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Modernizing the Case for God

A Review of *Time's Review*

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The Background of Confrontation

In order, too, the rolling heavens
appear,
And varied seasons of the circling
year:
But still the source of motion was
concealed;
The Primum Mobile was un-
revealed.
Hence, men to Gods creation's
frame assigned,
Themselves and all things to
their will resigned:¹

So wrote Lucretius, a first century Latin pagan. About the same time the Apostle Paul was writing:

The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessness and wickedness of men who suppress the truth by their wickedness, since what may be known of God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities—eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse. (Romans 1:18-20, NIV)

Lucretius, an advocate of the primitive atomism of Democritus and the

hedonism of Epicurus, was hardly your Madalyn O'Hair type of rabid atheist. By way of his materialism, Lucretius wanted to propagate an Aristotelian abstract concept of the origins of the universe. He would offer his impersonal Primum Mobile (prime mover) as a substitute for any kind of creating God. Though he held that men appropriated gods out of ignorance, Lucretius was not interested in promoting atheism as such. He felt that people would be happier in this life if they did not anticipate any kind of retribution in the next. That kind of worry is a needless burden. To lift that burden one must rid one's self of any belief in avenging deities. Theism is a drag on hedonism.

Now referring to the passage from Romans 1:18-20 we should note that the Apostle Paul is not arguing a case for theism. Rather, the passage is part of a contrast he makes between the life of faith and the life of unbelief. In fact, the Bible really does not address itself to a defense of theism, but at all times presupposes the existence of God. The Old Testament has many statements repudiating the polytheism of the pagans, but even from such selected passages as Psalms 8 and 19 one does not get an apology for theism as much as a paean of praise for the Creator God whose existence is not argued.

By a comparison of the Apostle Paul with Lucretius, one can hardly claim that the battle for the minds of the intelligentsia was squarely joined in the first century of the Christian era. However, the confrontation did come very soon and was under way by the middle of the next century.

It is interesting to note that the first allegations of atheism were brought against the Christians because they denied that the host of the pagan deities were authentic gods. Considering the wicked deeds of the pagan gods the Christians pronounced them

to be "wicked and impious demons." "Hence we are called atheists. And we confess we are atheists so far as gods of this sort are concerned, but not with regard to the most true God."²

It was not long before the tables were turned and the defense of theism became an important, though in many cases a misguided concern for later Christians. In its April 7, 1980 issue *Time* magazine through its "Religion" section attempts to bring us up-to-date on the discussions which are going on around the question, "Does God exist?" The *Time* essay is entitled, "Modernizing the Case for God."

The Modern Pagans

Presumably, in modern times God has suffered serious defeats, if not actual demise, in the intellectual world through the work of such shapers of modern thought as Marx, Freud, Darwin and Nietzsche, among others. I think the *Time* editor is not entirely exact when he suggests that Marx chased God out of heaven. It is rather the case that Marx limited God to heaven and then attempted to make heaven unnecessary by the utopia of his classless society built on a materialism.

According to the editor, God was "banished to the unconscious by Freud," but I would add that for Freud the imprint of God as a residual infantilism could be therapeutically removed by psychoanalysis.

"God was announced by Nietzsche to be deceased," says the editor. I would elaborate to suggest that it was Nietzsche's purpose to get rid of the sovereign God in order to make room for his autonomous superman, the new man, who, setting himself "beyond good and evil," could ignore any divine imperatives and the limitations of Christian morality.

And "did not Darwin drive him

[God] out of the empirical world?" The editor answers:

Well, not entirely. In a quiet revolution in thought and argument that hardly anyone could have foreseen only two decades ago, God is making a comeback. Most intriguingly, this is happening not among theologians or ordinary believers—most of whom never accepted for a moment that he was in any serious trouble—but in the crisp, intellectual circles of academic philosophers, where the consensus had long banished the Almighty from fruitful discourse.³

At this point the editor cites Bertrand Russell's empiricist's claim that "What science cannot tell us, mankind cannot know," and A.J. Ayer's assertion that "all utterances about the nature of God are nonsensical." For clarification these last two assertions need some background.

Let me go to August Comte, the father of modern positivism, who expressed the belief that truth is limited to those assertions which can be empirically verified directly or indirectly by sense inspection. Comte maintained that in early times men lived by theologies and other superstitions. The early Greeks as pioneers in philosophies introduced speculative metaphysics by way of getting their answers as to meaning and origins. But in the modern age science set aside all former unreliable means of producing answers. As Alexander Pope wrote:

Nature and nature's laws lay hid
in night:

God said, "Let Newton be," and
all was light.

In the 1920's the Vienna Circle

philosophers—Ernst Mach, Moritz Schlich and others (with an occasional suggestion from Ludwig Wittgenstein)—busied themselves with the implications of a thorough-going positivism. They drew up a kind of catechism which demanded in part: (1) All theoretic terms must be definable by means of observation terms. Thus their most basic and radical demand had the effect of eliminating theology and metaphysics because the conclusions of both elude empirical verification; (2) All categories for classification are ultimately reducible to physics. That kind of reduction helped to confirm positivism's materialism; (3) A rigid distinction must be made between statements of value and statements of fact. With this demand they could draw support from Immanuel Kant, who divided his world into the noumenal, the world of religion, morals, and aesthetics, and the phenomenal, the world of scientific fact; (4) A distinction must be made between analytical statements and synthetic statements. The former were of the nature of definitions in which the predicate is implied in the subject. They alone yield certainty. Synthetic statements require inspection for their verification and since the days of David Hume inspection, that is, empirical statements, could at best yield only high probability but never certainty.

Working out the implications of their basic assumptions, the positivists concluded that only statements which could be empirically verified could be considered to be declarative statements, that is, statements of fact. Other statements, though they have the syntax of declarative statements—for example, "God is love,"—must be considered to be pseudodeclaratives. While the tenets of positivism had closed the whole world of metaphysics and theology to philosophers, threatening

them with a loss of employment, language analysis now opened up a whole new field of endeavor. Philosophers could serve as semantic gumshoes (detectives) to track down the meaningless terms in our language and unmask them for what they are, that is, nonsense. English and American empiricist philosophers entered upon their new job with such vigor that for several decades they virtually pushed other philosophies into the background.

Many analysts busied themselves with a study of what they called "God

Working out the implications of their basic assumptions, the positivists concluded that only statements which could be empirically verified could be considered to be declarative statements, that is, statements of fact.

talk." Others studied the meanings of ethical terms to develop that new branch of ethical studies, meta-ethics. A.J. Ayer, for example, insisted that, should I hear someone make the statement, "Stealing is wrong," I must not conclude that such a person is making a statement of fact or a truth claim. That person is only venting his feelings concerning stealing in much the same way that one might boo a referee's decision at a ball game. In fact, Ayer's approach is sometimes referred to as the "Rah, Rah, Boo" theory of ethics. For Ayer, all statements that are non-sense-verifiable also became nonsense.

Because semantics has to do particularly with the referent of a term, it

was of particular interest to the analysts and those associated with them. At the time that he was periodically looking in on the activities of the Vienna Circle Ludwig Wittgenstein's thought as set down in his *Tractatus* expressed the opinion that there had to be an empirically verifiable referent for every term that could claim semantic significance. He concluded, further, that whereof one could not speak, according to that perspective, one had best keep still. Talk about God then turns out to be one of those areas concerning which no meaningful discourse is possible. Having changed some of his opinions by the time of his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein retreated somewhat from his earlier severe position.

Antony Flew, a vociferous English exponent of atheism, approaches the problem of meaning as to religious language from another angle. He insists that in order to be meaningful a term must be falsifiable. But in the mind of a Christian nothing counts against such statements as, "God loves us as a father loves his children." Flew argues that if there is nothing that can be alleged to count against the truth of an assertion then nothing can be used to establish its reliability either. Flew's words: "And if there is nothing which a putative assertion denies then there is nothing which it asserts either."⁴

To make his point Flew uses the now-famous parable proposed by John Wisdom.

Once upon a time two explorers came upon a clearing in the jungle. In the clearing were growing many flowers and many weeds. One explorer says, "Some gardener must tend this plot." The other disagrees, "There is no gardener." So they pitch their tent and set a watch. No gardener

is ever seen. "But perhaps the gardener is an invisible gardener." So they set up a barbed-wire fence. They electrify it. They patrol with bloodhounds. But no shrieks ever suggest that some intruder has received a shock. No movements of the wire ever betray an invisible climber. The bloodhounds never give cry. Yet the Believer is not convinced. "But there is a gardener, invisible, intangible, insensible to electric shocks, a gardener who comes secretly to look after the garden which he loves." At last the Skeptic despairs. But what remains of your gardener of your original assertion? Just how does what you call invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener or even no gardener at all?"⁵

If we now do what Flew wants us to do—take the case for or against the existence of a gardener as the case for or against the existence of God—then Skeptic is convinced that he has Believer in a tight spot. Believer presumably is faced with a dilemma. He must conclude that, because he cannot come up with a physical referent, he must conclude that God does not exist, or he can choose with men like Ludwig Feurbach and conclude that God is a construction of man's imagination which serves some emotional purposes.

