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Imperialism and Hegemony: Some Historical Reflections



by Keith Sewell

For the historian nothing ever totally goes away, except for those events for which no evidence has survived and that have, therefore, become permanently lost to all human recollection. Other than events and developments in this category, the great movements of human history from ancient, classical, medieval, and modern times—and much more besides—are under constant scrutiny. Of course, it is possible to see these great eras, and the

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immense historical developments that took place in them, as continually receding from that point of experience between past and future that we call “the present.” Yet that “past” never completely goes away: tradition ensures that we carry with us a great deal of baggage from human history. Assessed from a biblical standard, traditions might be variously judged, but without tradition there can be no continuity in human history. And there are episodes or epochs or institutions in the human past that we might think have received some sort of historical burial, but they can surprise us by re-emerging unexpectedly in a new form. When I was an undergraduate, it was emphasized that we lived in a post-colonial era. Imperialism was finished. That was then; this is now: *empire is back*.¹

The Idea of Empire: Rome and After

The idea of empire has been with us for a long time. In the West, our notion of empire has arisen from the awe with which successive generations beheld the grandeur and legacy of Rome. For centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire in the West, men tended to see Rome as an ideal to which they ought to aspire. The Roman *imperium* was the yardstick of greatness. It was the inspiration for the Holy Roman Empire (*sacrum romanum imperium*), which had a continuous existence from its reconstitution by Otto I in 962 until its abolition by Napoleon in 1806.² English overseas colonial expansion arose in the context of the “old imperialism,” led by the navigators of Portugal and the Spanish *conquistadores*. Early English maritime adventurism and colonialism came to exhibit a strongly Protestant mode of self-justification,

with its declared right to challenge any presumed Catholic monopoly across the seas.³ At the same time, it is worth remembering that empires have not always been in vogue. The United States often saw itself, and self-defined its distinctiveness, in terms of a repudiation of empire. In England, in the same year as the *Declaration of Independence* (1776), Adam Smith published his *Wealth of Nations*, which seemed to imply that empire was not necessary for prosperity,⁴ and Edward Gibbon his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, which suggested that empires tended towards corruption and disintegration.⁵

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The United States was long the home of anti- (British) imperial sentiment. After the Great War (1914-18) various American writers were quick to argue that competitive imperialism had contributed to the coming of that disastrous conflict.⁶ In the United Kingdom itself, by the 1930s, British left-wing thought especially was increasingly embarrassed by the racism and exploitation that imperialism seemed to entail, in part because such practices were explicitly endorsed by an increasingly powerful continental European Fascism.⁷ It was in this era that Winston Churchill found that his opposition to constitutional advance in India towards self-government was politically disadvantageous.⁸ After the fall of France, in 1940, Great Britain faced Germany and Italy alone, apart from the support she received from within her Empire. But lands such as Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand were too remote and too thinly populated to offset the full weight of a European continent dominated by Nazi Germany. Of necessity, Great Britain sought support from a U.S.A. led by President Roosevelt. It eventually arrived, but only in full force after Nazi Germany declared war on the U.S.A. in the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

It was at this time that Great Britain felt the full impact of American anti-imperialism. Pulling Britain's imperial chestnuts out of the fire was

definitely not part of the American taxpayer's responsibilities, and there was soon talk from Washington that the European colonial empires should be placed under some sort of international control.⁹ As might be imagined, this was deeply resented in London. To the British this seemed both self-serving and hypocritical. Washington need not have worried. In truth, the British Empire, between 1922 (Ireland) and 1998 (Hong Kong), gradually faded away. The Statute of Westminster, 1931 (an act of the British parliament), set "the Dominions," such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, on the road to independent statehood. All ties between them and "the mother country" were to be voluntary. Great Britain, since the Durham Report of 1839, had learned to heed the prescient advice of Edmund Burke in his "Reconciliation with America" (1775).¹⁰

The Passing of the British Empire

The high-point of popular imperial sentiment in Great Britain itself had come at the outbreak of the South African War in 1899. The bitterness and disappointments of that conflict brought imperial disillusionment.¹¹ After 1900, British politics became more preoccupied with welfare and defense at home than with expansion beyond the seas. The revival of imperial sentiment during the bloodletting of the Great War (1914-1918) was official rather than heartfelt. After 1919, the country was enfeebled, and the diplomatic unity of the British Empire could no longer be assumed. In 1921, Lloyd George, at the time of the Chanak Crisis with Turkey, found that the old methods no longer worked. Bonar Law, the Conservative leader at that time, declared that "We cannot act alone as the policeman of the world."¹² In 1919-20 Great Britain and France, as victor powers, both managed to make a colossal miscalculation. They allowed themselves to presume that if they were weary and ill-disposed towards further expansion, then everyone else would stop behaving the way they had behaved in the nineteenth century. But others were far from satiated. In truth, the British and French governments could no more freeze the *status quo* in the world of 1919 than could Metternich in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. And even in 1919, the implications of the Amritsar (*Jalliamwala Bagh*) massacre in India were clear:

either Great Britain would have to choose between measured change across her widely-scattered empire, leading to self-government, or she could strive to maintain her position, even if doing so entailed severe repression and wading through the blood of rebellious subjects. After 1919, it became clear that the British electorate had no taste for the latter course.

The fall of France in June 1940 left Great Britain without a single great power ally. She was hard-pressed to defend herself against a Germany that now controlled a significant portion of Europe and an Italy that presumed for herself dominance in the Mediterranean and East Africa.¹³ This is why Britain found herself dependent on America in 1940, a situation ultimately incompatible with the maintenance of her empire. The British nightmare was to confront three great powers single-handedly: Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean, and Japan in East Asia. The full nightmare finally materialized in December 1941, but deliverance came at the same time because when Japan struck at Great Britain in Hong Kong and Malaya, she also struck at the United States in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor. This brought the manpower, resources, and prodigious productive capacity of the United States into the conflict against the Axis and on the side of Great Britain and Soviet Russia. This was the era in which the United States, already a great power, flexed her muscles and clearly became a global power.¹⁴

If the British Empire ever went with a resounding crash, it was at the fall of Singapore to Japan in February 1942.¹⁵ The importance of this catastrophe was perhaps obscured by the curious after-life that the British Empire enjoyed for at time after 1945, in some areas even on into the 1960s. But the tide was definitely running out. The Second World War produced a significant wave of pro-Dominion (i.e., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) sentiment in Great Britain but no renewals of anything like a commitment to empire as such.

After 1945, the old sort of imperialism became internationally passé. The two emergent “super-powers,” the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., were both officially “anti-imperialist.” They were not generally seen as empires at this time because imperialism still tended to be equated with the colonial empires of Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands,

Spain, and Portugal. These empires were passing. India and Pakistan became independent in 1947, Burma and Ceylon in 1948.¹⁶

It is in these years that the passing of the *Pax Britannica* and the arrival of the *Pax Americana* took place,¹⁷ perhaps best exemplified in Britain’s February 1947 statement to Washington of her inability to continue to provide aid to Greece and Turkey and in the consequential statement of the “Truman Doctrine.”¹⁸ If America did not exactly step into Britain’s shoes, she often found herself stepping into her place.

The British Debate on Empire

The last expansion-affirming, self-congratulating account of the British Empire taken at all seriously appeared in 1950.¹⁹ Thereafter, the *de-colonization* of sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asian, and the Caribbean and South Pacific island territories proceeded a-pace from 1957 onwards. In some places the process was far too rushed, the responsibilities of “independence” came too soon, and the consequences included immense loss of life.²⁰ The story of the end of empire has been told constitutionally by Nicholas Mansergh,²¹ politically and strategically by Max Beloff,²² belligerently by Corelli Barnett,²³ and aesthetically by James Morris in a renowned trilogy.²⁴

In Great Britain itself, in the 1950s and 1960s, what little was left of the British imperial spirit was subjected to withering criticism from within.²⁵ In retrospect it seemed that a mighty battle had been fought between William Ewart Gladstone (1809-98) and Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81) over Great Britain’s posture in the world. Was it to be free trade and prosperity or territorial aggrandizement by imperial expansion? The former led to standing with Russia against the Turk in defense of European civilization, the latter with the Turk against Russia for reasons of imperial security.²⁶ Although Gladstone, “the Grand Old Man,” outlived the “Tory” Disraeli, it was the imperial vision of the latter that won the day—but only for the time being, for things were to look very different after the South African War of 1899 and Great War of 1914.

It was not until the 1960s that the idea of empire first received the scholarly attention it surely merits, in the form of Richard Koebner’s writings on *Empire* (1961) and *Imperialism* (1964). Koebner’s work

was of great breadth and profound scholarship.²⁷ He drew attention to a number of salient points. At the time of the Reformation, parliament laid statutory claim to an imperial status for England in repudiation of any Papal claims.²⁸ For a long time, when Englishmen spoke of “the empire,” they often meant England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, rather than an array of far-flung colonies. And deep into the nineteenth century, British sentiment was suspicious of “imperialism” as too reminiscent of the empire of Napoleon. Disraeli’s “Empire of India,” with Victoria taking the title of “Empress of India,” was a late innovation, distasteful to many Englishmen because it carried too close an association with oriental despotism.

Koebner’s work was published in a period that saw a great flowering of literature on the history, character, and motivations of the British Empire. This literature came to a peak from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, even as the empire was itself fading rapidly. Much arose from the seminal paper by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson on “The Imperialism of Free Trade.”²⁹ Was there a new imperialism in the late nineteenth century? What was its character? How much was its expansion driven by the imperial capital, and how much by the need to respond to the challenging exigencies of the imperial frontier? How is this late-nineteenth-century expansion of empire to be explained, given the end of the (mercantilist) “old colonial system” on which the (post-Yorktown) “second British Empire” was originally based, thanks to the rise of “free trade”?³⁰ How therefore did “free trade” function in relation to empire? Was “free trade” really anti-colonial empire? In his influential lectures on British global expansion, J. R. Seeley famously remarked that the British Empire was acquired in a “fit of absence of mind.”³¹ Was the British colonial empire ever an unintended by-product of “free trade” style commercial activity?

There seemed to be a great deal of deliberate expansion going on at the very time in which Seeley was writing. It is hard to imagine that the massive empire of 1914, which so excited the envy of other great powers, was the result of no policies whatsoever. Gallagher and Robinson argue that the empire was primarily an empire of commerce, that the “new imperialism” of the mid to late nineteenth century was a continuation of existing policy in

response to changing conditions, and that empire might be formal (as with colonies) or “informal,” as in spheres of economic hegemony, such as Latin America.³² Territorial expansion was never engaged in for its own sake, whether to provide strategic depth or to pre-empt rivals. Commerce, investment, and the protection of trade routes were the prime motivations.³³

Not everyone agreed. There were always those who found “informal empire” too fluid a concept, seeming to include even the U.S.A. within a British “informal empire” (even though the U.S.A. was itself a great power by the end of the nineteenth century), and those who saw

