me call your attention to something
> the apostle Paul said in II Corinthians 4:5.
> With this brief sentence he can help us a lot
> when it comes to making a judgment about
> preachers and preaching. He says: "For we
> preach not ourselves, but Jesus Christ as
> Lord, with ourselves as your servants for
> Jesus' sake."

It is this servant role which is the opposite of the type

of preaching he has condemned. Recognizing that he has

placed the preacher in the background with his statement

"Preaching, then, is a unique and singular activity

that draws attention away from the preacher and focuses

attention on the person and work of the Lord Jesus

Christ," he asks:

> But the preacher, we can't forget him. Is it
> true that he is just a pipeline through which
> the material of Christ's message comes? Is
> he nothing but a cool, aloof, unmoved person
> who gives his message without being involved
> himself? What about the person of the preacher?
> How can we recognize one? There are too many
> strange ones around these days who seem to be
> in the preaching business for personal advan-
> tage alone--how can you spot a preacher?

The answer illustrates the Reformed perspective in opera-

tion for it insists that full respect requires that the

needs of others be considered first: "A preacher is a servant of the people he speaks to. A servant. He must be willing to give anything so that they will know the truth about Jesus."

Although not all people are preachers in an official sense, the analogy of the servant role applies in general communication, according to the Reformed view, far beyond preaching. The speaker could also have selected Biblical texts similar to the one above that state rather precisely the servant role which should be taken by all communicators and which is inherent in the concept of full respect.[4]

Nederhood's technique of letting the Bible speak takes the onus of documentation off his shoulders. His audience can check the reliability of his description of methods of proper preaching. He never refers to a special vision he has had so that people would have to rely only on him--the evidence he uses is clearly before them. Of course, his faith is prominent, but it is the faith set forth in the Bible which is freely open for examination. His open, honest revelation of his faith

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[4] See, for example, Eph. 4:29: "Do not let any unwholesome talk come out of your mouths, but only what is helpful for building others up according to their needs, that it may benefit those who listen."

reflects his concern for people's response as religious

beings and reflects his whole-man perspective on faith

also. He wants them to show the likeness-to-God inherent

in their creation. At no time does he demonstrate how

successful his own program is, nor does he spend time

describing himself since doing so would contradict his

perspective,

Basing his view of the content of preaching di-

rectly on 2 Cor. 4:5, "For we preach not ourselves, but

Jesus Christ as Lord, with ourselves as your servants

for Jesus' sake," Nederhood illustrates implementation

of the Reformed view for ethical communication in several

ways. His comments about the content of preaching con-

tain principles for ethical communication. It almost

seems as if he is arguing that the Reformed ethical view

for communication should govern preaching. Certainly

his statements do not contradict this view.

First, his view of preaching adds to our under-

standing of the implementation of the over-arching

principle. He begins his explanation by stating that

the preacher does not speak for himself. Instead, he

must stand within the message of the Bible and be a

"herald" for the message of Christ: preaching "is direct

announcement of His message." This announcement occurs

whenever people are met for worship of God and, thus,

it would take place primarily in church. He defines preaching specifically as "the authoritative proclamation of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ."

This view means that preaching about Jesus is more than talking about salvation of men's souls, although this is present. It also means that preaching is directly concerned with people's daily interaction with one another. More specifically, it involves explaining and applying to present-day situations what the Bible teaches about how people should live. Preaching is evangelism, but not only that as defined in the narrow sense, and his other speeches provide examples. Thus God is honored not only with communication that centers on Him, but also when preaching explains God's will for how people should live in relationship with one another.

Ideally, proper communication outside preaching would then reflect these directives as established by proper preaching (which should match the Reformed view of ethics). He does not deal as directly with this second aspect of explaining God's will in this particular speech as much as he does in the other speeches which have been studied here. The Reformed position does not say that God is honored only in communication that explains what the Bible says, but all ethical communication must be in accord with Biblical injunctions

for human behavior.

A second principle evident in his comments about the content of preaching is the concern for the direction of the life of people called to respond correctly to both God and man. Using the apostle Paul for support, Nederhood says:

> Paul came to see that Jesus was the fulfillment of everything he had studied in the Old Testament, he discovered that Jesus' death on the cross was the great work of God that made salvation possible for sinners, and he saw that everyone is obligated to live under the lordship of Jesus throughout his entire life.

Preaching, according to Nederhood, must grapple with these fundamental truths. He could have more extensively explained what living "under the lordship of Christ" means since this is the working out of a concern for direction, but his prime purpose in this speech quite specifically and clearly is recognizing that lordship first so that people are turned, through means of faithful preaching, in the right direction. Then they can live respectfully with each other in a fuller sense. His other speeches often deal with the implications of that direction and show how preaching helps people understand how to live properly in relationship. We see more fully Nederhood's view of this principle of concern for life's direction when we examine several of his

speeches together. Ethical criticism is more complete if more of a person's communication is examined than one speech. Each communication event must be placed in context of the larger set of events and speeches illustrated by this instance.

Finally, a brief discussion is needed of Nederhood's view of responsibility in communication as witnessed in this speech on preaching. It will add to our appreciation of concepts of responsibility in the Reformed view for communication. Implicitly recognizing that communication is not one-way and that all persons bear responsibility for communication, he also presses the responsibility on laymen who need proper preaching:

> Remember, it is the message of the preacher that brings revival. And so you must go and find it. You must search for it as you would search for a pearl of great price. Don't rest. Find a man who speaks in the authority of the Lord Jesus Christ and who tells only about Him, a man who will not be drawn into all kinds of curious questions and mysterious controversies.

Lest they think the journey is too great for them, his reassurance is filled with promise:

> There are thousands and thousands of preachers still around. They are common ordinary men; they are dedicated men. They are not famous. But they are working faithfully in their churches and they have only one thing on their mind, and that is to preach Jesus Christ.

> I tell you they are still around. And I dare
> say that there are preachers like that right
> in your community.

Thus, listeners cannot escape responsibility for communi-
cation, including preaching. The stress in the Re-
formed view for ethical communication on the profound
respect for others as image-bearers of God requires
that each person take responsibility for communication
that influences. Nederhood's comments here show how
that ethical responsibility should be undertaken in
regard to preaching.

Conclusions

Operating from the premise that Dr. Nederhood would
likely hold a normative ethical perspective similar to
the one developed in Chapter Four, we sought to increase
our understanding of that ethical system by studying
how these ethical principles and considerations influence
choice of rhetorical strategies. The evidence shows
how the ethical system operates in public address.

Yet, as this chapter indicates, ethical criticism
implicitly involves more than determining the extent
to which a person's ethics guide his communication.
It includes evaluation of whether the communication

actually measures up to an ethical standard. The ethical critic goes beyond the point of view of the communicator as he faces choice to examine the communication after it has taken place. Although our concern is with both, these two become intertwined in this project because we are asking how a person who holds a Reformed perspective (and preaches a Reformed world-and-life view) implements it. If we were doing a piece of criticism on a communicator who did not hold this position, we would focus more on ethical evaluation from the Reformed view, than on the communicator's own ethics guiding his communication. To say that a person who holds a particular ethical standard succeeds or fails in its implementation in communication says little about the viability of that perspective. But showing how the person succeeds or fails helps to explain the manner in which an ethical perspective should be implemented and helps clarify the ethical perspective by which discourse may be explained and evaluated, which is the purpose of this chapter.

In these speeches, Nederhood selflessly examines the direction of people's lives in accordance with the purpose of their creation. The principle is concrete in major issues that significantly influence and are influenced by this direction. In doing this, he shows

that he holds a deep concern for the way the audience
lives now, for the positions they take on these issues,
and for the ultimate end of their life on earth. The
second basic ethical principle of full respect for the
image of God in man operates in several ways, particu-
larly as the speeches reflect a whole man concept in
his appeals to reason and emotion and in his considera-
tion of both faith and intellect. He considers lis-
teners' needs carefully. And the third basic principle
of holding a high view of the communication process is
illustrated by his attempt to be respectfully interac-
tive, to sense how meaning is engendered in the minds of
the listeners, and to be sure not to denigrate the com-
munication process.

In addition, the emphasis throughout these speeches
shows his concern for the listeners rather than for him-
self. No appeals for money are made. While the speaker
wants people to attend church, he never mentions that
they should join his church or his denomination. He
rarely talks about his own work--at least not in terms
of successes he has had, although he mentions that he
believes true preaching is effective, not because of
the preacher, but because of the message. This selfless
approach is probably not typical of most media preachers
today. Yet, it is interesting to note that the program

has been on the air for more than forty years and that

Nederhood has been its principal speaker since 1965.

It continues to expand and recently has moved into tele-

vision in addition to radio. One can only read this

success story in committee reports to the denomination,

however. His preaching illustrates the servant role he

prescribes for preachers.

Although this chapter shows how the Reformed ethi-

cal perspective works in discourse, it has shown pri-

marily this perspective in operation in one type of

communication--preaching--and only one type of preaching

at that. One might even argue that radio preaching is

not the same as preaching in church. Certainly audiences

are different. Nederhood seems to view this program as

a way of leading people to church where they will get

preaching in the more complete sense of exposition of

the Bible. Thus explanation of the functioning of the

Reformed ethical system in discourse is limited in scope

here. The extent to which this position can be applied

in other types of communication is suggested in Chapter

Four and will be discussed more fully in Chapter Six.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

A review of the literature of speech communication
amply demonstrates that ethics is a vital concern in the
discipline. Because communication can easily manipulate
others for selfish ends, scholars have, for a long time,
spoken to ethical issues and must continue to do so if
they wish to project for the discipline a direct involv-
ment in promoting the humane in mankind. This project
has continued that tradition of concern by developing a
position which has hardly been a part of the literature
on ethics of speech communication. In the process,
several issues in ethics and communication have been
addressed. This chapter seeks to state several values
of this project, review specific claims for the Reformed
position, and indicate directions for future work with
this normative theory for the ethics of communication.

Values of this Project

Several conclusions highlight the advantages of
this study and indicate the nature of our task in

communication ethics. Abundant attention to ethical problems in communication shows that speech communication scholars are quick to point out matters that seem to require ethical considerations. Such a concern is but a preliminary step, however. Solid normative ethical standards need to be developed, tested in argument, and demonstrated capable of dealing with these problems in the totality of a person's communication. Standards have been developed, but careful critiques to test their power have been weak to this point. Chapter Three has demonstrated inadequacies in several currently popular positions. Chapter Four argues that the Reformed standard compares favorably with others now being advanced.

A difficulty the speech communication discipline has faced in the study of ethics is the weakness of method in ethical criticism. This project helps in a small way in addressing this problem by reviewing the writings of past critics on methods of ethical criticism and recommending a method of procedure illustrated in Chapter Five.

Some additional conclusions may be drawn from this project as a whole. By developing a theological perspective for ethics and applying it to communication, this project demonstrates that theology, philosophy, and

communication relate in ways which illuminate each.
To presume that each discipline can do its work in
isolation from others is to force each one to remain
incomplete. This project provides an example of the
validity and necessity of interdisciplinary work. To
illustrate, theologians have studied the nature of man
(as we have seen in Reformed theology); moral philoso-
phers have extensively considered ethics; but neither
discipline has worked out thoroughly the implications
for communication. The communication discipline con-
tains extensive analysis of communication techniques,
but it has failed to utilize the work of theology on
the nature of man and moral philosophy on the require-
ments of an ethical system. This project shows theolo-
gians the logical extensions of some of their work for
communication; it shows moral philosophers how an
ethical system, based in theology, is applied in speci-
fic communication events; and it shows communication
scholars how it is possible to begin with a starting
point in the nature of man as developed in theology
and achieve a system of ethics for communication. With-
out interdisciplinary contributions, this project could
not have been completed.

A normative ethical standard scarcely treated in
the literature of speech communication has been

developed here. Neither the Reformed theological posi-
tion, nor any other Christian position, has been given
significant time or space in our journals. The study
here indicates that the Reformed position yields an
organized set of comprehensive principles for ethical
communication. It is a viable position for guiding
and evaluating communication and should receive a com-
mensurate place in our discipline.