To Skeptic's chagrin, Believer chooses neither horn of the dilemma. Believer wasn't born yesterday, so to speak. He knows just as well as the analyst that all language need not be accepted for what it claims. Believer is convinced that the dilemma which Skeptic presents is valid only on the basis of Skeptic's presuppositions. Those presuppositions Believer does not share. Believer does not consent to

Bertrand Russell's claim: "What science cannot tell us, mankind cannot know." Using an update of the claim of Pascal, Believer tells Skeptic that his heart has evidence which scientific method cannot reach by its empirical method of verification.

The Revival of Interest in Theism

I now return to the *Time* essay. I will cite or paraphrase some of the key passages from the essay and then make some elaborations and evaluations.

As noted, the "Religion" editor, who shares the Reformed faith, first calls attention to the decline of interest in theism under the influence of the language analysts, a theme on which I just expanded. The editor then goes on to call attention to the factors which have contributed to a revival of interest in the arguments for the existence of God.

(1) A Generation ago, atheistic empiricists like Harvard's Willard V. Quine were influential simply because 'they were the brightest people,' says Philosophy Professor Roderick Chisholm of Brown University, adding that now the 'brightest people include theists, using a kind of tough-minded intellectualism' that was often lacking on their side of the debate.⁶

(2) The proofs of God's existence, long pursued in impenetrable books and journals, are engaging wider audiences. Last week Mortimer Adler, popular philosopher and guru of the Great Books Program, published *How To Think About God: A Guide for the 20th Century Pagan* (Macmillan: \$9.95). In September Doubleday will issue an English version of dis-

sident Roman Catholic Theologian Hans Küng's latest, which despite its 850 pages is a huge bestseller in West Germany. The title: *Does God Exist?*⁷

In the course of the discussion Alvin Plantinga of Calvin College is cited as one of the bright theists who demonstrates a tough-minded intellectualism. I'll come back to him when his thought is discussed in sequel. Let me turn to Adler and Küng.

I believe that from a Christian perspective Adler's new book is mistitled. It should read, *How Not to Think About God*. Adler has been busy for decades with scholastic-type remedies for atheism, but his scholasticism has never brought him to a Christian theism, much less a Christian profession in the Lord Jesus Christ. Last year in an interview with Bill Moyers he said almost wistfully that if he could be a Christian he would embrace the Roman Catholicism of some of the members of his family, his wife and daughter. More recently on William Buckley's *Firing Line* (June 22, 1980) where he was plugging his new book, Adler affirmed that he used only "pagan arguments" for the existence of God, arguments which are based on reason and do not require a "leap of faith." I should add here that one should distinguish a leap of faith into the dark, so to speak, from that affirmation of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ as it comes through the Scriptures.

Hans Küng would enlist his theistic efforts with those who see proof for the existence of God in the fact of the moral conscience of man. But Küng succeeds only in supplying an unserviceable retreat for the now well-worn arguments of Immanuel Kant. "This is essentially Küng's approach. Conscience doth make Christians—or at least theists—of us all." Unless the moral

argument does something for the theist's morality, it is hard to see what value there is to bringing a person to theism without bringing the demands of Christ for his life.

Kant by repudiating the work of Christ and Küng by ignoring Christ as essential to his theism and moral arguments, fail to produce a Christian theism and fail to produce or introduce a Christian morality. The reference point for man's conscience is not some higher, more perfect being but the context of man's morality, is person, the persons of the triune God of the Bible. Falling short of that, Küng's argument has little to recommend it beyond those who seek to explain the human conscience as harking back to some moral agent. The editor furnishes an example of that kind of explanation in the following:

Updating Kant, Dartmouth Scholar Ronald Green argues in *Religious Reason* (Oxford: \$12) that though skeptics may think primitive instincts or emotions are the basis for religion, faith actually stems from the sophisticated reasoning process that distinguishes humans from animals. To Green, man must seek an independent, coherent source for his morality. Although Kant ended with a personal God, Green will only go so far as to postulate "some kind of supreme moral causal agency," whether a personal deity or Hinduism's impersonal karma.⁸

It is hard to see how Green's approach would be an updating of Kant more than a reverting to Thomas Aquinas. Man's sense of moral obligation needs a causal explanation. Aquinas in one of his Five Ways argued, "There must also be something which is

to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God" (emphasis mine, N.V.T.). Considering the fact that by eliminating God and attributing conscience to a causal agent Green is really back to Aristotle, hardly a modernizing of the case for God. From a Christian perspective it also has no cogency.

Perhaps it should be noted here that there are those who are willing to argue the origin of conscience on a naturalistic basis. For example, John Fiske, a late-nineteenth century American proponent of evolution, proposed that the maternal instinct is the basis for the development of altruism which in turn provides a basis for conscientious behavior toward one's fellow man.

Mental Proof

The editor takes up the Mental Proof next. At this point he writes as follows:

America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God, Alvin Plantinga of Michigan's Calvin College, develops a related argument from one of the pressing issues in modern epistemology. Though it sounds strange to the man in the street, philosophers ponder how an individual can know anything ever existed in the past. How, for instance, can we know if another person is in pain? Plantinga answers that such knowledge is acquired by analogy. In *God and Other Minds* (Cornell: \$13.95) he makes an intricate case that this is the way believers know God. Since it is perfectly plausible to infer that other minds exist, he thinks it is reasonable to believe that God does as well.⁹

The treatment of analogy here taken in the context of the title of the *Time* essay "Modernizing the Case for God" would give the impression that Plantinga is proposing a new kind of proof or way of knowing God. While it may be true, as the editor indicates, that Plantinga's proofs are newly intricate, the use of the *analogia entis*, the analogy of being, was an approach used by medieval scholars and worked over by Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, I am not sure that Plantinga would want to claim that analogy "is the way believers know God." Among Christians, knowing God is not limited to or basically an intellectual assent to the idea of his existence, but more in the sense expressed in John 14:17 where we read, "But you know him, for he lives with you and will be in you." Many other passages could be cited to indicate that knowing God Christianly must be distinguished from believing in the existence of God. The devils believe that also and tremble.


As a concluding statement concerning his position on analogy Plantinga writes:

Hence my tentative conclusion: if my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the latter.¹⁰

No matter how intricately argued or tentatively held, there are many who would dispute Plantinga's conclusion. Karl Barth and his followers would argue that one cannot use analogy to come to any conclusions concerning God because God is the "Wholly Other." In that case all language concerning God and man must be equivocal and analogies do not apply.¹¹

Moreover, one must wonder, would it not be true that if Plantinga would abandon the method of the "tough"

minded intellectual" then he could defend the Christian belief in God more biblically? Then he would conclude that analogy does not begin with man and point up to God, but that man is the analogue of God as God's image-bearer. There is no indication in the Bible that analogy between God and man begins with man. We only know that "as a father has compassion on his children, so the Lord has compassion on those



Among Christians, knowing God is not limited to or basically an intellectual assent to the idea of his existence, but more in the sense expressed in John 14:17 where we read: "But you know him, for he lives with you and will be in you."

who fear him" because the Bible tells us that it is so (Psalm 103:13).

For some, the argument from analogy breaks down because for them the teleological argument has no cogency. They see no intelligent purpose in "Nature." Some have tried to make the chimpanzee analogous to man in its tool-making activity, but in the larger functions of nature (Mt. St. Helens erupting in May and five twisters hitting Grand Island, Nebraska in June, 1980) they find no analogy to what man counts as his own intelligent action. That, then, stands in contrast to the analogy which exists between one's self and others. After carefully cogitating and executing some intricate pattern of action requiring intelligent planning, a similar intricate action by

one's neighbor is assumed to have taken similar intelligent planning. Nature writ large, presumably, shows no such comparative intelligence.

Experimental Proof

Concerning experiential proof for the existence of God the editor writes in part:

Because religious experiences are so widespread, this argument runs, there must be something (or, rather Someone) inspiring them. Skeptics, of course, reply that experiences are subjective, hence unreliable as evidence, and besides they can be explained apart from God.¹²

This argument has a considerable appeal among some evangelicals who sing lustily at times, "You ask me how I know he lives; He lives within my heart." But one must caution that in our day of subjectivistic theologies, irrationalism, and charismatic movements, many kinds of "feeling" proofs are interposed to validate the presence of the Spirit of God. Not all religious feeling, though satisfying, necessarily testifies to the fact that "the Spirit himself testifies with our spirit that we are the children of God" (Romans 8:16).