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mid-century British free-traders as decidedly anti-imperialist.³⁴ D. K. Fieldhouse expressed doubts, for far too much imperial action seemed to lack sufficient economic justification – a great deal of empire did not pay.³⁵ By contrast, and in a succession of works, D. C. M. Platt strongly criticized the imperialism of free trade idea, especially with reference to Latin America. Moreover, the “new imperialism” of the late nineteenth century was *partly* attributable to the need to protect British “free trading” interests against the protectionism of others. For Platt, the term “the imperialism of free trade” was insufficiently precise and therefore misleading.³⁶

From these and related discussions there eventually emerged a more nuanced and refocused understanding of Victorian imperialism and free-trade convictions: the concept of “gentlemanly capitalism,” especially as announced in the work of P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins.³⁷ The “gentlemanly capitalism” model of global imperial commercial activity has proved to be remarkably fruitful. Without being overly prescriptive, it pointed to the money-making motivation behind so much Western activity across the rest of the world.³⁸

The American Empire and the British

It is in this context that two very influential writers, working in distinct disciplines, have helped to put *empire* once again at front stage. The first is Niall Ferguson (b. 1964), a historian of modern history, and the second N.T. “Tom” Wright (b. 1948), a leading scholar in the field of New Testament studies. It is hardly surprising that both see the U.S.A.’s global reach and hegemonic tendencies as imperial in character. Both of these scholars are British, and while the British might not have an empire any longer, “they know one when they see one,” as the saying goes, and both writers have established an extensive readership beyond the limits of academia, not least in the U.S.A.

Niall Ferguson first came to widespread attention with his willingness to re-consider certain of the questions relating to Great Britain’s part in the circumstances that led up to the outbreak of the Great War of 1914.³⁹ His contribution to the literature is his *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*. This work invites its readers to see the British Empire as a pointing to the phenomenon of Anglophone globalization.⁴⁰ For Ferguson, one of the many tragedies arising from the First World War was that it severely retarded the globalization process that the British world trading system greatly facilitated.⁴¹ Ferguson’s conclusion is that the U.S.A. inherited Great Britain’s former position, without fully appreciating its implications and perils.⁴² The British Empire was more benign than many other empires, but it was still marked with crimes and injustices.⁴³ The British found that while empire brings a measure of respect, and sometimes even admiration, it only occasionally evokes gratitude and hardly ever love. It is clear that whenever Ferguson writes about the British imperial experience, a cross-reference to contemporary America is not so far from his mind. Ferguson urges Americans to consider that their present global hegemony (challenged though it is by violent Islamic *jihad*) amounts to a form of capitalistic *imperium*. His *Empire* was quickly followed by *Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire*. For Ferguson, who does not oppose the American empire as such, the U.S.A. is an empire significantly in denial, lacking an adequate understanding of its own hegemonic character.⁴⁴

Certainly within the U.S.A., over a century ago, considerable misgivings were expressed by William Jennings Bryan and the Anti-Imperialist League at the time the U.S.A. was acquiring a modest formal empire, including Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico.⁴⁵ The modern American empire is not territorial but informal, based on finance, commerce and cultural predominance; and it seems to be hard for many Americans to envisage this also as empire.⁴⁶ Therefore, in the U.S.A. the cry still goes up, “We don’t do empire.”⁴⁷ Yet such a cry belies the truth. While the U.S.A. has engaged in some more formal “empire-building” (in the Pacific and Caribbean) than its citizens appreciate, America’s *de facto* global hegemony is preeminently that of “informal empire” backed by military power.⁴⁸ Whereas British *laissez faire* style gentlemanly capitalism found its embodiment in the limited-liability stock company, its American counterpart has been the even more impressive U.S.-based multi-national business corporation.⁴⁹ In Great Britain the dominance of conservatism in the late nineteenth century tended to privilege the financial sector over the (still largely liberal) manufacturing interest—a trend that lasted well into the twentieth century.⁵⁰ Moreover, the English agrarian ideal of the gentleman living on his rural estate, with a town house in London for “the season,” was highly influential, sidetracking many of the more successful away from the challenges and rewards of further enterprise and development.⁵¹

It was not so in the U.S.A. Here estate acquisition seems not to have generally impeded individual ambition or corporate growth and development. The triumph of the north was the triumph of protectionism. After the Civil War, through one business cycle after another, shielded by a high protective tariff but stimulated by the burgeoning size of its domestic markets and the efficiency of its distribution networks, American corporate and economic growth assumed unparalleled proportions. By 1914 the U.S.A. was the leading power in many areas of industrial and agricultural productivity. In one key index after another she came to surpass Great Britain and Germany *combined*. Even if the European great powers had not torn themselves to pieces commencing in 1914, there are strong indications that the twentieth century would still have witnessed the rise of the U.S.A. to global preeminence. The follies, crimes,

and tragedies of Europe provided the context and largely shaped the circumstances in which this rise happened, but it would most probably have happened anyway.⁵²

After 1919 the U.S.A. was the world's top power economically, although she did not yet assume prime responsibility for the global financial system. The 1939 renewal of great power hostilities in Europe, hit hard by the post-1929 Great Depression (at its worst in the early 1930s), breathed new life and profitability into the spare industrial capacity left over from the boom that had ended in 1929. With the devastation of Europe by 1945, global leadership (excluding the Soviet Block) inevitably fell to the U.S.A. The Bretton Woods Agreement (1944) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1947) were both ordered according

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to American national interests. As the undisputed economic and financial *hegemon*, the U.S.A. now argued for a lowering of tariffs and the promotion of "free trade" when and where it was to her advantage. This can be seen as an "imperialism of free trade" of a new sort. Certainly, our present-day advocates of globalization can sometimes sound like those British free trade stalwarts of the nineteenth century, Richard Cobden (1804-65) and John Bright (1811-89).⁵³