The Reformed view considers religion a life-encom-
passing matter which cannot be relegated to Sunday or
to a person's private life. The broad definition of
religion offered here argues that the typical limita-
tion of religion to certain spheres of life hardly does
justice to an understanding of the nature of religion
and, therefore, of the nature of man. Religion, as a
necessary element in the nature of man, determines one's
view of the world, is thus crucial to ethics, and
directly influences communication. More attention
should be given to religious foundations of other
perspectives--whether or not they are overtly called
"religious." All positions are based on some kind of
faith and this faith should be identified and examined
for its implications in ethical communication.

Another less obvious value of this study deserves
mention. If an ethical system is to be viably used in

guiding and evaluating communication it must move beyond
stating abstract principles into the arena of decision-
making. It is easier to develop theory in the abstract
than it is to proceed to application. It was noted
earlier that Bok indicts moral philosophers for staying
too long in the realm of the abstract rather than con-
fronting urgent moral choices which demand decisions.
In our own discipline of speech communication, appli-
cation has been far less abundant than either calling
attention to problems or the development of abstract
normative ethical theories. We must be able to _see_ an
ethical system in operation. In this project, Chapter
Five is a necessary logical development from Chapter
Four.

A significant speaker, previously unnoticed in the
scholarly literature on speech communication, has been
our concern here. This study not only provides insight
into Nederhood's ethics, but also illuminated the rhe-
torical strategies of an evangelical preacher utilizing
radio. Traditionally preachers seem to receive far
less attention in scholarly work than do other speakers.
Given the amount of influence of media preachers in
American society today, study of other preachers should
prove worthwhile. Dr. Nederhood should not be regarded
as typical of contemporary media preachers. Indeed

this study has suggested otherwise. Further analysis
of the strategies of other media preachers would proba-
bly more fully establish the distinctiveness of this
preacher and this program.

Claims for the Reformed Position

In addition to the conclusions discussed above,
several specific claims have been made for the Reformed
position for ethical communication. This perspective
stands alone among normative ethical theories in its
demonstration of the centrality of religion in the
formation of guiding principles for communication.

A significant result of this starting point is
that it leads to a very basic principle--communication
should reflect concern for the full direction of man's
life. Casting the life of a human being in the mold of
being created for response to God, this position sees
man as a directional creature and asks that communica-
tion help an individual respond appropriately to his
created nature as an image-bearer of God. Another way
of stating this concern is that this position asks that
man live obediently before God. Thus, communication,
if it is to be ethical, must show respect for the other
person beyond the particular situation, time, and place

of immediate interaction. Although other normative
positions claim a wider view, i.e., they may be con-
cerned with consequences, the Reformed position is more
specific in its concern for direction. It bases its
concern for direction on the whole life of a person--
from creation to eternity--not just on particular cir-
cumstances or comparatively short-range consequences.

Another claim for the Reformed position grows
from the concept of full respect. This concept of
respect is also founded on the image of God in man.
This is not simply to say that man should be respected
because he is "human," a term often nebulously defined.
This position does not ground respect in what a person
has done or what he is capable of doing, but instead
in a person's creation. In so doing, in essence the
Reformed position maintains that in order to fully
respect a person, one must believe in God and acknow-
ledge Him as the Creator who must be served. While
this statement may be controversial, the Reformed posi-
tion is bound by its fundamental beliefs to make such
a statement because it argues that man's nature cannot
be fully understood aside from its creation, and the
belief in creation of course assumes a Creator. This
respect, then, is more profound than consideration of
a person's appearance, deeds, or abilities--although

these may very well be admired in addition to the re-
quired fundamental respect.

A third claim results from another basic principle
for ethics from this perspective. The importance of
communication in a person is stressed because communi-
cation is essential if man is to live in fellowship with
God. Thus, to denigrate the communication process by
manipulation, coercion, etc., is to denigrate the nature
of a human being by failing to permit him to live out
the link between God and man.

Of course, not all would agree that these claims
are distinct advantages for an ethical system of commu-
nication. And the most common root of objection or
disagreement probably lies in the lack of belief that
God exists or that He can be known or that He created
man for fellowship. This problem illustrates the major
influence of basic faith assumptions which underlie an
ethical perspective. One can hardly accept any norma-
tive ethical standard without also accepting the faith
underlying that perspective. Although much time and
effort has been spent throughout the ages debating faith
assumptions, these do not yield readily to logical
argumentation. No such effort will be attempted here.
What one can do is to examine positions for consistency
and compare positions in terms of ramifications in

ethical communication. If the ramifications are inadequate, surely one ought to re-examine his faith. Examination of positions for inherent consistency between faith and practice and comparison with other ethical theories in this project has shown that the Reformed position withstands such analysis, results in consequences which appear at least as satisfactory as any other normative standard, and yields a more comprehensive view of the nature of man and the ethical dimensions of communication.

The application of the Reformed normative position to a speaker in Chapter Five testifies to the organic nature of this position. Principles work together to guide a person's rhetoric when this perspective is implemented. And making an ethical evaluation of communication requires that one combine principles, albeit at times one principle will rise over another. Standards for the perspective are high; yet, through the analysis and evaluation of Nederhood's discourse, we find that it is possible for a person to use these principles to guide rhetorical strategies and that it is possible to evaluate communication as ethical. This application particularly shows how one can demonstrate full respect for others in communication and also manifest concern for the direction of another person's life. Furthermore,

since this project analyzed a speaker who stands within the Reformed tradition, we have gained additional insight into a Reformed world-and-life view. The speeches themselves add to an understanding of the theory developed in Chapter Four.

The description, analysis, interpretation, and evaluation of Nederhood's speeches in Chapter Five show him to be effective in operating within the constraints of the Reformed ethical theory for communication. The principles inherent in this system, when put into practice, compel him to be distinctive from many other radio ministers as they presently operate.[1] For example, in implementing the over-arching principle that God must be honored in all communication, he must remain faithful to what the Bible says. He cannot step outside of Biblical directives to launch a campaign to build a personal empire. He cannot simply tell people what they would like to hear—he must present the message of the Bible. Faithfulness to the God he serves is his criterion for operation rather than personal success. These two are not polar opposites. They may well go together as this program illustrates. Yet, faithfulness to proper

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[1] William C. Martin, "The God-Hucksters of Radio," The Atlantic, 225 (June 1970), 51-56.

principle is the guide and success is a result, or by-
product, rather than the guide for action.

Future Directions

This project does not complete my interest in this
subject. First, application of the Reformed normative
ethical position for communication to a Reformed speaker
presents some problems which should be addressed in
future work.

While using a Reformed speaker for application has
the advantage of gaining greater insight into the nature
of the Reformed world-and-life view, it may also give
the impression that this ethical perspective is fine for
him but it does not have application beyond a preacher
or someone who upholds a Reformed position. Such is not
the intent of this project. Consequently, this problem
indicates a direction for future research in implicitly
recommending that this position be applied to speakers
who are not fully aware of the Reformed view. At no
time do proponents of this position for ethical communi-
cation indicate that it applies only to people within
the Reformed circle. Certainly it holds that all people
have been created in the image of God and should be res-
pected as such. Like other normative ethical standards,

it claims that it should be practiced by all people.

Furthermore, additional application to other speakers would more fully illustrate the normative theory. Perhaps a wider range of examples, including negative examples, would shed additional light. The intent of this project was not to pick someone whose speaking was thought to satisfy this theory, but rather that by picking a Reformed speaker the function of this ethical system in guiding rhetorical choices might be more fully seen. Nevertheless, evaluation of other speakers would be worthwhile.

A second problem relates to the first. The application to speaker may suggest that this standard is only for public address. Again, this would be a mistaken impression. Application to a public speaker illustrated implementation of this position in discourse. Showing this position applied to other types of communication would be another fruitful direction for future work. In our field, increasing interest is being shown, for example, in interpersonal and organizational communication, and working out this normative theory in these types of communication would enhance the value of the theory. Brief indication of its application in interpersonal relationships has been given in Chapter Four, but a more complete exposition would be warranted

elsewhere.

Another interesting question which should be addressed in future work is the degree to which questions of ethics and questions of success must be considered together. The Reformed system, as a deontological theory, insists that ethics be the primary concern and argues that success, although far less important, will likely follow correct implementation of ethical principles. It was suggested in Chapter Five that when Nederhood was guided by and implemented the ethical principles from the Reformed perspective, he was successful in communicating the message. Although determining success was not the purpose of this project, the question of degree of success over the long range when ethical principles are implemented deserves further research in building a comprehensive theory for communication.

If these Reformed principles for communicating are indeed correct, then the implications for them go far beyond ethics. The normative standards were shown to be inherent in the nature of man as created in the image of God. As such, they might be termed "creational norms." And to the extent that they are creational norms, they should be able to be discovered, at least to some degree, by people from other perspectives. The

most complete explanation, however, would have to come
from a creational view. It would be interesting to see
broad implications of this ethical system for communi-
cation in demonstrating, for example, how these ethical
principles recommend a particular form of organization
for a public speech. I would like to see how they sug-
gest particular procedures for interpersonal, organiza-
tional, and small group communication, i.e., how the
term "normative" would come to reflect creational norms.
Proper communication would then result from following
these norms inherent in one's nature by creation. These
intriguing questions about the development of this
normative ethical theory into a more comprehensive
theory of communication hold much promise for future
study.

Even as my interest in this subject began long
before this project, I intend to continue to pursue
ramifications of the Reformed view for communication
in a variety of contexts not only on a scholarly level
but also on a practical level. Interest at both levels
is indispensable to anyone who seeks a deeper appre-
ciation of the Reformed view.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

"The Abortion Issues"

Transcript of a speech as delivered by Dr. Joel Nederhood
on The Back To God Hour on January 21, 1979.

"Pregnant? Need Help? Please call our number."
An ad in a large city newspaper. Those who respond find
themselves talking with Birthright, a pregnancy coun-
seling organization. Mrs. Rose Marie Diamond, president
of the Chicago chapter of Birthright, describes it:
> Birthright began in Toronto, Canada, in 1968,
> in response to the liberalization of the Cana-
> dian abortion law. It was founded by a house-
> wife and mother of seven children, Louise Sum-
> merhill. It has now spread to the part of
> 2000 pregnancy service centers throughout the
> world.

When Birthright counselors answer their phones, what
kinds of women do they find themselves talking to?
> Many of the women who call us now are very
> young--teenagers. Some are married women in
> the process of getting a divorce. Others are
> married women who have had several children and
> who thought that their child-bearing years were
> over and may have gone back to work. They're
> all very upset about their pregnancies. We
> offer to help them in whatever way we can.
> Lately it seems that most of the people who
> call us are really more in need of a friend
> than they are in need of the medical services
> and the financial services that we can find for
> them. In this day and age women who are preg-
> nant are just about the lowest person on the
> totem pole that you can find. And when she's
> alone and the pressures of the society are on
> her to get an abortion, she truly can't find a
> friend anywhere.

Mrs. Diamond suggests that there is a possibility that some of the women who are receiving abortions are not even pregnant:

> Of the women that we have given pregnancy tests to--these are hospital tests provided to Birthright free of charge by hospitals--fifty percent are not even pregnant which is rather shocking when you find that in the abortion clinics in this country most women who present themselves as candidates for abortion are found to be pregnant. I think there are an awful lot of women who are having abortions who really aren't pregnant in the first place.

How does a woman feel who decides to keep her baby after having considered destroying it?

> The women who go along with us think back on it and wonder how they ever could have thought of having an abortion. And their babies are precious to them--more precious because they had gone through this period, I think, in which they had planned to abort the child.

On February 7, 1969, a number of people met in a hearing room of the Chicago Circle Campus of the University of Illinois and testified before the Family Council Commission of the State of Illinois. The hearings dealt with the matter of abortion. There was a movement then within the state to change the laws and make abortion on demand legal. Some who testified spoke in favor of the change. Several of us who were there spoke against it. In any case, the state legislature did not change the law. And the feeling in the hearing room that day was that, though some spoke out in favor of abortion, the idea of changing the law was largely academic. Most everyone felt that the possibility for legalizing abortion was virtually non-existent. The citizens of the state would never stand for it.