John Calvin maintained that all people everywhere have a *sensus deitatis* as a psychological witness to the fact that they stand in a responsible relationship to God as their creator and judge. William James in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* emphasizes the fact that religious experiences tend towards a great diversity. And, generally, it has long been agreed that man is incurably religious. Though varieties of cultures will have varieties of religions, religions they will have.

Yet, subjective witness does not add up to objective truth. The tragedy at Jonestown, Guyana instigated by Jim Jones should warn us that feelings can be grossly and tragically misled. Isaiah warned those who were tempted to follow the prevaricators of his day,

To the law and to the testimony!
If they do not speak according
to this word, they have no light of
dawn. Distressed and hungry,
they will roam through the land;
when they are famished, they
will become enraged and,
looking upward, will curse their
king and their God. (Isaiah 8:20,
21)

By contrast, there is no indication in the Bible that reason, or intellectualism as the editor has it, is a safeguard against misguided feeling. In fact, intellectualism itself must be judged a misguided effort in relation to a biblical approach to knowing God. Metaphysical speculations, though reinforced with logical entailments, leave no more foundation for spiritual awareness than did the arguments long ages past of Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle as they attempted to ascertain the nature of the One. Those speculations bear no witness to the truth in Jesus Christ which is the only truth that can make one free.

The Ontological Argument

The argument first proposed by Anselm, an eleventh century archbishop of Canterbury, defines God as "a being greater than which none can be conceived." Because existence would be implied in that conception in order to qualify for the "greater than which none," God necessarily exists. A monk, contemporary to Anselm, suggested that it was possible to conceive of all

kinds of non-existent entities, for example, a fantasy island. Kant presumed to demolish the ontological argument definitively by insisting that the argument is of the nature of a definition and that whatever we may predicate concerning an entity's existence cannot be included because it is not a predicate. For instance, one hundred imaginary dollars would have all the predictable attributes that could be associated with real dollars. This refutation of Kant seemed to lay the argument to rest for some time though I suspect that most had the itchy intuition that they would rather deal with real dollars than imaginary ones.

The method lay in disrepute after Kant supposedly demolished it, until Norman Malcolm, then at Cornell, suddenly claimed in a 1960 article that it was partly defensible. Since then it has been the most debated proof among philosophers. Three current advocates renovate it by applying a technique known as modal logic: Plantinga; Unitarian Charles Hartshorne, a follower of Alfred North Whitehead's "process" philosophy, now retired from the University of Texas; and Roman Catholic Layman James F. Ross of the University of Pennsylvania.¹³

It would seem to me that the modal logic approach to the idea of the existence of God must become suspect as a method if it will yield results that can satisfy simultaneously a Calvinist, a Unitarian, and a Roman Catholic, unless one is willing to say that in spite of apparent differences they are worshipping the same God.

In *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: \$8.50) Plantinga, who had long

opposed ontological theories, explains that his mind was changed through the curious logical process of speculating about "possible worlds" in which things could be different.¹⁴

Here I would call attention to the fact that one can draw all sorts of logical conclusions from an almost limitless variety of hypotheses. One's imagination would constitute the limit of the number of hypothetical syllogisms one might devise with all their entailments valid, but that will help us very little with our existential situation, and as to theistic proofs, they will not benefit us in a knowing way in our relationship with the "God with whom we have to do."

The Problem of Evil

By reason of space limitations I pass over the cosmological arguments with Pascal's reminder that they do not lead us to the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob but merely to an abstract principle of causality. So let me terminate the discussion by looking into the problem of evil. In the discussion of this problem I think Plantinga may have performed some limited service to those Christian philosophers who judge their status among their non-Christian colleagues on the basis of the rationalistic validity of their position.

Plantinga calls attention to the fact that it would generally be conceded by both Christians and atheists that Christian doctrine about God would include the following:

- (a) God exists, (b) that God is omnipotent, (c) that God is omniscient, (d) that God is wholly good, and (e) that evil exists.¹⁵

The atheists refuse to believe

because they find that Christian assertions about God violate the canons of their rationalism and their idea of morality and freedom. What Plantinga shows is that in order to invalidate statements (a) through (e) the atheist must add some proposition (f) which is "necessarily true, or essential to theism, or a logical consequence of such propositions."¹⁶ This none of the spokesmen for atheism is able to do.