It is significant that the American empire, which emerged in the twentieth century, was primarily based on inventiveness, productivity, competitiveness, and marketing. The market-

driven, inventive fecundity of the American mechanical imagination produced a seemingly endless stream of product innovations and improvements. The American-style marketing of food has for more than a century concentrated on "adding value" to the basic product—economic value, that is, not necessarily nutritional value. American production, trade, and commerce exhibited a relentless drive to maximize profitability through ever more sophisticated marketing and production techniques. It was in the U.S.A. that the techniques of mass production came to their fullest expression: radios, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, and automobiles in peacetime; tanks, aircraft-carriers, liberty ships, fighters, and bombers in wartime. First in Europe and then around the world, successive generations of consumers became loyal to the U.S.A.-derived products of their choice. Eventually the time came when conservative gentlemen might object to "new fangled" American inventions, such as electric razors, forgetting that Mr. K. C. Gillette's "safety razor" was yet another American innovation of an earlier generation.⁵⁴ It is not surprising that America's twentieth-century penetration of other Western, and eventually global, markets with a vast array of labor-saving devices and convenient gadgets has been described by one writer as the triumph of an *irresistible empire*. And all of this was typically American, the democratic impulse of mass marketing repeatedly overriding smaller economies based on regional or national culture or class-based preferences and expectations.⁵⁵ This "American Empire" has arisen at least as much from entrepreneurial supremacy as it has from strategic imperatives.⁵⁶

To these inventive, manufacturing, and marketing triumphs, we must add the formidably pervasive influence of the American-based media, including all forms of electronic entertainment—and in America entertainment (including professional and much other sport) *is* an industry. As an alignment of powers, Wall Street, Madison Avenue, Nashville, and Hollywood present a formidable combination. Using all the suggestive powers of illustration, music, and drama, they have shaped the self-understanding and priorities of hundreds of millions worldwide. It might be said that they have shaped the minds—*colonized* the thoughts—and formed the perceptions of these

multitudes. This colonization of thought has given American styles and methods a *hegemonic* influence that is unparalleled in modern history, so much so, that Americanization and modernization have become, to all intents and purposes, synonymous. And all this came even *before* the internet and worldwide web, which have had such a colossal impact over the last decade. If the United States stepped into Great Britain's place, she did so wearing shoes very much of her own making.

When writers today refer to "globalization" they generally have in view the way in which production, communication, and technology have become connected on a global scale. The U.S. is the prime player in agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in fostering and advancing this globalizing tendency. A great deal has come to depend on, or revolve around, American decisions and competencies. This is our equivalent of *omnes viae Romam ducunt*—all roads lead to Rome. This is not to say that others have no place in what some have dared to call "the new world order."⁵⁷ On the contrary, it is rather that others, multinational corporations from Europe or East Asia, for example, must now conform to the requirements of a milieu essentially shaped by their American archetypes.⁵⁸ For such Europeans and Asians it is a case of *Si fueris Romae, Romano vivito more*—"When in Rome, do as the Romans do"—except that the new Rome is the U.S.-supervised and -superintended economic world order. Perhaps one of the most telling marks of America's hegemonic pervasiveness is its evident success in convincing others of the universal validity of its concept of what constitutes success. Wealth, power, and technique combine to make the U.S. the cornerstone of an encompassing world-system. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Block (1989-91), the United States has been described as the "indispensable power."⁵⁹

Above all else, this "hyper-power" is committed to advocating, advancing the scope of, even to *placing faith in*, "the market" and "market forces." This is the context within which much contemporary discussion about "globalization"—also by Christians—is necessarily taking place.⁶⁰ Now, therefore, we find ourselves at a historical juncture at which we who are Christians in the U.S.A., and the West generally, need to strain and gasp—hunger and thirst—after righteousness

and wisdom. This is, not least, because we need to subject all concepts of "the market" to a most careful, scripturally ordered analysis.

We need to grasp that "the market" is an abstract term denoting the aggregate and cumulative buying and selling (exchanging) actions of countless decision makers. Moreover, these innumerable market-place participants (both individual and corporate) are all sinners, be they Christians or non-Christians. Accordingly, while an open market, justly conducted, in lawful goods, has a legitimate and highly constructive place in human affairs, the behavior of the market as we know it can never constitute a norm for right conduct and valid decision-making, because the behavior of the market reflects not only legitimate needs grounded in the order of creation (such as the need for food and shelter) but also the ever-present sinful inclinations of its participants (such as the age-old demand for prostitutes). When everything is reduced to a commodity, everything becomes tradable in the market place. This being so, a "globalization" based on little more than the presumed supremacy of "market forces" may give leverage to a vast array of evils, even as it stands to make some individuals and corporations very rich.

Perhaps some clarification is appropriate at this point, if only because of the widespread tendency in both academic and church settings to try to assess Christian thinkers as to whether they are inclining to "the left" or "the right." The Calvinistic understanding of the Christian religion has always been robust in its affirmation of the sovereignty of God. Accordingly, those who are in Calvin's line do not believe in the absolute sovereignty of the church or civil administration or society or the individual or the market. These are all law-ordered creatures. They have their own God-given authority or sovereignty in their prescribed place or sphere. In this respect these creatures, the market included, all represent great blessings from the hand of Almighty God.

Nevertheless, we are in deep trouble if we ascribe authority to market demands because time and again "the market" also reflects those demands and ways of doing things that betray our fallen condition. In such circumstances we can end up legitimizing the human sin that "market demand" inevitably reflects. It is clear that the "globalization" of "market forces," much advocated in our

time, will do this on a massive scale. To make the point minimally, one could say that an American-led globalization based on “the free play of market forces,” which ignores what the Bible says about creation, the human condition, and our all-encompassing need for redemption, is inevitably open to serious question.

Thirty years ago the Kuyperian-Reformational thinker Bernard Zylstra addressed the question of American empire with considerable prescience.⁶¹ Over the years, Christian thinkers such as Bob Goudzwaard have reflected long and hard on the assumptions and consequences of how capitalist economic systems have functioned in the West and now encompass the globe under the hegemonic leadership of the U.S.A.⁶² Time and again, the “globalization” that we are offered, which so often suits multinational corporations, pays minimal attention at best to human dignity and the cry of the poor and dispossessed for justice.

The seeming triumph of the West under the hegemony of the United States is replete with ambiguities for Christians, for whom Jesus Christ (and not the market) is king. These ambiguities are particularly evident as we consider the close inter-weaving of Western exploration and trade (including slavery) with Catholic and Protestant missions (including Bible translation and dissemination) over the centuries, across Asia, Africa and the Americas.⁶³ The formula associated with David Livingstone (1813-1873)—“Christianity, Commerce and Civilization”—now cries out for further critical scrutiny.⁶⁴ Not least, we need to reflect on how much the dominant culture of commerce has shaped our understanding of the Christian faith that we profess—even to asking ourselves if salvation has become for us a heaven-offered consumer commodity.

The American Empire and the Romans

And now we are also being challenged to consider the parallels between the contemporary American empire, or hegemony, and the dominant position of Rome at the time of first-century Apostolic Christianity. These parallels are pronounced in the work of Richard Horsley⁶⁵ and have been carried to a much wider readership by the English bishop and New Testament scholar N. T. Wright.⁶⁶ Here we are confronted with a view that sees the global reach of the American empire

as our contemporary spiritual counterpart to the Roman imperial system everywhere evident in the New Testament. The ambiguities are there also. We all know that Paul used his Roman citizenship to advantage.⁶⁷ At the same time his message was that (the lawful office of the magistrate notwithstanding) Christ and not Caesar is Lord. Caesar’s office was to be honored, but God alone was to be feared (I Peter 2:17).

When Jesus said that his kingdom was not of this world, he was not saying that it had nothing to do with this world but that it was not founded in any worldly principle. Christianity was not a *religio licita* within the Roman Empire. It was illicit because it would not participate in sacrificing to emperors as divine beings. In this respect it inevitably challenged—and challenges—Rome’s and anyone else’s claims (explicit or implicit) to be almighty. This is the central point about the Christian religion that inevitably urges it towards a public stance, however much the temptations of

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pietism might drive some into a world of private devotions and closet fellowships. And it is of no use our saying that Rome’s imperialism was oppressive whereas America is the champion of the “free market,” because the biblical answer is that Christ rules and the market is not a law unto itself: a standing legitimization of commercial antinomianism but a means of providing all

humankind with lawful commodities and services in a lawful way. Indeed, we need to reflect carefully on the way in which the close union of Caesar's empire and commercial exploitation is highlighted in the New Testament.⁶⁸

In the long span of its history, the Christian religion has another word that it would prefer to "globalization." That word is "ecumenical" (*oikonomia*), which not only has ecclesiastical connotations for Christians but also refers to the economy of the entire human household (*oikos*), under the peaceable rule of Jesus Christ.⁶⁹ It was once the proud boast of Habsburg monarchs that "the sun never sets on the Spanish Empire."⁷⁰ In their day, the British were wont to say, "The sun never sets on the British Empire."⁷¹ Indeed, Spain, Britain, and America have all been tempted to flatter themselves that they were the designated instrument of the Almighty's global purposes. Such flattery is liable to back-fire when the self-delusions of empire are unmasked by the course of events, and the hammer blows of judgment fall. Ferguson, in a recent paper, has argued that there is a tendency for empires to be of decreasing duration.⁷² It is possible to discern at such points a certain eschatological "pull" within the texture of human history as we know it. It is not given to a single human institution to lord it over the earth. The history of human-kind presents us with the problem of the human condition, which cannot be resolved from within the resources of either human nature or human culture. The nations will only find peace and fulfillment in all their callings under the kingly rule of Jesus Christ.

Perhaps the greatest folly of our age is the *hubris* that leads us to presume that the world belongs to us—unless it is our current additional presumption that we can indulge such follies with impunity. The world does not belong to us—ultimately empire is not ours. Rather, "our world" (the cosmos that we have been given to cultivate and care for) belongs to God. It is "ours" to care for and develop according to the Creator's command—which is always in line with humankind's true wellbeing. Those Christians in these latter days who have taught us this truth have taught us rightly, and if we bring this truth home to ourselves, it will transform our thinking about empire and the issues presented by globalization.⁷³