Several gray-haired men in a large building in Washington, D. C., have changed all this for the United States, for on January 22, 1973, they declared that the state laws that had previously provided the unborn with the protection of the state were bad laws. And so the crimson tide of abortion has washed over the North American continent all the way from the northernmost reaches of Alaska, across the wide expanse of Canada, and throughout the lower forty-eight. And this crimson tide is, of

course, part of the world-wide epidemic of abortions which now casts its blight over most of the nations. In Australia, abortions are accepted everywhere. They are in Great Britain as well. And with all this, the evaluation of people like those who defended the rights of the unborn in that hearing room in February 1969 has changed as well.

At that time we had the distinct feeling that we spoke for the majority of the population. We had the distinct feeling that the majority of our fellow citizens considered abortion abhorrent, a damnable abomination in the sight of Almighty God. I say we had that feeling. Now that is different, too. Those who condemn abortion and who try to call their country back to a more God-fearing position get the impression that they are part of a lunatic fringe, they are know-nothing reactionaries who have not yet caught up with the 20th century. Once again I find that radio messages dealing with abortion--messages that try to show people the degrading evil of this practice--are accepted with some reluctance by radio stations. In some instances they are refused; or we are told that if we continue to mention this issue, we must expect that the station will no longer want to carry this program. In less than ten years the climate has changed entirely; now those who speak for life, who represent the rights of the unborn, are considered ignorant culprits who cruelly want to deprive young girls and women of their rights and privileges.

And one of the things we are accused of is that we tend to be one-issue people. All we think about is the abortion question. In connection with politics, for example, those who evaluate candidates in terms of their stand on the abortion question are derisively labeled as one-issue people who fail to see the complexities of the political scene. One gets the uncomfortable feeling that those who view national policy and political campaigns in terms of abortion should hardly be allowed to participate in political life at all, they should have enough sense to understand that the issue of abortion is just one single issue among many others. One gets the impression that only stupid, know-nothing fanatics who have been hopelessly brainwashed by some church or another would ever think that abortion is so important that every other issue fades by comparison to it.

Well, what about this? Is it right to evaluate

political candidates and political life and government
policy almost exclusively in the light of this issue?
I'd like to look at that matter for a few moments. And
I would like to suggest that there is good reason to make
the issue of abortion a central issue in political judg-
ment-making. The reason is that the abortion issue is not
really a single issue at all. The abortion issue is one
which touches on several important elements of our com-
mon life together. It is, in fact, more accurate to
speak of the abortion issues rather than the abortion is-
sue. Look at these issues for a few moments with me.

(a song is inserted at this point)

First of all, the abortion issue involves the issue
of how we are going to establish the relationship between
religion and the state. Perhaps I shouldn't have started
with an issue as large and as grave as this one is but I
have, so let's look at it. How one feels about abortion
is after all related to one's religious convictions. It
is simply true that many of us are unalterably opposed to
the destruction of the unborn because of the way the
Bible evaluates the unborn. The Bible supports the view
that human life begins at conception. Several of the
prominent figures in the Bible speak of the way God was
with them even before their birth. The Bible also main-
tains a high view of the offspring of the human family
in terms of its condemnation of the heathen practice of
sacrificing children to idol gods.

Quite apart from specific statements in the Bible
that speak explicitly about the unborn, the total Bibli-
cal perspective about human life and conduct contradicts
the easy destruction of unborn children which is prac-
ticed in our modern abortion culture. The religious
issue in the Bible is described as a choice between life
and death. And the people of God are consistently en-
couraged to reject a way of death and to choose a way of
life. When Moses spoke to the Hebrew people about the
way of the Lord in contrast to the false service of
idols, he concluded by saying:
>I call heaven and earth to witness against you
>this day, that I have set before you life and
>death, blessing and curse; therefore choose
>life, that you and your descendants may live,
>loving the Lord your God, obeying his voice,
>and cleaving to him; for that means life to you
>and length of days . . . (Deut. 30:19,20).

In these concluding words of the great prophet and lawgiver Moses, the dominant theme is "Choose life." And given the way natural physical life and spiritual life are integrated in the Bible, we may assume that God expects His people always to choose life, also in connection with the developing life of the unborn.

So then, the position one takes regarding abortion is a religious matter. Does this mean that it is consequently merely a private matter? What is the relationship of the grand, ethical, moral insights of the Bible to the life of a nation? Some might be inclined to say there is no relationship whatever. The state is one thing and religion is something else. But we don't really believe that, do we?

As a matter of fact, within many nations there is a great reliance on insights that come from the Judeo-Christian tradition so far as laws are concerned. I think, for example, of laws that deal with private property. The entire free world expresses a point of view that is rooted in the commandment of the Lord which says, "Thou shalt not steal." Biblical demands for honesty and trustworthiness are related to our legal system of covenants and contracts. Such social sensitivities as are expressed in care for the poor also come directly out of Biblical traditions. The Bible's description of the dignity of the individual and the sacredness of the human conscience are expressed in state laws that protect our freedoms.

In terms of the relationship between the great insights of religion and the state, it is not possible simply to fall back on the phrase separation of church and state. It's not that simple. And with respect to the matter of whether or not the unborn are entitled to the protection of the laws of the land, there are some of us who are convinced, with all the strength of religious conviction, that the unborn need the protection of the state more than anyone else and they are fully entitled to it. We feel that it is false to consider them simply subhuman organisms growing within the mother. We know they have their own circulatory systems and their own nervous systems—they are in fact separate human beings.

Now, you may say, "That's your religion, and don't let your religion infringe on my opinions. You have

your religion and I have mine." Well, once again we would say that the question is not that simple. Admittedly there are certain religious matters which remain in the circle of individual persuasion. There are other religious matters that are in the nature of the case matters of public policy. And abortion is such a religious issue. I'm not going to say anymore about this religious matter. For now let it be clearly understood that one of the issues related to abortion is this very complex and difficult issue of the relationship of religion to the state. And we haven't solved that issue by any means.

Let's move on to another issue that's part of the abortion issue. And that is the matter of quality of life. When I talk about the quality of life I remember the words of Moses again. Remember, he said to the people that he had set before them the way of life and the way of death, and he said that they were to choose life. Well, nations exhibit a quality of life in terms of whether or not they choose for life or for death. A society is a good and exciting place to live in if it is a society in which the choices consistently are in favor of life and against death. And a society is a horrible place in which to live if there is a consistent choice for death.

Well, what has happened to us now that we have lived with abortion on demand for several years? There are many of us who believe that the objective observer of our culture, of our society, would be able to discern a strong, demoralizing movement in the direction of death. I think, for example, of what the possibility of abortion is doing to the medical profession.

In his book, This Curette for Hire, Dr. Eugene F. Diamond, a pediatrician, decries the deterioration of the practice of medicine today. He tells how it used to be that the most marginal student in a class in medical school would be called the class abortioner, whereas today many doctors have turned to profiteering in this horrible traffic of slaughtering children. Dr. Diamond reminds his colleagues of the Hippocratic Oath that set the tone of the medical profession three centuries before Christ, an oath that has been repeated by doctors over the years, an oath that explicitly states: "I will not give to a woman an instrument to produce abortion."

And there are other elements of the abortion culture which have developed over the last several years which

suggest that the choice for destruction in the case of the unborn has destructive effects in many areas of our lives together. There is certainly a deterioration in the whole matter of sexual ethics nowadays. I think, for example, of the way younger and younger children are being seduced into sexual activity which turns out to be utterly detrimental for them.

A television program released by CRC-TV, a part of The Back to God Hour, recently showed how 11- and 12-year-old children are becoming pregnant these days; 14-year-olds sometimes have already experienced more than one abortion. Children are bombarded by suggestive lyrics in music and exposed to sexually stimulating literature and motion pictures at a very early age. The emphases in our society these days are all in the direction of sexual activity, and the impression is given that if pregnancy results the people involved can simply procure an abortion. The emotional toll that this is taking is impossible to calculate. But if you want to know about it, talk with a social worker who is trying her best to counsel a child, not yet a teenager, about what she should do with her child who will soon be born.

When a society loses its way with respect to sexual and reproductive ethics, the results are extremely serious. And in our abortion culture this is exactly what is happening. One could go on describing the negative impact on the quality of our life which the choice for abortion is having. I think, for example, of the impact of the abortion mentality on the concept of fatherhood.

Abortion is a grossly evil social sin, one that involves a host of people besides the woman whose baby is being aborted and besides others who may participate in the decision with her. It is a social sin because legalized abortion demands that the entire society provide the framework in which this crime can occur. It is social choice which has the most far-reaching consequences. Dr. Diamond puts it well when he says:

> What we as a society must really face up to, in the push toward abortion on demand, is the reality of the fact that developed anthropomorphic human beings are being sacrificed to achieve allegedly desirable societal goals. There is serious question as to whether these goals are even achieved, but the means proposed for their achievement must be clearly understood.

This is absolutely true. Human beings are being

deliberately sacrificed so that certain social goals can be achieved.

I am mentioning these things to show that the matter of abortion is not simply a single issue that can be isolated from the rest of the issues in society. Abortion is in fact a cluster of issues, and I have already talked about the matter of the relationship of religion and the state and the quality of our lives. And there is one more issue that I want to mention now. It is the most obvious issues of all. It's this: our evaluation of life itself.

Dr. Diamond helps us visualize the reality of the human life of an unborn child this way:

> Let us trace the typical pregnancy as it relates to the question of abortion. The average woman will not suspect she is pregnant until her menstrual period is missed and overdue by about a week. By this time, she is three weeks pregnant and the embryo's heart is already beating. She can confirm her pregnancy after six weeks of gestation by a biological test. By six weeks, all organ systems are present and functioning in the unborn child. Most abortions are performed between the eighth and twelfth week of pregnancy. At eight weeks of pregnancy, we have a functioning nervous system. If you stroke the upper lip of an eight week fetus, it will flex its neck. This is a confirmation of reflex activity and of a functional nervous system. Furthermore, an electroencephalographic tracing done at eight weeks will show brain waves essentially the same as the newborn infant and not substantially different from the brain waves of a mature adult. By twelve weeks the fetus will squint, swallow, and suck his thumb. More importantly, he will withdraw from a painful stimulus or, in other words, he perceives pain. When abortion is done in twelve weeks, it is done by the method of dilatation and curettage. That is, . . . the fetus is removed in pieces by a sharp curette. When such a procedure is done, there is little doubt that the fetus, in fact, feels what is done to it. Between the sixteenth and twentieth week, the preferred abortion procedure would be hysterotomy. A small Caesarean section is done and the fetus is removed intact.

> Such a procedure, at this state, almost always
> results in a live birth by the criteria estab-
> lished internationally for the definition of a
> live birth. In New York, for example, when a
> hysterotomy is performed at twenty weeks, the
> law requires that the operating surgeon first
> fill out a birth certificate and <u>after all
> signs of life subside</u>, he then fill out a death
> certificate.

I've read enough to show that when we talk about
abortion we are talking about the destruction of actual
human life which, if not aborted, would grow to become a
boy, a girl, an adult man or woman, just as you were once
a child and are now perhaps an adult. So you see, the
way we evaluate human life is the great issue here.

If a nation makes an error at this point--if its
evaluation of the basic life of its citizens is not pro-
per--everything else within that nation will ultimately
be destroyed. If human life is not viewed as sacred,
everyone's life is ultimately in danger. And there is
evidence that much of our culture even now is more a cul-
ture of death than a culture of life. People who do not
love life will ultimately find that they are in love with
death.

Is abortion, then, a single issue? Most decidedly
not! It is many issues, and each of the issues related
to abortion is of fundamental significance for the life
of our nation. This is not a simple and small matter by
any means. A nation that legalizes abortion on demand
has made a radical choice that will finally destroy
everything.

So within the minds of many of us there is no ques-
tion that <u>all</u> human life must be surrounded by the pro-
tection of the law, and that is true of the unborn, of
the retarded, of the sick and of the aged. Society has
a special responsibility to these citizens who so often
are unable to help themselves and to speak for themselves.

Remember Jonestown? Maybe you think I'm being un-
fair to bring that up. But I tell you the truth--there
is a relationship between the mass suicide/murder that
happened there deep in the Guyanan jungle and the daily
slaughter of the unborn. Were you aghast and appalled
by the heaps of dead who lay face down, rotting in the
jungle? Do you know why they died? They died because

somewhere, at some time, they or their leader or all of
them together turned their back on the beauty of life,
and they fell in love with death. When God looks down
on our nation, it all looks like Jonestown to Him.

