June 2014

From Defending Theism to Discerning Spirits: Reconceiving the Task of Christian Philosophy

Neal DeRoo
Dordt College, neal.deroo@dordt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege

Part of the Christianity Commons, Higher Education Commons, Philosophy Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege/vol42/iss4/1

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Publications at Digital Collections @ Dordt. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pro Rege by an authorized administrator of Digital Collections @ Dordt. For more information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu.
Dr. Neal DeRoo is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Dordt College, and Fellow of the Andreas Center for Reformed Scholarship and Service.

From Defending Theism to Discerning Spirits: Reconceiving the Task of Christian Philosophy

by Neal DeRoo

In his “Advice to Christian Philosophers” Alvin Plantinga lays out two pressing tasks for philosophy: systematizing, deepening, and clarifying Christian thought on key philosophical topics and exploring how the result of such clarification bears on the rest of what we think and do. These tasks are necessary because philosophy provides “an arena for the articulation and interplay of commitments and allegiances fundamentally religious in nature; it is an expression of deep and fundamental perspectives, ways of viewing ourselves and the world and God.” In this paper I will argue that philosophy is not only an arena in which these deep commitments play out and are systematically clarified but also a key method by which those commitments are brought to intellectual light in the first place. In this regard, philosophy is not just about examining and understanding theistic beliefs and their relation to our other thoughts and actions; rather, it is the means by which we discern the spirits of our time.

Spirits of the Age?
If this recourse to spirits seems too mystical—or, perhaps even worse, too Hegelian—to be included in meaningful rational discourse, that is an issue you will have to take up with Prof. Plantinga himself. For it is he who uses this language to describe the urgency of the task of Christian philosophy: “Most of the so-called human sciences, much of the non-human sciences, most of non-scientific intellectual endeavor and even a good bit of allegedly Christian theology is animated by a spirit wholly foreign to that of Christian theism” (3; emphasis added). It is highly unlikely that we are to think of this animation by a spirit along the lines of supernatural possession, as if a distinct immaterial entity somehow occupies and controls the scientific enterprise. But if it’s not Casper the un-friendly ghost, then what are we dealing with here?

Generally, we tend to speak of a spirit of the age...
humanity is not an image-bearer in the sense of exhibiting a similar property in a similar way to God. Indeed, being an image-bearer of God is not a property of humanity at all but is rather its essential definition: humanity is image-bearing-ness itself and not merely a thing that happens, accidentally, to bear the image of God. That is to say, bearing God’s image to creation is not a part of human activity, but it is, in fact, the totality of it: everything that humanity does bears the imprint of the God who created it—or the image of something else functioning as if it were God.

An anthropology that seeks to systematize this understanding of humanity as image-bearers was sketched out by Herman Dooyeweerd and elaborated by some of his followers (notably James H. Olthuis). Central to this anthropology is the notion of the heart as the spiritual center and integral whole of humankind, the center from which the entirety of human living flows. A key metaphor in understanding this notion of the heart is that of light shining through a prism: just as light is a solid beam of white light on one side of the prism but is refracted into the many colors of the rainbow on the other side of the prism, so too, the heart is like a prism through which the creative spirit of God shines and is refracted, in temporal (creaturely) life, as all the various types of creaturely inter-action. On one side of the heart is the unrefracted spirit of God, and on the other (temporal) side of the heart are the multiple aspects of human existence, which are nothing but the spirit of God refracted and expressed in particular temporal circumstances. The heart is therefore not a part of the human being, but it is rather the essential condition of humanity: we do not have a heart: we are heart-ed. As heart-ed creatures, we cannot help but reflect some type of spirit in all that we do, since it is our very natures to do so. All of human action is a refraction of the spirit flowing through our hearts.

On this anthropology, humanity is essentially spiritual, insofar as everything we do is a refraction of the spirit flowing through the human heart. This spirit is picked up from, and is expressed within, creation. Because the spirit is expressed through every human action, other creatures can pick up that spirit from human actions. Human action
functions as a transmitter that spreads that spirit to other creatures. As creatures ourselves, we humans also receive the spirit expressed in the work of other humans; because we are uniquely image-bearing creatures, all human action is driven and animated by a spirit of this type. Through all of our actions, then, humans not only express the spirit that is at work in their heart but also receive the spirit that is to be expressed. Other people’s expressions of the spirit become the fodder for our own expressions of the spirit, and vice versa. The spirit is therefore

Indeed, being an image-bearer of God is not a property of humanity at all but is rather its essential definition: humanity is image-bearing-ness itself and not merely a thing that happens, accidentally, to bear the image of God.

Discerning the Spirit(s)

This anthropology has the virtue (at least in this gathering) of lending credence to Professor Plantinga’s claims that Christian philosophers need be no more apologetic of their own spiritual starting point than are philosophers whose work expresses a different spirit (humanist, materialist, etc.), as well as his claims that Christian philosophers are responsible first to the Christian community and only secondarily to the philosophical one. This anthropology also helps us understand more clearly what it might mean for a spirit to animate human actions and institutions (such as the scientific enterprise and/or the institution of academic theology). While its implications on this score might raise some questions about certain elements of the anthropology that Plantinga lays out in “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” especially pertaining to voluntaristic free will and agent causation, here I will focus on what this anthropology tells us about the relation between animating spirits and human action and how it helps us re-think the task of Christian philosophy.