Endnotes

1. A recent annual "theme issue" of *History and Theory* was devoted entirely to "Theorizing Empire." See *History and Theory*, *Theme Issue* 44 (December 2005): 1-131.
2. The best overview remains Friedrich Heer, *The Holy Roman Empire*, tr. Janet Sondheimer (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968).
3. For a recent and very well researched discussion, see David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 61-124. See also the fascinating paper by William M. Lamont on "Protestant Imperialism and the English Revolution," in *Richard Baxter and the Millennium* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 285 ff.
4. Adam Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* is best read in the "Glasgow Edition," edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, 2 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). It is important to consider Adam Smith in his historical context, and in this connection see the discussion offered by Donald Winch in *Adam Smith's Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), noting esp. 146-163.
5. This work is replete with depreciation and innuendo towards Christianity, especially Catholicism. Many still regard the best edition as that edited by the rationalist historian John B. Bury (1861-1927) (London: Macmillan, 1896-1900), 7 vols. For how the *Decline and Fall* may be read with regard to late eighteenth-century British politics, see Roy Porter, *Gibbon: Making History* (London: Phoenix, 1988), 96-110.
6. Parker Thomas Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1926). European colonial rivalries were certainly part of the picture in the years down to 1914, although arguably not part of the causes of the conflict in the way that some anti-imperialist writers in the 1920s envisaged. The immediate crisis of 1911-14 was centered on the Balkans, but the wider alignments of the great powers, which were activated so disastrously in the crisis of July 1914, had been partly shaped by imperial considerations.
7. See, for example, Leonard Barnes, *Empire or Democracy: A Study of the Colonial Question* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1939).
8. For a sympathetic but not uncritical narration, see Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. v., London: Heinemann, 1976, 367-405, 464-484, 511-548 and 581-601.
9. William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

10. See George Bennett (ed.), *The Concept of Empire: Burke to Attlee, 1774-1947* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1962), 40-43 and 134-139.
11. John Atkinson Hobson's highly critical and widely influential, *Imperialism, A Study*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1902, dates from precisely this period. It was revised in 1905 and 1938. Cf. Peter Cain, *Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism, New Liberalism, and Finance 1887-1938* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), as well as his earlier "J.A. Hobson, Cobdenism, and the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism, 1898-1914," *Economic History Review* Second Series 31 (1978), 565-584.
12. In a letter to *The Times* [of London] and the *Daily Express*, published October 7, 1922, printed by Robert Blake, in *The Unknown Prime Minister; the Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858-1921* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955), 447-8 at 448. See also Peter Rowland, *David Lloyd George: A Biography* (London: Macmillan, 1975), 578-580.
13. Readers will recall that at this stage the U.S.A was officially neutral, and the Russo-German non-aggression pact of August 1939 was still in operation. The German attack on Russia by no means guaranteed that Great Britain would survive the German threat. Germany had defeated Russia in 1917/18, and might do so again, and so further augment the immense resources that might eventually be deployed against Great Britain.
14. See Iriye Akira, *The Globalizing of America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), esp. 191-215.
15. See James Neidpath, *The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919-1941* (Oxford University Press, 1981); Ian Hamill, *The Strategic Illusion: the Singapore Strategy and the Defense of Australia and New Zealand, 1919-1942* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981); Alan Warren, *Singapore, 1942: Britain's Greatest Defeat*, London: The Hambledon Press, 2002); and Noel Barber, *Sinister Twilight: The Fall of Singapore*, London: Cassell, 2002). For an account from a Japanese standpoint, see Masanobu Tsuji, *Japan's Greatest Victory Britain's Worst Defeat*, edited by H. V. Howe (New York: De Capo Press, 1997). For an Australian view, see Jacqui Murray, *Watching the Sun Rise: Australian reporting of Japan, 1931 to the Fall of Singapore* (Lexington Books, 2004).
16. The literature on the independence of the Indian sub-continent is itself vast, but the essay by John Higgins, "Partition in India: The Atlee Government and the Independence of India and Pakistan," in *Age of Austerity*, ed. Michael Sissons and Philip French (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963), at 191-207, effectively captures the British sense of the end of the *raj*. For a recent overview see Judith M. Brown, "India," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. iv: *The Twentieth Century*, ed. Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 420-445.
17. For an American view of this process, see Robert S. Thompson, *The Eagle Triumphant: How America took over the British Empire* (Hoboken NJ: John Wiley, 2004), and for two British views, see David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century* (London: Longman, 1991), and Anne Orde, *The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895-1956* (London: Macmillan, 1996). For a discussion of an earlier crucial decade, see Aaron L. Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press), 1988.
18. See Warren I. Cohen, *America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 36-39.
19. Charles Edmund Carrington, *The British Overseas: Exploits of a Nation of Shopkeepers* (Cambridge University Press, 1950). In the 1968 the publishers issued a contracted "Part One" in a "second edition" which excised various sections, including those later regarded as acceptable.
20. The account by Henri Grimal, in *Decolonization: The British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) has achieved early recognition. For a more recent discussion, see John Springhall, *Decolonization Since 1945: The Collapse of European Overseas Empires* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
21. Nicholas Mansergh, *The Commonwealth Experience: The Durham Report to the Anglo-Irish Treaty* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson / New York: Praeger, 1969), *The Commonwealth of Nations: Studies in British Commonwealth Relations* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), and *Survey of the British Commonwealth, 1939-1952* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952).
22. Max Beloff, *Imperial Sunset I: Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921* (London: Methuen, 1969), and *Dream of Commonwealth, 1921-1942* (London: Macmillan, 1989).
23. Corelli Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), *The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation* (London: Macmillan, 1986), *The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities, 1945-1950* (London: Macmillan, 1995), and *The Verdict of Peace: Britain between her Past and her Future* (London: Macmillan, 2001).
24. James Morris, *Heaven's Command: An Imperial Progress; Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire*, and *Farewell the Trumpets: An Imperial Retreat* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973, 1968 and 1978 respectively).
25. A. P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in British Power* (London: Macmillan, 1959), esp. 108 ff.