Can you bear to think of all the unborn children
who have died already? Has our nation, too, fallen in
love with death? Abortion is not just one issue among
many. It is many issues. No, when one sees the big
picture, it's clear that abortion is the only issue. If
we can get this straightened out, there's a chance that
we'll become human again.

Appendix B

"Are Preachers Necessary?"

Transcript of a speech as delivered by Dr. Joel Nederhood
on The Back To God Hour on February 11, 1979.

What will it take for a great revival of the Chris-
tian faith? Something has to happen if the present con-
ditions of crime, corruption, and decay are going to be
changed. And some people recognize that what we need is
a renewal of hearts, a renewal of faith, a renewal of
vision. There have been times when people have been full
of the fear of the Lord. But now it's different. People
don't seem to have much of that fear in their souls. If
only that could be recovered there would be an upswing of
morality. Our land would become a better place to live.
But what would it take?

Well, there are some who say that there can be a
revival of faith if we create conditions which show that
there is no contradiction between Christianity and sci-
ence. They point out that the scientific point of view
dominates everything these days, and so long as the im-
pression is given that Christianity and science are ene-
mies people will just not be interested in the Christian
position.

Others say that what we need is to clear away the
intellectual problems that come up whenever we examine
Christianity nowadays. They talk about a great intellec-
tual problem like the problem of God's great power and
governance and the meaning of human activity. They ask,
"If God is all-powerful and in charge of everything, how
can we believe that our day-by-day lives have signifi-
cance?" Or they might ask, "If God is in charge of every-
thing, why is He letting me die of cancer?" Or, "Why did
He allow that little boy to be hit by a car and killed?"
These kinds of questions create great intellectual stumb-
ling blocks along the road to the Christian faith, and
therefore there are some who believe that there will be a

revival of religion only when these intellectual ques-
tions are cleared up one way or another.

Well, I suppose it might help to solve some of these
intellectual problems, though I would have to confess
that I have certainly not found a satisfactory answer to
the kinds of questions I have posed, and I still believe
the Bible. And when one examines the history of the
Christian movement, he will discover that those who have
addressed themselves to the intellectual issues have had
an important role to play, but they have not brought
about great revival. To be sure the intellectual giants
of the Christian faith continue to receive a great deal
of respect, and their books can be found on many shelves,
but when it comes to broadscale revival, a major turn-
around, the intellectual giants have not brought it about.

Those who are able to wrestle with the intellectual
problems of the Christian faith have an important job,
but it is a limited one. And this was brought home to
me the other day when I was reading C. S. Lewis. Now, I
don't know how well you know Clive Staples Lewis, but he
was a monumental defender of the Christian faith, and
generally in intellectual terms. He was an Oxford don,
and later a scholar at Cambridge. While he was at Oxford
he was president of the Socratic Club, a club where pa-
pers were delivered and discussed dealing with the intel-
lectual problems surrounding Christianity. Agnostics
spoke there--those who said that man could have no cer-
tain knowledge of God--and capable Christians responded
with a defense of the Christian position. I suppose that
practically any intellectual attack that could be mounted
against Christianity was expressed in the club, and C. S.
Lewis engaged himself frequently in careful reply.

Lewis' writings are astonishingly broad, and many
know him in terms of the science fiction he wrote--the
Narnia series especially for children and a book like
Out of the Silent Planet. But again, his main contribu-
tion has been his straightforward, extremely learned and
readable defense of the Christian faith. And now the
point I want to make in introducing this remarkable man:
Lewis did not think that what was needed for the advance
of the Christian faith was actually an intellectual de-
fense of the Christian position. Something else was.
Another kind of person was needed. He describes this in
a brief piece he wrote called "The Decline of Religion."
This is what he says:

> Those who help to produce and spread a proper
> intellectual climate for the acceptance of
> Christianity are . . . doing useful work: and
> yet no great matter after all. Their share is
> a modest one; and it is always possible that
> nothing--nothing whatever--may come of it. Far
> higher than they stands that character whom, to
> the best of my knowledge, the present Christian
> movement has not yet produced--the <u>Preacher</u> in
> the full sense, the Evangelist, the man on fire,
> the man who infects. . . . The Preacher repre-
> sents the Lord Himself. He will be sent--or
> else he will not. But unless he comes we mere
> Christian intellectuals will not effect very
> much. That does not mean that we should lay
> down our tools.

I find this very fascinating. C. S. Lewis calls
people like himself, who do and have done so very much
to defend Christianity on an intellectual level, "we mere
intellectuals." He points beyond himself and his kind
and talks about someone else, another kind of person
which he names the Preacher. He writes the word <u>preacher</u>
with a capital <u>P</u>. This is the person who is needed to
bring about revival, to make men's hearts flame again
with the pure fire of true faith. Intellectuals have a
job, and they should not lay down their tools, but it is
the preacher who establishes the movement, who sweeps
people into it, and carries it forward.

Now, I would be inclined to disagree with the man
because of the fiasco so-called preachers have made of
religion, especially lately. I wonder if Lewis, who died
in 1963, would still say the same now when some preachers
have conducted themselves as despicably as some have
lately. I think of the religious confusion that has been
sown by preachers who have developed this gimmick or an-
other one and have used their charisma and their message
to establish kingdoms for themselves. Nowadays, if a man
is a preacher, if he has the title <u>Reverend</u> in front of
his name, many people are inclined to be suspicious of
him.

Well, it's true; we are living in an era in which
self-styled preachers have done a great deal of damage
to the cause of Christ. There have been preachers who
have proclaimed false and bizarre teachings. They have
collected great sums of money for their efforts. They
have dreamed grandiose dreams and have supplicated their

followers to make their dreams come true for them. One would even question these days whether preachers are useful at all. Do we really need preachers? What do you think?

In spite of the unsavory reputation that preachers have achieved for themselves in some instances, the Bible nevertheless throws its weight behind the statement that preaching is what is needed if revival is to take place. In the book of Romans, for example, the Bible indicates that preaching is necessary if faith is to occur. Listen to this from the tenth chapter of Romans:

> But how are men to call upon him in whom they have not believed? And how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard? And how are they to hear without a preacher? . . . So faith comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes by the preaching of Christ (vs. 14, 17).

Do you know what this means? It means that it is true--you need a preacher. It is the preacher who is the link that God has established between Himself and the people who come to Him in faith. The preacher is the bridge between God and man. This is confirmed by the New Testament which shows again and again that the great initial advance of the Christian faith was accomplished by the proclamation of the Word of God. So it's true. We do need preachers. Preachers are essential in the the establishment and maintenance of the Christian faith.

But once again, how in the world are we to benefit from preachers and preaching today, when there are so many charlatans who call themselves preachers? How can we benefit from preaching when there are so many evil preachers? Is there any test that we can use to find the kind of preacher we can truly benefit from?

In answering this, let me call your attention to something the apostle Paul said in II Cor. 4:5. With this brief sentence he can help us a lot when it comes to making a judgment about preachers and preaching. He says: "For we preach not ourselves, but Jesus Christ as Lord, with ourselves as your servants for Jesus' sake." Spend a little time with me now, and we'll look at this sentence and we'll see how it can help us recognize a true preacher when we see one.

First of all, we should be aware that the Bible does speak of preaching as a very special activity. If one were to study the original language, he would discover that in II Cor. 4 the word that is used here for preaching is related to the military life. In ancient times when armies would meet in battle, it would be necessary sometimes for one military commander to send a message to another commander. He would then use a herald who would go swiftly to the headquarters of the general or king or whatever and would deliver the message from the general who had sent him. The word for what the herald did is the same word that the apostle Paul uses in the sentence we have read--I preach not myself, but Jesus as Lord. The impression he gives by using this special technical term is that the message that he has came from someone else. And he delivers it verbatim, exactly as the man in authority commanded him to present it. To preach is to be a herald.

This is exactly the way the Bible invites us to think about preaching. It is the message which Jesus Christ has entrusted to His servants to announce. The message, thus, is surrounded by Jesus' own authority. It came to the people who heard Paul centuries ago with all the impact that accompanies communication from Jesus Himself. And this is what preaching is today. It is not simply discussion. It is not simply conversation about the Lord Jesus Christ. It is the direct announcement of His message. And it occurs whenever the people of God are met in worship and the God-ordained herald announces the message of the Lord once again. Preaching is very, very special. Nowadays we may define it as the authoritative proclamation of the church of the Lord Jesus Christ.

In the second place, Paul, in the sentence we are examining, describes the content of his message in both negative and positive terms. Notice that he says, "We preach not ourselves." With this, he establishes once and for all time that the person of the proclaimer is not the important thing when it comes to preaching. When a herald would come from one general's tent and go to another with his message, the person of that herald had nothing whatever to do with the message. He could be tall or short, thin or fat, he could have a fine personality or a difficult one--none of these made the slightest difference. What was important was his message. And this emphasis is strong in Paul's description of his preaching. The last thing he wanted anyone to do was to

look at him. He did not want them to make their judgment
about what he said in terms of the way he acted or did
not act. He did not set himself up; he did not put him-
self forward.

Now this is very important for us because today more
often than not, the successful preachers are often those
who have made it in terms of their personalities. People
are impressed by them for one reason or another. There
are biographies written about them. Sometimes they write
their own autobiographies. They tell how much they pray
and how much they read their Bibles and how much they
love their wives. They tell of their dreams and their
visions and their great plans. We are living in a time
of personality cult. And a preacher who continuously
emphasizes himself and draws attention to himself, is
not worthy of our attention. When the apostle talked
about the content of the preaching he and other church
leaders did, he emphasized the fact that it had nothing
to do with them personally.

So far as the content of preaching is concerned, the
apostle Paul describes this positively when he says that
he and his colleagues preached Jesus as Lord. Preaching
presents the message about Jesus Christ.

Sometimes when I preach in churches I see this sim-
ple statement on the pulpit: "Sir, we would see Jesus,"
and it is a reminder to me that if my message does not
give material about Jesus and if it does not draw me and
those who hear closer to Jesus, I might as well not open
my mouth. Jesus is the content of preaching, and this
is true whether the preacher is preaching out of the Old
Testament part of the Bible or the New. For even the
Old Testament is a great testimony about the Lord Jesus
Christ.

In other places in the New Testament the apostle
Paul indicates that when he thinks about preaching Christ,
he is thinking of the cross where the great saving work
of Jesus was actualized. Writing in the book of I Corin-
thians, he talks about preaching this way:
>The word of the cross is folly to those who
>are perishing, but to us who are being saved
>it is the power of God. . . . We preach Christ
>crucified, a stumbling block to the Jews and
>folly to Gentiles, but to those who are called,
>both Jews and Greeks, Christ is the power of
>God and the wisdom of God (I Cor. 1:18, 23, 24).

If we want to know what preaching is, it is necessary to understand how the apostle Paul viewed it. His experience in this regard is the standard that we must use. Let me tell you a little about him. As a young boy he grew up steeped in the Jewish religion. He learned all about the Old Testament and was especially impressed with the significance of the law of God. He believed that if a person kept the law of God perfectly he could work himself into a situation in which God would be obligated to save him. As a young man he traveled from the city of Tarsus where he had grown up, and as a scholarship student in Jerusalem he learned even more about the way of salvation by means of the law.

For Paul, Jesus Christ of Nazareth contradicted everything that he believed. And then through a miracle Jesus appeared to him. Paul recounts this meeting with Jesus Christ several times in the book of Acts. Paul came to see that Jesus was the fulfillment of everything that he had studied in the Old Testament, he discovered that Jesus' death on the cross was the great work of God that made salvation possible for sinners, and he saw that everyone is obligated to live under the lordship of Jesus throughout his entire life.

Now that is the reason that whenever he opened his mouth to preach he told people about the Lord Jesus Christ. When he talked with Jewish people in his day he skillfully showed them that the Old Testament Scriptures actually pointed forward to the Lord Jesus Christ. When he talked with people who didn't know the Old Testament he referred to some of their own literature, but ultimately he always got around to talking to them about Jesus and His resurrection. For Paul, there was only one message, and that message was the message of Jesus who through His life, death, and resurrection has become the Lord whom all of us must serve.

Preaching, then, is a unique and singular activity carried on by the church, an activity that draws attention away from the preacher and focuses attention on the person and the work of the Lord Jesus Christ. But the preacher, we can't forget him. Is it true that he is just a pipeline through which the material of Christ's message comes? Is he nothing but a cool, aloof, unmoved person who gives his message without being involved himself? What about the person of the preacher? How can we recognize one? There are too many strange ones around these days who seem to be in the preaching business for

personal advantage alone--how can you spot a preacher?

Well, the sentence of the apostle that we have been looking at concludes by saying something about the preacher's relation to those whom he serves with the gospel. Let's look at it once more; "For what we preach is not ourselves, but Jesus Christ as Lord, with ourselves as your servants for Jesus' sake."

A preacher is a servant of the people he speaks to. A servant. He must be willing to give anything so that they will know the truth about Jesus. In II Cor. 4 the apostle describes what he went through so that the gospel message might be delivered. He spoke about how weak he was and about how great his message was, and then he explained how he was willing to expend all that he was in the service of those who needed that message so desperately. Listen to this:

> But we have this treasure in earthen vessels,
> to show that the transcendent power belongs to
> God and not to us. We are afflicted in every
> way, but not crushed; perplexed, but not dri-
> ven to despair; persecuted, but not forsaken;
> struck down, but not destroyed; always carry-
> ing in the body the death of Jesus, so that
> the life of Jesus may also be manifested in
> our bodies. For while we live we are always
> being given up to death for Jesus' sake, so
> that the life of Jesus may be manifested in
> our mortal flesh. So death is at work in us,
> but life in you (vs. 7-12).

Tremble, preacher. You are listening to me right now. You're a preacher you say--are you something like that which we just read? Where is your vision for the poor lost sinners who need your gospel? Are you willing to give and give and give some more of yourself so that they will hear it? Everyone of us who calls himself a preacher, must measure himself by the example of a preacher that we find in the Bible. Have we become too self-seeking--too concerned for our own advantage and for our own advancement? Is this the reason that the power has drained out of our preaching: A preacher is a servant, pure and simple. He will do anything and will go anywhere and he will endure any hardship so that those who need the message will hear it from his lips.

Surely there is a message here for those of us who preach. And there is a message here for those who need

the message that the preacher brings. Remember, it is
the message of the preacher that brings revival. And so
you must go and find it. You must search for it as you
would search for a pearl of great price. Don't rest.
Find a man who speaks in the authority of the Lord Jesus
Christ and who tells only about Him, a man who will not
be drawn into all kinds of curious questions and myste-
rious controversies. Find a man who tells about Jesus,
and tells about Jesus, and tells about Jesus.

This means that you have to find a church where
there's a pulpit in the front. Some of our churches
these days have turned the space in front to a stage,
into a place where this or that kind of entertainment is
taking place. A church is not a place where we go to be
entertained--there are others who are skilled at enter-
taining us. We need a church with a pulpit, with an
open Bible, and with a preacher who does not preach him-
self but Jesus Christ as Lord and who is our servant for
Jesus' sake.

I agree when C. S. Lewis says we need preachers for
revival. I disagree when he says that such a man has not
been produced yet. He apparently envisioned some special
single individual who would call millions to the Savior.
There are thousands and thousands of preachers still
around. They are common ordinary men; they are dedicated
men. They are not famous. But they are working faith-
fully in their churches and they have only one thing on
their mind, and that is to preach Jesus Christ. I tell
you they are still around. And I dare say that there are
preachers like that right in your community.

Now, do you think you would be able to find a true
preacher of the gospel? Surely something I have said
should be able to help you. Think about what you have
heard, and start looking.

It's strange. It's a mystery. But God uses prea-
chers to bring His needy people to faith in Jesus.

Appendix C

"The Man Who Missed Easter"

Transcript of a speech as delivered by Dr. Joel Nederhood on The Back To God Hour on April 22, 1979.

You never know what impact the preaching of the Word of God has. You just never know. A preacher who preaches in church Sunday after Sunday doesn't always know what kind of an impact his preaching has on his congregation. And if he doesn't know, a radio preacher hardly finds out whether lives have been really changed by his preaching. But every once in a while something happens and we discover that preaching, even radio preaching, is changing people; it's even changing our world.

I ran across an article the other day that showed me that faithful preaching of the Word has a powerful effect. The article was written by a man who is now the head of a large organization which works among students in colleges and universities and helps them see the great importance of the Christian faith. From this article I learned that this man had not always been a Christian himself. To be sure, he had been raised in a Christian home, but as he matured and went off to the university and finally became a professor, he gradually began to doubt the Bible. One by one, the great facts which the Bible reveals about God and about God's work in our world, the facts about Jesus Christ, the Son of God, all these facts began to fall; he began to view them as stories, as myths. After all he had become a scientist, and when he measured the Bible by the standards of science he concluded that the Bible came up short. So he discarded the Bible.

But obviously that wasn't the end of the story of his intellectual development, for as I said, this man is now the head of a large organization which helps college and university students see that the Bible is true. What happened to change him? What happened to make him believe again? Well, he listened to a radio program; as a matter

of fact, it was the very radio program that you are lis-
tening to right now. And he listened to a preacher, and
that preacher was the man who used to be the preacher on
this program, Dr. Peter Eldersveld. And in his article
this Christian student-leader tells how back in the
early sixties he used to listen to Dr. Eldersveld preach,
and, influenced by this man and his splendid, forthright
presentation of the Bible as the Word of God, the wan-
derer turned around and came back to the truth. Oh, in
his article he tells about some other influences too, but
when I noticed that he mentioned Dr. Eldersveld my heart
skipped a beat, and my eyes lit up. Ah yes, here was
proof that Dr. Eldersveld's ministry was not in vain.
God had used Dr. Eldersveld to bring His Word with great
power into a young professor's heart, and today that man
is being used by God to bring many young people close to
the Lord Jesus Christ.

Dr. Peter Eldersveld died in October 1965, but for
many of us who loved him the impact of his life continues.
It was my privilege to work close to him for five years,
and when I had finished the article I sat back and remem-
bered some of the things that man had said; I remembered
our conversations together and I remembered some of his
sermons. And today I would like to pick up on one of
them that he brought a long time ago. It was called "The
Man Who Missed Easter." Right now I don't have a copy of
it in front of me, but I remember it was about one of
Jesus' disciples who, apparently, strangely missed Jesus'
great resurrection when it first happened. The disci-
ple's name was Thomas, and it wasn't until a week later
that that poor disciple met the resurrected Jesus. I
got to thinking about that message that I had heard so
many years ago, and I thought about how close the man who
wrote the article had come to missing Easter himself.
Yes, he had become an unbeliever, and for a while it
looked as if he was going to stay that way. Fortunately,
God got hold of him again and brought him into faith. But
it was mighty close--he almost missed Easter altogether.
It was only the power of the Word of God that turned him
around.

And I got to thinking that with all of the talk
about the resurrection of Jesus there's a good possibi-
lity that there are many who listen to this program now
who know the story of Jesus' resurrection very well, but
they somehow have never believed that it's true. So,
just as my predecessor did back in the sixties, I want to
talk about the man who missed Easter. Who knows what God

will do with His preached Word today? Let's see what He
will do, right after this song.

(a contemporary song about Thomas is inserted here)

Thomas, the disciple of Jesus, missed all the excite-
ment of resurrection day, and when the other disciples
told him what had happened, he said that he just didn't
believe it. The Gospel according to John, chapter 20,
tells about his reaction to the news of Jesus' resurrec-
tion and about the way Thomas finally became a believer.
We just heard about it in the song. Now this is what we
read from the Gospel:
> Now Thomas, one of the twelve, called the
> Twin, was not with them when Jesus came. So
> the other disciples told him, "We have seen
> the Lord." But he said to them, "Unless I see
> in his hands the print of the nails, and place
> my finger in the mark of the nails, and place
> my hand in his side, I will not believe."
> Eight days later, his disciples were again
> in the house, and Thomas was with them. The
> doors were shut, but Jesus came and stood among
> them, and said, "Peace be to you." Then he
> said to Thomas, "Put your finger here and see
> my hands; and put out your hand, and place it
> in my side; don't be faithless, but believing."
> Thomas answered him, "My Lord and my God!"
> Jesus said to him, "Have you believed because
> you have seen me? Blessed are those who have
> not seen and yet believe"(vs. 24-28).

When we review the information we have about Thomas
in the Bible there are several things about him that
stand out, and each of these things is a part of the cen-
tral characteristic of this man: he was a realist. He
was a realist. He did not allow his sentiments to color
his evaluation of a situation. He would have been a good
businessman. He evaluated a situation objectively, and
then he acted in terms of what he saw.

So, it was Thomas' realism that apparently made him
leave the disciples entirely once Jesus was crucified.
The Bible describes the way the disciples abandoned Jesus
when He died, but gives the impression that at least the
disciples did not leave one another. But Thomas appa-
rently did leave them. Once he had seen Jesus crucified,
he apparently took all of the hopes that he had had for
the establishment of Jesus' kingdom, bundled them together,

and threw them away. He didn't like to conclude that
Jesus' cause was a failure, but he had to. It was all
over, and there was no use denying it. When he learned
that the dead Jesus had been taken down from the cross
and buried, he left the disciples and went his own way.

We can only begin to imagine the thoughts that went
through his mind as he finally had to admit that the
cause of Christ was a useless cause. Think of the dismay
that must have overwhelmed him when he finally had to
admit that the enemies of Jesus had been victorious.
But he was a man who was courageous enough to ask the
hard questions, and as Jesus was buried he asked the
hardest question of all: "Is it all over?" The answer
that had come booming back to him had been unmistakably
clear: "Yes, it's all over." So Thomas turned away from
the disciple circle and determined to put his own life
back together again as best he could.

Thomas was a realist; admire him for what he was.
But then know that it was his realism that kept him from
embracing the marvelous joy which the other disciples ex-
perienced when Jesus rose from the grave. Because of his
hard-headed realism, Thomas was nowhere to be seen when
Jesus appeared to His disciples on resurrection day. And
then it was his realism that kept him from believing when
they found him somehow and blurted out the whole story.
He looked blankly at Peter and John and whoever else it
was who stood before him, and told him that Jesus was
alive. He observed their excited eyes and heard them
laugh and saw them slap each other on the back. He looked
at them and said very slowly but very seriously, "No.
I'm sorry. I saw Him, you see. I saw what they did to
Him. I saw His hands. I saw the spear thrust. I know
all about these things. I know that they buried Him.
I'm sorry. I'd like to believe, but I just can't. I
won't believe until I see the nail prints myself and trace
them with my fingers. I've got to see Him myself, and
I've got to know that it's really Him and not somebody
playing a trick on me. I'm sorry, but that's the way it
is."

Maybe you know exactly how he felt. You've heard
about the resurrection of Jesus and about the way it is
supposed to change everything and give hope to men again,
but you don't believe it either, even though you'd
honestly like to. You say, with Thomas, "Just because I
would like so very much to believe something is true,
that doesn't make it true. I have to be realistic, and

I have to remember that Jesus was really dead and He was
really buried, so that's the end of Him. I'm still in-
terested in Him, and I think that His teachings are just
great, but I still have to say that as a human being
Jesus died just like everyone else, and I don't ever
expect to see Him."

All right, be a realist. Be like Thomas. I admire
people who are truly realistic. But then note carefully
that the Bible comes with evidence which should have a
powerful impact on the lives of realistic people. The
Bible says that there was something that drew Thomas back
into the circle of his friends once more. Perhaps it was
their persistent telling him that Jesus was alive. And
more than a week after Jesus rose from the grave, Jesus
arranged to have a special meeting with Thomas. Suddenly
Jesus was there with His followers, and immediately He
singled out Thomas. With simple, almost chilling dignity
Jesus spoke to Thomas and He took Thomas' very own words
and invited His realistic disciple to carry out a test.
"Touch the nail wounds," He said, "touch the sword wound.
Then you will know." So Thomas broke. And he spoke:
"My Lord and my God!"