What Plantinga then has succeeded in doing is to demonstrate once more, though he doesn't emphasize the point, that, with respect to the problem of evil as with other aspects of God's sovereignty, people appropriate whatever their presuppositions allow them to appropriate. And as the editor suggests, Plantinga also demonstrates that, among the theists, there are minds capable of exploring the dark recesses of modal logic to show that the mechanics of its operations are not geared particularly to favor the atheist in the establishment of his unbelief. That in itself may be a comfort to some Christians.

While it can hardly be less than disappointing to Reformed Christians that Plantinga harks back to scholasticism in using analogy to move from the nature of man to the nature of God, it must be even more disappointing that in connection with the problem of evil, Plantinga limits God to what is logically possible according to human understanding of the law of noncontradiction. The editor expresses Plantinga's conclusion as follows:

The existence of evil is no "knock-down disproof of an omnipotent and wholly good God," he says, but it does make God improbable. Plantinga renovates the theist's classical reply to this free will argument. Examining whether a semifictional Boston Mayor would

have taken smaller bribes in other "possible worlds," he argues that even an all-powerful God cannot create a world in which mayors can choose to take bribes and that also contains no evil.¹⁷

What Plantinga presents here is a modern version of the old scholastic insistence that God's will is limited by his (more accurately, man's) use of reason. I would judge that a large number of Christian theists, both philosophers and theologians, are unwilling to commit themselves to that kind of scholasticism, or, as the editor has it, "tough-minded intellectualism."

I think the editor wants us to conclude that in "Modernizing the Case for God" it has been shown that Christian theism has been returned to intellectual respectability and that Plantinga has made large contributions to that rehabilitation. It would be difficult to assess the value of that kind of rehabilitation. Several Christians have attained national prominence doing philosophy on secular campuses. And there is now an association of more than 300 Christians who are professional philosophers. Now Christian philosophers do not have to gather in furtive little conclaves when philosophers congregate, as they are wont to do from time to time.

In his late-second-century apology for Christianity, Minucius Felix in his *Octavius* sets out the case for Christianity without ever so much as once calling attention to the doctrine of substitutionary atonement. At the end of the dialogue his disputant virtually says, "You've convinced me. I'm ready to become a Christian." But what was the man embracing? A vacuous theism is hardly a substitute for Christianity and the claims of a crucified and risen Lord. The Apostle Paul wrote in Romans 10:17, "Faith comes from hearing the

message, and the message is heard through the word of Christ."

The editor also does not seem to be entirely sold on "tough-minded intellectualism." He concludes:

Probably, the major failing of such enterprise is that the results, however persuasive, tell too little about the nature and will of God. Blaise Pascal, anticipating modern objections to natural theology, believed that one cannot worship a dry concept, only the living God. Though a genius in science and mathematics, Pascal believed that "the heart has its reasons which reason cannot know."¹⁸

Notes

¹Lucretius, *On The Nature Of Things*, Bk. 5, trans. Thomas Busby.

²Justin Martyr, *First Apology*, Section 6.

³*Time*, "Modernizing the Case for God," 7 April 1980, p. 65.

⁴Antony Flew, "Theology and Falsification," *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 98.

⁵Flew, p. 96.

⁶*Time*, p. 65.

⁷*Time*, p. 65.

⁸*Time*, p. 66.

⁹*Time*, p. 66.

¹⁰Alvin Plantinga, *God And Other Minds* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 271.

¹¹It is also interesting to note that, while Plantinga is going the route of rational arguments, his colleague at Calvin College, Nicholas Wolterstorff, is inclined to repudiate empirical and rational procedures in arriving at foundational tenets for Christian thought. For a discussion of Wolterstorff's position see his *Reason within the Bounds of Religion* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1976), and my "The Foundations of Science," *Pro Rege*, VI, No. 2 (1977), 8ff.

¹²*Time*, p. 66.

¹³*Time*, p. 66.

¹⁴*Time*, p. 66.

¹⁵Plantinga, p. 116.

¹⁶Plantinga, p. 117.

¹⁷*Time*, p. 68.

¹⁸*Time*, p. 68.