26. See R. W. Seton Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question* (London: Macmillan, 1935), C. C. Eldridge, *England's Mission: The Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880*, (London: Macmillan, 1973), esp. 234-255, and *Disraeli and the Rise of a New Imperialism* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996).
27. By training Koebner was a medievalist. He was forced to quit his position at the University of Breslau by the Nazi's. He held the Chair of Modern History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem from 1934 to 1955. He eventually gave his name to the "Richard Koebner Center for German History" at the University of Jerusalem.
28. In the (English) *Act of Supremacy*, of 1534, reference was made to "the imperial Crown of this realm."
29. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade" in *Economic History Review* Second Series 6 (1953): 1-15. These authors subsequently collaborated with Alice Denny to produce *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent* (London: Macmillan / New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961). See also their "The Partition of Africa," in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Volume xi, ed. F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962): 593-640.
30. The classic discussion is by Robert Livingston Schuyler, *The Fall of the Old Colonial System: A Study in British Free Trade, 1770-1870* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945). For the British Empire after Yorktown, the magisterial work remains that of Vincent T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793* (London: Longmans, Green, 2 vols, 1952, 1964). See also Bernard Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy and the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism, 1750-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) and *The Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
31. John Robert Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, London: Macmillan, 1883, 1. On the man and his book, see Deborah Wormell, *Sir John Seeley and the Uses of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), esp. at 93-99 and 154 ff. An argument against any view of Australia being settled in a "fit of absence of mind" has been presented by Alan Atkinson in *The Europeans in Australia*, Vol. i, *The Beginning* (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1997). The "absence of mind" notion has proved to be remarkably enduring. See Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire Society and Culture in Great Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
32. Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *op cit*, 1, 7-10. The term "informal empire," as the writers note, (at 1 n. 1) was used by C. R. Fay in the *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, vol. ii (Cambridge University Press, 1940), at 399. See also, H. S. Ferns, "Britain's Informal Empire in Argentina, 1806-1914," *Past and Present* 4 (1953), 60-75, and "Britain's Informal Empire in Uruguay during the Nineteenth Century," *Past and Present* 73 (1976), 100-126.
33. Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *op cit*, 13-15
34. For example, see Oliver MacDonagh, "The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review* Second Series 14 (1962): 489- 501, esp. 489, n. 1, and 500-1.
35. D. K. Fieldhouse, "Imperialism?: An Historical Revision," *The Economic History Review* Second Series 14 (1961): 187-209, esp. at 196-7, 200 and 208-9.
36. D. C. M. Platt, *Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914* (Oxford University Press, 1968), *Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914* (London: Macmillan, 1972), and *Britain's Investments Overseas on the Eve of the First World War* (London: Macmillan, 1986). The relevant articles include "Economic Factors in British Policy during the 'New Imperialism,'" *Past and Present* 39 (1968): 120-138; "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations," *Economic History Review* Second Series 21 (1968): 296-306; and "Further Objections to an Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review* Second Series 26 (1973): 77-91.
37. Peter J. Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins, "Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas," in *Economic History Review* Second Series 39 (1986): 501-525 and 40 (1987): 1-26; *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914* (London: Longman, 1993), esp. 141 ff., and *British Imperialism, 1688-2000* (London: Longman 2001). See also the discussions in *Gentlemanly Capitalism and the British Empire: The New Debate on Empire*, as edited by Raymond E. Dumet (London: Longman, 1999). For the response of D. K. Fieldhouse, see his "Gentlemen, Capitalists, and the British Empire," in *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22 (1994): 531-541.
38. See also Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, *Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
39. Niall Ferguson, "Public Finance and National Security: The Domestic Origins of the First World War Revisited," in *Past and Present* 142 (1994): 141-168, which should be read in the wake of his earlier review essay, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War: New Perspectives," in *Historical Journal* 35 (1992): 725-752. The big work is *The Pity of War: Explaining World War I* (London: Allen Lane / New York: Basic Books, 1998). In this context note esp. xxxvii-xl, and 51-104. See also Ferguson's "The Kaiser's European Union: What if Britain had 'stood aside' in August

- 1914?" in *Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals*, ed. Ferguson (London: Picador, 1997), 228-280.
40. Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (London: Allen Lane 2002 / New York: Basic Books, 2003); note esp. xxii-xxix.
 41. Niall Ferguson, "Sinking Globalization," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (2005), 64-77, esp. 66-69.
 42. Niall Ferguson, *Empire*, op cit, 367 ff.
 43. Strong arguments can be formulated to support the assertion that the British Empire was among the least oppressive in global history, but it was also capable of injustice and tyranny even towards the very end. See, for example, Vytautas B. Bandjunis, *Diego Garcia: Creation of the Indian Ocean Base* (Writer's Showcase Press, 2001), and Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).
 44. Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), esp. 6-13, 65-69, 201-225 and 290-295.
 45. William Miller, *A New History of the United States*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1958), 325-6, 334-335. See also Walter La Feber, *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 129-182, esp. 178-181. The Spanish-American war was pivotal: see Ernest R. May, *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1961).
 46. As early as 1960, in England, the Historical Association published a booklet, by R. W. Van Alstyne, entitled *The American Empire: Its Historical Pattern and Evolution*.
 47. Bernard Porter, *Empire and Super Empire: Britain, America and the World* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2006), esp. 93-133.
 48. See the discussion of "full spectrum dominance" offered by Andrew J. Bacevich in *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 117 ff., cf. the conclusion on "War for Imperium" at 225 ff. This author is clear that "America today is Rome" at 244.
 49. The origins of the modern Anglo-American style limited liability corporation lie in the (British) Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, as amended and developed by the Limited Liability Act of 1855. In the next decade or so, comparable changes were made to French and Belgian as well as to American state laws.
 50. For a castigation of Treasury policy in post-war Great Britain, see Sidney Pollard, *The Wasting of the British Economy: British Economic Policy 1945 to the Present* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), esp. 71 ff.
 51. See the argument presented by Martin J. Wiener, *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. 81-154.
 52. An almost forgotten literature points us in this direction, e.g., William Thomas Stead, *The Americanization of the World, or the Trend of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Marckley, 1901); Christopher Furness, *The American Invasion* (London: Simkin Marshall, 1902), F. A. Mackenzie, *The American Invaders* (London: Grant Richards, 1902), Ludwell Denny, *America Conquers Britain: A Record of Economic War* (New York: Knopf, 1930), and in the crucial year: Henry Luce, *The American Century* (New York: Time, 1941).
 53. See Donald Read, *Cobden and Bright: A Victorian Political Partnership* (London: Edward Arnold, 1967). Cf. George Bennett (ed.), *The Concept of Empire: Burke to Atlee, 1774-1947*, op cit., 165-175.
 54. This product was first marketed by the Gillette Safety Razor Company in 1903.
 55. For some fascinating insights, see Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through 20th-Century Europe*. For an even more recent study see Michael Adas, *Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005 and 2006 respectively).
 56. See the discussion offered by William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric in *America's Inadvertent Empire* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), esp. at 36-63. Note how the reference to inadvertency alludes to Seeley's sense of British imperial expansion.
 57. Speech to a joint session of Congress by (the first) President Bush, entitled "Toward a New World Order," September 11, 1990.
 58. See the discussion offered by Charles S. Maier, in *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), esp. 24-77 and 191-284.
 59. This expression was used on more than one occasion by Madeleine Albright, former U.S. Secretary of State (1997-2001) and onetime U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (1993-97).
 60. For a Christian contribution see the papers edited by Peter Heslam in *Globalization and the Good* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), esp. the contributions by Ann Pettifor, Michael Schluter and Timothy Gorringer at 52-91. See also Heslam's *Globalization: Unraveling the New Capitalism* (Cambridge: Grove, revised ed., 2004). For more fully developed reflections, see *God and Globalization*, vol. i: *Religion and the Powers of the Common Life*, ed. Max L. Stackhouse and Peter J. Paris; *God and Globalization*, vol. ii: *The Spirit and the*

- Modern Authorities*, ed. Max L. Stackhouse and Don S. Browning; and *God and Globalization*, Vol. iii: *Christ and the Dominions of Civilization*, ed. Max L. Stackhouse and Diane B. Obenchain (all Harrisburg PA: Trinity Press International, 2000, 2001, and 2002 respectively). A further volume is anticipated.
61. Bernard Zylstra, "Modernity and the American Empire," in *International Reformed Bulletin* numbers 68/69 (1977): 3-19.
 62. Cf. Bob Goudzwaard, *Aid for the Overdeveloped West* (Toronto: Wedge, 1975); *Capitalism and Progress: A Diagnosis of Western Society* (Toronto: Wedge, 1979); "Norms for the International Economic Order" (with John van Baars) in *Justice in the International Economic Order* (Grand Rapids MI: Calvin College, 1980), 223-253; *Idols of our Time* (Downers Grove IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1984); (with Harry de Lange) *Beyond Poverty and Affluence: Toward an Economy of Care* (Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1995); and *Globalization and the Kingdom of God* (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Books, 2001). At the time of writing, a further study, *Hope in Troubled Times: A New Vision for Confronting Global Crises*, is forthcoming.
 63. See the very perceptive discussion by Brian Stanley, "Commerce and Christianity: Providence Theory, The Missionary Movement, and the Imperialism of Free Trade, 1842-1860," in *Historical Journal* 26 (1983): 71-94. See also the more recent essays collected in *Christian Missions and the Enlightenment*, ed. Brian Stanley; *The Imperial Horizons of British Protestant Missions, 1880-1914*, ed. Andrew Porter; and *Missions, Nationalism, and the End of Empire*, ed. Brian Stanley (all Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2001, 2003, and 2004 respectively).
 64. It was Livingstone's destiny to become a revered symbol of the nineteenth-century British Empire in Africa. The literature on Livingstone is heavy with evangelical hagiography, but for some shrewd discussion of the context and content of the *profoundly anti-slavery* formula— "Christianity, commerce and civilization"—see Andrew C. Ross, *David Livingstone: Mission and Empire* (London: The Hambledon Press, 2002), esp. 24-25, 117-123 and 239-244.
 65. Richard Horsley, *Jesus and Empire: The Kingdom of God and the New World Disorder* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), esp. 129-149. See also the papers edited by Horsley, in *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997).
 66. N. T. Wright, *What Saint Paul Really Said: Was Paul of Tarsus the Real Founder of Christianity?* (Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1997), 88; "Paul's Gospel and Caesar's Empire," in *Paul and Politics*, ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg PA: Trinity Press international, 2000), 160-183; and *Paul in Fresh Perspective* (Minneapolis MN: Fortress Press, 2005), 59-79.
 67. Acts 16: 37-39; 22: 22-29.
 68. Acts 19: 25-28; Revelation 18: 11-19.
 69. Cf. Bob Goudzwaard, *Globalization and the Kingdom of God*, op cit, 19-22. Our word "hegemony," by contrast, is derived from the Greek *hegemonia*, which implies dominance enforced on possibly reluctant subjects. The "hegemon" is the dominant party in such a relationship.
 70. Friedrich Heer, *The Holy Roman Empire*, op cit, 160-175.
 71. The notion survives even in the age of the internet. See "The Sun Never Set on the British Empire / Dominion over Palm and Pine," at <http://www.fresian.com/british.htm>
 72. Niall Ferguson, "Empires with Expiration Dates," *Foreign Policy* (September / October 2006): 1 ff.
 73. See "Our World Belongs to God: A Contemporary Testimony," in the *Psalter Hymnal of the Christian Reformed Church* 4th ed. (Grand Rapids MI: CRC Publications, 1987), 1019-1038.