Now, is this story worth anything to you and me to-
day? What about realists like us? Is there anything
here that could help us to believe? Yes and no. There
is something here that encourages belief. It is impor-
tant to know that there was a man like Thomas among the
disciples and that evidently there was sufficient evi-
dence presented him which made him conclude that Jesus
was alive and that He was his Lord and God. That this
is in the Bible shows that the Bible takes unbelief very
seriously. But there are a couple of other things that
make this whole matter rather useless as a means to get
modern realists to believe.

First of all, since the day Thomas confessed that
Jesus was Lord and God there has been a great deal of
progress among us in thought and in science. If it was
hard for Thomas to believe that Jesus rose from the dead,
today we know that it was in fact totally impossible
that Jesus arose. When death sets in as it did in Jesus'
case there is nothing that can be done for a poor person
like Jesus. There are too many processes that are irre-
versible. Once a brain is dead, for example, that's it.
And Jesus had gone that far, after all. Thomas didn't
know all of that physiology, but we know it. And be-
cause we do we tend to be unimpressed by Jesus' meeting

with Thomas.

And then there is another thing. We have come to
the point now where we would have to say that if one's
senses are confronted by something that is fundamentally
impossible that means that one's senses are wrong. You
see, it is easier to believe that Jesus didn't rise from
the dead and that all of His followers had something
wrong with them, than it is to believe that He really did
rise from the dead and His followers were accurate in
their perceptions. If Thomas had gone to the university
today and had taken a good basic course in logic, for
example, he would have known that there was something
wrong with his senses; Jesus was not really alive.

So we realists today think this way about this en-
tire episode. But there is something else many people
think about, and that's this: many people don't really
believe that John 20 is the truth. Over the last few
years there have been all kinds of learned theologians
who have declared that the Bible is untrustworthy. They
say that it's full of errors, and the greatest errors of
all are those that describe Jesus' miraculous birth and
His great resurrection. So they say the whole record of
Jesus' resurrection is a myth and the interesting story
of Jesus and Thomas meeting and Thomas' great confession
is a myth too.

Now what can be said in reply to ideas like these?
Really nothing. If a person chooses to approach the
Bible's revelation of Jesus' resurrection this way,
that's that. There is not much more we can say to one
another. But you know, the Christian faith is not depen-
dent upon anyone's ability to answer all of the objec-
tions to it that man is able to put together. It's still
true that there are many people who believe that Jesus
rose again, that He is now alive, and that He is coming
again. And many of these people are very intelligent
people who know all about the arguments we've just men-
tioned against the resurrection. For example, if you
heard the beginning of this program, you will remember
that I told about a learned scientist who moved from a
situation of unbelief into the reality of belief. What
makes this happen?

Well, in John 20, the chapter that tells about
Jesus' meeting with the man who missed Easter, His dis-
ciple Thomas, we have the answer. The apostle John,
after telling about Thomas' reaction to Jesus, records

that Jesus talked to Thomas about a group of people who
were going to believe in Him even though they never saw
Him at all. He said, "Blessed are those who have not
seen and yet believe" (vs. 29). And with this He pointed
forward to the great multitude of believing people who
would never see Him alive but who nevertheless would be-
lieve in Him completely. And then the apostle John says
this:

> Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence
> of the disciples, which are not written in this
> book; but these are written that you may be-
> lieve that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God,
> and that believing you may have life in his
> name (vs. 30, 31).

This means that people believe in the resurrection
of Jesus. And they believe that Jesus is the Son of God
and all of the other facts they must believe about Him
because the message of the Bible is so compelling that
those who read the Bible and open their lives to its
power are turned from their unbelief into faith. The
Bible has its own authority and power. Surely science is
very important but the competence of science is very li-
mited. For example, science cannot tell us what we ought
to do--it cannot tell us what is right and what is wrong.
If we make science the ultimate authority of our lives,
we are heading for a very dreary future. And the many
learned scholars who have insisted that the Bible is full
of errors, what about them? If you want to believe those
"learned scholars," that's up to you, but you might as
well know that more and more of the discoveries of ar-
chaeology, for example, are showing that the Bible was
right again and again, exactly at places where the
learned scientists thought it was wrong. If you read a
magazine like the National Geographic, to name just one
source, you will find article after article which shows
that the history recorded in the Old Testament about
Abraham and the people of Israel is entirely accurate.

But the truth of the Bible is not dependent on the
diggings of the archaeologists; it is dependent on the
witness of the Holy Spirit of the living God that runs
through it from beginning to end. Those who despise the
Bible are not usually people who have read it through
over and over again. I challenge anyone to read the
Bible through, and to read it through often, and still
claim that it's falsehood. The Bible is without question
the Word of the living God.

So the apostle John says to you and me today, "You will never be able to touch Jesus' hands, and you will never be able to put your hand in His side, but you have the full record of God's great saving action—from Genesis, the first book of the Bible, all the way to the last book of the Bible, the book of Revelation. Take it. Read it. It's all there. Believe it. And be saved."

Yes, believe and be saved. Salvation is the issue. That poor man Thomas, if he had missed the resurrected Jesus altogether, he would have walked right into eternal death. But Jesus turned him around. In the same way with you, if you believe all those who tell you that the Bible's message is wrong, okay; but then understand that you are turning aside from the salvation you need desperately. You need the resurrected Jesus a lot more than He needs you. Don't forget that.

Thomas was a realist, and that's why he missed Easter. I am going to assume that you are a realist, too. Be a realist, and understand that if Christ Jesus didn't rise from the dead, there is no hope for any of us. Be a realist, and read the Bible with an open heart and mind, and you will see that it has a power which no realist can afford to ignore. Be a realist, and understand that science will never save you—it can't tell you everything you need to know—and bad theology won't save you either. Only Jesus can save you, and He comes to meet you today, not holding out His nail-scarred hands, but He comes to you on the pages of the Bible which present their powerful message about Jesus' life, death, and resurrection. And this message can mean life for you, if you are realistic enough to believe that what God says is the truth.

The man who missed Easter—an intriguing idea. How about you, have you missed Jesus' resurrection, too? You know, I believe that Jesus arranged your life and mine in a special way so that today the living Jesus you may have missed could come to you and say: "Come now, be a realist: believe the good news of life eternal and be saved."

Appendix D

"Establishing Religion"

Transcript of a speech as delivered by Dr. Joel Nederhood
on The Back To God Hour on September 23, 1979.

    It is with a measure of risk, I know, that I say
that I have found a recent decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States to be somewhat funny. The risk
exists because it is certainly unwise to say that the
carefully thought-out briefs which the Justices produce
would ever be anything other than extraordinarily wise
and profound. And it is also somewhat risky because in
the nature of the case, the decisions of the Court have
such far-reaching effects it can hardly be considered
humorous when they finally make an important announce-
ment touching the lives of millions of people. And yet
there is something humorous about a recent decision they
have taken, for it is another proof that the person who
first said, "There are none so blind as those who will
not see," was absolutely correct. Once a group of per-
sons have made up their minds not to respond to evidence
that is clearly placed before them, there is no amount
of persuasion that will get them to change their position.
And the Supreme Court of the United States of America
evidently has a very serious blind spot.

    Speaking of risk, I suppose that it is also somewhat
risky for a person like me to speak about a decision
which the Court has taken, because I represent the Chris-
tian faith and I have access to the air waves. And there
are some who might remind me that I should not enter into
the political realm and make statements about such things
as Supreme Court decisions. It should be remembered,
however, that when I call attention to a Supreme Court
decision, I am not entering the realm of politics; the
courts of the land are part of the judicial branch of
government, which is removed from politics, and so far
as I know I have the freedom to react to what goes on in
the courts, Moreover, in calling attention to the

decision I want to discuss now, I am not doing it with a view of getting the Justices to change their minds; one doesn't do that so far as such decisions are concerned. I call attention to their decision because I believe that their confusion concerning the nature of education (for their decision related to education) is a confusion that is exceedingly widespread. And I call attention to their decision in order to spotlight this confusion and so that I may perhaps say a few things that might possibly clear it up.

And I suppose that in all candor I would have to say that I cherish the hope that the Justices, should they happen to run across my comments either as they listen to their radios or as they read them in printed form, might be large enough personalities to respond positively to my comments. I hope that my initial statement that I found one of their decisions humorous would not so prejudice them against me that they would be unable to see the thrust of my argument.

I call attention to this decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, realizing that a sizeable element of the listening audience of this broadcast is found in Canada, Great Britain, and Australia--indeed in many countries of the world. Yet I think it is valuable to underscore this particular decision because I think that in doing so it will be possible to put the entire matter of education within a nation in a setting that will also have application to other countries in which this broadcast is heard.

The decision of the Justices to which I refer was taken on May 29, 1979. This decision struck down as unconstitutional a New Jersey law which gave parents whose children attended parochial and other private schools a $1,000 per child deduction on the state income tax. And the reason that this deduction was declared unconstitutional was that it was judged to be a provision that had the "primary effect of advancing religion," and therefore it is allegedly a violation of the first amendment of the Constitution.

Now there are many of us who are familiar with the fact that the first amendment of the United States Constitution has something to say about religion. But maybe it has been a long time since we have heard the exact wording. This is what it is:

> Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
> tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the
> free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
> dom of speech, or of the press; or the right
> of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
> to petition the Government for a redress of
> grievances.

So far as the decision which struck down a $1,000 per
student deduction for the citizens of the state of New
Jersey is concerned, the phrase that has bearing is the
phrase that speaks of the establishment of religion.
The deduction in question would, according to the Jus-
tices, have the primary effect of advancing religion be-
cause the deduction would advance schools, which accor-
ding to the Justices, would be involved in the establish-
ment of religion.

This was their reasoning: the deduction would be
advantageous for the private schools involved, and since
the private schools were affiliated with religious orga-
nizations, allowing the deduction would cause the advance
of religion. This evidently is what the Constitution of
the land prohibits when it prohibits Congress from making
laws establishing religion. This all becomes rather
humorous when we notice that all of the tax monies which
the federal and state governments are now pouring into
general, public education are, in fact, directly involved
in advancement and establishment of religion.

Yes, the public funds which are made available to
the so-called public, or non-sectarian, schools are ad-
vancing the cause of religion--are establishing religion.
It is simply not true that the private schools of the
state are religious schools and the public schools are
not religious schools. Both categories of schools are
equally religious. It's just that the private schools
represent a religion that is acceptable to the state.

Now I realize that I have made some serious state-
ments here, and if I may, I'd like to explain what I mean
a bit further, and I cherish the hope that you will agree
with me. If you do, you will be able to think about
education in your country more usefully.

(a song is inserted at this point)

As we have seen the Supreme Court of the United
States disallowed an income tax deduction for the stu-
dents attending private and parochial schools in the
state of New Jersey because in their judgment most of

these schools were affiliated with religious organiza-
tions and the deduction would, in effect, be involved
in the establishment of religion. A few moments ago I
pointed out that in fact the private schools are no more
promoting religion than the public schools are. Let me
tell you what I mean by that.

Perhaps we should begin by recognizing that religion
is, in fact, a very broad category. It is considerably
more broad than that which is expressed in the regular
lives of the denominations, or the cults for that matter.
I think, for example, of something D. H. Lawrence wrote
to his minister. His minister was somewhat irritated
with Lawrence because he had not taken a stand for Chris-
tianity in the narrow sense. The gifted novelist wrote
to Reverend D. Robert Reid this way:

> It appears to me, a man gradually formulates
> his religion, be that what it may. A man has
> no religion who has not slowly and painfully
> gathered one together, adding to it, shaping
> it; and one's religion is never complete and
> final it seems, but must always be undergoing
> modification. So I contend that true Socialism
> is religion; that honest, fervent politics are
> religion; that whatever a man will labour for
> earnestly and in some measure unselfishly is
> religion.

Lawrence then goes on and states categorically that he
does not believe in the divinity of Jesus. Nevertheless,
he assures his pastor that he is a very religious man.

I quote Lawrence not because I consider him a great
authority on religion, but because I feel that his frank
statement about what is religion and what is religious
is shared by many. There are thousands of people who
have frankly rejected the tenets of organized religion,
but who are nevertheless passionately devoted to certain
steadfast convictions. They are not religious in the
sense that they attend church regularly, but they are
not irreligious either; that is, they are not unthinking,
careless barbarians. Religion, then, as Lawrence has
reminded us, is very broad.

Religion is what a person cares deeply about, and it
relates to what he believes about himself, his fellow-
man, and about God. It is that which contributes to a
person's understanding of his duty and obligation. It
forms the conscience. It is deep running and strong.

Now, there are several basic religious ideas that
have direct bearing on the way education is conducted,
on the way an educational system is put together. They
are religious questions that have to be faced and an-
wered, whether one is writing a philosophy of education
for general state-controlled education or whether he is
writing a statement that reflects the convictions of a
frankly sectarian school.

In the first place, there is the fundamental reli-
gious question regarding the existence of God and the
further question regarding His relation to the world, if
He does in fact exist. Now, this question has profound
and far-reaching impact on the way education is conducted.
If there is no God, let's say, it is certainly fool-
hardy and misleading to allow ideas to creep into the
educational process that suggest that there is a God.
Obviously, this idea has bearing on the way we view the
universe. Where did it come from? Is it a self-genera-
ting entity? Or did it come from something or someone
else? Did God make it? Or did it make itself? Or did
it always exist?

You see, if there is no God, this will have a great
deal to say about the way many subjects are handled that
relate to the world and to our view of it. On the other
hand, if there is a God, and He has made all things and
still relates to the events in this world by means of
His providential control, it is also very important that
this fact be taken into account when various subjects
are studied. If there is a God and He is simply ignored
when the world and the universe He made is studied, it
is simply true that the students will have a lot of mis-
taken notions about the world and the universe.

Now, I submit to you that every educational system
has to make some kind of judgment regarding this funda-
mental religious question. In many Christian schools
the world and everything in it is studied in terms of the
faith that God is, that He has made all things, and He
still controls all things. In state education today the
assumption is made that for the purposes of education we
will act as if material reality is ultimate reality. We
will act as if there is no God. Or, if there is, we will
act as if it is possible to understand our world without
any reference to Him. Both of these positions are reli-
gious. And in this regard the public state-controlled
school is as religious as the Christian school. It is
just that its position is a different one. Its religion

is a different one. That is all. And I might add at
this point that in the degree that the public school
educates in the light of this religious viewpoint it
establishes a religious position whether it wants to or
not.

There is another fundamental religious question
that must be answered in connection with all education,
whether it be conducted by a school that is openly re-
lated to a religious position or whether the school
claims that it has no religious affiliation. And that
question concerns man. How an educational system views
man will have bearing on whatever is done within the
classrooms of that system. There are two basic alter-
natives regarding this matter. I am sure you are fami-
liar with them. One of them is strongly expressed in
the generally evolutionistic viewpoint that is so preva-
lent today. According to that viewpoint man is nothing
more than a member of the animal kingdom, and his
general destiny can be described pretty much in the same
way as the destiny of any other animal.

According to this viewpoint man's significance
must be described in terms of his relationship with the
animal kingdom as a whole. And in the light of such a
placement of humankind it is difficult to develop a
strong rationale that emphasizes the great importance
of man as the human race, and even more difficult to
develop support for the great importance of individual
human beings.

The other point of view regarding man is that man
is a special creation of God, which God made in His own
image. This is a point of view which follows from the
material that we find in the opening chapter of the
Bible which reads as follows: "Then God said, 'Let us
make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them
have dominion. . . .' So God created man in his own
image, in the image of God he created him; male and
female he created them" (vs. 26-27).

According to this information man is the crown of
all creation, yes, even the crown of the universe itself;
and he reflects the very likeness of God in a special
way. This revelation concerning man dominates the Bible
throughout and is used to emphasize the necessity of
surrounding each human life with the protection of so-
ciety and of God. The supreme worthfulness of the race
as such and the worthfulness of individual human beings

is established by the biblical viewpoint.

Now, the way a teacher views the children who have been committed to his or her care will be determined by the way she thinks about these children. One Christian writer, C. S. Lewis, commented once that in our relationship with everyone we meet we must remember that ultimately the person we deal with will either spend his eternity in heaven or he will receive the punishment of God forever. Now, that is a very strange point of view from a certain standpoint, but it is very logical and understandable in the light of the way the Bible describes the way every person is related to God. Each human being stands in a very solemn and important relationship to God, and when we deal with one another we either weaken or we strengthen that person's position in God's sight.

On the other hand, if a person views the children in his or her classroom as being really nothing more than members of the animal kingdom, this point of view will have bearing on the way teaching is conducted. Take, for example, the matter of sexual ethics. If man is nothing more than a very intelligent animal, his sensations become very important and his satisfactions become extremely important. If he has no other responsibility but his responsibility toward himself and perhaps to those nearest to him, he will naturally conduct himself quite differently from how he would conduct himself if he knew that he was living in the presence of God and was God's image-bearer.

Now, so far as this religious question is concerned, it must be said that the general state-controlled educational system that operates in most countries these days has committed itself to operating as if man is a part of the animal kingdom. I do not mean that everyone believes that this is so. But I do mean that those who believe that man is the image bearer of God do not have the right to express their faith as a position that should be received by everyone, and they do not have the right to tell their students that they should conduct themselves as image bearers of God. For all practical purposes modern education conducts its business in terms of the fact that man is a member of the animal kingdom.

Another important religious question that must be faced squarely by every educational system is the question of ultimate authority. We need authority in education

--by that I mean that there must be some authority that determines what is going to be taught. To return to the questions we have already been discussing, whether or not there is a God and what the nature of man is, there has to be some authority that determines what the answers to these questions will be. These are ultimate questions, and they can be answered only in terms of an ultimate authority. There are two possible "authorities."

The first of these is that man himself is the ultimate authority. If man is considered the ultimate authority, this is sometimes expressed in terms of his rationality, sometimes in terms of his use of the scientific method. In any case, no matter how this is described precisely, the fact is that man is considered the final judge. Man is the ultimate authority.

The other answer to the question of what our ultimate authority is is that the Bible is our ultimate auhority. Within the Christian tradition there has long been the declaration that every other authority must submit to the authority of the Bible. A psalm like 119, for example, describes the authority of God's law and states that those who submit to the law of God have more knowledge than their teachers. God's word, God's law, and for us today, God's Bible, must be the ultimate authority.

There is no question of greater importance than this. Why is it that the world in general operates as if there is no God and considers man nothing more than a part of the animal kingdom? The reason is simple: men have rejected the ultimate authority of the Word of God, and they have built their great educational systems on this far-reaching rejection. And in the degree they do this, they have established religion.

Now do you see why I almost smile when I hear that a high court has removed a group of private schools from a tax advantage which they have been enjoying because, the Court says, these schools are advancing religion? They are, according to the Court, involved in the establishment of religion. They may be. But then, so are the regular state-controlled schools involved in the establishment of religion. There are religious positions at the foundation of state-controlled education just as well as there are at the foundation of schools that may represent a specific denominational position. The state sometimes claims that its schools are neutral, while the

private schools are not neutral so far as religion is concerned. This is nonsense. Stephen Arons, writing in the Harvard Educational Review has said: "Because value inculcation cannot be eliminated from schooling, the notion of value-neutral education implicit in the legal distinction between religious and secular education is not acceptable." He's right. There is no such thing as a neutral school. It just doesn't exist.

This means that, so far as the establishment of religion is concerned, never in the history of man has there been an establishment of religion that is occurring in connection with the great state-controlled systems of education which are based on a religious position that contradicts the Christian faith. There is an establishment of a new false religion here—at least it is false in the judgment of many of us. It is, moreover, unthinkable that children whose parents believe another religion should be expected to educate their children in schools in which this establishment of religion is occurring. One of the fundamental commandments of the Christian faith is that Christians are not to have other gods in the place of the one true God. And this is the reason why so many of them are working hard to establish their own schools in which their children can be educated in terms of the religious ideas that are thoroughly Christian in every way.

There are some of us who fervently hope that one of these days the blindness that continues to lay disadvantage on Christian schools while promoting non-Christian schools will be taken away and that people will see the real religious issues that are a part of education. Every school is religious, in the nature of the case; it is always a question of which religion it is that is the foundation of one school or another. And there are many of us who are convinced that it is serious and damaging abridgment of religious liberty that only one kind of religion is represented in the public schools of the land.

Do you see this? Do you understand that all schools are religious? I hope you do. There is no fact more fundamental for our understanding of what education must be. Those of us who see the great religious issues that are at the center of the educational struggle today must work hard to bring about real freedom of religion in education within our country. And those of us who see these issues and who are thoroughly committed to Jesus Christ have a great obligation to establish schools

where the religion of Jesus is expressed and honored.

Appendix E

"Fast People"

Transcript of a speech as delivered by Dr. Joel Nederhood
on The Back To God Hour on November 11, 1979.

Louis T. Grant doesn't like Charlotte Web. He is a
professor of something or other--I believe it is English,
one of the more thoughtful of human activities; that is,
the study of English takes thoughtful people. Charlotte
Web is a fast rising executive in a company that makes
suitcases--excuse me: luggage. Let me tell you a little
more about her.

Let me begin by admitting that I've made up her last
name. If you want to find out her real last name and
where she lives you will have to buy the woman's magazine
that has recently featured her. The magazine calls her
"The New Breed." She is a wife, a mother, but most of
all she is an executive. She drives to work in the mor-
ning, consuming yogurt mixed with bran cereal; it takes
her forty minutes, and we are told that for a less-deter-
mined driver the trip would take nearly an hour. That's
what eating yogurt while you drive will do for you. She
like to be at her office by 7:30 in the morning. She
puts in a ten-hour day. Two evenings in the week she
teaches business in a college. Within the next few
months she will start working for her certified accoun-
tant degree. Then she will go to school evenings, and
she will go to work an hour earlier in the morning so
that she can study. Charlotte Web lives a very fast life.

But she handles all her responsibilities very well,
according to the woman's magazine that has written about
her. She has a very cooperative husband. When things go
wrong at home, her husband is the one who stays calm; as
a matter of fact, during the years Charlotte has worked
at the luggage company she has never had to miss because
of a family crisis, even though her children have had
some pretty serious bouts with strep throat. Yes, she

does have children, by the way--two of them. But she has learned to fit them into her lifestyle very well.

One of the things Louis T. Grant doesn't like about Charlotte, though, is the way she cares for her children. Reacting to the article in the woman's magazine about her, Mr. Grant says this about the way she has taken care of her children:

> There is a common theme running throughout her story, but you must read slowly to catch it. It's called "Leave the kids." Charlotte began leaving the kids when she decided she was "bored with teaching" and would get "a master's degree in business administration." Charlotte left her child Paige, "not yet a year old," at the university daycare center while she worked on her master's degree. "Once a week, Charlotte paid a babysitter to stay with Paige while she spent the day in the library, studying." Charlotte went into labor with Christa during her accounting final, "but she finished the exam and was back in class three days later."

Louis Grant doesn't feel this is the proper way for a mother to care for her children. I get the distinct impression that he feels that if Charlotte Web is "The New Breed" he likes the old breed better.

But the main thing he has against her is the fast pace of her life. He describes the way every minute of the day is carefully laid out so that she gets the maximum out of it. She is a very determined person, and highly individual. She is concerned to express herself, to get what she wants. And the woman's magazine that describes her gives the distinct impression that she is the kind of a woman they feel many other women should well be. Mr. Grant, though, thinks that the reason the woman's magazine wants more women like Charlotte is that women like Charlotte buy a lot of merchandise, and a lot of magazines. Mr. Grant suggests that the woman's magazine, and much of modern culture as a matter of fact, looks at a person like Charlotte and says: "The more you work the more you buy. The faster you work the more you work and the more you buy. The more you work the faster you work and the more you work the more you buy!" And then he adds, "The two-earner household is the Ideal Consumer Unit. Ideally Charlotte and her husband would not have to go home at all except to take delivery of their purchases."

Well, I guess many of us would agree with Louis
Grant's evaluation of Mrs. Web's lifestyle, and many
would disagree with him. For my part, I would simply
like to take her now as a representative of a way of life
which many people have fallen into, both men and women.
They are what we might call "Fast People." As a matter
of fact, Louis Grant calls them "Fast Folk," people who
know how to fly but don't know how to land. Always on
the go, they don't really know how to think. They rush
through their lives with unseeing eyes. He thinks they
ought to slow down. For Charlotte--he thinks that she
ought to slow down to take care of her children. Perhaps
she should. But one thing is sure, it would be better
for her to slow down. And it might be better if you did.
It might be better if I did.

It's very easy to fall into the trap of the fast
life, and if I'm sorry about anything I've said thus far,
I guess I would have to say that I'm sorry that I have
given the impression that the particular woman I've been
talking about has been presented as if she is an excep-
tion. She is not. And, she is not to be blamed, in a
way, for the lifestyle that she has fallen into, for
people like her, people like us, are being bombarded
countless times throughout the day with messages that say
that we should live fast lives, successful lives. Even
the church sometimes chimes in with its message which
says that we are supposed to make every minute count and
with proper attitudes we will be able to accomplish any-
thing we really and truly want to accomplish.

And maybe you have fallen into this trap, too. Is
there any way we can get out of it, once we are caught?
There surely is. And I would like to show Charlotte, if
she happens to be listening, and all of us--because we
all need this--the way fast people can become slow people.
Slow people? Well, not really that. What I really mean
is more tranquil, more calm, more at peace, more thought-
ful, --and even more God-fearing.

(recorded sounds of a busy office are inserted here)

Fast people--that's what I'm talking about today--
people who live a very fast-paced life and who accomplish
a great deal. But they don't think a great deal, they
don't reflect, they don't meditate. They scarcely know
who they are, and their children seldom spend much time
with them. Fast people--a very large class of people--
and I fear that there are many of us who hear this right

now who would have to admit that they have fallen into the trap of living this way. Is there any hope for such people--is there any hope for people like us?

I think that we have to begin by analyzing why people like us fall into the trap of living so fast or into the trap of simply assuming that the fast life is the best life and that we had better start accelerating our own somewhat. The most obvious thing that drives us when we fall into this pattern is the desire to be successful, or the fear that if we don't work at top speed all the time we will become poverty-stricken.

That's really not all bad, from a certain point of view, because it is necessary to work and to be diligent and not to waste time if we are to have enough money so that we can have sufficient food, clothing, and shelter. It's good to understand that we have to work to get these things. But for many of us who live in the western world our understanding of what we need has been formed by continuous advertisements and other elements in our culture that make us very dissatisfied with what we have, even if what we have is enough, and we are urged to strive for more and better possessions. For one thing we want good luggage, and that's what Charlotte is busy making sure we have, and we with her want all the good things that luggage-makers can purchase. We want bikes and houses and cars and so on and so on.

Well, most of us know all about these things, and there is no use dwelling on them. Besides, there is a deeper reason we feel so driven. It's this: many of us have lost our faith in God and in the fact that He is caring for us and is moving us toward a future that is even better than the present. Human beings have lately become very lonely in the universe. The space probes have examined the outer fringes of the universe and have found nothing much there--nothing much that can comfort a person. We are very much alone in a very hostile environment from the looks of things.

Many people who have come to this gloomy conclusion about themselves have concluded as well that unless they work frantically during the brief years they are in this world, their lives will be totally meaningless and empty. What is life all about anyway? Well, they say to themselves, it's about a good home, a good car, and possibly even some servants if you're lucky, security and so forth and so forth. What else is there?

In the light of these kinds of reasons why people throw themselves into the business of living almost recklessly, it seems to me that it is so very necessary that we remind one another that it is simply not true that we are alone in the universe and so we had jolly well better work with all our might at making our lives busy. I know the impression is often given that if there is a God, He doesn't care very much about us. That is a wrong impression. God is real, and He comes to us and He tells us to slow down and think about ourselves and about Him.

Slow down--that's what God says, I believe, when He tells us in the words of Psalm 46, "Be still, and know that I am God. I am exalted among the nations, I am exalted in the earth!" (vs. 10). I really do believe that it is impossible for us to achieve some quiet and tranquility in our lives unless we begin by recognizing that with all the other things that happen to us, God confronts us, He meets us, and He invites us to respond to Him with worship and with praise. Failing to recognize this, we continue to batter ourselves to bits against the harsh wall of our own wills and desires; we trot through our days, hoping that somehow our harried efforts will pay off in a little peace later on.

So long as we never acknowledge the existence of the exalted God and we never feel the reality of His presence in our lives, we naturally devote ourselves to the pursuit, and I mean pursuit, of trivial goals. What we do not realize is that we are not so much pursuing these goals we set for ourselves as we are fleeing from God. The fast people whom Louis Grant criticizes so very severely are trying to get away from God.

When we read the Bible we discover that the God who tells us to respond to Him with the stillness and the quietness that is appropriate is the God who has come into the world in the person of the Lord Jesus Christ. The information we have about God is not only that which we observe when we scan the heavens and marvel at the intricacy of nature, but it now includes the great message of salvation for sinful people which was accomplished by the Lord Jesus Christ on Calvary's cross. The story of Jesus--do you know it? It is the great fact of God-become-man in the person of His only begotten Son Jesus. It is the great fact of Jesus' sacrificial death whereby he paid the price of human sin. It is, with all this, the great fact of the love of God who created a way of salvation for us even while we were miserable

sinners who didn't deserve salvation at all.

If you have fallen into the trap that has made you one of the fast people who never really take the time to examine their lives and discover who they really are and what they are here for, may I just say that it is extremely important that you create some calm in the middle of our life's storm. And I would like to suggest how you could do that. Here are my suggestions. See what you think of them.

Start by praying. Why do I say <u>start</u> by praying? I say this because it's the logical way to begin. It's logical because the very act of prayer is a contrast to your usual lifestyle. Just praying is in itself a pause in the hectic pace you are used to. It's also logical to start with prayer because it doesn't take any special place, and it doesn't take any special equipment. You can do it now, or right after this program is over. May I suggest that you just take your hands and fold them-- do you know how to do that? Or you might like to take your finger tips and just press them together. And then concentrate on--on God. Think about God. Think about Jesus His Son. If you haven't prayed for a long time, your prayer could be very short at first--maybe just a few brief seconds--maybe half a minute, maybe a minute. If your prayer goes well, it could be even longer.

But start by saying, "Oh God, I'm hooked. I'm hooked on the fast life. I feel all wound up. I want so many things. I am working hard to get them. But I realize that I don't know you. And I want to know you. I want you to come into my life and change it through your power."

Pray something like that. Actually, I feel strange telling you what to say, but I just wanted to get you started. Say whatever you feel like saying. But start by saying something to God. I am convinced by my study of the Bible that God has His ears open to people like you. He is delighted with this first step back to Him. And He listens. And He answers the prayers of people who sincerely want to find their peace by being close to Him.

Prayer--a great way of finding your way back to God. But just a beginning. Not that you will ever have finished with prayer--not on your life, you won't. But that first simple prayer is a beginning. The wonderful thing about the Christian faith is that God not only

invites our imperfect speech to Him, but He speaks to us in return. And this leads me to the second suggestion I want to make--a second suggestion that will help you escape the hectic pace you're involved in. You must read. You must read the gospel.

Notice, I didn't say you have to read the Bible. If you don't know the Bible very well, what you need is not just the Bible, starting in Genesis and reading through to the very end, but you need the good news-- that's what the word gospel means, good news. May I suggest that you read the gospel of Mark. It's hard-hitting and it's complete. You'll be astonished by the great delivering power of Jesus Christ. What a Savior He is! You will be amazed at His good grace. You will be wonderstruck with the glory of Jesus's love revealed in His willingness to go all the way to the cross.

If you read the gospel with an open heart, praying that God will open your mind and break down your defenses, you will discover that good things will happen to you. You will feel yourself being drawn closer and closer to the Lord Jesus Christ. And you will find that the prayers you started to pray will become more meaningful to you, perhaps somewhat longer, surely more frequent, and you will discover that you naturally take the various needs that you have or think you have to the throne of God's good grace. And when people pray in faith about their lives and about their needs, and about the great work of God in the world, they discover that their attitudes change regarding their own lives. When you go through life with God as your partner, you speaking to Him and He to you, not all of the burden for success rests on your shoulders anymore. You trust in God. And so the fast pace begins to slow down somewhat. Gradually there are some changes. Anxiety begins to drain out of your life, and you discover what peace is.

Be still, and know that I am God--this is what God says as He comes into our fast-paced lives, and the way we do that is that we approach God in prayer and to open our lives to the strengthening influences of His good news. To be still in the presence of God is to believe in Him and to accept His great offer of salvation in the Lord Jesus Christ. And with this, there is something else I want to mention.

What I mention now may seem strange to you, and before describing what it is, I want to say that it is not

exactly the same kind of thing as the first two I men-
tioned. It relates to habits and to lifestyle. But the
third thing is this: you should start keeping a special
day each week as a holy day for worship and for praise.
I'm thinking of Sunday. You know of course that there
are some people who use Sunday this way. They don't work
on Sunday. They don't even play in the usual sense as a
matter of fact--they feel that they have six days to work
and play and that Sunday is a special day that God set
aside for their spiritual benefit.

Those who make Sunday a special day find that they
are automatically lifted out of the treadmill existence
that so many people are involved in. When Sunday is
used for worshipping the Lord, a person naturally has to
arrange the rest of his work so that it's possible to
break away on Sunday. The very fact that a person is
willing to restrict his usual work and play to six days
is a statement that he makes to himself and to those who
know him that he does not consider his ordinary work and
play all-important. God is important, too.

Keeping Sunday as a special day of spiritual activi-
ties contributes to the tranquility and peace as the wor-
ship services, the preaching of the Word of God, and the
fellowship with other Christians brings into a person's
life an entirely new experience. No matter how harried
and tense he may be during the week, within the fellow-
ship of the people of God where he receives the uplifting
ministry of the church of Jesus Christ there is a new
beginning. Life takes on a new cast, a new flavor, a new
color, when a person is willing to set aside a special
day each week to be with the Lord and the people of the
Lord.

Now, please don't make what I am saying about Sunday
an obstacle that stands between you and the other things
I have said--I mean what I said about prayer and Bible
reading. What I mean is this: a person could reason
that if what I said about prayer and Bible reading leads
to the keeping of a special day of worship, he is not
interested. Prayer, okay; Bible reading, okay; but
keeping Sunday, that's a little much. I can imagine that
a person would reason this way, and that would be tragic.
I hope that you will begin with the first step--the step
of prayer--and let God take care of the rest. The only
people who can consistently and usefully keep Sunday as a
special day of worship are people who really want to.
And you won't do it either until you come to that point

in your life.

The only way that some of us are going to escape the hectic pace that we are involved in is that we come to the Lord. Louis Grant calls the life of Charlotte Web "keeping up with the gerbils." You know how frantic little gerbils are--you have perhaps seen them running on their little treadmills. I am sure that is what many of our lives look like to God in heaven--I'm sure that's the way my life looks sometimes. And when we get caught in this trap, God comes to us and says, "Be still, and know that I am God." And we must listen when He says that, as He is saying that to you right now.

We must listen for our own good--for our own mental, emotional, and physical well-being. But we must listen too because those who ignore God and try to make a success out of their lives without paying any attention to God will ultimately be destroyed. They will be conquered by the "inevitable."

You know what the "inevitable" is, don't you. The "inevitable"-- you know what that is. The inevitable is death, the dust, and the ashes at the end of the road. No matter how hard we try, no matter how hard we run, the inevitable remains inevitable. The inevitable is unavoidable. Only God can guarantee that when it comes we will be able to rise above it and we will be saved from the destruction that will sweep in upon us. Only God can guarantee that.

Ignoring God is the most ignorant thing anybody can ever do. So God comes to us in this very moment, and He announces that there is salvation, release, and relief for us, if we believe in the Lord Jesus Christ.

In the name of Christ, I now plead with you to stop running away from God. Believe in the great salvation He provides. Confess your sin and believe in Jesus. Pray. Read the good news. And worship God as He has directed. Get off the treadmill. God comes to you and invites you to quiet your life in His glorious presence.

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