We have already established that this anthropology suggests that all human actions are expressive of a spirit that is at work in the human heart, the spiritual, integral core of human existence. This spirit is communal rather than individual—it is expressed in, and received from, human interaction with other creatures (especially other humans). As the spirit is communal, certain communities will have a consistent spiritual vision vis-à-vis other communities, insofar as different spirits are animating each. While these different spirits will be expressed in different ways through concrete human actions, there is no guarantee that the spirits themselves are rationally or consciously known to the people within the communities they are animating. That is to say, because these spirits work directly on the heart, they work on a register that is pre-rational (and pre- everything else, too, for that matter) and so may work in a way that is totally unavowed to those expressing that spirit: While I cannot help but express the spirit at work in the heart, there is no guarantee that I realize I am doing so. And because these spirits are so integral to human living, their influence is massive, whether we realize this or not. And because
it is so massive, we might like the opportunity to think more carefully about the spirits animating us and our communities, both to determine what spirits drive us and whether we are all right with that spirit or not. What is required, then, is a way of distilling (or discerning) from human actions the spirit(s) that animate or propel those actions. Indeed, such a discerning of spirits is a primary religious and spiritual task, insofar as these spirits determine the religious and spiritual direction of a community.

I would like to argue here that philosophy has a unique role to play in this discerning process. Where each discipline is tasked with investigating a particular aspect of creation (or, rather, is tasked with investigating creation from the viewpoint of a particular aspect: biological, linguistic, psychological, etc.), philosophy is tasked with investigating the integrity of creation: how do the different aspects and different disciplines hang together? Philosophical conceptions of ontology, anthropology, and epistemology deal with these larger questions and so are in a unique position to determine the larger forces operating within and upon multiple disciplines, multiple aspects (though these conceptions themselves will bear the mark of the spirit that animates them). In addition, the self-reflective, wisdom-seeking elements of philo-sophia, as opposed to merely the more specialized, technical elements of academic philosophy, also move in the direction of articulating the spiritual forces that animate the human world. Something similar to this impulse seems to already be on Professor Plantinga’s radar when he describes philosophy as an arena for the “articulation … of commitments…fundamentally religious in nature” (18). What I am suggesting here is to take this definition of philosophy a step further, as that which pertains to the very driving forces of cultural life itself. Philosophy is not merely one arena, one discipline, among many in which these spiritual forces can be articulated (though it is certainly that, too), and its articulations are not limited merely to rational or theoretical claims, to ideas; rather, philosophy is a unique tool in the discernment, articulation, and elaboration of the spirits that animate human endeavors, be they the spirit of God or the spirits of the age. This particular philosophical task might be one that is apparent only to Christian philosophers (though I don’t think this is the case⁶), but Professor Plantinga would be the first to concede that that alone does not make it any less pressing a philosophical problem. As Christian philosophers, we need not let our conception of philosophy, its tasks and problems, be defined by the broader academy.

A Final Suggestion

Before I proceed further, let me offer a word of caution: that I want to add discerning the spirits of our age as a task of Christian philosophy does not imply that I want to abandon the other tasks of (Christian) philosophy laid out by Professor Plantinga. There is still a need for philosophy to be academically rigorous; to systematize, deepen, and clarify Christian thought; and to explore how the result of such clarification bears on the rest of what we think and do (18). That is, even as it is tasked with discerning the spirits of the age, philosophy must remain a theoretical and academic venture. But the academic venture of philosophy must, ultimately, be in the service of the pursuit of the wisdom that requires a discerning of the spirits that animate us, whether that be the spirit of God (“The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom”) or of something else. This is not to say that all Christian philosophers must be so-called popularizers, but merely that the results of Christian philosophizing ought to be helpful beyond merely academic borders.

In that light, I would like to offer an exploratory hypothesis, a tentative suggestion: Christian philosophy would benefit greatly from using the resources of phenomenology in its pursuit of its task. Phenomenology offers two distinct elements of methodology that make it a beneficial addition to the Christian philosophical toolbox: first, it elaborates the life-world, that is, the world of everyday human experience, by recourse to the promises already inherent in that life-world and so takes that world on its own terms while further clarifying, deepening, and understanding those terms; and second, it uses both synthesis and analyticity in service of integrality, which again points to its orientation to the world of everyday human experience. Both of these elements helpfully serve
served in the service of a broader integrality that is not merely synthetic but spiritual. This notion of integrality is central to the heart-ed anthropology laid out here, and I think phenomenology offers a methodology that can respect that integrality without losing the necessity of analytic rigor, clarification, and articulation.

As heart-ed creatures, we cannot help but reflect some type of spirit in all that we do, since it is our very natures to do so.

Much too briefly, then, I suggest that phenomenology might be key to any attempt to achieve the discerning task of Christian philosophy. While phenomenology may not be alone in its promissory and integral methodology, I think we would be remiss to ignore its literature and methodology as we pursue further what it means to be Christian philosophers in the 21st century.

Endnotes
2. This idea seems to go against Plantinga’s claims on page 12 of “Advice to Christian Philosophers.”
4. Dooyeweerd enumerates them as the mathematical, spatial, kinematic, physical, biological, sensitive, logical, historical (formative), lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, judicial, ethical, and the pistic (faith).
5. Or that a similar spirit is being animated differently, but pursuing this topic would take us too far afield for our purposes here.
6. See, for example, Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences.